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What do community interpreting for the Deaf in western societies, conference
interpreting for the European Parliament, and language brokering in international
management have in common? Academic research and professional training have
historically emphasized the linguistic and cognitive challenges of interpreting, neglecting
or ignoring the social aspects that structure communication. All forms of interpreting are
inherently social; they involve relationships among at least three people and two
languages. The contexts explored here, American Sign Language/English interpreting
and spoken language interpreting within the European Parliament, show that
simultaneous interpreting involves attitudes, norms and values about intercultural
communication that overemphasize information and discount cultural identity.
The default mode of interpreting shows a desire for speed that suppresses
differences requiring cultural mediation. It is theorized this imbalance stems from the
invention and implementation of simultaneous interpreting within a highly charged
historical moment that was steeped in trauma. Interpreting as a professional practice
developed in keeping with technological capacities and historical contingencies
accompanying processes of industrialization and modernity. The resulting expectations

ix

about what interpreting can and cannot achieve play out in microsocial group dynamics
(as inequality) and macrosocial policy (legalized injustice).
Interpreting invites an encounter with difference: foreignization is embedded
within the experience of participating in simultaneous interpretation because interpreting
disrupts the accustomed flow of consciousness, forcing participants to adapt (or resist
adapting) to an alternate rhythm of turn-taking. This results in an unusual awareness of
time. Discomforts associated with heightened time-consciousness open possibilities for
deep learning and new kinds of relationships among people, ideas, and problem-setting.
An analysis of the frustrations of users (interpretees) and practitioners
(interpreters) suggests the need for other remedies than complete domestication.
Reframing training for interpreters, and cultivating skillful and strategic participation by
interpretees, could be leveraged systematically to improve social equality and reduce
intercultural tensions through a balanced emphasis on sharing understanding and creating
mutually-relevant meanings. This comparative cultural and critical discourse analysis
enables an action research/action learning hypothesis aimed at intercultural social
resilience: social control of diversity can be calibrated and contained through rituals of
participation in special practices of simultaneously-interpreted communication.
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CHAPTER 1
INTERPRETING

Why is participating in interpreted communication so challenging? The backdrop
for the study is the researcher’s career development as an American Sign Language
(ASL)/English interpreter beginning in the late 1980s. In the first formal phase of
research, seventy interpreters for the EP were interviewed about their experiences
interpreting for Members of the EP. In the second phase, fifty-five Members of the
European Parliament were interviewed about their experiences with interpreting in the
EP.1 In both these phases, participant-observation was also conducted. Reflections on the
researcher’s professional career as an interpreter for the Deaf occurred in parallel,
involving academic literature, participant-observation and action research. Intended as a
social justice intervention, this dissertation poses simultaneous interpretation as a special
practice of intercultural communication with ritual elements implicating identities and
relationships that are as important for society as the linguistic transfer of information.

1.1

Culture as Communication (Communication as Culture)
James W. Carey, an American communication theorist, summarizes the two

complementary aspects of all communication processes: the ritual aspect existing in time,
and the transmission aspect that operates in space (1992). Further, Carey explains how

1

Nearly seventy Members of the European Parliament participated in these
conversational interviews. A back-up glitch resulted in the loss of half the hard data.
Field notes from those interviews are consistent with the findings gleaned from the
corpus of transcribed interviews.
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culture is generated by the performance of rituals through time, and how control of
culture is exercised through the transmission of information across space. This research
about simultaneous interpretation illustrates how rituals of talk about interpreting (in live
discourses as well as in academic literature) emphasize mainly the transmission aspects
of the communication process. This one-sided emphasis generates an ideologicallydelimited culture that manifests in particular types of being (roughly, a kind of identity)
and a privileged manner for doing interpreted communication. In particular, the routine
behaviors normalized by discourses about interpreted interaction play out in the actual
relationships among-and-between people of similar and different identities.
A discursive emphasis on transmission of information reflects predominant values
about knowledge, technology and economy, and also contributes to how people orient to
the experience of time and thus of social interaction. At a macrosocial level, the evolution
of the field of professional simultaneous interpretation offers an example of the social
construction of technology with specific and particular effects on individual identities as
well as the capacity of individuals to create and maintain relationships both within and
across cultural difference. The European Parliament is a site of production for a language
ideology about simultaneous interpretation: linking microsocial features of the discourse
about SI in the EP with microsocial features of Deaf discourse about SI brings into view
the generation of social inequality through “the same linguistic signs or discourse
practices… indexically linked by speakers to more than one group, at varying degrees of
abstraction and inclusion, and at multiple sites of use and levels of awareness”
(Kroskrity, 2000, p. 28). Such micro-macro linking also brings into view the converse,
the action research hypothesis undergirding this dissertation: social equality.

2

The perspective gleaned from how simultaneous interpretation was originally
conceived and operationalized can be cynical or optimistic. The current values and rituals
that associate interpreting only with information transfer reinforce a hierarchical and
ideological status for functional linguistics by locating meaning ‘in’ language’s linguistic
structures rather than representing meaning as the outcome of language use in social
interaction. This entrenched linguistic paradigm in the field of interpreting contributes to
maintaining a particular social co-construction of a timespace (technically, a chronotope) in
which, for instance, the dominant culture of “Hearing people” maintains status, privilege,
and access to resources that Deaf people are still usually denied. In contrast, the related
field of literary translation studies has escaped the narrow functional linguistic paradigm
and developed very sophisticated ideas about language as a field of equality where authors
and characters from minority and oppressed groups can ‘talk back’ to privileged characters
and majority language audiences (e.g., Gentzler, 2001; Tymoczko, 2007, 2010; Venuti,
1998). In other words, translation studies has moved beyond linguistics, per se, to
emphasize the interplay of language use among alert interpretees. This dissertation research
investigates why interpreting studies has been so stagnant in comparison, especially since
simultaneous interpretation as a professional practice was formalized a couple of decades
before literary translation began to establish academic credibility.

1.2

Consciousness
The disparate development of interpreting studies and translation studies

necessarily draws attention to aspects of consciousness. Situating myself as a researcherpractitioner involves acknowledging that participant-observation dates from my
introduction to the Deafworld in 1988, even though (at the time) I did not have the
3

academic framing to provide such labels or comprehend that I was already doing some
version of action research. The ‘80s was a time of tremendous upheaval in the profession
of ASL/English interpretation and in the overall empowerment of Deaf people. For
instance, the famous “Deaf President Now” uprising occurred at Gallaudet College in
1988, an historical peak in a cultural movement against the pathological view that
disables and medicalizes deafness. Jankowski (2002) describes the rhetorical moment of
Deaf President Now in Deaf Empowerment: “If the predominately hearing Congress and
media could understand and endorse the rationale for the protest, then the conflict was
between the protesters and the paternalistic plantation owners, rather than between Deaf
and hearing people” (p. 125).
The Deaf President Now historical moment in post-secondary education
accompanied a pedagogical movement in elementary and secondary education at
residential schools for the Deaf that was insisting on equality between the languages of
(written) English and (visual-gestural) American Sign Language. The BilingualBicultural (Bi-Bi) pedagogy sprang from Deaf activism at The Learning Center for Deaf
Children in Massachusetts and the Indiana School for the Deaf and, notably, incorporated
many non-deaf “hearing” allies (e.g., Mahshie, 1995). The ally concept became
prominent in sign language simultaneous interpretation as an outcome of heated struggle
since the 1970s regarding the disenfranchisement of the American Deaf community from
the (US) national professional organization they had been instrumental in creating in the
1960s (e.g., Fant, 1990).
In 1986, Baker-Shenk published an article on “oppressor characteristics” targeted
at the “hearing heritage” (p. 44) of (most) sign language interpreters, introducing
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processes of stigmatization (Goffman, 1963) based on assuming the audiological function
of hearing as the standard way of being human and drawing other parallels with
stereotyping based on ethnocentric assumptions of superiority. She concludes:
We need more creative alternatives than the pendulum swing from
interpreter paternalism to interpreter machine offers. We need a more
humane model which is sensitive to the socio-political realities of the deaf
community—which neither exploits those realities (paternalism model)
nor ignores them (machine model). (Baker-Shenk, 1986, p. 53)
This is the first mention, in print, of the machine model. It arose from her observation of
“the theme of ‘interpreter control’ occur[ing] again and again…suggest[ing] the presence
of paternalism and a pejorative view of deaf people shown in a lack of respect for their
language and linguistic rights” (p. 52)
Baker-Shenk’s article followed on the heels of the refusal in 1983 of the national
organization, the Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf (RID), to recognize ASL as an
official language, a vote which occurred at the tail end of a raging controversy about the
certification of oral interpreters (who do not use ASL but are trained in making spoken
English visible on the lips). Fant explains, “Oral interpretation was far less an issue about
needed services than it was one of who decided what” (1990, p. 37). The power struggle
in RID continued through the 1990s with an offshoot series of Allies conferences (mainly
in New England, which is RID’s Region 1, e.g., Kent, 2007) and the competitive
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development of an interpreter credential by the National Association of the Deaf.2 During
the late 1990s and 2000s, RID embarked on a strategic course of reconciliation,
eventually establishing a Deaf Advisory Council, a permanent Board position for a Deaf
Member-at-Large and hiring a Deaf Executive Director for only the third time in the halfcentury since its founding.3
This brief chronology touches a few highlights of the American Deaf
community’s journey to voice. Voice is a sociolinguistic concept regarding the
achievement of a desired uptake of communication (Blommaert, 2005). Voice is,
therefore, a central concern of everyone involved in simultaneously-interpreted
communication. One reason to highlight the Deaf voice here is as an example of the
collective development of discursive consciousness. Giddens (1979) described the
difference between “practical consciousness, as tacit stocks of knowledge which actors
draw upon in the constitution of social activity, and … ‘discursive consciousness’,
involving knowledge which actors are able to express on the level of discourse” (p. 5).
Giddens explains that the transition of practical consciousness to discursive
consciousness occurs through reflection, and may involve a period of collective struggle.

2

“MY understanding of RID and NAD [National Association of the Deaf] and NIC
[National Interpreter Certification] is that Marcella M Meyer, founder of GLAD
(Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness) back in the 80's had an issue with RID
certifying interpreters and the membership issue, feeling like there was a monopoly
within RID. She went toe to toe with them and signed a ‘lease’ with NAD to certify
interpreters. When that ‘lease’ expired, NAD and RID combined and then became
NIC. You can google Marcella Meyer or GLAD and look at her tribute page, and see
if you can glean more info. At least that's how I remember it.” Connie Schultz,
Facebook email, April 20, 2013 [personal correspondence].

3

“Shane H. Feldman, M.S., CAE was named the new Executive Director by the RID
Board of Directors on November 29, 2012” (RID Views, p. 25 Winter 2013).
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For the Deaf community in the United States, the Registry of Interpreters for the
Deaf provided a focal point for concentrating the collective struggle from indigenous tacit
knowledge of ‘how to be Deaf’ to the discursive knowledge necessary for training others
in the Deaf Way. W.E.B. Dubois’ (1903/1979) concept of double consciousness is also
implicated by Deaf people telling non-deaf/hearing interpreters about aspects of privilege
and dominance that hearing interpreters may be unable (or unwilling) to perceive. During
the 1980s and 1990s, sign language interpreters were constantly challenged to create
conditions for the performance of Deaf identity and Deaf cultural values during
interpreted communication. Empowerment was practically a daily topic of conversation
within the profession (especially at residential schools for the Deaf); however at that time
the remedies were unclear and even a bit mysterious.

1.2.1

The Machine Model of Interpreting
Du Bois described double consciousness as “a peculiar sensation…this sense of

always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others” (1903/1994, p. 45). The
experience Du Bois describes of the American Negro’s hyper-awareness of whites
looking down from a (supposedly) superior stance parallels some descriptions of
Deafhood. “Hell, it’s our world too!” exclaims Ben Bahan (1989, p. 47), asking
pointedly, “What right do hearing people have to impose on us the dominance of their
world?” Bahan’s indignation was aroused (in one instance) by a waitress at a roadside
diner whose routine assumption that he should learn to verbalize English illustrates the
legacy of how hearing people exert control, both historically as well as in the present.
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For instance, hearing people control language and educational policies,4 provide
or fail to provide communication accessibility,5 and promote medical interventions.6
Some of these attitudes of privilege and its accompanying exercise of power have been
conceptualized as audism (attributed to Humphries, 1975;7 Lane, 1992) and oralism
(Ladd, 2003). It turns out that ASL/English interpreters are very often carriers of these
oppressive attitudes (e.g., McDermid, 2009), sometimes even despite being aware of their
adverse effects.

4

The 1880 ban on signed languages from the Milan conference initiated a century of
severe linguistic repression (Gannon, 1981). In the US, the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 opened a crack for the re-emergence of ASL in residential schools for the Deaf.
Later, the 1990 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (1990) re-emphasized the
rights of individuals with legally-defined disabilities.

5

The Americans with Disabilities Act, as amended 2008; The Robert T. Stafford Act;
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; The Fair Housing Act; Architectural
Barriers Act; Individuals with Disabilities Education Act; Olmstead; and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 are all supposed to guarantee communication
accessibility for the culturally Deaf as well as for people who lose their hearing due
to aging or accident.

6

Cochlear implants were originally understood by the culturally Deaf as a form of
medical genocide, in which the will of hearing people to force Deaf people to
communicate via speech and sound overrides the equally natural capacity to
communicate via manual gestures and sight. Now, after hundreds of thousands of
children have already received implants and grown up with varying degrees of
integration in the “Hearing” world, Deaf communities embrace people with implants
while still questioning the morality of the medical practice.

7

“According to an article in Capital D Magazine (vol. 1, issue 1) (now apparently
defunct), Tom Humphries invented the word "audism" in 1975 to mean an attitude
that people who hear and speak, or have good English are superior. This applies
whether the person who hears and speaks is deaf or hearing. I remember that when I
was in my early teens, I liked a deaf girl who was strong ASL, but someone else
(hearing) put down the girl because she was strong ASL and weak in English.”
(Berke, 2011).
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It was the overwhelming evidence of oralist and audist attitudes that originally
inspired Baker-Shenk to write about the machine model of interpreting as a problem of
interpreter ethics (1986, 1992). The Deaf community agreed, adopting the term and
extending the machine model criticism to the inadequate ASL fluency of many
interpreters who were supposedly qualified (or at least allowed to work as if they were).
“Let me clarify my use of the term ‘machine’ model,” writes Baker-Shenk seven years
after introducing it. “I first used this term at the 1985 RID Convention...since then, it has
been used in a different way, specifically referring to the linguistic process of word-forsign or sign-for-word, machine-like transliteration” (1992, p. 123). Transliteration tends
to ignore grammatical differences between ASL and English, imposing an English
structure by attributing a one-to-one correspondence of meaning between English words
and ASL signs. Sign choices are biased toward a preferred or most common English
definition regardless of the semantic range of the sign in American Sign Language
(ASL). The mechanical quality experienced by Deaf people watching transliterations is
based on a disconnect between the interpreter’s semantic production and the customary
flow of communication among equally fluent users of ASL (e.g., Kannapell, 1989).
This amalgamation in Deaf criticism of signed language interpreters as
performance machines is curious: it reveals a tangle of linguistics and social interaction.
Unethical interpreter behavior accompanies linguistic misproduction and vice-versa. In
other words, the focus of critique on interpreters’ linguistic renderings (which need to be
fluent in order to transfer information), implicates the dimension of social interaction,
because how one handles the ambiguities of meaning influences the identities and
relationships of interpretees with each other and with interpreters (following Turner

9

2007).8 What the Deaf naming of the machine model of simultaneous interpretation
accomplishes is to challenge the norms of social interaction in this special kind of
intercultural communication, while also questioning the standards for linguistic
production.
Baker-Shenk explains her original use of “the term ‘machine’ model ... was to
describe the interpreter’s role...functioning...ethically...as machines. This machine model
clearly reveals the basic tendencies of people in power (the dominant class) both to deny
the reality of their power and to deny that power is part of what’s going on in every
situation” (emphasis in original, 1992, p. 123-124). One purpose of this dissertation is to
extend the Deaf voice beyond the professionally-defined interpreter’s role9 to encompass
the ethical behavior of the other interpretees as well, namely the hearing people involved
in the intercultural interaction.
It may seem obvious that the signed language interpreter was never operating
alone, that they/we are aided and abetted (one could say) by the culture shared with the
hearing interpretees who are involved in each and every interpreted communication. The
point is to stretch the scope of social interaction beyond the dyadic unit of an interpreter
and a single interpretee (whether the source or the receiver) to a group-level view
8

The term in traditional usage is interlocutor. I follow Turner’s (2007) lead in
preferring the label of interpretee because it clarifies the relative positions of all
participants within the scene of interpreted communication, without obscuring the
reality that interpreters are also sometimes interlocutors, that is, “someone who takes
part in a dialogue or conversation” (Oxford Dictionary online, retrieved 26 March
2014).

9

The idea of an interpreter functioning in an isolated, discrete or invisible role was
first challenged in theoretical terms by sign language interpreting researchers
Cynthia Roy (1989, 1993, 2000) and Melanie Metzger (1995, 1999) and then by
spoken language interpreting researcher Claudia Angelelli (2001, 2003).
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encompassing all of the participants in the interpreted interaction. This move is
theoretically necessary for interpreting studies to move beyond the functional linguistic
paradigm. Paradigm growth may also signal a further stage in Deaf empowerment by
supporting the continued evolution of Deafhood-centered agency through the exercise of
Deaf voice that is enhanced by interpretation rather than diminished by it.
Developing voice and agency within a field of linguistic equality measured by the
quality of social interaction during interpreted communication is conjecture.10 For now,
the practical move is to cultivate discursive consciousness and elicit increased
responsibility among interpretees for noticing and engaging proactively with the
dynamics of simultaneous interpretation (SI). There will be mistakes that are not noticed
(such as also always occur in same language communication). But often there are nonverbal cues and other behavioral indicators (such as deviations from the patterns of social
interaction or responses that are unexpected or non-sensible in the context) which could
be acted upon by an alert and conscientious interpretee. Not following up on cues that are
noticed replicates and reifies social inequality.

1.2.2

Interpreting Makes Timespace Apparent
There is a lot going on during simultaneous interpretation. Immersion into ASL

and the Deafworld provides a macrosocial backdrop for some of the microsocial
dynamics that repeatedly play out during interpreted interaction. I was an English
monolingual when I had my first significant encounter with simultaneous interpretation

10

“Fields of equality” are a theoretical construct from economist Amartya Sen (1992).
The notion of a linguistic field of equality constructed through skillful and strategic
use of simultaneous interpretation is one of the contributions of this dissertation.
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in 1989.11 I had joined an activist lesbian group and became intrigued that non-deaf
“hearing” members of our political initiative seemed incapable of following the simple
instructions for using an interpreter. Two deaf lesbians involved with the group were
willing to scribble English with me on notepaper or napkins; sometimes we were lucky
and allowed to grab a few minutes of a professional interpreter’s downtime. To my
surprise, I started to recognize vocabulary and was soon able to remember many signs
well enough to begin to express some of my own ideas. Without hesitation I sought to
learn American Sign Language well.
Although I did not set out to become a professional ASL/English interpreter,
training opportunities and encouragement from friends and colleagues at the Indiana
School for the Deaf drew me along that career path. Twenty-three years later I find
myself still fascinated by the challenges of simultaneous interpreting and thrilled by its
fringe benefits; especially the regular exposure to new places, diverse peoples, novel
ideas, and alternate ways of being. This background is important because it shapes how I
approached research into the system of spoken language simultaneous interpretation at
the European Parliament in 2005 and again in 2008-2009.12
Being an interpreter provides an odd vantage point because interpreters are,
according to convention, ‘not supposed to be there.’ In my own professional work and as

11

Junior high school classes in Spanish did provide me some exposure but I have, to
date, not pursued fluency and can barely handle rudimentary conversation.

12

The 2008-2009 trip was funded by a Fulbright scholarship. The 2005 trip was
sponsored through the Anthropology Department’s European Field Studies Program
and jointly funded by the Anthropology Department, Communication Department,
and the School of Behavioral and Social Science at the University of Massachusetts
Amherst.
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a researcher, I have continued to observe interpretees being unable to use the interpreting
process well. Over the years, I have come to understand that a major reason is this norm
of pretending the interpreter is invisible. This seems particularly true for hearing people
communicating with the Deaf: it is quite common to observe hearing people
misunderstanding and misusing the interpreting process, sometimes even despite their
supposed or professed familiarity with simultaneous interpretation.
Specifically, many non-deaf, non-signing people (who are grouped together as
“Hearing People” from the Deaf point-of-view because of our attachment to sound,
especially to auditory language) seem not to see visual-gestural language. That is, signing
does not always appear to register it in cognitive consciousness: all the physically
expressive motion of ASL does not appear to register in awareness as talking, that is, as
equivalent to the sound of a voice. Eventually, I also came to realize that Deaf people
frequently do not achieve the most that they could from this unique practice of
intercultural communication. These puzzles led to research questions regarding the
general conditions of interpreted communication: where did they originate? How are they
evaluated? Who is responsible for identifying and establishing the conditions required for
effective interpreted communication, and when, how, and by whom are these conditions
evaluated and adjusted when necessary?
Fieldwork with spoken language interpreting shows that many of the issues
flagged by Deaf criticism about simultaneous interpretation also appear in the discourses
about simultaneous interpretation (SI) at the European Parliament. There may be nuances
in the criticisms of interpreters and interpreting at the EP that depend somewhat upon the
language(s) in use, however the findings show that there is not much difference in the
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criticisms of SI in the EP from larger/more common languages and those of language
users from smaller/less common languages. It is interesting that such relative balance in
user-generated criticism of simultaneous interpreters does not hold between spoken
English and ASL.
Instead, most hearing users of signed/spoken language simultaneous interpretation
are remarkably uncritical. In contrast with the (hearing) users of spoken/spoken language
simultaneous interpretation in the European Parliament , if hearing interpretees say
anything about the sign language interpreting process, they tend to wax poetic in their
praise of the sign language interpreter and/or carry on about the beauty of the signed
language.13 Deaf users of simultaneous interpretation, however, regularly critique
ASL/English interpreters for failing to mediate the social interaction in such a way as to
enable them to remain culturally Deaf during the communication process. The
preservation of cultural characteristics and linguistic distinctions during interpreted
communication is actually discouraged at the European Parliament: such displays are
often understood as a kind of nationalism. A permanent official (in the Parliament’s civil
service) wryly commented, “Some people love their languages more than others” (F25).
Usually, cultural criticism by Deaf persons is aimed at linguistic dysfluency or a
specific action or inaction by the interpreter in relation to mediating the interpersonal
dynamics in a culturally satisfactory manner; often both. The point to be emphasized here
is that, while Deaf people are interested in the information exchange they are also
13

E.g., this glorifying attitude was glaringly evident in tweets about ASL/English
interpreter Lydia Callis interpreting for Mayor Bloomberg in New York City during
public emergency warnings in advance of Hurricane Sandy (October 2012), and
subsequently exaggerated by spoofs on Saturday Night Live and Jon Stewart’s Daily
Show.
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interested (sometimes even more so) in the cultural flow of the interaction, its structure of
feeling (Williams, 1977). A disconnect in perceptions between the Deaf viewpoint and
the perspective of many professional signed language interpreters (who, like me, tend to
believe that we do a very hard job as well as we can) is what initially focused my
researcher’s gaze. In the last few years, scholarship has begun to confirm that bringing
Deafhood (Ladd, 2003) into an interpreted interaction requires the interpreter’s
investment in ensuring mutual understanding (Adam, Carty, & Stone, 2011; Forestal,
2011; Kent, 2013; Stone, 2009). The intensity of Deaf concern over the loss or
suppression of culture during interpreted interaction led me to wonder about parallels and
contrasts in the European Parliament.
The challenge does seem to arise for the Deaf when the participants in
simultaneously-interpreted communication events, referred to in most literature as
interlocutors but labelled here interpretees, are taught to proceed to communicate with
each other as if the interpreter is not there. Not only does this fly in the face of the
obvious, but it builds a strong constraint against acknowledging the interpreter at all.
Deaf people can be very critical of the interpreter INTERRUPTING14 to ask for
clarification or repetition and can be angered when they perceive an interpreter TAKING
OVER (Kent 2004). These management behaviors of the interpreter by Deaf interpretees
occur in relation with other targets of Deaf criticism, which are contextualized by an
extensive history of prejudice and discrimination from Hearing People, including outright
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Written English glosses of semantically-rich ASL signs are usually represented by
ALL CAPS. Capital letters signify the English word that is most accurate to the
semantic meaning associated with an ASL sign in the given context of use.
Synonyms are possible.
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oppression (e.g., Gannon, 1991; Ladd, 2003; Moore & Levitan, 2003; Padden &
Humphries, 1988; Wilcox, 1989) and (what is perceived by many as) medical genocide.15
The fact that most interpreters, by definition, come from the majority Hearing culture
endows the matter of ‘ensuring mutual understanding’ among interpretees with layers of
complication. The expectation exists that interpreters should understand (automatically,
naturally); intentionally ignoring the interpreter is a norm that seems to make sense in
signed language interpretation just as it does in spoken language interpreting at the
European Parliament.

1.3

Origins of Simultaneous Interpretation
As noted above, Deaf people have been criticizing sign language interpreters’

disengagement from ensuring mutual understanding soon after the field began to
professionalize, gaining momentum in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Baker-Shenk, 1986,
1992). It turns out that the model of simultaneous interpretation adopted by sign language
interpreters is premised upon a system Peter Uiberall says was “crafted by trial and error
in an attic room of the Nuremberg Palace of Justice” (Gaiba, 1998, p. 13). An interpreter
who worked extensively during the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal, Uiberall was the first
interpreter to be cited regarding the implementation of the electronic technology that
made simultaneous interpretation possible. His comment refers explicitly to the human
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At its most basic, cochlear implants are justified by pathologizing deafness and
glorifying the sense of sound. Cochlear implants have had the effect of making
mainstreaming more possible through, in the United States, the idea of “the least
restrictive environment” (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, amended
2004). The result has been devastating to residential schools for the Deaf, which
provided the institutional container for the birth and development of American Deaf
Culture (e.g. Edwards, 2012).
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component required to complete the newly patented Filene-Finlay parallel processing
machinery in order to make it functional for immediate social interaction.
The historic context of the invention and use of the system of simultaneous
interpretation is detailed by Francesca Gaiba in The Origins of Simultaneous
Interpretation: The Nuremberg Trial:
There is much disagreement about the trial, concerning its raison d’être,
its fairness, its being or not “victors’ justice.” On one thing, however,
there is consensus: the trial would not have been possible without the
simultaneous interpretation into four languages. (p. 27)
Gaiba’s comprehensive overview of the invention and original use of simultaneous
interpretation begins to fill an enormous gap in scholarship about the Nuremberg Trial.
My task is to build from her description and present an argument about the extent, reach,
and consequences of that historic consensus. It remains widely celebrated that
simultaneous interpreting enabled the fair and equal participation of French, German,
Russian and English witnesses, judges, jurors, legal counsel and observers. In addition to
agreement about the necessity of simultaneous interpreting for the occasion of the
international war crimes tribunal, there was also unquestioned acceptance that the
interpreter’s function was just one among many of the invisible components of an
electronic machine. This dissertation explores and critiques the normative outcomes from
seventy years of implementing the system of simultaneous interpretation as it was
invented and validated at Nuremberg.
Today, the European Union is the world’s largest user of simultaneous
interpretation services. The system in use at the main EU institutions (the European
Commission, the European Court of Justice, the European Parliament) is directly
descended from the model championed at Nuremberg. The Members of the European
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Parliament (EP), elected from the official Member States of the European Union, are the
main users of the system of simultaneous interpretation in the EP. I had extensive
conversations and observations with a diverse, volunteer sample of fifty-five MEPs over
the course of one legislative year. I also spoke with permanent administrative and
technical support staff.16 These conversations complemented interviews with official
European Parliament Interpreters in 2005 (Kent, 2009).
Using techniques from the ethnography of communication and critical discourse
analysis, I sought to learn about the use of simultaneous interpretation in the European
Parliament (SI in the EP) as experienced and understood by its performers and
participants. I was immediately struck by similarities in patterns of talk. For one thing,
interpreters and users talking about SI in the EP expressed many similar sentiments about
interpreting as had been said by interpreters and users of SI during and about Nuremberg.
I will demonstrate that the continuity of assumptions about the values of simultaneous
interpretation, including what it is good for, and how to do it, have not changed from the
origins at the international war crimes tribunal in Nuremberg to its present-day
implementation in the European Parliament. These unquestioned values and assumptions
have extended problematically to everyday life, as evidenced by sign language
community interpreting for the Deaf. I also draw upon Mikhael M. Bakhtin’s (1981)
theoretical notion of chronotopes, the construction of a sense of time through the use of
language, as a means of thinking in practical terms about what geographer David Harvey
calls the postmodern condition, involving the collapse of time and space (1990). Modern
16

Some ninety people participated in these conversational interviews. A back-up glitch
resulted in the loss of half the hard data. Field notes from those interviews are
consistent with the findings gleaned from the corpus of transcribed interviews.

18

communication technology allows people in developed parts of the world to
communicate with others as if there is no geographical distance and without the
intervention of long periods of time waiting for responses. Sometimes this
communication access extends even into undeveloped and underdeveloped regions, too.
The historical development of the intercultural communication practice of
simultaneous interpretation illustrates how language, language use, and social interaction
create and co-create the human experience of time here-and-now: in post-structural postmodernity. Simultaneous interpretation is special in part because, as a unique mode of
intercultural communication, the active work of interpretation among people using
different languages brings relationships and the shared creation of meaning into view.
Identities and social status are explicitly present whenever simultaneous interpretation is
used. Skilled practitioners and users of SI in the EP use the interpretation process to alter
or maintain power dynamics. Commonalities of complaint about interpreting by two
different sets of users, the culturally Deaf and Members of the EP, direct attention to
critical problems with positioning the interpreter as a non-participant in interpreted
communication.

1.4

Points of Reference: Thinking in Time
The research method and logic of analysis is influenced by Neustadt and May’s

(1986) argument to politicians and policymakers to make effective use of history by
thinking in terms of timestreams.
In thinking of time as a stream, the preeminent challenge is to judge
whether change has happened, or is happening, or will. The imperative
need is to get that reasonably right. This mode of thought contributes to
the chances of doing so by continuously posing comparisons of present
with past and future. (p. 256-257)
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Tracing timestreams for making strategic decisions guides the organization of this
dissertation. Roughly, I take the situation as represented by discourses about interpreting
in the European Parliament during its Sixth Term (2004-2009) and trace chains-ofutterances (Bakhtin, 1981) through discourses about interpreting in the American Deaf
community to the modern invention of simultaneous interpreting at Nuremberg (19451946).
The patterns of talk about spoken language simultaneous interpretation that drew
my attention at the European Parliament were primed by exposure to patterns of talk that
had already captured my attention in signed language interpreting. The nascent intuition I
had was that interpreting makes time visible, and, by doing so, imbues communication
with an unusual sense of palpability, raising questions of control and meaning that are
usually passed over in everyday life.

1.4.1

Engineering
Interpreting has not previously been considered as an example of the social

construction of technology (Bijker, Hughes & Pinch; 1987; Bjiker, 1990). Simultaneous
interpretation emerged with the advent of electronic technology patented by Edward
Filene and a partner, Albert Finlay, and subsequently developed by IBM.17 An action
learning18 hypothesis of this dissertation is that discourses of translation, that is, any talk
and all texts in which the word “translation” is used when referring to simultaneous

17

Today, IBM promotes their involvement as “Pioneering Machine-Aided
Translation.” IBM 100 Icons of Progress. Retrieved 5 April 2013. http://www03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/translation/.

18

Action learning is described in more detail in chapter two.
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interpretation, represents the pluralingual communication processes of interpreted
interaction as a kind of mathematics or otherwise amenable to being coded according to a
rigid scheme. The generic idea of translation is to move something in space without
changing its properties.
The notion of translation depends upon the assumption that meaning is an
attribute of language that can be moved from one place in space (the source language or
person or both combined) to another place (the target language or person or both
combined) without alteration. Translation, in this commonsense view, requires a binary
source-target dichotomy that necessarily eliminates other factors that bear, significantly,
upon the co-construction of shared meaning in real time. These basic assumptions of
translation underlie the functional linguistic paradigm that remains predominant in
interpreting studies. Evidence of this dominance in the professional practices of
interpreting occurs through frequent reference and built-in bias in favour of locating
meaning in the source producer/production, disregarding input filters of the receiving
target (whether conceptualized as the target language or as an embodied human being)
and considering only the immediate, local setting as the contextualizing environment.
The presumed fixity of meaning ‘in’ spontaneous source language utterances has not
been adequately deconstructed in regard to performances of simultaneous interpretation.
Nor has this bias been reframed as relevant to the participation of interpretees during
simultaneous interpretation.
When live, spontaneous interpretation among co-present human beings
communicating in real (synchronous) time is referred to as translation, the necessity of
interpretation is hidden because the intercultural aspects of the communicative interaction
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are de-selected. This is an example of what Burke (1966) calls a terministic screen,19
because the commonsense meaning of “translation” leans in favour of engineering
equations, rather than recognizing, say, cultural relativity. (For instance, an algebraic
“transposition, i.e., the shifting of the terms of an equation from one side to the other, as
for instance, the passing from 3X + 7 = 25 to 3X = 25-7” (Dantzig, 1930/2005, p. 80) is
assumed as akin to a notion of moving “a meaning” (usually expressed as “the meaning”)
from the “side” of one language to the “side” of another language. This analogy of a
simple equation may be the source for Hatim’s (2001) observation of “a tendency to use
linguistics as a scapegoat and as something to blame for the ills that have befallen us” (p.
xiv). Hatim is referring specifically to “the discourse” of the research agenda within
translation studies (p. xiv), a discourse that typically culminates in the conclusion that
“linguistics has all but failed us” (p. xv). This dissertation makes a likewise gesture: that
linguistics has ‘all but failed’ interpretation, too, while agreeing with Hatim, who
concedes linguistics can retain usefulness as long as it is comprehended as one approach
of many within a range of ways for interpretees and interpreters to collaborate in ensuring
mutual understanding.
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In Language as Symbolic Action, Kenneth Burke describes the “terministic screen”
in which diction (the choice of this or that word or phrasing) necessarily ‘selects’ an
emphasis or framing while ‘de-selecting’ other emphases and framings. “We must
use terministic screens, since we cannot say anything without the use of terms;
whatever terms we use, they necessarily constitute a corresponding kind of screen;
and any such screen necessarily directs the attention to one field rather than another”
(1966, p. 50). He continues: “Within that field, there can be different screens, each
with its ways of directing the attention and shaping the range of observations implicit
in the given terminology. All terminologies must implicitly or explicitly embody
choices between the principle of continuity and the principle of discontinuity” (p.
50). At stake during SI is whose continuity will be supported or dropped, and which
discontinuities will be tended to or ignored.
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The reality of influences on the cultural aspects of simultaneous interpretation is
more geometrical (one could say spherical) than linear algebra or the traditional versions
of functional linguistics allow. The research collected in this dissertation shows how the
accretion of discourse about interpreting has severely constrained the professional
performances of interpreters and interpretees, effecting the cultural practices of
participating in SI. This embedded engineering imagery may have inhibited the field of
Interpreting Studies from evolving in the more sophisticated ways demonstrated by theory
in literary translation, and kept interpretees, particularly those from linguistic minority
cultures, from reliably attaining achievements of voice. Perhaps the reticence of
interpreting scholars, trainers, and practitioners to engage the unforeseen consequences of
relying exclusively on linguistic models has also delayed translators from making more
progress on Bassnett and Levefre’s (1998) call for translators to study cultural interaction.

1.4.1.1

Prediction, Risk and Engineering Safety
Engineers require prediction in order to design appropriate controls that reduce

risk and uncertainty in order to maintain engineering safety (Petroski, 1992). Historically
and today, language is used as a tool for control over others. Historically, for instance, in
instituting nationalism (Anderson, 1992) and recently in the English Only movement in
the United States (e.g., Olson, 1991). Language is also used to enact resistance and
demonstrate opposition to being controlled (e.g., Sibii, 2003, 2006), and to promote or
argue against any social movement. Postcolonial scholarship in particular cases (i.e.,
bilingualism in North Africa, Mehrez, 1992) shows how to “transform plurilingualism
and translation into radical elements that defy compartmentalization and pre-existing
hierarchies by constantly moving and migrating” (Gentzler, 2001, p. 195). In other
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words, translation (which, from the point-of-view of their field, includes/subsumes
interpretation), is a means for generating conditions that enhance the possibility of
exercising voice (Blommaert, 2005), and may be a medium for creating linguistic fields
of equality in the capabilities approach called for by Amartya Sen (1992).
This dissertation’s findings illustrate how opportunities for voice-enhancing
creativity by interpreters during simultaneous interpretation are resisted by discourses
that equate interpreter agency with the loss of control by interpretees. These engineeringlike discourses are notable for their insistence on privileging the source language, yet also
for their adverse effects on the interpretees, whose assumptions about risk and
uncertainty are measured by how effectively the interpreter remains invisible. In other
words, making it seem as if no differences are present or operative during intercultural
interaction has been made more important than acknowledging differences and, therefore,
addressing them when needed.

1.4.2

Control
Control is fundamental to communication processes and social organizing:

culturally as well as institutionally. Simultaneous interpreting raises concerns about
control depending on the position, perspective, and disposition of social actors.
Understanding what can and cannot be controlled, and how to institute appropriate
controls in order to provide boundaries and limits for interpreting as an institutional
practice, are topics largely avoided by professional practitioners and researchers, with the
notable exception of Dean and Pollard’s (2001) Demand-Control Schema. DemandControl Schema (DC-S) is a ‘work analysis’ framework for signed language interpreters
that details a set of ‘controls’ that interpreters can use within the range of ‘demands’
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presented by interpretees. In this prescriptive model, the controls are ‘professional
practice skills’ to be exercised by the individual interpreter. DC-S has the capacity to deal
with larger system issues if interpretees and interpreters use it together to evaluate work
effectiveness and ethics. In this regard, DC-S provides a way to contextualize
institutional elements and intercultural factors organizing interpreted interactions.
Unlike most models of interpreting which focus exclusively on linguistic tasks (as
critiqued by Hatim, 2001; Gentzler, 2001; for an early example of a model for sign
language interpreters, see Ingram, 1974),20 the Demand-Control Schema acknowledges
the managerial functions of the interpreter’s task, outlining four demand categories
(environmental, interpersonal, paralinguistic, and intrapersonal) and three sets of control
opportunities (pre-, during, and post-assignment) (Dean & Pollard, 2013, pp. 5, 19). The
premises of DC-S originate in research and guidelines for occupational safety (Karasek,
1979). Concern with interpreter safety is a recent development;21 it is the opposite of the
focus of concern at Nuremberg, which was interpreter failure. Within the field of
engineering, risks of engineering failure are assessed by measures of engineering safety
(Petroski, 1992). The principle of engineering safety does not appear to have been
extended to the human beings who completed the circuitry of the IBM system which
produced the collapsed-time possibility of (so-called) “simultaneous” interpreting.

20

A collection of interpreting models for sign language interpreters is being collected
in a forthcoming volume, The Sign Language Interpreting Studies Reader, Roy &
Napier (Eds.).

21

Interpreter safety may have been a fleeting concern but Dean & Pollard’s DC-S
model quickly moved its focus onto the aspect of Karasak’s model involving work
effectiveness and work ethics (Robyn Dean, Facebook chat, 14 December 2012
[personal correspondence]). However the frequency of repetitive motion and overuse
injuries in the field is significant (e.g., Peper & Gibney, 1999).
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Balancing safety and the risks of failure is a management challenge. The
Directorate of Interpretation at the European Parliament is responsible for this function in
their administration of the language regime in the EP, which is commonly labelled
controlled multilingualism (Podesta, 2001a; 2001b; 2001c). The Registry of Interpreters
for the Deaf (RID) is responsible for this function in their administration of the
credentialing system for American Sign Language/English interpreters in the United
States; a responsibility now officially shared with the National Association of the Deaf
(NAD).22 There are substantive differences between these two types of organizations: the
EP is a direct employer of interpreters, while the RID is a professional association of
interpreters who are employed by unaffiliated private and governmental entities. RID is
challenged to work in partnership with Deaf advocacy organizations,23 the EP is

22

The National Interpreter Certification (NIC) was launched December 1, 2011. The
first performance report, jointly released by NAD and RID on February 20, 2014, is
available at http://www.nad.org/news/2014/2/nad-and-rid-release-performancereport (retrieved 27 March 2014). The report includes both a summary and the full
technical report of the certification test’s validity and reliability as well as candidate
performance results during the first testing cycle. The results of a 2002 Role
Delineation Study and a 2011 Job/Task Analysis Survey are included as supporting
documentation.

23

Along with the NAD, RID is a member of the Deaf and Hard of Hearing Consumer
Advocacy Network (DHHCAN), which includes the American Association of the
Deaf-Blind (AADB), American Deafness and Rehabilitation Association (ADARA),
American Society for Deaf Children (ASDC), Association of Late-Deafened Adults
(ALDA), Cerebral Palsy and Deaf Organization, Communication Service for the
Deaf (CSD), Conference of Educational Administrators of Schools and Programs for
the Deaf (CEASD), Deaf Seniors of America (DSA), Deaf and Hard of Hearing in
Government, Gallaudet University (GU), Gallaudet University Alumni Association
(GUAA), Hearing Loss Association of America, National Black Deaf Advocates
(NBDA), National Catholic Office of the Deaf (NCOD),Telecommunications for the
Deaf and Hard of Hearing (TDI), and the USA Deaf Sports Federation (USADSF).
RID’s Government Affairs Program (GAP) also works with the Deaf and Hard of
Hearing Alliance and the National Interpreter Association Coalition. (Source:
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structured to operate in tandem with other formal governing institutions of the European
Union. Hence, control is exercised by each organization with different sets of formal and
informal means. What the organizational structures have in common, however, is the
need to establish and maintain control of a communication process involving people from
different cultural backgrounds using different languages.
One of the moves in this dissertation is to treat the discourse of the research
agenda in interpreting studies as parallel with the commonsense discourse of users of SI
(the interpretees) and also with the common sense discourse of most trained practitioners
(the interpreters). Few members of these groups, it should be noted (including
interpreting researchers), are educated (as yet) about social theory in general, let alone
communication theory, cultural studies or postcolonial theory. The concept of “parallel
process” comes from a psychoanalytic tradition of group relations theory.24 Parallel
processes25 occur in “microcosm groups” composed by members of salient identity
groups and organization groups (Alderfer & Smith, 1982, p. 40). The notion as applied
here is that the salient members of discourses about interpreting, namely interpreters and
interpretees, include persons with a range of ascribed and achieved identity
characteristics. Achieved is used in the sociological sense of having acquired through life
24

Wilfred Bion worked on group relations in the United Kingdom after World War II,
at the same time as Kurt Lewin was developing his approach to group dynamics in
the United States. Bion’s contributions to psychoanalytic theory are summarized by
Bleandonu (1994).

25

In terms of the parallel process concept mentioned previously, what Deaf people are
telling community-style interpreters may be a similar message (with similar
problematic dynamics) that community interpreters are trying to tell conference
interpreters. Likewise, the Deaf discursive consciousness may have significance for
users of interpreting services who are experiencing conditions of linguistic inequality
despite the accommodation of SI.
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circumstances (things that befall a person by accident or chance, such as surviving an
accident or winning a lottery) or effort (undergoing training or being a parent). Achieved
identities (sometimes called status) are complemented with ascribed identity
characteristics, which in this case would include one’s native language as well as features
of gender, ethnicity, nationality and so forth). This essential heterogeneity is intrinsic to
these discourses; members are essentially diverse from each other. They can be
constituted as a group only by virtue of a shared cultural activity and practice; their
participation, interest and concerns with simultaneous interpretation.
In addition to the achieved characteristics salient to simultaneous interpretation
(e.g., researcher, interpreter, interpretee, trainer/teacher) there are also administrators,
professional association officers, referral agency personnel, even authors of fiction and
directors of film who represent interpreters and interpreting in particular ways.26 There
are also discourses that can be described on the basis of ascribed characteristics, such as
the Deaf who use signed languages, the influx of Eastern Europeans into the European
Parliament in 2005, majority language users such as English monolinguals, as well as
discourses based on nationality, gender and others. In general, these more particular
discourse strands are not teased out in detail, although features that suggest them are
present. This action research did not note particular relevance of traditional demographic
(ascribed) characteristics, and does not draw particular conclusions on the basis of
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Diriker (2004) names five meta-discourses about simultaneous interpretation:
general reference books, codes of ethics, professional organizations, academia, and
the media. The discourse analysed here does not fall neatly into one of these
categories: it is a discourse of practitioners and users/participants including elements
which could originate in one or more of Diriker’s meta-discourse categories.
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national boundaries per se. One rough division is noted between the so-called “old” and
“new” languages, as defined by the boundary of “the big bang enlargement” in 2004.27

1.4.2.1

Establishing a Reference Group
The popularity of Dean & Pollard’s (2001, 2013) Demand-Control Schema

suggests that control is very much on interpreters’ minds. However there is no research
on how interpreters themselves conceive of control, per se; the closest is a literature on
interpreter norms (eg., Chesterman, 2006; Diriker, 2004; Duflou, 2012; Gile, 1999;
Harris, 1990; Harris & Sherwood, 1978; Shlesinger, 1989b; Toury, 1995, 1999).28
Community and conference interpreters are the closest reference groups for each other,
despite all efforts to compartmentalize them.29 (Merton, 1957; Merton & Kitt, 1957)
Likewise, there is no research on the European Parliament’s administrators’ conceptions

27

As described by European Parliament Official Martin Wooding for a story in the
Shanghai Star, 30 October 2003.
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An example of a norm that could be understood as a control is provided by Diriker
(2004, p. 164). Diriker’s example from an academic conference is compared with
similar examples in the European Parliament by Duflou (2012): “… the interpreter
learnt to solve the problem of not being able to refer to herself as “I” when 'on mic'
(i.e. when the microphone is switched on and the interpreter is heard by the users) by
speaking about herself as 'the interpreter' in order to be able to correct a mistake
made earlier” (p. 152).

29

Reference group theory offers ways to understand processes of norming: “Informal
preparation for the roles to be performed in connection with future statuses tends to
have a distinct character…the individual responds to the cues in behavioral
situations, more or less unwittingly draws implications from these for future role
behavior, and thus becomes oriented toward a status he [or she, or ze] does not yet
occupy. Typically, he does not expressly codify the values and role-requirements he
is learning” (Merton, 1957, p. 385).
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of controlling interpretation processes,30 let alone the relationship between administrative
(i.e., managerial) control of interpreters and the control(s) available to interpreters during
work performances. As a thought experiment, extracting the practice and discourse of
control regarding simultaneous interpreting from these disparate institutional settings
allows comparison by analogy with control in another kind of institution.
Organization scholars (especially within schools for business management) have
generated a literature on control in organizations, especially in regard to for-profit
businesses where the effectiveness of control is measured by time and cost. Drawing on
Follett’s (1948) definition of control, Rayat (2011) explains how international business
managers construe control as “an exercise of power toward specific ends” (p. 4). First,
Rayat notes: “In organization studies, researchers have found that organizational
members in different countries tend to attribute different meanings to the same
organizational phenomena” (p. 9). Second, researchers “have found differences in both
practices of control and preferences for controls in different countries” at the
organizational, individual, inter-organization and intra-organizational levels (p. 8).
Therefore, “Control cannot be explained just in terms of systems, structures, or policies.
In order to understand how control works in organizations, we must attend to what
managers, as agents of control in organization, think of their task of control, and their
beliefs and values relating to control” (p. 14).

30

There is a series of articles justifying the design and implementation of “controlled
multilingualism” as the language regime for interpretation in the Parliament (Podesta
2001a, 2001b, 2001c). These are descriptive and rhetorical pieces offering
justifications for, not an analysis of, the conceptions of control upon which the
system is based. The argumentation is predominantly financial.

30

According to Rayat (2011), organizational researchers “agree that control is an
important function of management, yet they do not expound how the notion of control
fits into managers’ wider expectations, experiences and understanding of management”
(p. 2). This knowledge gap seems quite analogous to the absence of understanding of
control by interpreters and interpretees during interpreted interaction. When control in
organizations has been studied, the academic gaze has tended to emphasize the
perspective of those being controlled (i.e., employees), disregarding, for instance, “the
value attributions made by managers” (p. 2). Roughly, one can perceive a sense of ‘being
controlled’ in the discourse of Deaf consumers as they critique signed language
interpreters as well as by the Members of the EP who are consumers of its controlled
multilingualism interpreting regime. These broad strokes of commonality justify
considering managers of international business as a reference group for simultaneous
interpreters (and vice-versa, but that argument is not made here).

1.4.2.2

Disclaimer: Comparison Groups
Conference and community interpreters are presented as reference groups for each

other explicitly for the purposes of comparison and contrast with people talking about
(and performing) interpreting from other (non-professional) positions. Literature on
simultaneous interpretation typically segregates two types of SI, conference interpreting
and community interpreting, as if they have little in common. Signed Language
interpreting with the Deaf community is presented here as an exemplar of so-called
community interpreting, and interpreting with Members of the European Parliament is
presented here as the exemplar of so-called conference interpreting. Both are exemplars
of simultaneous interpreting (not consecutive interpreting, in which interpreters take
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notes and render interpretations in an explicit, non-overlapping, turn-taking sequence
with original speakers and intended receivers). The division between conference and
community interpreting has heretofore served as a convenient way to build discrete
bodies of knowledge within a high degree of shared boundary conditions (the institutional
setting, social class statuses of participants, legal requirements, etc.). However the
activities of interpreting, its performances, practices, and modes of cultural production,
are represented within this dissertation as more alike than dissimilar, despite the
traditionally-understood distinction. In this view, the boundary conditions used to
distinguish between community and conference styles of interpreting are superficial
characteristics that are exceeded by more fundamental shared characteristics and
outcomes of interpreted social interaction.31

1.4.3

Conference Interpreting : Community Interpreting
The institutional setting of interpreted events has been used to carve up the field

of SI practitioners in terms of resources and prestige. “Conference” interpreting is usually
posed in contrast with “community” interpreting, and conference interpreters have
generally received more training and more prestige than their counterparts working in the
everyday world of social services, public education, medical appointments, court cases,
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This assertion of essential similarity is the opposite of the conclusion drawn by
Angelelli (2000) when she applied Hymes’ taxonomy of speaking to compare a
community interpreting event with a conference interpreting event. “The analysis
suggests that there are more differences than similarities between the two settings”
(p. 580). She and I do agree that it is important to intervene in the “blind transfer” (p.
580) of conference interpreting standards to community interpreting, which is what
makes her emphasis on differences sensible.
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employment situations and emergency response.32 The terms of distinction are instructive
and a target for critique.
The conference interpreting style in the European Parliament is descended
directly from the Nuremberg precedent. It generally adheres to a translation ideal that
“historically…has valorized translations that measure up to some ideal by smoothing
over contradictions, and has ignored or dismissed those which do not seem to cohere.
Such a practice, in turn, affects that which gets produced” (Gentzler, 2001, p. 200).
Community-style interpreting has been indirectly influenced by the Nuremberg precedent
through the process of professionalization. To some extent, community SI has escaped
the full force of conference-style systemic constraints. Although struggle has been
necessary to mold this relative looseness33 in community SI to support a broader range of
voices during SI, this struggle (epitomized here by the American Deaf community’s
struggle from practical to discursive consciousness and then to voice) brings the double
constitution of language use and the social co-construction of reality into view.
Gentzler (2001) explains it like this:
In the act of reproducing the textual relations (of the original text), a
double constitution becomes quite lucid: the language restraints imposed
by the receiving culture are enormous, yet the possibility of creating new
relations in the present are also vivid - not just the old relations
transported to a new time and place, but also a myriad of signifying
32

The role of research in establishing the profession of community interpreting as a
distinct domain within Interpreting Studies is the subject of the 4th volume from the
triennial Critical Link international community interpreting conferences (Wadensjö,
Dimitrova & Nilsson, 2007), in particular the chapter, “Critical linking up: kinships
and convergence in interpreting studies” (Pöchhacker, 2007).
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Technically, “interpretive flexibility” (Kline & Pinch, 1996). This concept,
associated with the social construction of technology, will be described in chapter
six.

33

practices that both reinforce and alter present signifying practices. In fact,
the process of translation and the process of construction of our own
identities may be analogous: as translations are subject to at least the two
semiotic systems (source and target languages) but are nevertheless
capable of changing those very structures, so we, as humans, are the
subjects of a variety of discourses but are also free to change those
relations that condition our existence. (p. 200)
Gentzler’s formulation encapsulates the cultural turn in translation studies, which is just
beginning to reach among scholars and practitioners in Interpreting Studies. This
dissertation speculates this delay may be due to the way interpreting was sociallyconstructed under the sway of an engineering discourse emphasizing control.

1.4.4

Interpreting is Not Translation: i.e., Temporal Matters (synchronicity vs
asynchronicity)
One way to understand the essential difference between interpretation and

translation as cultural productions is to apply Marshall McLuhan’s (1964) insight about
communication technologies: the medium is the message.34 The standard distinction, that
translation is written and interpretation live is both too simplistic and exactly the point.
The frozen quality of words written in a permanent form35 puts readers in a specific zone
of asynchronous relationship with the other participants in the communication process.
The author(s), translator(s) and readers are usually not together in either time or space:
they are typically scattered about in more-or-less random places which may or may not

34

The English word “message” is problematized in the last chapter and Appendix F.

35

“Seleskovitch considers the form of the source text as constituting the key
difference; written translation is static, allowing analysis and reflection before the
text is reformulated in another language, whereas the text to be interpreted will only
be heard once, and what one will remember of the text is its content and meaning,
not its form (1978: 2)” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 55).
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even be in the same geographic location where the author wrote or the translator
translated. Readers and translators are engaged with the text after the time the author has
written, and at different times than when other members of the audience are reading it.36
Characteristically and classically, translation involves relatively few overlaps in
timespace.
In contrast with the essentially solitary activity of writing or reading a written
text, the experience of participating as an interpretee in simultaneous interpretation puts
one in the midst of a spontaneous and dynamic communication process.37 Typically,
interpretees are in the same physical space, or conditions are created so as to seem
‘together’ through the use of sophisticated technology (such as video relay services which
enable signed and spoken language interpretation between Deaf people and non-signing
hearing persons). Simultaneous interpretation has time boundaries in the present: there is
a starting and endpoint, you are ‘here’ and ‘now’ (present in body, with others) and may
(or may not) achieve voice depending on the attention and focus of your mind, rhetorical
skills, and familiarity with the norms of social interaction in the specific setting.

36

This insight about the mediation of time goes back (in Western thought) to Aristotle,
via Plato. “Otto Kade (1968: 35) and Reiss & Vermeer (1984) regard the opportunity
to make corrections as the key feature distinguishing written translation from
interpreting” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 56).
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See Streeck and Jordan (2009), “Communication as a dynamical self-sustaining
system” addresses “the importance of time scales and nested contexts.” Also, “Gile
[1993: 74-75] suggests…there are qualitative features that differentiate written
translation from interpreting. Since interpreting is intended for the immediate use of
the recipients, Gile assumes that they do not expect the same kind of terminological
accuracy as they would in a written translation, nor can they expect the same kind of
polished style as in a written translation (cf Toury [who argues there are different
systems and strategies in addition to different modes of written and oral translation]
(1995:235)” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 56, 55)
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(Recordings that one can watch or listen to afterwards shift the audience member along
the relational timespace continuum in the direction of frozen text because the immediate
interactive capacity is eliminated.)38 Crucially, and in sharp distinction from translation,
interpretation occurs within a relationally-shared timespace.
We will not forget that at the linguistic level translators of written texts do
sometimes interpret, and simultaneous interpreters sometimes achieve felicitous
translations.39 This may be why Vermeer can “[state] that everything he says about
translation refers to interpreting, and vice versa (1989: 83-83)” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 55).
Here is a brief illustration from a prose-poem by Ama Ata Aidoo:
‘Zo vas is zis name, “Sissie”‘?
‘Oh, it is just a beautiful way they call “Sister” by people who like you
very much. Especially if there are not many girl babies in the family . . .
one of the very few ways where an original concept from our old ways has
been given expression successfully in English.’
‘Yes?’
‘Yes . . . Though even here, they had to beat in the English word,
somehow.’ (Aidoo, 1977, p. 28)

38

The fact of recordability could, perhaps, serve as motivation for interpretees (and
interpreters) to more frequently problematize interpretations in the moment.
Although such interventions could be framed as disruptions and even edited out of
final productions, non-action in moments of confusion or concern about clarity,
meaning, or understanding generates the appearance of consent: a false confirmation
of shared comprehension.

39

Felicity is a condition of speech acts conceptualized by J.L. Austin in How to Do
Things With Words (1962). Felicity conditions are those that establish the foundation
for achieving voice with any particular speech act.
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The closeness of match between languages regarding a particular expression is what
distinguishes, linguistically, a “literal” translation from a “free” interpretation. The closer
a lexical match, the more translational; the further the reach to establish a connection of
some sort, the more interpretive. Nuances of distinction and similarity at these semantic,
syntactic, or grammatical levels will generally not be included in this study, which is
focused on the interactional level, e.g., the collective and group-level dynamics of
engaging the interpreter as a remedy for many kinds of repairs.40
Using the terms ‘interpret’ and ‘translate’ as if they are synonyms has effects that
will be demonstrated. Analogies from math and engineering serve as metaphors to
illustrate the significance of distinctions between translation and interpretation, all in
service of demonstrating that the differences are worth serious consideration. In contrast
with the linguistic emphasis on control via immediate matching of meaning in the space
of interaction, we will focus on the unfolding of meaning in time at the level of
relationships as they are co-constructed among interpretees and interpreters through
mutual engagement in intercultural communication using simultaneous interpretation.
The theoretical goal is to establish, on the basis of discursive and behavioral
evidence, the necessity of valuing and making creative social uses of the timespace
components of simultaneous interpretation. Two aspects of temporality have been
identified as figural in distinguishing between interpretation and translation. One aspect is
the synchrony of participants in interpretation versus the asynchrony of participants in
translation. The other aspect is the fixing of meaning in a linguistic now instead of in a

40

Technically, transactional level not interaction level. This term is not defined and
contrasted with interaction until chapter four. See footnote 201.
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continuously-unfolding timestream. The boundary of temporal co-presence and the
consciousness of participants in regards to where they locate control (exclusively in the
language or equally or moreso in the interaction) outlines the zone of this research. The
practical goal of comprehending these temporal features is to produce an argument
illustrating that the intercultural communication practice of simultaneous interpretation
can be revitalized to serve, institutionally, as a societal-level design intervention for
promoting cultural and linguistic diversity in order to counteract time-space compression
(Harvey 1990), particularly as it has been generated, via language and language use, by
the age of mechanical reproduction (Benjamin 1916/1969 English translation).

1.5

Why the European Parliament?
The European Parliament is the largest and most representative governing

institution of the European Union and, in combination with the European Commission,
crafts law for the entire EU. The European Parliament (EP) is one of three major
institutions of the European Union,41 and is loosely akin to the United States’ Congress,
especially in its role of being the political body that is supposed to be representative of
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“The EU is the result of decades of integration, from the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) to the establishment of the EEC in 1957 (the Treaty of Rome),
to the Single European Act in 1987, to the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union
of 1993, and to the latest revised Treaty. The fact that the EU was developed from
three communities (the ECSC, the European Atomic Energy Community – Euratom
– and the European Economic Community – EEC) is still reflected in the internal
functioning of the EU. The three communities have been governed by five
institutions: the European Parliament (since 1958), the Council and the Commission
(single bodies since 1967), the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors. They are
supported by five bodies: the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the
Regions, the European Ombudsman, the European Investment bank, and, as the most
recent addition, the European Central Bank” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 75).
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and for the citizens of Europe. While the United Nations also employ a significant
number of interpreters, the regular structure for simultaneous interpretation (called a
language regime)42 in the UN encompasses only six official languages.43 In other words,
despite the visual appearance of all those delegates from all the countries of the world
wearing headphones with which one might assume they are listening to their country’s
language, UN Delegates are limited to choosing among Arabic, Chinese, English, French,
Russian, or Spanish. In the EP, the number of language choices available at the turn of a
dial often exceeds twenty,44 and can include languages natively spoken by relatively
small national populations (e.g., Catalan and other regional languages granted status
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Kroskrity (2000) describes “regimes of language”: “ ‘Regimes’ invokes the display
of political domination in all its many forms, including what Gramsci (1971)
distinguished as the coercive force of the state and the hegemonic influence of the
state-endorsed culture of civil society” (p. 3). Juxtaposing this with the “many senses
of ‘language’ that, by contrast, emphasize its form (not its meaning), decontextualize
its use, limit its role to providing labels for pre-existing things, and otherwise present
language as [an] apolitical, even sometimes asocial, phenomenon….[led to]
‘Regimes of Language,’ as…promis[ing] to integrate two often segregated domains:
politics (without language) and language (without politics)” (p. 3). Kroskrity and his
colleagues’ move builds upon Bernstein (1975), Gumperz (1962), Hymes (1980),
Labov (1972), Bourdieu (1977, 1991) and Foucault (1972, 1980). See also “Spaces
of Multilingualism” (Blommaert, Collins & Slembrouck, 2005).
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The only counterparts at such a multilingual scale as the European Parliament are the
Indian and South African Parliaments (Corbett et al, 2008, p. 2).

44

The physical technology is capable of handling some sixty languages “no problem”
(F12) but “thirty is a reasonable limit” on the human side (OM57). There were sixtytwo languages recognized as “official” in the European Union (OM57) in 2009.
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under particular conditions of cost-bearing, and languages of guests, e.g., Arabic,
Kurdish).45
As the host of the largest interpreting community in the world, the EP is an ideal
site for studying simultaneous interpretation.46 The relevance is both contemporary and
historical: namely, the European Parliament is attempting to govern with linguistic
diversity instead of by language homogenization, and the EP is the direct heir of the first
system of simultaneous interpretation created and performed during the World War II
War Crimes Tribunal at Nuremberg. Interpreting for the European Parliament is
prestigious: a pinnacle of professional achievement.47
The linguistic rights of Members of the EP (formerly called Delegates) extend
from the European Union’s earliest inception as the Coal and Steel Consortium in 1958.
Regulation No. 1 “determining the languages to be used by the European Economic
Community” was understood as a practical matter of equality and instituted as the first
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At the time of fieldwork (2008-2009), the EU was negotiating with Turkey, and
Kurdish was not supposed to be spoken in the EP. However interpreters were
observed to do so and some admitted (off the record) that they felt it was a matter of
‘the right thing to do’ in the presence of Kurds who were speaking Kurdish, and who
preferred (and in a few cases required) interpretations into Kurdish in order to fully
comprehend and participate in the proceedings.
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The EP is an “ideological site….a notion developed by Silverstein (1998:136) ‘as
institutional sites of social practice as both object and modality of ideological
expression.’ Sites may be institutionalized, interactional rituals that are culturally
familiar loci for the expression and/or explication of ideologies that indexically
ground them in identities and relationships” (Kroskrity, 2000, p. 19).
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Simultaneous interpreters for the other European Institutions jostle for prominence
too; the relevant distinction singling out the EP is the size of its official language
footprint and it’s institutional ambition to be the representative voice for all of
Europe’s citizens (and, it could be argued, non-residents too). The other major
institutions of the EU have reduced language regimes similar in size and scope to the
United Nations.
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rule in the original governing document (EUR-Lex). As EU expansion has continued
over the years, the original linguistic right of choice has been extended to new Members
despite concerns about the size, cost, and complication of the system required to enable
functional interpretation across all language combinations. The official language regime
at the EP during the course of the research reported here (2005 and 2008-2009) included
twenty-three spoken languages (Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian,
Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese,
Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovene, Spanish, and Swedish), although
Maltese was only provided during one observation. When fully functioning, simultaneous
interpretation could occur in 506 binary combinations (e.g., English-Lithuanian, CzechSpanish, French-Swedish, Polish-Finnish, etcetera). In the subsequent term (2009-2014),
a Deaf Member of Parliament was elected from Hungary, which required incorporating
Hungarian sign language interpreters as a regular part of the language regime.48
The European Parliament is a dynamic microcosm of the European Union and
thus serves both symbolic and practical purposes in regard to communicating the rituals
of identification beyond the nation to Europe-as-a-whole. According to Raunio (1996)
“the most under-studied features…are its internal organization and the behavior of
individual MEPs…” (p. 40). His study on political party behavior during “Question

48

Ádám Kósa works with seven sign language interpreters (EP Newshound, 2013).
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Time” does not address the dynamics of simultaneous interpretation.49 Is it just a
curiosity that “the right of an elected Member to speak, read and write in his or her
language” (a 2001 Bureau report quoted in Corbett et al, 2007, p. 38) omits “listening”?
How beats this “heart of Parliament’s democratic legitimacy” (Patrick Twidle, in
Lauridsen, 2002)?50 Questions such as these highlight the community building function
of SI in the EP by suggesting that skillful and strategic participation in simultaneous
interpretation is at least as crucial as the transfer of information among speakers of
various languages. If the goal of the EU is truly not to impose a common language on all
of its citizens, but rather to maintain a pluralingual social structure in which knowing
multiple languages is a core element of the European identity, then the skills of
communicating across language difference through participating in the intercultural
communication practice of simultaneous interpretation are as integral as the skills of
communicating within language similarity through language learning.
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Raunio (1996) found, for instance, that “Party groups’ questioning activity is not
related to their size and influence” (p. 224); and MEPs “make active use of questions
in order to raise matters important to their constituents” (p. 225). He concludes:
“Parliamentary questions have a well-established and important part to play in interinstitutional relations, especially between the Commission and the Parliament” (p.
226). Raunio’s study was specific to the Strasbourg Parliament; it is probably fair to
generalize his results as representative of behavior in the Brussels Parliament too.
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“Multilingualism” is touted as the heart of the European Parliament’s democratic
legitimacy in innumerable EU and EP public relations documents and occurs
frequently in the talk of elected Members and permanent staff of the EP.
Multilingualism is the official language ideology of the EU; its primary strategy is
language learning. Bauman & Briggs (2000) present a critique of Locke and Herder
that illuminates a trajectory of philosophical thought about language that is
recognizable in EU language policy overall, as well as its instantiation in practice at
the EP. More on language ideology in chapter seven.
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1.6

Research Question
This study aims to reduce ambiguities about control and meaning during

interpreted communication generally, that is, in as broad a manner as possible. This
motivation complicates the matter of delineating a singular research question. Instead, the
study revolves dynamically around four points of reference: consciousness, control,
culture (through reference group comparisons) and voice. These reference points were
selected in order to illustrate an outline for articulating theory about the social
construction of timespace. The practical aim is to circulate language among practitioners
and users of interpreting that calibrates (Holquist, 2009) to an alternative chronotope than
the dominant postmodern condition of timespace compression (as described by Harvey,
1990). The method of action research was chosen specifically to promote interpretive
flexibility and enable the researcher to root in reflective action learning.

1.6.1

Commitments: Action Learning

The reporting trajectory persists with the ethos of action learning. “If it is to be creative at
all, research cannot be confined to the testing of predetermined hypotheses. New concepts
and hypotheses emerge in the process of inquiry, and these become the basis for further
inquiry. This, we take it, is exactly how continuity in science occurs” (Merton & Rossi,
1957, p. 249). I have in mind an intuition about systems change using simultaneous
interpretation as an institutional lever for creating a field of equality as conceptualized by
Amartya Sen (1992). Articulating a rationale for economic and social policies that
support and encourage the use of simultaneous interpretation requires reflective analysis
of existing conditions. Grounding rational recommendations in widely-shared
experiences necessitates bridging participant experience with academic theorizing. I am
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particularly interested in how people in policy-making positions understand their own
language-related choices and concomitant communication interactions, and the extent to
which they consider, or fail to consider, the full range of communicative implications.
Studying the attitudes and tensions emerging from talk about language use,
language choice, and communicative efficiency with diverse users of two sophisticated
systems for simultaneous interpretation addresses a gap in research regarding the
perspectives of users of simultaneous interpretation. Considering interpreters and users51
together as whole units of social interaction that can be considered through lenses of
group and organizational studies is rare. Imagining the communication among all of these
participants in simultaneously-interpreted interaction as a form of culture is also unusual.
Conceptualizing the attitudes and behavioral practices of co-participants in simultaneous
interpretation as sites for cultural production is presented as a hypothesis for readers to
explore and experiment with in terms of cultivating agency and establishing better
conditions for the exercise of voice for all participants (interpretees and interpreters) in
the special intercultural communication practices of simultaneous interpretation.

1.7

Organization of Chapters
Crafting the argument that simultaneous interpretation brings the social

construction of timespace into view led naturally to considering the temporal framing of

51

To reiterate, users (also referred to as consumers and clients) have traditionally been
identified interlocutors. Instead, I follow the lead of Graham H. Turner in referring
to the users of SI as interpretees (2007). Distinguishing the basic roles in interpreted
interaction as interpretees and interpreters emphasizes the co-participatory nature of
communication. Also, problematizing assumptions of interpreter neutrality, the
objectification of interpreters as machines, and the reduction of language to
simplistic units of unambiguous meaning are served by this terministic switch.
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this dissertation. Rather than a strictly linear process, the chapters cycle through emergent
reference points, adding depth and detail. The next chapter describes the method of
research, further establishing the juxtaposition and narrative strategies of action learning.
Chapter three situates a recent timesnap of literature from Interpreting Studies (all fifteen
contributions in one volume of conference proceedings published in 2009) in contrast
with a longer trend of development in Translation Studies. Chapter four introduces the
case study of the European Parliament as a democratic institution within the larger
project of the European Union. The social reconstruction of conference interpreting by
users of the system of SI in the EP is explored and a particular context of legislative work
regarding asylum seekers is established.
The fifth chapter extends the exploration of discourse about interpreting in the
European Parliament, investigating the possibility of a paradigm shift from
multilingualism to pluralingualism and introducing the concepts of homolingualism and
social interpreting. Chapter six revisits the establishment of technological and social
norms for simultaneous interpretation and explores community interpreting for the Deaf
as the natural point of comparison and contrast with conference interpreting. The sixth
chapter includes an argument that community interpreting is an invention of Deaf culture.
Finally, chapter seven touches upon some philosophy of the (so-called) language problem
and tracks a few contemporary chronotopic calibrations with the goal of considering their
forward influence on policy, practices, and legislation regarding SI while also engaging
questions and implications of language ideology.
The design of these chapters is to cultivate thinking both backwards and forwards
in time. Beginning with a current enactment of the intercultural communication practice
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of conference-style simultaneous interpretation (SI) and comparing it with preceeding
and concurrent developments in community-style SI, then casting further back in history,
the narrative seeks to expand discursive consciousness.
Keeping in mind “the multiplex indexicalities of languages” (Kroskrity, 2000, p.
27), this research is premised in the “correlational relationship between high levels of
discursive consciousness and active contestation of ideologies (p. 19). It’s imagined
audience includes interpretees and policymakers as well as academics and practitioners.
Structuring society to better accommodate language difference is, by definition, a
challenge of thinking in terms of time. Achieving a political economic infrastructure that
celebrates and protects differences would be evolutionary. Learning how to collaborate in
the social co-construction of meanings and relationships through proactive participation
in the special intercultural communication practice of simultaneous interpretation is
proposed as a design stream for establishing a field of linguistic equality where the
achievement of voice is a realistic possibility for all participants in interpreted
communication.
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CHAPTER 2
“METHOD”: NARRATIVE AND TRANSDISCIPLINARY JUXTAPOSITION

2.1

Overview
The ambition of this dissertation is to tell a story that inspires change. The goal is

to “make a gathering that renders clear what is obscure” (Tedlock, 1983, p. 252) and
which consistently “sticks to its object” (Henri Bergson, in Moore, 1996, p. xvii).
Juxtaposing the comparison groups of community and conference interpreters and their
respective interpretees within a unified historical narrative is the strategy.52 The audacity
of a researcher’s “integral involvement…in an intent to change the organization[s]” is a
characteristic of action research highlighted by organization scholars Eden & Huxham
(1996, p. 539). “This intent may not succeed,” they clarify, “no change may take place as
a result of the intervention – and the change may not be as intended” (p. 539).
Within such a frame, action learning is a humbler stance that aims to contribute to
the knowledge of actors both within and beyond the research context, ideally resulting in
“double loop learning” (Argyris & Schön, 1974). Double loop learning involves engaging
research participants in critical reflection regarding “how the very way they go about
defining and solving problems can be a source of problems in its own right” (Argyris,

52

Mona Baker argues that “narrative provides a basis for shared language and values,
thus enabling the mobilization of numerous individuals with very different
backgrounds and attributes around specific political, humanitarian, or social issues”
(2010, p. 23).
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1991, p. 2).53 Action research is a qualitative method that became popular in management
and organization studies during the 1970s and 1980s. The sub-style of action learning
was selected for this dissertation research because it allowed the greatest range of motion
for exploring the relationships among ‘objects’ and ‘subjects’ in the research domain
while foregrounding the researcher as a learner, too.
The concept and practice of action research is tightly tied with the study of group
dynamics and processes of organizational and social change, stemming from post-WWII
work by Kurt Lewin (1946; 1947). Lewin shifted the object of psychology from the level
of a self-contained individual to the social level of individuals as members of groups,
inventing the field of social psychology. Lewin (1936) was particularly interested in
change processes, and created an equation of social action: that a person’s behavior (B) is
a function (f) of that person (P) in their environment (E), B = f(P, E). Mathematical
analogies are popular in the field of communication and figure importantly in the origins
and models of interpreting and the production of interpreters.
Action research “directly confronts the theory/practice relationship” (Clegg et al,
1996, p. 13). Action research is a methodology “concerned with a system of emergent
theory” (Eden & Huxham, 1996, p. 533, also Herr & Anderson, 2005). Such theory is
necessarily interpretivist and subjective, considering multiple simultaneously-occurring
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Double-loop learning is contrasted with single-loop learning. Chris Argyris explains:
“I have coined the terms “single loop” and “double loop” learning to capture this
crucial distinction. To give a simple analogy: a thermostat that automatically turns
on the heat whenever the temperature in a room drops below 68 degrees is a good
example of single-loop learning. A thermostat that could ask, “Why am I set at 68
degrees?” and then explore whether or not some other temperature might more
economically achieve the goal of heating the room would be engaging in doubleloop learning.” (1991, p. xx).
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complex transactions: intrapersonal and intragroup (within persons and their own
language use), multiple interpersonal and intergroup dynamics (between interpretees and
interpreters, among interpretees with and without interpreters, among interpreters with
and without interpretees), intra-institutionally (among MEPs, EP interpreters, and
Parliament’s staff), and inter-institutionally (taking the European Parliament as an
organizational locus of policy making for society). All of these layers confirm Eden and
Huxham’s (1996) recommendation that action research be geared toward theory
generation and development, rather than (for instance) trying to test the results of a
single, particularized hypothesis.
Eden and Huxham particularly emphasize the necessity of producing results that
can be generalized from the specific case to wider applications in other contexts. Also,
“history and context…must be taken as critical” (1996, p. 539). They assert that the best
action research is importantly concerned with systematic relationships, because “the aim
is to understand conceptual and theoretical frameworks where each theory must be
understood in the context of other related theories” (p. 532). Most of the emphasis here is
to document the discourse about simultaneous interpretation, with references to other
literature provided as markers of theory informing and grounding the analysis. Contrary
to the academic preference for paraphrasing, most citations are quoted in order to
emphasis discursive relations in addition to intellectual and epistemological connections.
Ethnographic documentation is obviously a necessity in order to track “theory
[that] develops from a synthesis of that which emerges from the data and that which
emerges from the use in practice of the body of theory” (Eden and Huxham, 2002, p.
533). Hence lengthy quotations from research participants, representative as well as
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demonstrative of the iterative (Herr & Anderson, 2005), looping (Greenwood, 1997), and
cyclic (Heron, 1996; Lather, 1986) nature of dialogically developing understanding
among researcher, participants and relevant literature (Herr & Anderson, 2005). All
quotations taken together should illustrate the application of interpreting (as theory) as it
develops into prescriptions for interpreting (as practice). Action research assumes there
will be “implications beyond…the project…that could inform other contexts” (p. 539),
which must be “capable of being explained to others” (p. 539) and “disseminated in such
a way as to be of interest to an audience wider than those integrally involved with the
action and/or with the research” (p. 539).

2.2

Commitments: Interpreting as a Communication Event
An assumption that carries throughout this dissertation and its analyses is a

disciplinary stance that views interpreting as a communication event, not as a linguistic
event. Although language and linguistics are obviously involved in any and every
instance of simultaneous interpretation, one of the action research hypotheses is that the
linguistic frame is inadequate for addressing the complexity of intercultural social
interaction, even when reduced to the realm of interpreted communication. A reference
point for this action learning question is Claudia Angelelli’s (2000) application of Dell
Hymes’ “taxonomy of speaking” (p. 580). Hymes’s (1962) SPEAKING54 rubric is
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Dell Hymes (1962) created a rubric for remembering the components of
communication events: S=Setting, Scene. P=Participants. E=Ends (intended, actual).
A=Act (the speech act). K=Key (generally, tone). I=Instrument or channel of
communication. N=Norms. G=Genre. This dissertation investigates norms and ends
(both actual and intended). Kroskrity notes that “Hymes (1974:33) called for the
inclusion of a community’s local theory of speech, even if only as ethnography”
(2000, p. 6).
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foundational to a robust area of research called the ethnography of communication.
Angelelli explains:
[Hymes] defines a speech community as ‘a social, rather than a linguistic
entity’ (1074: 47) thus differentiating it from language. This distinction
separates Hymes’ work from Bloomfield’s or Chomsky’s since the later
[sic] have equated speech community to language. (Angelelli, 2000, p.
584)
Using Hymes’ categories in an abstract, comparative analysis, Angelelli concludes “there
are more differences than similarities between the two settings” of conference and
community interpreting (p. 580).55
Angelelli (2000) couches her argument in a disagreement with Roberts (1998)
about whether interpreting in these two settings are “equal on the types of skills they
required from interpreters and on the ethical principles they observed” (p. 581). Angelelli
is working within an equivalence paradigm56 in which “the goal of translation or
interpretation (T&I) is that a message makes the same impact on the target audience that
a speaker/signer intends for an audience of her/his same language” (p. 580). An important
caveat (offered in parentheses) is Angelelli’s idealization of equality sans the role of

55

Interestingly, rather than establishing a single variable, Angelelli sets up a contrast
between “conference interpreting in a simultaneous mode (done in a booth) with
community interpreting in consecutive mode” (emphasis added, 2000, p. 582). She
says this “rationale…is what emerges from the literature…and from the average
situations observed” (p. 582). Her study is interview based, presumably only with
spoken language interpreters. This deduction appears to be born out in her table’s
section on Channels in which she specifies “the medium of speech transmission
(e.g. oral, written, telegraphic, etc.)” (p. 588) without acknowledgment of signed
languages. The gathering of simultaneous sign language interpreters with
simultaneous spoken language interpreters together within the mode of simultaneous
(not consecutive) interpreting is unique to this action learning research endeavour.

56

See section 2.4, Tangling with Translation Studies, for more on the equivalence
paradigm.
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privilege. She seeks to argue that it is possible to “[show] that different interpretation
situations are different in substantive ways (without falling into the prestige trap)” (p.
582) and to “explore interpretation events where the standards of conference interpreting
(regardless of prestige) may prove insufficient to gain an understanding of the complexity
involved in community interpreting” (p. 582).
The prestige Angelelli is referring to regards the basis of Roberts (1998)
argument, which, Angelelli reports “was based on the similarities of community and
conference interpreting in order for the former to achieve the same status and prestige
that the later [sic] enjoys” (p. 581). My position is that community interpreters should
have the same status as conference interpreters, although the status question is not a
sufficient motivator in and of itself. The disagreement with Angelelli is twofold: first,
prestige (power, privilege) can never be ruled out (Foucault, 1980);57 and second, with
her conclusion that “a single standard of interpretation … [is] inappropriate since
different communicative events require different performances on the part of the
interpreter” (p. 582). Taking a stance in action research and action learning allows
attention to shift among the elements and assumptions embedded in Angelelli’s claim:
including, for instance, the relevance of performance differences depending upon which
single standard is applied, and the exclusive focus on the interpreter’s performance with
no responsibility or accountability afforded to interpretees.

57

“Michel Foucault offered a slightly more optimistic view of the relationship between
language and power…for Foucault, discourse is ambiguous and plurivocal. It is a
site of conflict and contestation. Thus, women [for instance] can adopt and adapt
language to their own ends. They may not have total control over it but then neither
do men. Choice, chance and power govern our relationships to the discourses we
employ” (Sawicki, 1991, p. 1).
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Also, referring to “one of the main pillars and classics since they were the first to
write on interpretation and interpretation pedagogy,” Angelelli borrows the definition
provided by Seleskovitch and Lederer (1989): “Interpretation is the transfer of a message
across languages” (Angelelli, 2000, p. 581). This transfer model (a transmission model) is
a central theme in the discourses about interpreting presented here. The prevalence and
function of a transmission model in determining the social organization and norms of
interpreted events will be critiqued, particularly as a feature of linguistic inequality.
Finally, in keeping with a kinship model (e.g., Pochhacker, 2007), Angelelli poses
conference and community interpreting as “two points on an interpretation continuum,
rather than a dichotomy” (2000, p. 582). She lays out her basic assumptions regarding
each: “We may assume that a community interpreter is probably quite familiar with the
ways of speaking that occur in her/his community. Undoubtedly, this means that she/he is
a fluent speaker of that speech community” (emphasis in original, p. 585). “A conference
interpreter has to be familiar with the ways of speaking that occur in a conference.
However, this does not necessarily mean that he/she must be a fluent speaker of that
speech community (of which the speaker and the audience are genuine members who do
not share a common language)” (emphasis in original, p. 585).
As the rest of the dissertation will demonstrate, some of Angelelli’s (2000)
conclusions are problematized with a more proactive inclusion of sign language and the
community interpreting norm of simultaneous signed-spoken language interpretation
rather than consecutive (as is often necessitated by working in the same oral/auditory
medium). For instance, she characterizes the Hymesian Scene of community interpreting
involving the interpretees’ having “constant interaction with both speaker and listener
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allow[ing] for negotiation and clarification” (p. 589) and the interpreter as a Participant
“facing a dialogic situation (of which she is an active participant too), [in which] she has
the opportunity to interact differently if she needed to negotiate meaning (ask for
elaboration, clarification, etc.)” (p. 590). Angelelli’s findings from spoken language
community interpreting are not necessarily in accord with signed-spoken language
community interpreting. Some reasons for the differences involve power and
institutionalized practices of professional simultaneous interpretation.

2.3

Paradigms: Two Approaches to Language & Communication
As hinted at above, the functional linguistic paradigm privileges the source

language as primary in interpreted communication. This privileging is structured through
emphasizing the text (the words) rather than the speech act (the interpretee’s voice in the
interaction). The structuralism of focusing on linguistic functions remains the dominant
and unchallenged way of thinking about interpreting. An interpretivist or interactional
paradigm has made some inroads into Interpreting Studies, for instance in the guise of
‘dialogic discourse-based interaction’ (Pöchhacker 2004, p. 79), but the lessons of the
interpretive paradigm are continuously subsumed by the perpetuation of positivist
structural framings. The synonym of ‘positivist’ for both ‘functionalist’ and ‘structuralist’
is because the functions being structured are maintained and reinforced: an additive
‘positive’ effect. Although a literal equation is far too crass, for the purposes of
introducing the argument I will borrow a generalization between structuralism and a
building-block approach to language, and another generalization between interpretivism
and a creative approach to language.
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Barnett Pearce (1994), in the tradition of American pragmatism, poses the
opposition between static building-blocks and a perpetual creativity in language use in
order to establish two basic orientations to “language as such” (Benjamin, 1916/1969).58
As with any duality, the opposition can be exaggerated too extremely, and each
orientation can be applied to the same stimulus or object of study. The point in using this
opposition as a heuristic is not to argue that one is more right than the other, only that
both exist, and each entails different possibilities. The building-block and the creative
orientations to language both focus on language, but the building-block approach looks at
the words as if disembodied from the speaker/signer, and the interpretivist approach
never neglects the context that the speaking/signing body is situated within.
In How To Do Things With Words, J.L Austin showed that some speech acts
“make things happen” (1962/1992). The classic examples involve ministers who
pronounce marriage and judges who sentence criminals. If someone not authorized to
utter those words says them, neither married life nor jail time are forthcoming. The action
of these statements made by non-authorized persons is, then, that of lying or makebelieve. Any saying and every utterance always does something, it is the meaning or
effect that differs depending upon who says it and how it is received, which can be
separated (as in structural linguistics) as if these are independent variables, or taken
together as intradependent variables of social interaction.
This power of language to do things, of language as an activity, is also illustrated
by Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1953) theory of ‘speech playing’ or language games (Pearce,
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“Benjamin himself believed that “all human knowledge, if it can be justified, must
take on no other form than that of interpretation” (Kirsch, 2006).
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p. 110). The difference between Austin and Wittgenstein is that in Austin’s speech act
theory the component parts of language are discrete and have fixed meanings; language is
composed of building-blocks to be put together in certain ways to conduct specific
behaviors and accomplish desired actions. The range of meaning for “I pronounce you
man and wife” in the building-block conception is fairly narrow, because the phrase is
intended only to be uttered under appropriate circumstances. Whereas for Wittgenstein,
language is always understood first as uttered in a context, from which it follows that the
meaning(s) of a speech act are always flexible: “the meaning of what we say is
determined by how it fits into the game” (Pearce, p. 110). From the creative perspective,
“I pronounce you man and wife” could be a joke, a theatrical performance, or a scathing
social commentary; each of which would do different work, socially.
Critical discourse analysis provides evidence that discourses about communitystyle SI tend to reflect the building-block orientation to language. The building-block
assumption concerning language carries across settings of conference and community
interpreting, research and practice, interpretees and interpreters. The building-block view
is a natural fit with the structuralism of functional linguistics. To give one quick example
from the volume of community interpreting studies research that will compose the
literature review in chapter three, Tebble (2009) provides a diagram, a “Hierarchy of
discourse structures” (Figure 4, p. 210), which she describes as “a ranked scale from the
smallest unit, the speech act, to the largest discourse unit, the genre itself” (p. 209). The
metacommunication implicit in this “language about language” (p. 210) is of discrete,
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unconnected units (uttered speech acts) serving explicit functions as if they only ‘build
up’ in an additive way to generate a top level of a discourse hierarchy.59
In keeping with the paradigm, Tebble (2009) uses the label, genre, for the top
level. In contrast, interpretivist theories start with a multilayered view of language and
social interaction and work ‘up,’ ‘down’ and ‘through’ discourse toward both genres and
acts. Imagine the center and periphery of a sphere, with ‘action’ moving in both
directions, originating (and re-originating) from both the center and the periphery in
multiple flows of circulation. The difference is that an interpretivist view can allow the
act to change the genre, a possibility not available within structuralist regimes that
establish the genre as determinant. The analysis up to this point makes the case that
structuralism (specifically the functional linguistic paradigm) retains too much sway in
the practice of simultaneous interpretation. This is particularly evidenced in the
community interpreting literature by the frustration of interpreters with interpretees and
in tensions within the academic meta-discourse of interpreting researchers.
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Vuorikoski’s view is more nuanced. “Genres are the result of socio-discursive
practices acquired by text producers” (2004, p. 66). She draws upon Jean-Michel
Adam (1999) who has combined discourse analysis with a non-English-centered text
linguistics. Vuorikoski uses terminology developed by Halliday (1985/1990) but
does not rely upon him solely because “his work is based on the English language”
(p. 66). “Adam quotes Bakhtin and his definition of the functions of genres. Bakhtin
proposes that for the reciprocal intelligibility of language, the genres of discourse are
just as important as the grammatical forms of language. Compared with the
grammatical forms, the discourse genres are more changeable and more flexible
while still possessing a normative value for the individual speaker; the speaker has
not created them himself, they have been given to him. (Bakhtin 1984: 287, quoted
by Adam 1999: 90)” (in Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 67). Tebble refers (functionally) to the
normative value of a genre; which I’m seeking to balance with attention to their
changeability and flexibility.
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The goal of this dissertation is to expose and engage these paradigmatic tensions
with consideration of the implications for material practice. Bringing the language of the
interpretive paradigm into critical interaction with the language of the structural paradigm
is an experiment. This experimental essence dictated the selection of action research as
the most appropriate methodology. Critical discourse analysis is one of the main tools
used in service of the action research. Technically, it could be considered an experiment
in foreignization. This term will be properly defined in the forthcoming section on
translation studies, after the following section on methodology.

2.3.1

Action research: Application in the Interpretivist Paradigm
The combination of research tools includes critical discourse analysis (e.g.,

Fairclough, 1992, Blommaert, 2004) and Dell Hymes (1962, 1972, 1974) SPEAKING
rubric from the ethnography of communication (e.g., Angelelli, 2000; Carbaugh, 1990).
Fairclough’s (1992) three-dimensional theory of critical discourse analysis is an
application of an interpretivist orientation to language in a style that might be
characterized by the later Wittgenstein (1953) who, for instance, poses ‘family
resemblances’ as a way to think about the meanings of words based on the web of their
relationships with other similar and related words. For Fairclough (1992), every utterance
is simultaneously an act, an instance of discursive practice, and an instance of social
practice. The words of an utterance are given meaning by the relations among definitions
held by interlocutors according to individual discernment as to which of the
simultaneously-occurring levels (discourse, social interaction, speech act) is significant or
necessary within the given context at each turn in the communication process.
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Creativity enters based upon interpretee choice (whether this is consciously
prioritized or habitually conditioned) regarding which level(s) of an utterance to respond
to: the discrete act (conceived as a turn in a ritual flow of interaction), the discourse
instantiated by the act (e.g., a particular ideology or a social construction of identity), or
the enactment of social practice (e.g., empowerment or disenfranchisement). As useful
and productive as structuralism is for understanding useful and important things about
communication, linguistic functionalism cannot accommodate the variability of these
simultaneously-occurring levels of communication because linguistic functionalism
focuses ‘positively’ and exclusively on the speech act, rendering the other levels of
meaning essentially invisible.
So, while it may seem that the difference between structuralism and interpretivism
is only the matter of direction, as in the opposition between induction and deduction,
either building up or inferring down, the crucial distinction regards what is excluded or
included in the analysis. For instance, drawing upon my own and other working
interpreters’ experiences, we often recognize speech acts representing different social
practices or distinctive discursive practices in one language that are appropriate for the
context but unfamiliar to interpretees using another language. How can this be dealt with?
Structuralism will reduce these social and discursive practices to a single
dimension by insisting the speech act represents a supposedly uncontroversial (one could
say traditional or customary) speech act indicating a particular kind of turn given the
script prescribed by genre. Interpretivism will assume as a matter of course that speech
acts always carry potentials for new social relationships and discursive alternatives to
genre norms that could be made meaningful by interpretees at any moment during the
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event. A creative orientation to language and language use presumes a wider degree of
flexibility in the realm of meaning-making than the structuralist building-block approach
usually allows. This is not because the building-block view prohibits or denies the
emergence of spontaneity or discovery; rather the structuralist view conditions its
adherents to ‘positively’ seek the expected and familiar instead of cultivating alertness for
the significance of the unusual, unordinary, or atypical.
Heuristically-coupling these two approaches to language, building-block and
creative, with the respective paradigms of structuralism and interpretivism, enables a
demonstration of how they work as language ideologies while demonstrating that they
can also work well together, hand-in-hand.60 This is one of the action research goals of
exploring the difference between Giddens’ (1979, 1984) practical consciousness and
discursive consciousness in interpreter and interpretee accounts and representations of
simultaneous interpretation. What do interpretees and interpreters know how to do in
60

Kroskrity (2000) “introduce(s) the notion of language ideology…[by] offer[ing] a
language-ideological myth of origin. In such a myth, the concept of language
ideology is the offspring of a union of two neglected forces: the linguistic
‘awareness’ of speakers and the (nonreferential) functions of language. Both of these
forces were prematurely marginalized by the dominant and disciplinarily
institutionalized approaches to language, which denied the relevance—to linguistics,
certainly—of a speaker’s own linguistic analysis and valorized the referential
functions of language to the exclusion of others. In effect, this surgical removal of
language from context produced an ‘amputated’ language that was the preferred
object of the language sciences for most of the twentieth century.
Two of the many proposed definitions of language ideology emphatically restore
the relevance of these contextual factors…Michael Silverstein (1979:193) defined
linguistic ideologies as ‘sets of beliefs about language articulated by users as a
rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use.’ In a similar
way, but with a more sociocultural emphasis, Judith Irvine (1989:255) defined
language ideology as ‘the cultural system of ideas about social and linguistic
relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests.’ Both
definitions place a focal emphasis on speakers’ ideas about language and discourse
and about how these articulate with various social phenomena” (p. 5).
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practical terms, and what are interpretees and interpreters able to say about what it is that
they are doing during simultaneous interpretation? Giddens’ (1984) distinction is one of
reflexivity:
The reflexive capacities of the human actor are characteristically involved
in a continuous manner with the flow of day-to-day conduct in the
contexts of social activity. But reflexivity operates only partly on a
discursive level. What agents know about what they do, and why they do
it—their knowledgeability as agents—is largely carried in practical
consciousness. Practical consciousness consists of all the things which
actors know tacitly about how to ‘go on’ in the contexts of social life
without being able to give them direct discursive expression. (Thursby,
n.d., Paragraph 10)
In the next chapter, we’ll see in the literature, there is not much evidence of discursive
consciousness of researchers about the social and epistemic practice of constructing
paradigmatic knowledge. This is not because interpreting researchers lack discursive
consciousness. It is a side effect of operating, practically, in only one paradigm:
structural, positivist linguistic functionalism.
Reading a critical discourse analysis of previously taken-for-granted knowledge
may be confusing or even alienating. If so, these are among the possible effects of
foreignization, an important concept from the field of translation studies from Lawrence
Venuti (1998). Comparing the professional discourses between interpreting researchers
and translation researchers highlights similarities and differences in the practical and
discursive consciousness of researchers in these fields. More on Venuti’s relevance to
this study will be presented below.
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2.4

Contrast: Tangling with Translation Theory
To pursue development of discursive consciousness about paradigmatic tensions in

interpreting research, some comparison will be made between the academic fields of
interpreting and translation studies. Basil Hatim’s (2001) Teaching and Researching
Translation and Edwin Gentzler’s (2001) Contemporary Translation Theories establish
bases for the advancing evolution of thought in terms of literary translation theory. More
current thinking is quite radical. In Translation, Resistance, Activism (2010), editor Maria
Tymoczko has composed a collection of chapters exploring “how we have arrived at a
position where translations are read and discussed as records of cultural contestations and
struggle rather than as simple literary transpositions or creative literary endeavours” (p. 3).
For instance, Mona Baker (2010) presents “some of the ways in which translation
and interpreting may…challenge the dominant narratives of time” (p. 23). An example is
provided by Antonia Carcelen-Estrada (2010), who sets two antagonists
in dialogue, hypothesizing that the [Huaorani, an indigenous people in the
Ecuadorian Amazon whose language is Huao Terero] translated their
bodies as the [Summer Institute of Linguistics] translated the Bible, with
consequent divergence between actions and intentions in both systems.
The temporal, semiotic, and intentional miscommunication between these
two groups unveils different levels of ideology and significant ethical
problems. (p. 65-66)
Where Carcelen-Estrada finds evidence of “a native strategy for cultural survival” (p. 66)
from inside the translation process, Pua’ala’okalani D. Aiu (2010) describes how and
why “Hawaiians often choose not to translate because refusal to translate allows
Hawaiian speakers to keep the context of their language intact” (p. 104). This contributes
to the irony that “both translation and non-translation work to empower Hawaiians (p.
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105) who promote “Ne’e papa i ke ō mau,” that is, “the inevitable return tide of the
Hawaiian language and with it Hawaiian cultural values and practices” (p. 89).
Tymoczko locates “the metonymic nature of both translation and activism” (2010,
p. 250) in the “specificity…of engaged translation” (p. 251) wherein “activist strategies
are highly variable and…sensitive to context, minutely located in time and space” (2010,
p. 249). Importantly, in order to be successful, an “activist translation must fit the felicity
conditions of its time” (p. 251).61 Within this dissertation, the notion of interpretation as
activism and resistance are mainly held in the wings and backstage. Instead, the narrative
foregrounds existing tensions and problems in keeping with Fairclough’s (1989) “faith in
the capacity of human beings to change what human beings have created…[through]
people developing a critical consciousnesss of domination and its modalities, rather than
just experiencing them” (in Tymockzo, 2010, p. 227).

2.4.1

A Dash through Key Developments in Translation Studies
Writing in 2001, Gentzler explains:
In the early days of translation theory, multiple theories simply did not
exist. The goal at the time, and which, despite the prevailing evidence,
continues to be the goal of some scholars today, was to establish one
general theory of translation that would hold across cultures and
languages. (p. xii)
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The coordination of actors in timespace, in combination with external conditions,
generates time felicity.
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The ‘early days’ in Gentzler’s (2001) account are the 1980s.62 Gentzler establishes the
formal origins of translation in the 1960s with the advent of academic programs
involving translation; these came to be known as the North American translation
workshop. Paul Engle instituted a Creative Writing Program at the University of Iowa,
hosting the first translation workshop in 1964; a Ford Foundation grant established the
National Translation Center at the University of Texas Austin in 1965; and two
publications were being produced by 1968 (Modern Poetry in Translation and Delos).
Then there was a plateau during the 1970s about which Gentzler says, “One reason is
surely the monolinguistic nature of the [US] culture” (p. 6).63
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Note: this is the time period when American Deaf resistance against institutionalized
oralism (Ladd, 2003), audism (e.g., Padden & Humphries, 1988; Lane, 1992) and the
colonization and co-optation of American Sign Language within the profession of
sign language interpretation was gaining momentum.
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American monolingualism had particularly profound effects on deaf people.
Historian R.A.R. Edwards (2012) traces how American nationalism was imprinted
on the deaf body, whose cultural identity was formed in conjunction with the
establishment of residential schools for the deaf in the mid-nineteenth century. As
sign language began to emerge as the natural language of the deaf, and deaf people
began to associate with each other, observers noticed the spontaneous development
of behavioral norms and attitudes associated with a unique culture. This was
welcomed by early manualists such as French sign language teacher Laurent Clerc
and American businessman Thomas Gallaudet, who had “an understanding of
disability that was located more in the society than in the body. The deaf body may
not hear, but it need not be made over to approximate hearing norms. Rather, social
norms may be adjusted to accommodate the deaf body” (p. 157). This was “a vision
that the oralists, led by [Samuel Gridley] Howe and [Horace] Mann, would not
accept….The most that could be done would be to mask this inferiority by making it
possible for the deaf to pass as hearing and so to reify the norm of the able-bodied.
The way for a society to deal with disability, in this oralist vision, was to make it
invisible. This erasure of the disabled from public view, in order to preserve the
body politic as uniformly able-bodied accounts for the impulse to train the deaf to
pass as hearing” (p. 158).
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Previously, linguists had begun to address some concerns of translation earlier:
Jakobson distinguished among intralingual, interlingual, and intersemiotic translation in
1959,64 and Quine discussed problems with determining meaning in 1960. “The
problems,” writes Gentzler, “of referentiality and indeterminacy have historically
troubled translation theory, making positions calling for a one-to-one transfer approach
and methods revolving around a decoding and recoding process increasingly difficult to
hold” (2001, p. 12-13). That ‘transfer approach’ remains dominant in discourses in
simultaneous interpretation, which has not yet moved beyond what Hatim calls “the
equivalence paradigm” (2001, p. 12).
In other words, translation studies has been addressing “the epistemological
problem” (Gentzler, 2001, p. 35) for all of the decades that sign language interpreting has
been in existence and most of the decades since spoken language simultaneous
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Roman Jakobson’s (1959) work is in structural linguistics. His three types of
translation are not addressed but remain, foundationally, in the background.
Kroskrity (2000) establishes Jakobson as part of the lineage building up to the
concept of language ideology: “Semiotic models of communication were formulated
by Jakobson (1957, 1960) and then in a functional idiom by Hymes (1964). Based on
the theories of C.S. Peirce (1931-1958), they recognized a variety of sign-focused
‘pragmatic’ relations between language users, the sign vehicles of their languages,
and the connections between these signs and the world. By contrast, most models—
whether the ethnoscience models of cultural anthropologists or the formal models of
Chomskian linguistics—reducted linguistic meaning to denotation, or ‘reference,’
and predication. One of the key advantages of such semiotic-functional models is the
recognition that much of the meaning and hence communicative value that linguistic
forms have for their speakers lies in the ‘indexical’ connections between the
linguistic signs and the contextual factors of their use—their connection to speakers,
settings, topics, institutions, and other aspects of their sociocultural worlds” (p. 7).
The effectiveness of making such indexical connections is a key feature of achieving
voice. Also, Gentzler argues, “the Jakobson term ‘creative transposition,’ with the
emphasis on creative, seems more operative [as a definition for translation]
(Jakobson, 1959: 238)” (2001, p. 35).
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interpretation was invented at Nuremberg.65 The epistemological problem is a label that
refers to the conundrum of establishing a definitive foundation for a unifying theory of
interpretation, that is, for a central organizing principle that eliminates the disagreements
about whether the essence of communication (and thus of translation) lies in energy,
identity, things, meanings, referents, sources, or time (Gentzler, p. 35).
Seemingly far removed yet in parallel with developments in translation theory,
during the 1980s American Deaf communities were trying to reclaim community-based
cultural performances of sign language interpreting from an influx of cultural outsiders,
re-establish the education of deaf children in the visual medium best suited to their
cognitive development, and counter the medicalization of deafness which justifies
surgical interventions such as cochlear implants and intensive speech therapies. While the
American Deaf community was fighting for their bodies on the ground, translation
theorists were fighting against what Gentzler (2001) calls a theoretical “stranglehold” (p.
xi). “In the late 1980s…the field [of literary translation] was trying to set itself free from
the dominance of…source-text oriented theories” (p. x-xi).

2.4.2

The Cultural Turn
Gentzler (2001) outlines five strands of intellectual thinking that have influenced

the field of translation studies: 1) new criticism aimed at a “proper”66 translation of
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The “IBM System” of electronic technology that enabled the simultaneous
interpretation of four languages during the Nuremberg Trials after WWII is
discussed in chapter five.

66

“Richards’s 1953 model was specifically tailored for the translator who aimed to
arrive at the ‘proper’ translation” (2001, p. 14).
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poetry in service of “perfect understanding”67 (i.e., Richards, 1929, 1953); 2) an energybased theory of language68 as a vortex characterized by “luminous” details69 and
dynamism of meaning70 (i.e., Ezra Pound);71 3) translation as paradox72 and thrust73 (i.e.,
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“’A perfect understanding would involve not only an accurate direction of thought, a
correct evocation of feeling, an exact apprehension of tone and a precise recognition
of intention, but further it would get these contributory meanings in their right order’
(Richards, 1929: 332)” in Gentzler (2001, p. 11).
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“[Pound’s] method was modern [not postmodern] insofar as it emphasized
juxtaposition and combination, hoping that the new configurations would react
chemically, combining into a new compound, and thereby give off energy”
(Gentzler, 2001, p. 23).
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“Words, according to [Ezra] Pound, were always seen in a network of relations:
Anglo-American words were signs similar to Chinese characters—always capable of
being compounded and capable of being metamorphosized” (Gentzler, 2001, p. 18).
“Theoretically for Pound, Chinese characters represented not meanings, not
structures, but things, or more importantly, things in action, in process, things with
energy, their form” (italics in original, Gentzler, 2001, p. 18).
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“[Pound] thinks not in terms of separable languages, but of a mesh or interweaving
of words that bind people together regardless of nationalities. The threads of
language run back in time, and as one traces them back, variable connections can be
made…Pound’s ideas were not aimed at fixed things, but at things that can change”
(Gentzler, 2001, p. 19).
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“According to Pound’s translation theory, meaning is not something abstract and
part of a universal language, but something that is always already located in
historical flux—the ‘atmosphere’ in which that meaning occurs. To unpack that
meaning, one has to know the history and reconstruct the atmosphere/milieu in
which that meaning occurred” (Gentzler, 2001, p. 22).
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The paradox is epistemological, “how is it possible to know anything we do not
already know” (Gentzler, 2001, p. 27), which problematizes the idea of “a universal
objective reality. Reality can only be learned, he argues, through the names we give
it, and so, to a certain degree language is the creator of reality” (p. 24-25). “The
activity of translation, according to Will, somehow reveals to the translator that
language is simultaneously unstable and stable, that texts are interwoven in reality
and in a tradition of fiction, and that man, as a complex system, is both subjected by
language or systems of discourse and is capable of creating language or new
relations in the present” (p. 30).
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Frederick Will); 4) a digression into the creative process of translation, in which ad hoc,
so-called ‘free’ or ‘modern’ translation “by writers with limited language skills ...
allow[ing] translators without the facility in a given language to translate, using literal
versions as cribs, from which they intuit the ‘essence’” emerges (Gentzler, p. 32), raising
“a whole new set of questions” (p. 34); and finally, 5) the cultural studies’ contribution of
Lawrence Venuti in “rethinking translation” through criticism (consonant with Gentzler’s
own) of “the humanistic underpinnings…[which] reinforces prevailing domestic beliefs
and ideologies” (Gentzler, 2001, p. 36).
Venuti’s main thesis is that translation tends to be an invisible practice in the
United States. By invisible, he means that the translators tend to be selfeffacing in their work, denying their own voice in favour of that of the author
and / or the prevailing styles in the receiving culture, and that in translation
criticism, scholars tend to ignore the decisions and mediations of the
translators, commenting instead as if they have direct access to the author.
Translations are judged to be successful when they read “fluently,” giving the
appearance that they have not been translated” (Gentzler, 2001, p. 36)
Simultaneous interpreters may recognize this discourse of invisibility and flow.
Gentzler’s intellectual strands in the history of translation studies overlap and
expand upon five types of equivalence described by Hatim (2001) on the basis of their
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“What Will advocates…is an approach that translates not what a work means, but
the energy or ‘thrust’ of a work, for which there is no ‘correct’ way of translating.
He writes: ‘Translation is par excellence the process by which the thrust behind the
verbal works of man … can be directly transferred, carried on, allowed to continue.
…Works of literature are highly organized instances of such thrust … these blocks
force themselves on, through time, from culture to culture (Will, 1973: 155).’ This
‘thrust’ is a new concept … Translation is less seen as a ‘carrying over’ of content,
but as a ‘carrying on’ of the content in language. In translation, texts are reborn,
given new life, stimulated with new energy … Meaning is redefined by Will not as
something behind the words or text, not as an ‘essence’ in a traditional metaphysical
sense, but as something different, as thrust or energy…a possible/impossible paradox
of language which not only defines the translation process, but defines how we come
to know ourselves through language” (Gentzler, 2001, p. 28-19).
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academic discipline: formal equivalence from the field of linguistics (i.e., Catford);
dynamic equivalence from the field of sociolinguistics (i.e., Nida); pragmatic equivalence
from the field of structural linguistics (e.g., Koller); text-based equivalence from the field
of poetics (Beaugrande), and foreignization and equivalence from the field of cultural
studies (Venuti). What distinguishes Gentzler’s organization from Hatim’s is that Hatim
appears to accept the assumptions of equivalence, while Gentzler highlights the fact that
there is always a non dit - that is, in any translation there is always something left unsaid.
In other words, Gentzler’s starting point is the impossibility of equivalence.
“Translation theory is not easy,” he explains. “Rather, it involves complex theories of
meaning and complex social forces creating numerous barriers, in addition to the already
prohibitive linguistic ones” (2001, p. xi-xii). Hatim is by no means arguing that
translation is easy, however he provides a sense that it can be packaged within academic
boundaries. Gentzler disagrees, highlighting the “interdisciplinary… incompatibilities…
[which] show how such problems of communication and exchange are grounded in the
differing theoretical assumptions of each approach” (p. 2). Gentzler also argues for the
inherent value of translation studies, which has provided “a first look into the black box
of the human mind as it works and reworks” the tasks of interpretation (p. 35).
Rather than a (structuralist) emphasis on equivalence, Gentzler describes creative
discovery, how translation “simultaneously reinforces and subverts” (2001, p. 9) because
“the very limits and constraints of the activity of translating seem to help in making
possible new verbal constructions” (p. 36). This inherently creative play results in “the
possibility of challenging norms and creating new forms of expression” (p. vii).
Gentzler’s analysis corresponds with and reflects the influence of Lawrence Venuti, who
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calls the question on the equivalence paradigm (with its privileging of the source text and
its emphasis on transfer) with his 1998 work, The Scandals of Translation: Towards an
Ethics of Difference.

2.4.3

Foreignization
What does it mean to foreignize? Venuti poses foreignization as a counterpoint

not only to the idea of equivalence, but also to the values assigned to fluency. “Venuti
sets up two paradigms for translation: one he calls fluent and the other foreignizing; one
opts for acceptable uses of linguistic and cultural terms and images| and the other ab-uses
or chooses alternatives” (Gentzler, 2001, p. 41-42). Venuti questions any representation,
explanation or definition “that mystifies…[translation] as an untroubled communicative
act” (emphasis added, 1998, p. 11).74
While there are significant differences in the communication event of
writing/reading a translated literary work and the communication event of participating in
live simultaneous interpretation, the paradigm conflict between fluency and
foreignization holds. The intercultural setting made manifest by the need for live
interpretation highlights how fluency domesticates and assimilates what is foreign, alien,
or just different even when there is only one language involved.

74

Full context: “The very function of translating is assimilation, the inscription of a
foreign text with domestic intelligibilities and interests. I follow Berman (1992:4-5;
cf. his revision in 1995:93-94) in suspecting any literary translation that mystifies
this inevitable domestication as an untroubled communicative act. Good translation
is demystifying: it manifests in its own language the foreignness of the foreign text
(Berman 1985:89)” (Venuti, 1998, p. 11).

70

As an example, Gentzler (2008) analyses an intralingual translation that illustrates
how
a retelling of the same story in the same language is always going to be a
different story…Translation enters the novel less by the juxtaposition of
language and more by the juxtaposition of culture and sexuality. In this
motel at the edge of the civilization, run by women and with many women
guests, the only male figure in the book, “L’homme long”
(“Longman/Oblong Man”), comes to represent the foreign. He is the
outsider, his arrogance does not fit in, and his devices—the mathematical
equations in his writings, the pornography that he reads in his room, the
gun that he hides under a napkin—represent a threat to the community.
One of the hardest parts in the translation is not to assimilate the foreign,
and in this case the goal is not to assimilate the male figure, who also most
of the time is polite and treats people with respect. While Maude Laures
[the protagonist in the novel, a translator] is able to capture the chaos,
ecstasy, energy, and sexuality radiated by [an antagonist] Angela Parkins,
whether she captures the foreignness as she translates L’homme long into
l’homme’oblong is debatable. (Gentzler, p. 63-64)75
Gentzler is not claiming that l’homme’oblong’s difference is completely erased in the
translation, but he seems to suspect that some of the aspects of culture, socialization, and
personality that make L’homme long such a remarkable contrast and obvious outsider in
the situation are muted, dulled, perhaps sacrificed in service of faithfulness, accuracy and
similarity to the source text.76
In other words, too much fluency can hide power. Venuti elaborates:
A translation always communicates an interpretation, a foreign text that is
partial and altered, supplemented with features peculiar to the translating
75

Le désert mauve by Nicole Brossard (1987).
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“Brossard’s fiction,” explains Gentlzer, “for the first time to my knowledge, allows
the reader to enter that cultural space of translators in their own unique element.
Brossard’s fiction attests to the intensity of the behind-the-scenes work carried out
by translators, and metaphorically reveals the displaced nature of an individual
caught between two languages and cultures, such as the entire population of Quebec”
(2008, p. 63).
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language, no longer inscrutably foreign but made comprehensible in a
distinctively domestic style. Translations, in other words, inevitably
perform a work of domestication. Those that work best, the most powerful
in recreating cultural values and the most responsible in accounting for
that power, usually engage readers in domestic terms that have been
defamiliarized to some extent, made fascinating by a revisionary
encounter with a foreign text. (1998, p. 5)
Domestication, in this usage, refers to shaping the communication in terms familiar to the
receiving culture’s frameworks or worldview, rather than maintaining frames or aspects
of worldview that are disconcerting because of cultural difference, that is, because of the
alien or other-ness of the source. No doubt there are double standards that skew when and
to what extent source texts are domesticated or not.
For instance, in a critique of a specific, linguistic-oriented theory usually applied
to live conversation (Grice’s (1968/1989) cooperative principle), Venuti notes that “the
remainder, the possibility for variation in any linguistic conjunction, means that the
translator works in an asymmetrical relationship, always cooperating more with the
domestic than the foreign culture and usually with one constituency among others”
(1998, p. 22). It is in that ‘cooperation’ with the domestic, that is, the rendering of target
language fluency and comfortable cultural reference points and markers that the
foreignness of an original (e.g., source language) can be left unexpressed, creating the
remainder or non dit. “Fluent strategies…mystify their domestication of the foreign text
while reinforcing dominant domestic values—notably the major language, the standard
dialect, [and] possibly other cultural discourses” (Venuti, 1998, p. 22).
The display of fluency to make translation appear easy and feel smooth is what
Venuti means by mystification. Challenges, gaps, unbridged differences and hierarchies
of power can be hidden by fluency. The co-construction of understanding is mystified,
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shared meaning made mysterious, because there is little evidence and few clues to the
presence of alternatives. It is against this homogenizing force of fluency that Venuti
poses the strategy of foreignization.77 Specifically, to resist and remedy domestication,
Venuti suggests that translators reproduce the features in language
that signal linguistic and cultural difference…Such translation techniques
expose the illusion of transparency by making the translator’s work visible,
and thereby encouraging a rethinking of the secondary, derivative status of
the translator. They also, ironically, preserve important elements of the
source text that frequently are smoothed over, elided, and / or adapted to
the point that they are no longer recognizable. (Gentzler, 2001, p. 39)
In other words, foreignizing preserves cultural difference. While this section refers
specifically to written translation of literature (especially fiction and poetry), the
relationships of translators to texts, their authors, and audiences in regard to language and
communication is not substantially different from the relationships of interpreters to live
utterances and interpretees. Remember, for instance, Hawaiians’ choices about
participating (and not participating) in interpreting and translation activities (Aiu, 2010)
as a way of conducting “ethnic boundary maintenance” (Kroskrity, 2000, p. 25).
Venuti’s influence on translation studies and translation itself can hardly be
overstated. In the Forward to her edited volume, Translation, Resistance, Activism, Maria
Tymoczko (2010) states: “Venuti’s writings on translation as a mode of resistance and his
calls for action addressed to translators were central in motivating discourses about
translation, ethics, ideology, and agency” (p. vii). Gentzler too argues that “Venuti’s
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Venuti characterizes foreignization as a minoritizing strategy: “Minoritizing
translation can…move between cultural constituencies precisely because its
heterogeneous discourse is able to support diverse notions of coherence that circulate
among different constituencies” (1998, p. 23).

73

approach outlines the first step in rethinking translation, exposing certain assumptions
held by those in institutions governing translation and opening the way for alternative
approaches, Venuti’s and others’” (2001, p. 43).

2.5

Researcher’s Positionality
As researcher, I occupy an interesting positionality (Herr & Anderson, 2005) with

respect to the research site. I am an insider of the profession of simultaneous
interpretation and an outsider to the European Parliament. During the interviews with EP
Interpreters it was common for interpreters to note my identity as an American, e.g., “We
don’t get too many of those around here” (EPI #48), while identifying with me on the
basis of the daunting challenge of providing spontaneous interpretation with integrity.
My differences were of note to some and not to others.78 I blended in as a white
person.79 Many people speak English with a vast array of accents, making my Americanness not particularly obvious. One female Member shared with me an in-depth feminist
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My being American did seem relevant during some conversations with European
Parliament Interpreters during the preliminary research phase in 2005, however as a
general dynamic the more salient identification was my professional training and
experience as an American Sign Language/English interpreter. In 2008-2009, a few
Members of the EP were intrigued by my background, but most remained focused on
their own thoughts and experiences of being an interpretee in the Parliament.
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The relevance of whiteness is construed differently in Europe than in the United
States (and differently in different parts of Europe), but there can be no denying the
colonial past or the privileged present. The research conclusions do imply that
whiteness is intertwined with language use in simultaneous interpretation, but a
specific race-based analysis is not conducted. Do make note, however, of the
contrasting examples that are provided (e.g., Apache (Basso, 1996), Hawaiians (Aiu,
2010), Huarani (Carcelen-Estrada, 2010), Xavante (Graham, 1995).
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critique of the gendered and engendering dynamics of political interaction in the EP.80 On
a few occasions lesbians co-identified with me and provided helpful background support.
I also received substantial assistance, input and guidance from numerous heterosexuals,
both male and female.

2.5.1

Questioning Norms
Consistency in the frame of the researcher is a condition for the success of

strategic intent (Eden & Huxham, 1996, p. 533). In this case, the intention is to draw the
intelligence of Members of the European Parliament to matters of language ideology and
the (collective, ritualized) communication practices that they inspire in order to motivate
a broad re-evaluation of assumptions about interpreting practices.81 “The really valuable
insights,” say Eden and Huxham, “are often those that emerge… in ways that cannot be
foreseen” (p. 533). Real surprises did in fact emerge, slowly and over time, through a
continuous process of conversational interviews loosely following Kolb’s (1984)
experiential learning cycle of inquiry, comprehension, re-evaluation, and new/revised
comprehension. In these conversations, I would ask questions, text my comprehension,
re-consider new/different angles and perceptions, generate new understandings and
generally do a lot of thinking out loud.
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In reference to gender and “multiple inequalities” in the EU, Mieke Verloo argues: “It
has become clear that attention to structural mechanisms and to the role of the state
and the private sphere in reproducing inequalities is much needed” (2006, p. 211).

81

For instance: “The negative effects of these [identified] factors [of source language
production by MEPs] on the interpreter’s performance have been discussed in the SI
literature (e.g., Gerver 1969, Seleskovitch 1982, Lederer 1978/2002), yet the practice
of reading out written speeches from manuscripts continues” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p.
184).
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In order to really comprehend the system, it was necessary for me to question
norms and explore the boundaries of acceptable practice. Occasionally this brought me
into conflict with the administration, enough so that at one point I thought about calling
the method guerrilla research. In an effort to pursue “the opportunities for triangulation
that do not offer themselves with other methods” (Eden & Huxhom, 1996, p. 539), on
one occasion (during the second research period, 2008-2009), I slipped postcards under
the doors of the interpreters’ booths during a meeting that I was observing, asking them
to email me if they noticed any glitches with the communication. The principle of action
research is that such efforts must be “exploited fully and reported. They should be used as
a dialectical device” (p 539).
Soon afterwards, I was cautioned that my badge (issued by an MEP) would be
revoked (by the administration) if I entered the interpreters’ booth space again. On
another occasion, after being advised (from the left hand, so to speak) that interpreters
might be willing to help me on a volunteer basis during unscheduled time, interpreters
were directed (from the right hand, as it were) not to cooperate with my requests for
interpreting assistance. After these boundaries were established I was cautious not to
violate them, although I did persist in posting in my blog and some people (from within
and outside of Parliament) did engage me via email.
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There were public demonstrations of support for my research by interpreters
(some of whom held positions within the AIIC Negotiating Delegation for the EU82) who
supported and encouraged me offline, and a few who would leave their booth and
approach me, visible to everyone, where I sat for observations at a desk on the floor of
meeting rooms, asking if they could be of particular assistance to me in that setting. The
politics of my presence was made apparent. My hope, then and now, is to transcend
controversy by focusing on the research outcomes, which are of general interest to
anyone concerned with language difference and cultural equality, and in particular how
these can be mobilized to stabilize economies and ease local conflict.

2.6

The Premier Case Study
In 2004, Anna-Riita Vuorikoski published her study of political speech in the

European Parliament, assessing “whether interpreters’ versions of the speeches allowed
the listeners to receive the same impression of the speakers’ messages and intentions as
people receive when listening to the original” (p. 16). She gave special attention to the
collaboration from Members in generating source texts (STs) that facilitate “an
unhampered flow of communication in a meeting (cf Kalina 2002)” (p. 16). She focused
particularly on qualities of “planned and scripted texts [that] are part of the discourse”
during plenaries (p. 19), contrasting these with the orality (cf Shlesinger) of speeches
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The International Association of Conference Interpreters (AIIC) is “a worldwide
representative organisation, AIIC…[who] negotiates the terms and conditions of the
interpreters who work for the EU organisations. The sector includes several
institutions, chief amongst them are: European Commission, European Parliament
and the European Court of Justice. The AIIC-EU Agreement applies to all
interpreters who work for the institutions, members and non-members alike.”
Retrieved 4 March 2014, from http://aiic.net/directories/aiic/sectors/.
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delivered without a written text. Her research is firmly planted in the equivalence
paradigm, focused on “the faithful transmission of a source language message, rendered
accurately in the target language” (emphasis in original, p. 19).83 [Notice: If I rewrote her
statement to reflect the emphasis of this communication research it would be on
transmission.]84 She clarifies, importantly, that “these criteria (accuracy, faithfulness,
etc.) will not advance our understanding of SI quality unless they are linked with a
theoretically grounded analysis of empirical material” (p. 88).
Vuorikoski maintains the ideological hegemony of the original speaker’s source
text through a concise yet comprehensive review of major models and theories of
interpreting. She also cites studies (Kurz, 1989; Moser, 1995) confirming that the most
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“‘Equivalence’…is an old concept in translation studies…[it] has been chosen as the
key concept for getting hold of the elusive idea of ‘sense consistency with the
original message’, which, according to theories of interpreting, is not, and must
never be, tantamount to word-for-word translation” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 22).
Vuorikoski acknowledges that the framing of her “[research] question echoes
Eugene Nida’s (1969) ideas of dynamic equivalence as well as the definition by
Déjean Le Féal (1990)” (p. 25). She also cites Halverson (1998), Lederer (1977),
Mackintosh (1995) and Snell-Hornby (1988).
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The argument will show that an exclusive emphasis on the transmission of
information feeds the illusions of faithfulness and accuracy, ritually recreating the
myth of their possibility rather than engaging what Vuorikoski also acknowledges:
“on-the-job experiences both in the EP and elsewhere have repeatedly confirmed the
observation that non-correspondences between the original speeches and their
interpreted versions are the rule rather than an exception. This observation has been
confirmed by I[nterpreting] S[tudies] scholars starting with Oléron and Nanpon
(1965/2002), Gerver (1969/2002), and Barik (1975/2002)…[and others]” (2004, p.
89-90). The argument of this dissertation is that the fact of non-correspondence
neither invalidates meaning-making nor destroys meaningful connections (e.g.,
Chang, 1995). The fact of non-correspondence is not, however, construed as an
excuse or justification for poor performances, but is predicated on faith in the
integrity of interpreters. As Vuorikoski puts it, “We can take it for granted, however,
that interpreters strive for maximum correspondence with the original speech,
including maximum accuracy and faithfulness” (italics in original, p. 90).
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important criteria for (so-called) “end users of SI” (p. 45) is the sense consistency of the
interpreter’s version of ‘the message’ with the speaker’s version of ‘the message.’ Kurz’s
and Moser’s surveys were influenced by a survey Bühler (1986) conducted of “linguistic
(semantic) and extra-linguistic (pragmatic) criteria” used by established professionals
within the profession when considering the admission of new professional colleagues to
the elite International Association of Conference Interpreters (known by its French
acronym, AIIC) (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 44). In other words, even though designed to
assess the priorities of interpretees, the items available for rating by end-users were predetermined by interpreters.
Recognizing some limits of this framing, such as the fact that “most members of
the audience do not concentrate on comparing the original with the interpreter’s version
even if it were technically possible” (p. 46), Vuorikoski (2004) designed another study85
which investigated whether audience members believed the “interpreting had been
‘informed’” (p. 46). Despite reducing the criteria and seeking to adapt the terminology
for non-linguist laypersons, she still encountered difficulties: individuals did not
necessarily attribute the same meanings to the terms, in some cases revealing that they
did not interpret the dynamics of the interpreting process in the same ways as interpreters
themselves. Vuorikoski concluded: “the quality criteria were not operational for research
purposes as they meant different things to different people” (p. 47).
Leaving aside the problem of assessing interpretees’ evaluations of interpreting
quality, Vuorokoski refined her question to seek the features in target texts (TTs: the
85

Prior to the 2004 study summarized in detail here. Vuorikoski conducted a survey
with audience members in 1995, using the metric of “informed.” See Vuorikoski
(1993, 1995, 1997).
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interpreted versions of speeches) that “convey the ‘sense of the original message’,
enabling those listening to the interpreters to have the same basis for creating an
impression of the incoming speech as those listening directly to the original” (emphasis
in original, 2004, p. 48). While acknowledging communication as transaction,86
Vuorikoski presents her research fully within the traditional linguistics-oriented
paradigm. She asserts that “professional interpreters have described the task of the
interpreter…[in] the core issues of communication, that is, how ideas are expressed and
how the ideas of others are understood” (p. 50). Vuorikoski’s focus is on the ideas (aka,
information).
Performing a comparative content analysis brought her right up against the
problem of meaning. “Pragmatics together with cognitive linguistics, not to mention the
key philosophers of language, provide a number of approaches to and definitions of what
is meant by ‘meaning’. (See e.g., Meyer 1986; Leech 1991/1983: 30-35)” (Vuorikoski,
2004, p. 59). Vuorikoski chooses a psycholinguistically-informed macro-structural
method combining Pöchhacker (1994) and Shlesinger (1989a) in order to “focus…on the
substance of the speeches and on the issue of the interpreter’s primary task of conveying
this substance to listeners” (p. 59). She adapts Williams (2001) argumentation theory (in
keeping with new rhetoric theory, e.g., Kenneth Burke, Chaim Perelman (1982) and
Stephen Toulmin)87 for the content analysis rather than worrying about microtextual
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Quoting Hatim & Mason (1990), see more on the conceptual difference between
interaction and transaction in chapter six.
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“New rhetoric covers all discourse that does not aim at general truths. In new
rhetoric, ‘argument’ refers to the various textual means of aiming at either accepting
or rejecting the thesis under dispute” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 60, cf Perelman &
Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958/1968).
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errors or omissions. This move seems to open up more roles of participation in the
interpreted event, because the role of the audience is crucial: “In Perelman’s view, there
is no argumentation without an audience” (p. 60).
The size of Vuorikoski’s (2004) corpus of “120 speeches and interventions” (p.
91) made by MEPs and members of the European Commission during plenary debates in
a hemicycle at the European Parliament, and the diligence of her analysis of the
spontaneously-generated interpretations by European Parliament interpreters, are beyond
impressive.88 She has carefully selected and blended insights from a variety of theorists in
translation studies, discourse analysis (especially Adam, 1999) and cognitive linguistics
(Setton, 1999). Controls are established to obtain a corpus across authentic, parallel
simultaneous interpretations of original speeches to overcome the limitations of previous
studies (cf Gile, 1990; Kalina, 1998; Setton, 1999; Pöchhacker, 1994).
The conditions of video-recording several interpreters’ simultaneous
interpretations for comparison with the video-recorded original speeches by Members are
carefully laid out within the macrostructure of the European Parliament as a producer of
its own unique genre. The specific context of each recorded plenary meeting is explained
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The 120 original speeches include 54 in English, 11 in Finnish, 44 in German and 11
in Swedish, and “includes the interpretations of these speeches into these four
languages, i.e., three [target text] versions of each speech” and “the verbatim reports
…[which] contain slightly edited versions of all the speeches in the original
languages” and additional supporting materials (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 92). Seventyseven speakers compose the entire corpus; excluded are speeches made in Danish,
Dutch, French, Greek, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish (p. 96). For the analysis, there
are “65 speeches by 50 speakers…the exact number of interpreters…is more difficult
to count…the 37 interpreters (three per language booth plus the extra pivots) take
their turns according to their language combination. A rough estimate of the number
of interpreters included in the corpus is 30; the report discusses the TTs of around 20
interpreters” (p. 97-98).
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within the context of a very structured monthly flow of committee and political group
meetings (two weeks and one week, respectively) in preparation for the full parliament
plenaries (one week). She explains that most utterances of Members in debate are
document-driven, that is, in reference to a report or pending piece of legislation, although
some refer to institutional issues or politics more broadly.
With the exception of the meetings of the political groups, the debates of
all the regular meetings are based on documents, most typically draft
legislation. This has an immediate influence on the nature of the discourse
that interpreters are expected to interpret. The printed documents contain
not only codes, terms and concepts that are part of the speakers’ discourse,
but they also contain text passages that speakers may quote by reciting
them from the documents. (p. 80)
The provision of documents in a timely manner is thus one indicator of Members’
collaboration with interpreters. Vuorikoski does not elaborate on this except to point out
situations when “interpreters received them shortly prior to the start of the debate, which
meant that there was not enough time to read the documents beforehand” (p. 82).89
Overall, Vuorikoski proceeds on the presumption that “the speaker plays a crucial role in
the achievement of quality in interpreting…the key question…to explore is what
facilitates this collaboration and what may obstruct it” (p. 88).
Refining the research question, Vuorikoski moves to investigate the extent to
which non-correspondences (that is, non-equivalencies) between the interpreted version
and the original version “hamper the listener from creating an equivalent representation
of the speaker’s message to that of a fellow member of the audience listening to the
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“The documents containing the MEPs’ draft resolutions only reach the interpreters’
booths shortly before they are discussed. Consequently, interpreters have only a
limited time to have a look at them before the debate begins” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p.
216).
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original speaker” (2004, p. 90). She could be establishing a foundation for broadening the
analysis from a strict comparison between the two texts (original, interpreted) to include a
triangulation of meaning-making among audience members. Most significantly, by the
careful research design guaranteeing multiple versions generated under identical
conditions, Vuorikoski has established a way of locating common causes for omissions
and errors (classic evidence of non-correspondence) in the source language as uttered by
the speaker rather than in the interpreted version rendered by the interpreter.
Building on the assumption that interpreters are aiming for maximum
correspondence, however it is labelled (as accuracy or faithfulness), “if at least two of the
three interpreters fail to convey information that is relevant or important considering the
speech as an entity, this failure may be caused by some characteristic in the ST [source
text]” (emphasis in original, Vuorkikoski, 2004, p. 98). Her goal is “to find features in the
STs that can be used to determine the de facto constraints of the SI method” (p. 100).
Vuorikoski distinguishes between “minor non-correspondences between the STs and TTs
which…shift the angle or emphasis of the original to some extent, but the audience will
still get the main gist of the speaker’s message…[and instances when] the information
content of the ST may be translated [sic] incorrectly, or that essential elements of the
content have been omitted” (p. 104).
In keeping with the political context, three categories of deviations (in the TT
from the ST) proved significant: rhetorical devices, argumentation features, and semantic
or propositional content (Vuorkikoski, 2004, p. 107). These are explored in “different text
profiles from the point of view of SI processing”: specifically a general topic that “does
not set high demands;” an EU topic requiring institutional knowledge, and topics or
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issues “which require an up-to-date knowledge of world affairs” (p. 117). These typical
(to the EP) text profiles are broken down in terms of the main arguments and speech acts
in the ST and the non-correspondences in the TTs (p. 118). Crucially, in the context of
the EP, the most important goals of argumentation are “1) to make the audience adhere to
the argumentation; 2) to make the argumentation more effective; 3) to make the argument
more persuasive” (Vuorikoski summarizing Perelman, 2004, p. 126).

2.6.1

Key Finding: Social Problems are More Relevant than Linguistic Problems
Regarding the matter of speakers collaborating with interpreters, the most

consistent and dramatic patterns involve speed. Both the pace of delivery and turn-taking
often occur too quickly for interpreters to accomplish a quality rendition. For instance,
In the corpus at hand, interpreters often omit material from the final points
of the speech. This may be determined by the speech situation where
interpreters have to finish speaking immediately after the speaker has
stopped, as the President will give the floor to the next speaker,
mentioning his name and political group. These are items that must be
rendered by the interpreters, too. Here is a paradoxical situation.
Interpreters are instructed to lag behind the speaker in order to get hold of
the idea he [or she] is developing before producing their SI version. Yet in
the fast moving debate interpreters must stop speaking as soon as the
speaker finishes. Thus, even if they only lag a little bit behind the speaker
they may have to skip several items of the speech, or condense the final
phrases into something that sounds logical in the context. Consequently,
the rhetorical effect of the original speech is lost in the TTs. (Vuorikoski,
2004, p. 126)
Vuorikoski’s finding confirms and corroborates Gerver’s previous finding (1969/2002),
in which he “was able to conclude that simultaneous interpreting provides empirical
proof of ‘an information-handling system which is subject to overload if required to
carry out more complex processes at too fast a rate and copes with overload by reaching
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a steady state of throughput at the expense of an increase in errors and omissions’”
(emphasis in original, Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 99).
In other words, in addition to the pace demand, the desire for flow forces
interpreters to (try to) generate prosody (‘something that sounds logical’) according to the
(familiar) terms of the target language (an example of what Venuti would call
domestication) at the expense of the (supposedly more important) content of the source
language. Also, the equivalence criterion of ‘sense consistency with the original message’
combined with the time demand often puts interpreters in the position of needing to
choose between “the semantic content and the illocutionary force of an argument”
(Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 128). As with any speech act in any communication event, “It is up
to each interpreter to decide what that ‘sense’ is” (p. 131); each interpretee and noninterpretee (in the case of Members listening to the original because they share that
language) also individually decides ‘the sense’ of the message. Rarely questioned is the
assumption that all listeners (without the mediation of SI) not only could, but actually do
interpret the original in the same way. Assuming a uniform, automatic correspondence of
comprehension between source text and all receivers is also troubled by the evidence of
non-correspondences in interpreted texts.
Specifically, “when the speaker’s rate of delivery is fast, and the ST syntax is
complicated, consisting of agent constructions and several qualifiers, for example,
interpreters are no longer able to convey all the lexical and illocutionary elements of the
speech” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 142-143). The speech act category of implied criticism is
also more difficult to interpret “in a rapid flow of speech” (p. 143). Additionally,
“metaphorical language is often the reason for discontinuities in the TT’s” (p. 150) and
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“in most cases, figurative speech is not conveyed successfully in the TTs” (p. 163).
Vuorikoski does not speculate if a reason for this may be the (lack) of additional
processing time provided to interpreters in order to comprehend the work that a metaphor
is being used for in the given instance and also compose a suitable parallel. She does
make a temporal link with humor, irony and sarcasm: “these rhetoric devices may not be
easy to identify in a rapid flow of speech, nor to translate and produce at the pace set by
the speaker” (p. 167).
Vuorikoski also suggests that omissions or inaccuracies in interpreting “EUrelated concepts” into TTs (2004, p. 172), which are assumed to be known by interpreters
on the basis of experience and general job preparation,90 “may be due to the fast rate at
which the speaker reads” (p. 173). She contextualizes non-correspondences involving
retour interpretations: “It has to be borne in mind, again, that the STs were written and
read from scripts without pauses or marked emphasis on individual terms, concepts or
other keywords” (p. 177). “Even the most frequent abbreviations,” she continues,
“…[tend] to suffer in a rapid stream of ST speech, complicated by a relatively dense
syntax…as well as colorful expressions (‘tinkering with funding’) in collocation with EU
terminology ([in this case] CAP programs)” (p. 178-179). Generally, “an increase in
presentation rate, and a decrease in the length and number of pauses separating meaning
units, correlate positively with the number of omissions and errors” (p. 236).
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“Speakers expect the names of the various EU or other international conferences to
be shared knowledge” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 170); and “In terms of shared
background knowledge it can be assumed that MEPs as well as interpreters with
experience at the EP know what is meant by the various Objectives and how the
Structural Funds are governed and administered” (p. 202).
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Tools that work to clue interpreters in to features of argumentation include
repetition (e.g., p. 148); rhetorical questions (p. 148-149); “using uncomplicated
[syntactical] structures” (p. 197); “coherence…which focuses on one point” (p. 197);
“focusing on key issues...[and] present[ing] ideas or questions in a straightforward
manner” (p. 206); “clearly marked themes” (p. 226); “adjust[ing written speeches] for
oral presentation” (p. 226); and contributing to prior knowledge of interpreters through
advance provision of documents. When “interpreters have the opportunity to become
familiar with the topic and the key concepts of the meeting[,] They can therefore be
expected to have at least some degree of shared knowledge with the speakers” (emphasis
added, p. 152). Implied is that speeches that conform to a rhetorical pattern consistent
with the unique genre of the EP are also more likely to be interpreted effectively. These
rhetorical features include:
●

the speeches are characterized by traditional structure of argumentation: the speakers
introduce their topic, discuss it, and conclude by presenting their final point;

●

the main arguments are based on values shared by EU;
o the MEPs are acting as guardians of democracy;
o MEPs as spokesmen of the citizens;
o they emphasize the role of the European Parliament;

●

they indicate the speakers’ stance towards the topic of the meeting. (Vuorikoski,
2004, p. 153)

This is a discourse structure that interpreters will assume as a roadmap to where one is
going (see Tebble on discourse analysis in chapter three).
One speech in Vuorikoski’s corpus “contained the largest number of various types
of non-correspondences with the original. The speech is clearly a carefully prepared

87

written document. The speaker simply read it out loud from the manuscript and most of
the argumentation was lost in all three TT versions” (2004, p. 154). Interpreters seemed
not to have had access to the prepared text; or at least not in time to actually read and
process it.
[This] confirms what Setton has observed in his study: ‘Even in
professional SI, serious breakdowns may occur when concentrated written
text is read as it stands with no warning or documentary support, […]”
(1999: 256).
In contrast to that German speech, the English speeches delivered [in the
same setting] can all be characterized as more spoken-like in their rhetoric
formation and their argumentation. There are very few instances where all
three interpreters omit relevant items or argumentation or distort the
meaning altogether. (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 154)
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All of the analysis leads to a major conclusion: “Failures in TTs are to a large extent
linked with the characteristics of the ST” (p. 155).91

2.6.1.1

The Unshared Knowledge Constraint
It is well established in the SI literature that “the availability—or

unavailability—of shared information may affect the interpreter’s reconstruction of the
speaker’s message (Shlesinger 1995b: 195)” (in Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 216). For her
(2004) research, Vuorikoski included a session called ‘debates on topical and urgent
subjects of major importance’ based on her own experience. “When I was working as a
freelance interpreter for the EU…this session taxes the interpreter’s world knowledge
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Not allowing time exacerbates other problems in the source texts (STs), which
include: use of “a coined compound like ‘intergovernmentalism’” (p. 165); sarcastic
analogies (p. 166); “a witty rhetoric device of adapting a familiar figure of speech”
(p. 166-167); “ad hoc metaphors” (p. 169); personification (p. 171-172); “if the
speaker refers to isolated issues…as well as political items…which have no
metatextual links to previous utterances” (p. 174) or are “lack[ing] metatextual
elements for linking the various items, or for foregrounding them” (p. 191);
acronyms and/or “the reasons for referring to them” can be problematic during retour
(p. 175); complicated syntax such as deixis, reiteration, and “the use of marked
syntactic constructions like [in this example] nicht +noun – sondern + noun) in order
to highlight the main argument” (p. 180), and (for an example of complicated syntax
in English) a segment containing “eight elements that need to be
processed…[including] some of these items do not have a direct equivalent in other
languages (‘fail to complete’, telecoms’)” (p. 182); “ideas are expressed in long and
complicated sentences” (p. 184) or “dense with references to various proper names
and concepts” (p. 191); “facts and figures are easily confused” (p. 222); “lists” (p.
228); “semantically close lexical units” (p. 221); “alternating between reading
from…notes and speaking freely” (p. 199); in sum, certain syntactic elements such
as “linguistic devices creating cohesion and coherence in a written text; negative
constructions; genitive constructions with several modifiers; elliptic infinite
constructions that contain several objects” are “unsuited for the oral translation [sic]
of aurally received texts” (emphasis added, p. 208). In particular, “Speeches [that]
have been prepared and written in advance [if] they tend to follow the cohesive
devices that are characteristic of literary style” (p. 226).
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even more than either the debates on the reports dealing with draft legislation or the
debates dealing with EU institutional issues” (p. 216). The sample reported in her
analysis includes “human rights issues…that could be described as exotic or remote
from the point of view of a rank-and-file interpreter” (p. 218). Again, she notes that
many (if not most or even nearly all) of the identified problems with STs are
compounded by “the fact that speakers read their texts, referring to issues and names
that are not known to the interpreters” (p. 231).
Sharing knowledge is possible only under conditions of “mutual intelligibility”
(drawing upon Bakhtin (1984), in Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 68). This is the lens Vuorikoski
applies: “The discourse of the European Parliament…is an example of a genre created
within one institution, and the features of this genre can be studied from the point of
view of discourse analysis, pragmatics in particular, and text linguistics” (p. 67-68).
Generating “mutual understanding” (p. 206) requires conformity to the capability
constraints of simultaneous interpretation. These are empirically identified and
theoretically explained by Vuorikoski in support of previous assertions and theory
regarding the factual nature of these constraints. Her results demonstrate divergences
in genre performances by Members of the European Parliament from the conditions
required to generate shared understanding across language differences.
Reading verbatim from texts written with literary conventions violates orality.
“Shlesinger [1989] uses ‘orality’ to mean the spoken-like vs written-like character of the
text, as distinct from its mode” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 42). Two of Shlesinger’s four
parameters of orality are relevant to Vuorikoski’s study: the “degree of planning” (which
implicates time) and “shared context and knowledge” (p. 42) “Shared context, which
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includes knowledge pertaining to the speaker; the intention of the utterance; situational
and circumstantial parameters, and other extralinguistic knowledge” (emphasis in
original, p. 43) comes into play with the provision of speech texts and other supporting
documentation prior to interpreting assignments. “When evaluating the performances of
the interpreters in the present corpus, the parameter of shared context is crucial, and the
aspect of shared knowledge in particular” (p. 43).92
Meetings for urgent issues involving human rights and democracy are conducted
under the same regime of simultaneous interpretation as other meetings. Interpreters may
or may not receive documentation or texts of speeches in advance. “The speaker has been
assigned 3 minutes’ speaking time. He has a written speech which he recites in a manner
typical of a classroom reading exercise” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 219). The analysis in this
context highlights the impact of the lack of shared knowledge between MEPs and
interpreters (p. 96). “The more specific the speaker is, the less of the content of the
speech is conveyed in the TT. This is even more so when the speech is read at a fast rate”
(p. 219). Comparing the practically random scene of an urgent meeting with the scene of
other meetings in which interpreters have already read the report and related documents,
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Vuorikoski presents Lederer’s view on shared knowledge in relation to notions of
equivalence: “For Lederer, finding an ’equivalent’ expression in the TL is not the
best method of interpreting. In her view, the important element of ’intelligent’
interpreting is to be free of the wording of the original speech. According to her
theory, the best method is to produce an ’intelligent’ interpretation instead of merely
establishing equivalents between two languages. According to her observations, this
procedure is resorted to by interpreters until they have accumulated shared
knowledge with the speaker(s). Once the interpreter begins to understand the theme
and topic of the speech he is translating, he probes more and more deeply into the
intended meaning of the speaker, leading to a different SI technique where the
interpretation departs from the linguistic meaning of the source text (1978/2001:
132)” (in Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 53).
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Vuorikoski’s empirical evidence shows beyond a doubt that “the interpreter’s knowledge
of the topic of the meeting does, in fact, have a positive effect on the quality of
interpreting’ (p. 152).
Three inter-related features of the system of SI in the EP are drawn into highrelief by Vuorikoski’s study: temporality, varying quality of source text production by
speakers, and the degree of effort given to constructing shared knowledge among
interpreters and interpretees within the shared institutional context. Another problem that
confounds interpretation involves the integrity of speakers’ utterances. “Accuracy of
interpreting would be greatly enhanced if the speech acts were conveyed faithfully. The
party addressed, or the person used by the speaker, as well as the political group the
speaker commits himself to, should be rendered faithfully” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 208209).93

2.6.1.2

An Integrity Problem?
“If it is in the speaker’s interest that his [or her] speech is conveyed accurately

and faithfully by the interpreters, he [or she] could collaborate with interpreters by
avoiding the ST features enumerated” as problematic (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 236).
Members of the European Parliament could speak more slowly, provide more and longer
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Raunio (1996) explores the behavior of political groups in the EP during the fifth
term (1989-1994), which is the term previous to the ‘big bang enlargement’ term
covered here. Hill (2000) describes “ideological complexity” in campaign speech in
the United States “distinguish[ing] two distinct language ideological discourses: the
discourse of truth and the discourse of theater. The former is a more popular
perspective grounded in expectations of ‘informed choice’ and ‘full disclosure’ and
indexically linked to personalist readings of ‘moral character.’ The latter discourse is
controlled by campaign specialists who worry about their candidate’s ‘performing’
their ‘messages’ in appropriately staged venues” (Kroskrity, 2000, p. 18).
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pauses, minimize textual density, and adapt written scripts to an oral presentation style.
Vuorikoski has asked, “If the argumentation, the speech act, and the relevant vocabulary
are not rendered in the TT, what are the features in the ST that explain the shortcomings
in equivalence?” (p. 158). My fieldwork shows that some advice about structuring their
speeches to be more amenable to interpretation is either given to Members formally or
they learn it on their own; the question then becomes, why are Members not
cooperating?
For instance, why do Members persist in reading from manuscripts as fast as
possible without inflection when there is incontrovertible evidence this ST production
leads to interpreting errors?94 Why is the matter of interpreter overload ignored even as
MEPs complain about the evidence when “the interpreter’s output suffers, showing an
increase in the number of errors and omissions?” (p. 194). If interpreters’ outputs show
evidence of strain, this is a signal to the institution not only about information transfer,
but, importantly, about rituals of communication that establish identity and
relationship.
The problem is no longer a question about language and linguistics; it is a
question about social organization and relationships characterized by, and encompassing,
language difference. Bear in mind that Vuorikoski set out to identify and “highlight the
constraints involved in the simultaneous mode of translation [sic]” (2004, p. 185). Her
assumption “that failures in the parallel TTs in the same segment of the same ST will
provide empirical data about textual features that hamper or obstruct an accurate
94

Vuorikoski repeats the claim several times with increasing stridency: “The
simultaneous mode is particularly ill suited for the translation [sic] of a written
speech which is read from notes at a fast rate” (2004, p. 204).
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rendering of the ST [by interpreters]” (p. 184) is supported by her close analysis. To
make the case, she selected samples from the corpus that showed these problems; not
samples that effectively generated equivalence.95, 96
In nearly all cases, even the most egregious speeches, “there are segments that are
rendered quite successfully” (p. 205). Vuorikoski (2004) determined that “the more
closely interpreters conveyed elements related to argumentation, the more accurately they
managed to convey the sense of the message. These elements are not strictly languagespecific; instead, they are used to express a speaker’s line of reasoning in a way which is
common to all” and (not incidentally!) helps all listeners (my emphasis, p. 234).
Functional linguistics and textual analysis undergirds the new rhetoric/argumentation
theory Vuorikoski has deployed to diagnose the problem.97 Another frame is needed to
move to the next level.
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“The segments that were selected for close scrutiny…represent topics and linguistic
features that at least two out of three interpreters did not render correctly” (p. 236).
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Vuorikoski also emphasizes the necessity of interpreter fluency, their “knowledge
and command of the languages in question” (p. 236) and notes differences between
novice and experienced EP interpreters based on the time required to build sufficient
institutional and contextual shared knowledge (p. 174).
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“Linguistics has always been interested in problems because they bring out the contrast
between what is ’normal’ or ’standard’ and what requires further study. In the present
investigation, the problem segments were selected in order to highlight the factors
which make simultaneous interpreting difficult” (p. 236). Vuorikoski names “three
main angles” of analysis suited to the EP’s unique genre (rhetorical elements, speech
acts, and the semantic and syntactic aspects of the speeches) “based on the premise that
essential elements of the sense of the message are contained in argumentation” (p. 233).
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2.7

Scrutinizing a Scandal
As we have seen, theoretical diversification and ungroundedness in translation

studies was challenged by Venuti and others (e.g., Aiu, 2010; Carcelen-Estrada, 2010;
Gentzler, 2008; Tymoczko, 2007, 2010). In particular, Venuti’s (1998) The Scandals of
Translation: Towards an Ethics of Difference explores, among other things, the “selfinflicted marginality” (p. x) of translation studies. “With rare exceptions,” Venuti argues,
“scholars have been reluctant to negotiate areas of agreement and to engage more deeply
with the cultural, political, and institutional problems posed by translation (for an
exception see Hatim and Mason 1997)” (p. 9).98 In contrast, interpreting studies appears
to be trying to negotiate intradisciplinary agreement without taking critical stock of the
cultural, political and institutional problems evident to at least some participants in the
field.99 This dissertation addresses this gap through a combination of foreignization and
critical discourse analysis. Juxtaposing a collectivized and empowered Deaf voice with
some critical strands of translation research brings paradigm conflict into view, raising
more questions than answers while charting, albeit optimistically, some potential
strategies for social change.
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Basil Hatim and Ian Mason build their definition of translation on the idea that all
texts are seen ‘as evidence of a communicative transaction taking place within a
social framework’ (original emphasis)…according to them, translation—including
simultaneous interpreting—is communicative discourse (1990: 2-3)” (in Vuorikoski,
2004, p. 50). For instance, regarding argumentation, Hatim & Mason note that
“persuasive strategies may differ in different cultures” (1997, p. 127).
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Critical in the context of use throughout this dissertation means taking stock of
power and keeping power in the account. Fairclough (1989, 1995) is a key resource
for critical discourse analysis, as is Stuart Hall, seminal to the field of cultural
studies, which establishes a position from which “to take some bearings about the
general question of the politics of theory” (Hall, 1992, p. 278).
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While the selection of theorists and concepts utilized in service of this action
research project may appear eclectic, it is not mere bricolage. I approach simultaneous
interpretation as an institutionalized intercultural practice, that is, as a particular and
specific kind of social organization that binds together people(s) who are inherently
diverse and heterogeneous.100 While there is no one “organization” in the literal sense of
a singular club, business, non-profit, governmental or other corporate entity that
encompasses the whole social practice of simultaneous interpreting, the essential
hypothesise of this research is that the social practice itself is unified and unifying, with
both adverse consequences and productive implications. As an intercultural social
practice, simultaneous interpretation communicates identities in time and regulates
relationships in space. The entire presentation is framed as action learning into the realm

100

Like any other social practice, interpreting and especially discourses about
interpreting, are inherently ideological. Kroskrity (2000) proposes “it is profitable to
think of ‘language ideologies’ as a cluster concept consisting of a number of
converging dimensions” (p. 7). “First, language ideologies represent the perception
of language and discourse that is constructed in the interest of a specific social or
cultural group” (p. 8). “Second, language ideologies are profitably conceived as
multiple because of the multiplicity of meaningful social divisions (class, gender,
clan, elites, generations, and so on) within sociocultural groups that have the
potential to produce divergent perspectives expressed as indices of group
membership. Language ideologies are thus grounded in social experience which is
never uniformly distributed throughout polities of any scale” (p. 12). “Third,
members may display varying degrees of awareness of local language ideologies.
While the Silverstein (1979) definition quoted above [see footnote #56] suggests that
language ideologies may often be explicitly articulated by members, researchers also
recognize ideologies of practice that must be read from actual usage” (p. 18-19).
“Finally, members’ language ideologies mediate between social structures and
forms of talk. The dynamic and synthetic role of ideologies is especially wellcaptured in Silverstein’s (1985:220) appeal to the necessity of including this often
neglected and delegitimated level of language analysis: ‘The total linguistic fact, the
datum for a science of language, is irreducibly dialectic in nature. It is an unstable
mutual interaction of meaningful sign forms contextualized to situations of interested
human use and mediated by the fact of cultural ideology’” (in Kroskrity, p. 21).
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of meta-discourse about simultaneous interpretation because it is an extension of the
researcher’s critical reflections of personal and professional experience101 on two counts
of being a privileged outsider: to Deaf culture102 and to conference interpreting.103 The
on-going action research question involves whether this foray can be continued through
engaging interpretees in addition to interpreters in more reflexivity about simultaneous
interpretation as an activist strategy for maintaining language diversity and promoting
cultural equality.
Steyaert and Janssens (2013) define three strategies for introducing reflexivity
into organizational thinking about languages: scrutinization, scandalization, and
invention. These strategies neatly describe the “action” dimension of research conducted
during conversational interviews with Members of the European Parliament. By engaging
with Members as already critical and reflexive thinkers about interpreting, our
conversations about the use and understanding of the system of interpreting in the EP
generated insights about simultaneous interpretation as a potentially productive
intervention in intercultural communication. For instance, by drawing Members’
attention to the presumed normalcy of ignoring the interpretation process, the apparently
natural trend to using English as lingua franca (ELF) was (at least potentially) troubled.
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“Experience cannot be mistaken, though we may be misled by it” (Moore, 1996, p.
73), discussing the philosophy of Henri Bergson.
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From the Deaf standpoint, I am Hearing person who learned American Sign
Language as an adult, eventually becoming an interpreter through a mix of
socializing and professional schooling.
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My status as an American researcher in Europe, my bilingualism involving a sign
language rather than another spoken language, and my career in community
interpreting all marked me as an outsider to the conference interpreting milieu in the
European Parliament.
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Steyaert and Janssons explain:
The way we use and adopt languages is never natural; instead, it is the
effect of a complex process with cultural, historical, institutional and
political dimensions. Certain standard explanations or widespread
discourses have been prioritized, implying that we have to be wary of any
kind of naturalization in language practices. (p. 133)
Establishing action research as the methodology allows investigatory latitude to deviate
from pre-scripted interviews and pre-defined problematics to explore tangents and
alternatives that were un-anticipated or otherwise emerge spontaneously during cointelligent dialogue.104
The strategy of scrutinization (Steyaert and Jannsons, 2013) is used for
“examining how certain linguistic resources are prioritized in the field and inquiring into
the various consequences of that choice” (p. 136). Scrutizination was used pervasively,
including when the other strategies of scandalization and invention were foregrounded.
Attempting to generate “awareness of and agony about the hegemony of English” (p.
134) through a scandalization strategy was not a preconceived goal of this action
research. Rather, scandalization in this context was intended “to provocatively point out
the flagrant problems with the current polices and practices” (p. 134) of the system of
simultaneous interpretation in the European Parliament. In other words, the targeted
scandal was not the use of English, per se, but the less tangible implicit norms of
expectation regarding the implementation and use of simultaneous interpretation. These
norms include, for instance, prohibitions regarding interacting with simultaneous
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“In its broadest sense, co-intelligence involves accessing the wisdom of the whole on
behalf of the whole” (Tom Atlee, The Co-Intelligence Institute. Retrieved 24
February 2014, http://www.co-intelligence.org/).
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interpreters. This interaction taboo (Kent, 2012) supports a normative ideology that
positions interpreters as if they are not co-participants in this special practice of
intercultural communication.
What Steyaert and Jannsons call invention is a strategy for what Aristotle called
productive knowledge. In contrast with theoretical knowledge, whose goal is truths, and
practical knowledge, which aims at action, productive knowledge is “directed towards the
creation of artifacts of all sorts…[specifically of] grasping the nature of the productive
processes by which [for instance] tragedies and the tragic effects are produced” (in F.C.T.
Moore, 1996, p. 70). Taken in total, cultural discourse from Deaf communities are
ambivalent about interpreting. While the gains of communication access are notable and
appreciated, the American Deaf community in particular can seem traumatized by
interpreting moreso than rescued by it.105
The ambition of this research project is to collect both theoretical and practical
knowledge in service of productive knowledge. It is a daunting prospect made possible
only through the stance of action learning. I have been regularly and consistently
humbled by the wisdom of interviewees, professional interpreting colleagues, and
academic peers and mentors. Their insights over the duration of this research project have
contributed greatly to the resulting representation. “Precision,” according to Henri
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A primary resource for the assumptions and motivations of this research is the
researcher’s lived experience (e.g., van Manen, 1990).
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Bergson, a French philosopher who uses time as the measure of all things,106 “consists in
the adaptation of methods,” specifically, “methods of enquiry to the subject-matter”
(p.11). Jumping among interpersonal and institutional levels of analysis has served in the
fashion of triangulation to sharpen and pinpoint the focus of interpretive critique on
humans immediate awareness (or lack thereof) of durance, of what is being coconstructed as human culture because of certain unquestioned practices of simultaneous
interpretation and through the performances of these practices in intercultural social
transaction.
Bergson commentator F.C.T. Moore chooses durance in English as a translation
for the French durée to emphasize Bergson’s wish to draw attention to “the fact or
property of going through time” rather than “to refer to a measurable period of time
during which something happens” as in the more literal translation, duration (emphasis in
original, 1996, p. 58). Discourses about interpreting revolve around time in a way that
recommend Bergson’s framing of this particular problematic:
When we are concerned with measurement, as we frequently have good
reason to be, we use a clock, taking it as the standard. But why should the
motions of a clock be privileged? Why should the successive ticks or the
successive vibrations of a quartz crystal, have a special lien on the value
of t? (Bergson, in Moore, 1996, p. 61)
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“The flow of time of which we are aware at the level of individual consciousnesss,
that flow which is misrepresented when we analyse it perforce into components,
becomes the model for life itself” (Moore, 1996, p. 9). Note: Moore finds Bergson’s
“attempt to create a sort of super-phenomenology for life itself, analogous to a
phenomenology for an individual consciousness…dubious, though…he [Bergson]
had some interesting arguments for it.” Moore links Bergson’s superphenomenology with “the fashion for ‘panpsychism’” (p. 9).
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The research protocol asked for an initial 15 minute meeting. The idea was to establish a
connection, observe the MEP at work and then follow-up when I had actual incidents that
we could investigate together. Some MEPs were on the clock with the appointments but
most were relaxed, indicating that we could continue talking past the scheduled end time.
I interpreted this as interest in the subject.
All conversations, interviews, readings, observations and participation in
simultaneous interpretation by the researcher were done, as alertness and perception
allowed, with durance and discursive consciousness in mind.
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CHAPTER 3
INTERPRETING STUDIES AND THE TRANSMISSION MODEL

3.1

Conference and Community Simultaneous Interpretation
Professional practitioners of simultaneous interpretation (SI) have typically been

divided into two camps: conference interpreters and community interpreters. Simultaneous
interpreters for the European Parliament exemplify the conference interpreter who works in
elite international settings such as academic conferences, political negotiations, and
multinational corporations. Simultaneous interpreters for the Deaf (i.e., sign language
interpreters) exemplify the community interpreter who works in the every day world of
citizens, linguistic minorities, foreigners, and non-dominant language speakers as they
access social services, acquire education and training, participate in workplaces as
employees or managers, receive medical care, and navigate legal proceedings. Is the
orientation to language similar or different in these two contexts of ‘conference’ and
‘community’? Do the differences or similarities distinguish simultaneous interpretation
from translation? Just as Translation Studies has historically subsumed Interpreting Studies,
conference interpreting has dominated community interpreting. The following analysis of a
selected literature from Interpreting Studies deliberately spotlights community interpreters.
Ozolins & Hale state the first Critical Link conference in 1995 “served as an
introduction to the international state of affairs” (2009, p. 1), implying that the present
volume likewise represents the academic view of current conditions, thoughts, and
concerns germane to the development of community interpreting at the global level.
Given that the chapters in this (2009) volume overtly focus on themes of quality and
shared responsibility, they provide an historical, situated snapshot of contemporary
102

academic discourse about “quality” and “responsibility” in SI. Implicit in the discourse
are also attitudes about “sharing” which will be explored later.

3.2

State of the Research in Interpreting Studies
Community interpreting is one of many social fields of intercultural interaction in our

time, an era characterized by contradictions of social comfort, transnational backlash,
economic crisis, unprecedented technological advancement, paradigm multiplication, and the
sixth mass extinction.107 This snapshot in time is provided through a critical,
deconstructionist-type of discourse analysis of contributions to the premier publication of
community interpreting, the proceedings of the biennial, international Critical Link
conferences. The volume chosen to contextualize community interpreting research and theory
was published in 2009, containing papers presented at the 2007 conference in Sydney,
Australia. This time period corresponds with the data collection from fieldwork undertaken at
the European Parliament, which is elaborated in subsequent chapters. Critical Link 5: Quality
in Interpreting - A Shared Responsibility (Hale, Ozolins & Stern, 2009) illustrates
marginalization as an everyday characteristic of this field of labor. Despite tremendous growth
in the scholarly study of community interpreting since the first Critical Link conference in
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The sixth mass extinction is sometimes being called the Holocene extinction. It is
firmly established as anthropocentric, that is, human-caused. Conservative estimates
anticipate the loss of half the biodiversity on earth in less than 80 years. More
alarming estimates by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (May 13,
2013) involve drastic changes that threaten the continued existence of homo sapiens.
Retrieved 5 April 2014, http://www.ipcc.ch/
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1995, fifteen years later Ozolins & Hale report108 “those who use interpreting services very
rarely understand the complexities of the process or the role of the interpreter” (p. 3).
The contributions to Critical Link 5: Quality in Interpreting - A Shared
Responsibility (henceforth, CL5) demonstrate that supporting and promoting community
interpretation remains a tremendous social and democratic challenge. Even those
countries that provided early models of well-institutionalized service provision, such as
Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, are “still struggling with issues of
status, quality of services and professionalism” (Ozolins & Hale, 2009, p. 1). This leads
contributors González & Auzmendi to assert, “It is crucial that the authorities get
involved in the development of this profession” (2009, p. 146). The “authorities”
apparently means government officials and policy-makers, not necessarily interpretee
participants whose own orientations to language greatly influence the ways simultaneous
interpretation is performed. Whether the users of community SI understand SI as a
particular kind of intercultural communication is not at all clear.
This timesnap of literature shows interpreter frustration with user confusion around
exercising voice in this less-than-common communication situation. Voice is used here in the
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Rather than the customary academic protocol of disassociating authors from the ideas
they propound, this critical discourse analysis of a representative sample of literature in
the field of community interpreting foregrounds researchers’ voice(s) in the academic
milieu. Representing knowledge is paradigmatic (e.g., Kuhn, 1962) and ideological (e.g.,
Hall, 1962; Kroskrity, 2000). “At moments of transition from one intellectual epoch to
another, the strains within a given system of thought become unsupportable and need to
be removed. When this happens, the absolute presumptions of the era are themselves
called in question, and normal rational debate ceases to be possible. There are no longer
agreed procedures for settling differences, or a shared vocabulary in which to discuss
them” (Toulmin, 1972, p. 100). This absence of shared vocabulary under conditions of
paradigm shift motivates the intervention of interpreters, and calls for the rapid skills
development of interpretees in order to generate new procedures for settling differences.
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technical, sociolinguistic sense: as a measure of effective communication, that is,
communication that results in something close to what is sought (e.g., Blommaert, 2005). Users
represented in the chapters of CL5 include: the clerical assistant in Austrian asylum hearings
who is responsible for recording the written record (Pöchhacker & Kolb, 2009); plaintiffs caught
between Chinese legal translators and interpreters in Hong Kong’s bilingual courts (Ng, 2009);
members of the Australian judiciary (Roberts-Smith, 2009); Aboriginal families and community
members (Cooke, 2009); healthcare providers in Italy accommodating English-speaking patients
(Blignault, Stephanou & Barrett, 2009; Merlini & Favaron, 2009); biomedical researchers in
Canada (Kaufert, Kaufert & LaBine, 2009), non-deaf “hearing” jurists in the presence of
Australian sign language (Auslan) interpretation (as explored in a simulation by Napier, Spencer
& Sabolcec, 2009); and a witness bursting into a special kind of song known as a bertso while
giving legal testimony in Basque Country (González & Auzmendi, 2009). Although interpreting
in the European Parliament is generally understood as “conference interpreting,” Members of
the European Parliament (MEPs) refer to themselves as representatives and participants in an
over-arching “European community” (emphasis added).109 As community-oriented interpretees,
MEPs are also represented as users and participants in SI through the expressed concerns of
conference interpreters for the European Parliament (Kent, 2009).
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Vuorikoski (2000): “Democracy is one of the primary values upheld by the EP
rhetoric; a quantitative analysis revealed that ’democracy’ appears in the EP
speeches more frequently than in ordinary journalese (Wordsmith analysis against a
million word corpus of UK journalistic texts). The concept of democracy also
includes the idea of open markets… (p. 129); and “In their role of guardians of
democracy the MEPs also act as spokespersons of the citizens” (p. 130); in sum,
“…the EP rhetoric, which is based on the shared values of democracy, on an open
market economy and the supremacy of the interests of the citizens/consumers” (p.
147). Overall, “democracy and human rights are two of the core values which are
defended by MEPs” (emphasis in original, p. 187).
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Table 1.

Languages and Settings from One Volume of Research on Community
Interpreting in 2009

Authors

Countries

Institution

Institutional
Language

Ozolins &
Hale

not countryspecific

International
conference &
research
literature

English

Community Languages

RobertsSmith

Australia

Legal –
Criminal
Trials

English

a language of Papua New Guinea,a
a “native tongue” of Australia,
Punjabi, Auslan, a Chinese
language, Malayalam, Portuguese,
Spanish, several Aboriginal
languages. By inference an
indigenous Canadian language,
perhaps Greek and Japanese

Ng

China (Hong
Kong)

Legal –
Criminal
Trials

English

Chinese, Cantonese, “other
Chinese dialects,” Mandarin

Government

Dutchb, English,
Finnish, French,
German, Greek,
Hungarian, Italian,
Lithuanian, Polish,
Portuguese, Spanish,
& Swedish

Kent

European
Union
(European
Parliament)

Garrett

Australia

Cooke

Australia
(Northern
Territory)

Napier,
Spencer &
Sabolcec

Australia

Pöchhacker
& Kolb

Austria

González
&

Basque
Country

Dutch, English, Finnish, French,
German, Greek, Hungarian,
Italian, Lithuanian, Polish,
Portuguese, Spanish, Swedish

English

Mentioned: “Chinese languages,
Vietnamese, Arabic, Italian and
Greek” but the specific languages
of participants in the study are not
named.c

Aboriginal
customary law

English

Djambarrpuyngu, “thirty or so
Aboriginal languages,” “an
Aboriginal pidgin.” By inference:
Eora / Dharawal / Darug, and some
Yolŋu Matha languages.

Legal – Jury
Duty

English

Australian Sign Language
(Auslan); mentions American Sign
Language.

Legal –
Asylum
Hearings

German

English. Levels of English fluency
of study participants are not clear.
English is the official language of
Gambia and Zimbabwe.
Participants from Nigeria may be
more fluent in a Niger-Congo or
Afroasiatic language.

Legal – Court

Batua (unified,
standard Basque)

Healthcare
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Spanish and the six dialects of
Euskera (the Basque languages):

Authors

Countries

Institution

Institutional
Language

Auzmendi

Community Languages
Biscayan, Guipuzcoan, High
Navaresse, Low Navaresse,
Labourdin and Souletin.

Spain

Hospitals,
social
services,
emergency &
civil defense
organizations,
security forces
& courts.

Spanish

English, French, Arabic, Italian,
Portuguese, Russian, Basque,
Galician, Polish, Romanian,
Berber, Catalan, Chinese, Czech,
Greek, Dutch, Albanian,
Bulgarian, Slovak, Japanese,
Macedonian, Moldovian, SerbianCroatian, Ukrainian, German,
Lithuanian, Wolof, Urdu, Punjabi,
Hindi

Lee

Australia

Professional
Interpreter
Rating/
Assessment

English

Korean

Merlini &
Favaron

Italy
(Palermo,
Sicily)

Healthcare

Italian

English

Tebble

Australia

Academic
tradition of
discourse
studies

English

Greek, Italian, Spanish, Serbian,
Cantonese, Mandarin, Khmer,
Vietnamese

Blignault,
Stephanou
& Barrett

Australia
(New South
Wales)

Healthcare

English

Arabic, Cantonese, Croatian,
Greek, Italian, Korean,
Macedonian, Mandarin, Polish,
Spanish, Thai and Vietnamese

Canada
(Manitoba)

Medical
Research –
ethics of
human
subjects
research

English

Cree, Afrikaans, Inuktitut,
“eight… languages other than
English, with a roughly even split
between indigenous and other
languages.”
Mentioned: French, Spanish,
Punjabi, Arabic

Ortega
Herráez,
Abril Martí
& Martin

Kaufert,
Kaufert &
LaBine

Source: Hale, S. B., Ozolins, D. U., & Stern, D. L. (2009). The Critical Link 5: Quality in Interpreting- a
shared responsibility. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
a

Few of the languages are named in the quotes or descriptions of this broad range of 35 court cases: an
intriguing oversight for this chapter or a deliberate (institutionalized) legal maneuver?
b

In 2009 there were twenty-three official languages of the European Parliament. Listed here are the
languages spoken by the sample of interpreters in this study.
c

Only some of the studies in this volume explicitly list the languages spoken by research subjects; some
refer to nationality as a proxy, others identify languages in particular instances, which may or may not be
inclusive of variation within the corpus.
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3.2.1

Community Interpreting Studies: A Bracketed Sample
The 2009 volume, CL5, provides a reasonable sample of state-of-the-art research

about simultaneous interpretation. A technique borrowed from philosophers (especially
phenomenologists and deconstructionists) is to ‘put brackets around’ the object of study,
hence creating a container to concentrate the analytical gaze. Bracketing off the CL5
volume from the entire literature about SI is intended to provide a clear and coherent
reference point for analysis and critique. The fifteen contributions to CL5 compose a
diverse range of reports on the status of SI in several countries (see Table 1), are based in
different institutional domains, and involve various language combinations. The title of
the volume shapes its scope, putting two dynamical configurations into tension, quality
and shared responsibility.

3.3

Tebble’s 4-step Discourse Analysis Frame
Within the CL5 timesnap of academic research on community interpreting,

Tebble (2009) draws upon an interdisciplinary approach to discourse analysis, in order to
argue that “skills in discourse analysis of spoken language are no longer the province just
of scholars; they need to be part of the repertoire of the professional interpreter” (2009, p.
202). “By understanding the nature of the interpreted speech event,” she elaborates,
“interpreters have a framework of the social context of their work” (p. 205). Tebble’s
introduction to discourse analysis is both a contribution to, and a continuation of,
academic meta-discourse (Diriker, 2004) about community simultaneous interpreting.
Tebble’s overview is both broad and selective. She briefly outlines three approaches
(conversation analysis, interactional sociolinguistics, social semiotics) with a brief sketch
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of their varied disciplinary origins before elaborating upon the social-semiotic approach
to discourse analysis known as systemic functional linguistics.
Tebble (2009) presents four core prescriptions as lessons from functionalist
discourse analysis. These lessons are borrowed in the following sections to organize and
enable reflection upon the academic meta-discourse represented by the works in CL5:

3.3.1

1

Know where you are going.

2

Know where you are.

3

Interpret all feedback.

4

Ascertain the certainty of facts.

Applied Discourse Analysis 1: Where is the Field of Community SI Going?
Tebble explains: “If you understand the genre of the speech event…then you have

a schema, a frame or structure for understanding where the […interaction…] is going”
(2009, p. 208). (This is the roadmap mentioned for the genre example on page 87: the
standard argumentation structure for Members of the European Parliament.) The
analytical move in this section is to raise the level of analysis from type of interpreted
event to the academic meta-discourse about simultaneous interpreting. The answer to the
question of the field’s development is implied by Ozolins & Hale in their introduction to
CL5 (2009). At the global scale, conditions for community interpreters are not improving,
infrastructures for education, training, and certification are being created very slowly if at
all, and attitudes toward the value of SI for society at large remain mixed and uncertain.
One could conclude that community interpreting as a field of profession activity for
communicative justice is going nowhere fast.
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Yet, simultaneously, there are patterns of convergence in the research metadiscourse (e.g., Pöchhacker, 2007) that provide a toehold for “a concerted unified
approach” (Ozolins & Hale, 2009, p. 3). This dissertation proposes that an impressive
range of inequities and injustice at the level of language difference could be redressed
through the strategic use of simultaneous interpretation as a strategy for creating
linguistic fields of equality, in service of, for instance, the justice-based economic goals
articulated by Amartya Sen (1992).
The organizing committee for the conference leading up to the publication of CL5
knew that unified and concerted action does not and cannot happen by dint of the
interpreter’s effort alone. The responsibility for generating communication that checks
for mutual understanding is inherently a social responsibility that must be shared by all
participants in the intercultural communication encounter. In order for practitioners and
researchers in the field of simultaneous interpretation to elicit attention and active coparticipation in the generation of meanings during processes of simultaneous
interpretation, we need to identify and recognize our own contribution to the status quo of
current conditions. On this basis, interpreters and interpretees can join with researchers
and interpreter trainers to envision a mutually-agreeable destination and chart a course to
reach there.

3.3.2

Applied Discourse Analysis 2: Where is Community SI Now?
Tebble titles this section of her summary on functional discourse analysis

“Interpreting the signposts” (2009, p. 210). She explains, “Apart from knowing where you
are going…everybody needs to know where they are at any one time” (p. 210). Tebble
uses the metaphor of a journey: “having a schema in mind…is like knowing the route of a
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journey…but actually negotiating the way can require the use of signposts” (p. 210).
Given typical patterns in the history of the development of disciplinary knowledge, the
field of Interpreting Studies is perched on the verge of what become known as paradigm
wars. The structuralist framework of Halliday’s systemic functional linguistics serves
intellectual conservatism and is a natural fit for risk-averse professionals, interpreters and
academics alike. However, moving to embrace an interactionist paradigm (also called an
interpretivist paradigm)110 is a necessary step toward the diversification of perspectives
that is crucial to the ongoing development of scientific knowledge (Kuhn, 1962).
The interpretivist paradigm is grounded by theories of language as a creative
process whose use entails tangible outcomes of social construction: such as identities,
relationships, and the many group dynamics that compose social reality (Berger &
Luckmann, 1966/1967). Given that community interpreters embody expertise with
languages and intercultural communication, it is possible to imagine that, rather than
engaging a paradigm shift as one of aggressive competition (i.e., an intellectual war), we
might embrace a collaborative, exploratory dialogue toward more sharing of
responsibility for defining and producing quality of participation during special
intercultural events involving simultaneous interpretation.
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The interpretive paradigm is described by sociologists Gibson Burrell and Gareth
Morgan as “informed by a concern to understand the world as it is, to understand the
fundamental nature of the social world at the level of subjective experience….It sees
the social world as an emergent social process which is created by the individuals
concerned” (1979, p. 28).
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3.3.2.1

Lessons on How to Use an Interpreter: Re-Centering the Problematic of
Simultaneous Interpretation
“Australians,” Roberts-Smith writes, “are generally completely unfamiliar with

working with interpreters and have little understanding of what is involved” (2009, p.
34). Contrast this, however, with Cooke’s observation that “English-speaking Australians
absorb this information [about the key characteristics and process of communicating
using interpreters] through the mass media” (2009, p. 94). Ironically, both Roberts-Smith
and Cooke are probably accurate. Participating in interpreted interaction is still an
uncommon intercultural experience. Most people either do not have the personal
experience that generates familiarity and understanding, or have experienced rigid,
mechanical interactions that reinforce differences and lack of connection, thereby
rendering comprehension difficult. Meanwhile, representations of SI in the mass media
consistently reflect stereotypes and generalizations, perpetuating adverse discourse
effects that tend to play out in problematic ways during real life encounters.
Interpreter frustration with interpretees is reflected throughout the CL5 sample of
contemporary interpreting research discourse.111 González & Auzmendi (2009) put it
explicitly, “The different parties involved (judges, prosecutors, lawyers and defendants)
have no awareness of the role of interpreters” (p. 146). A more conservative statement
might acknowledge that interpretees are aware of the interpreter, but their experiences
and exposure to enacted interpreters’ role and responsibilities do not enable the pro-active
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Vuorikoski notes that European Parliament interpreters also talk about interpretees,
but she only provides a single summary statement: “Interpreters frequently discuss
the performances of the speakers that they have just interpreted, pointing out features
that made interpreting difficult, or stating simply that someone had been ’a good
speaker’” (2004, p. 21).
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responsiveness and engagement with the intercultural communication process that
interpreters wish interpretees would embrace. Cooke argues “that ethical issues and
dilemmas…may often be discussed and resolved if the quality of intercultural
communication is high” (2009, p. 93), noting, in the instance of Australian-Aboriginal
interpreted interaction, that “this presumes a level of cultural awareness and sensitivity on
the part of police and lawyers that is not always present” (p. 92). Roberts-Smith puts the
matter quite succinctly: “monocultural or Anglophone lawyers and judges often lack an
understanding of the interpreting process and the work of interpreters” (2009, p. 13).
From an interactionist point-of-vew, the dynamic result of monocultural
monolingualism forces the interpreter into both error and ad hoc attempts at
accommodation, such as reported in Spain by Ortega Herráez, Abril Martí & Martin
(2009). “Ad hoc solutions are the order of the day and (inter)cultural mediation is given
priority over interpreting (or translating, as it is usually mistakenly called) which is seen
as being somehow narrowly literal and inadequate for community settings” (p. 150).
There are three tensions embedded in this single statement. One tension involves framing
intercultural interaction as unusual or unfamiliar because it deviates from an unnamed but
assumed norm for interacting. (Typically the unacknowledged norms are of the monoculture associated with the dominant language.) The second tension regards confusion
about language use and the substantiality of differences between interpreting and
translating. Third, the object of the communication process during interpreted interaction
is torn between a limited, structuralist emphasis on information exchange via presumedly
pre-established discrete linguistic meanings versus the social aspects of identity and
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relationship formation that accrue through collective repetition of the smallest rituals of
interaction.112
Such tensions indicate a paradigmatic crossroads wherein scholars and
professionals associated with the field of simultaneous interpretation can either maintain
the structural linguistic precedent that seeks (as represented by Lee) “to apply the same
standards across different language streams” (2009, p. 172) or creatively reconcile our
representations of what interpreting is and what interpreting does in order to get at what
interpreting can do. For instance, is interpreting about:
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●

“equivalence across languages and cultures” (emphasis added, Lee, 2009, p. 175;
related to Ng’s semantic mapping between Chinese and English, emphasis
added, 2009);

●

“the sense consistency between the source text and the target text” (emphasis
added, Lee, 2009, p. 171);

●

“the process which the language has to go through” (emphasis added, González
and Auzmendi, 2009, p. 137);

●

“effective communication between parties who do not speak the same language”
(emphasis added, Ng 2009, p. 50);

●

“to ensure that the witness can access the question being asked…and that all
personnel in the courtroom can understand the account” (emphasis added,
Napier, Spencer & Sabolcec, 2009, p. 100);

●

“the ethical issues and dilemmas facing the interpreter” (emphasis added, Cooke,
2009, p. 93);

●

the “linguistic barriers that deaf people face” (emphasis added, Napier et al.,
2009, p. 102);

●

the achievement of “the same effect on the target language listener as on the
source language listener” (emphasis added, Lee, 2009, p. 175).

Structuralism is also known by the labels functionalism and positivism, cf. Burrell &
Morgan, 1979).
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The emphasis added to the selected statements illustrates that interpreting research
has constructed its object more in terms of (roughly) externalized artefacts of
communication (such as texts, languages and words with supposedly fixed meanings)
than in terms of less tangible outcomes of communication (relationships, identities,
inequalities and so on). The former construction constitutes the logic of difference as a
barrier. The diversity of these representations suggest paradigm conflict between
structuralist and interactionist modes of analysis.
Paradigm conflict is illustrated by the array of quotes showing a) the dominance
of the structural linguistic frame, which emphasizes language, as opposed to the social
interaction frame, which emphasizes people, and b) the centering of the interpreter
(usually in isolation from interpretees) as the fixed location for all troubles. Together, the
isolation of the interpreter and the emphasis on language combine to structure interpreted
interaction as a homogenous professional activity. As a result, attention is deflected from
attending to the communication differences that interpreted interaction necessarily entails.
Interpretees are disenfranchised from the complex dynamism of intercultural
communication and interpreters are, by and large, prevented from drawing them in to do
something it.

3.3.2.2

Three Discursive Tensions
The contributions to CL5 explore conditions of simultaneous interpretation across

a range of institutional settings in a number of countries and involve an extensive array of
language combinations. (Review Table 1.) Reading across each scene, with attention to
how authors represent and discuss the findings of their research, some dialogic tensions
become apparent. One tension is between so-called unusual or atypical dynamics of SI
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and a taken-for-granted notion of what interpreted interaction ‘should’ feel like. A second
tension involves the stress of interpretee ignorance about using interpreters, which seems
to be a direct outcome of maintaining the twin myths of interpreter neutrality (Metzger,
1995, 1999) and interpreter invisibility (Roy, 1989, 1993, 2000), both of which contribute
to interpretee perceptions of interpreter opaqueness (Angelelli, 2001, p. 11; 2003). The
operation of these myths are apparent across the diverse range of settings and regardless
of language combinations, with some variability among institutional scenes. The tension
of interpretees’ acceptance of these myths about the interpreter’s role enables a third
tension to come into view.
The third tension regards language itself. Specifically the different orientations
and understandings that people from any of these groupings (interpretees, interpreters,
interpreting researchers, even bystanders and non-participants) have about what language
is and what language can do, that is, language ideologies. The following, continuing
critical deconstruction of this timesnap of published research on community interpreting
shows a paradigmatic contest between traditional structuralism (mainly linguistics) and
creative interactionism. Structural linguistics in particular organizes knowledge through
reduction (usually to ‘words” or morphological units, sometimes to ‘meanings’ which are
presented as if fixed and unchanging), while the lens of creative interactionism is
premised in the on-going necessity of meaningfulness as a constantly-evolving and
persistently-dynamic feature of social interaction.

3.3.2.2.1

Tension 1: An Unnamed, Assumed Standard

Half of the authors (8/15) make a uniqueness claim about their study that only
makes sense in contrast with some presumed normative type of community interpreting.
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These generally appear in authors’ claims about certain characteristics or features
respective to their research sites. For instance, Ng (2009) claims a deviation from “the
usual case” because court interpreting services in Hong Kong “have long been provided
for the linguistic majority [Chinese], instead of for the linguistic minority [English]” (p.
39). Napier et al.’s (2009) experiment to test the communicative efficacy of simultaneous
interpretation for potential Deaf jurors in Australia pits minority language users against
the assumptions of majority language speakers. Comprehension rates were equivalent
between mock ‘jurors’ communicating only in English and mock ‘jurors’ communicating
via English/Auslan113 interpretation, demonstrating that interpreting between two
languages is as effective for understanding as communicating in only one language.
In a different kind of legal setting, Pöchhacker and Kolb (2009) make special note
of discovering interpreters in asylum hearings working in a team-like way based on their
awareness of the future consequences of documented statements. Likewise, Merlini &
Favaron (2009) investigate the “highly specific context of peer-to-peer communication
[between Italian and US nurses] in an institution where interpreters interrelate daily with
their clients, and where they feel and are perceived by the healthcare staff as part of a
team” (pp. 188-189). Blignault, Stephanou & Barrett (2009) highlight the importance of
interpreters “being a valued member of the health care team” (p. 221). This special
emphasis on considering the interpreter as a team-member or co-participant in the
interpretation process brings into view a norm that does not typically acknowledge the
interpreter’s presence.

113

Australian Sign Language.
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González & Auzmendi (2009) highlight “the nature of the Basque language” (p.
135) and “the delicate political situation [of Basque Country and Spain]” (p. 135) as
generating “truly arduous” (p. 135) conditions for Spanish-Basque interpreters that are
“truly complex” (p. 135) and must be “endured” (p. 146). They emphasize the “highly
unusual situation rarely found elsewhere” (p. 145) of interpretees who are actually fluent
in both languages and are exercising their right of choice regarding which language to
use. Meanwhile Cooke (2009) proposes “the bar is perhaps set higher for legal
interpretations by Aboriginal communities than by the mainstream agencies who use
them” (p. 89), and Kaufert, Kaufert & LaBine (2009) compare and contrast ethical
practice at another intriguing juncture: that between medical researchers and the
interpreters who work for medical research teams in the field. Noting a distinction
between the goal of doctor-patient healthcare (which is, interpreted or not, the patient’s
health), and the goal of research (which is knowledge), Kaufert et al comment upon a
study of researcher experience in developing countries (Dawson & Kass, 2005) where the
majority of researchers had not learned the language of their subjects and thus necessarily
“would have used interpreters. Yet there is no mention of interpreters in the paper or their
contributions as language mediators” (p. 245).114
All of these claims to distinctiveness suggest that diversity and variation are
actually the norm for community-based simultaneous interpretation rather than the
exception. This begs the question of what hypothetical norm is being imagined by these
researchers as the basis for comparison and contrast? The standard that comes into view
114

Hidden or “invisible translation” is a theme of the international management
literature (Barner-Rasmussen & Aarnio, 2011; Piekkari & Tietze, 2008),) and also
part of the structure of controlled multilingualism in the European Parliament.
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seems to require operating as if the interpreter is not present in the communication
process, despite the varying dynamics of interpreting (such as the directionality of
interpreting, with reference to the majority or minority status of the language) and the
language profile of interpretees (monolingual or fluent in two or more of the languages in
use). Since the interpreter is not acknowledged as a crucial part of the communication
process, their mediation of these dynamics is not represented. This absence generates a
norm of silence, keeping interpreters as if invisible and certain kinds of talk about
interpreting taboo.

3.3.2.2.2

Tension 2: Adverse Effects of Interpreter Invisibility

This brings us to the second tension evident in a critical reading of the discourse
in CL5, that of perceptions of interpretee ignorance of how to use interpreters. There is no
discursive evidence of recognition that user incompetence or ignorance occurs as an
effect of (traditional) interpreter insistence on the invisibility of role. In reviewing a
trial115 nullified on an appeal that the defendant was spoken to in “a language she did not
understand,” Australian Justice Roberts-Smith (2009) quotes the findings of the English
Court of Appeal in which they criticize the solicitor and counsel: “Not once does it
appear to have occurred to either of them to question the interpreter so as to ascertain
whether or not he was understanding what the appellant said to him and whether, he, the
interpreter, had the impression that she was not comprehending the language he was
talking to her” (p. 19).

115

Begum (1991) 93 Cr App Rep 96.
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Setting aside the ethical implications of that interpreter’s non-professional
performance,116 ‘to question the interpreter’ is not a behavior encouraged by the
profession. How does one pose inquiries to someone who is supposed to be invisible?
This is an example of how the interpreter is actually “opaque” (Angelelli, 2003, p. 16
cited by Ortega Herráez et al, 2009, p. 152). It is not much of a stretch to comprehend the
desired effect of professional accreditation processes and codes of conduct for
interpreters’ professionalism as having an adverse effect on interpretees. As a remedy,
Roberts-Smith, for instance, wants “guaranteed competencies” (2009, p. 33), for
interpreters, without mention of baseline skills needed by interpretees.
In their exposition of the results of using the term “norm” for desired professional
behaviors instead of “rule” in healthcare interpreter training, Merlini & Favaron (2009)
draw upon a few sources to suggest interpreters must oppose “the linearity of habit” (p.
199, quoting Danou, 2007, p. 50) which keeps interpreters (supposedly) invisible. Note
Merlini & Favaron’s cautionary caveat: they acknowledge that such a contrary stance
“may be too daring a proposition in our field, where non-professional practice is still all
too frequent” (p. 199). Whether taken as a rule or a norm, interpreter invisibility is not
only idealized within codes of professional conduct but is often actually celebrated. It is
the context of accustomed invisibility, for instance, that explains how Pöchhacker & Kolb
(2009) did not anticipate how “forcefully” (p. 123) the written record of oral asylum
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The “fake interpreter” fiasco at Nelson Mandela’s Memorial Service in 2014 is
hardly an isolated issue; just higher profile. Uncredentialied and unqualified
interpreters illustrate a general disregard for intercultural communication by Hearing
(non-deaf/non-signing) interpretees as well as interpreters. The acceptance of
incompetent job performances is a particular instance of audism (the systematic
oppression of Deaf people).
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hearings in Austria emerged as a significant indicator of the interpreter’s presence and
performance in the interpreted communicative interaction.117
Pöchhacker & Kolb (2009) discovered that co-production of the documentation of
an asylum hearing elicits a “significant degree of shared responsibility on the interpreter’s
part for the legally relevant manifestation of the interview” (p. 119). They describe in
detail what might be considered a reversal of “established principles…whereby the
interpreter essentially renders what was said rather than what is to be written” (p. 133),
resulting in cooperative behaviors “by all participants, with the interpreter assuming a
role and responsibility far beyond normative precepts” (p. 120). In this variation of role,
the interpreter envisions the purposes the written record will be put to later, and crafts the
target language interpretations with such future use in mind. In other words, the
interpreter accepts some responsibility for ensuring that the voice (i.e., the
intended/desired effects) of the asylum seeker carries forward into the next levels of
bureaucracy and administration.
The actions engaged by the interpreter indicate what Pöchhacker & Kolb (2009)
call a “collaborative relationship, or mutual co-orientation” (p. 127) marked by “a verbal
alliance” (p. 128). The alliance involves the interpreter “adopt[ing] the interviewer’s
perspective” (p. 128) and “ask[ing]…follow up questions” (p. 128). Specific behaviors
include pausing for the person writing or typing to catch up with the interpretation (p.
126), “dictating punctuation marks” (p. 125), and apologizing when “repair[ing] a clause
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“Though not explicitly included in the original design of our research project, the
role of the written record emerged so forcefully from our observations that it became
a crucial point of interest, alongside and as part of such fundamental topics as role
boundaries, neutrality and fidelity” (Pöchhacker & Kolb, 2009, p. 123).

121

that … has already been uttered” (p. 128) because it may require typing corrections (p.
128). Reciprocally, the interpreter is open to being reminded by the recorder “of the last
words before [an] interruption” (p. 127). One upshot of sharing responsibility for the
accuracy of the record named by Pöchhacker & Kolb is “a more actively involved and
less invisible interpreter” (p. 134).
It seems, at least on the basis of this specific CL5 corpus, that future-oriented
behavior by the interpreter is likely to lead to shared responsibility among and with
interpretees. Such multidimensionality beyond the assumed, taken-as-normal limitations
of the interpreter’s contribution to the quality of communication is particularly evident in
Aboriginal and First Nations communities. According to Kaufert et al. (2009), “There is a
tradition of interpreters playing pivotal leadership roles in small remote Northern
communities” (p. 247). Along similar lines, an Aboriginal interpreter describes a process
conducted by her nation’s elders that could be considered the community’s counterpart to
mainstream professional accreditation: “The old people felt I had to be put through a
ceremony to receive my shield, my coolamon, with my story and the poison story as well:
the story that gives me real authority to be able to speak” (Cooke, 2009, p. 89). Respect
for the intercultural communication process is built in this indigenous way in parallel
with professional credentialing from mainstream society.
Such reciprocal authorization among interpretees to empower the interpreter is
also exhibited within the peer-to-peer healthcare team in Italy. Incidents occur which
“foreground the interpreter as an interlocutor in his [or her] own right” (Merlini &
Favaron, 2009, p. 194), and the nature of observed teamwork is such that, in one instance,
“the interpreter explicitly helps the parties settle [a] disagreement” (p. 195). That
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particular facilitation was accomplished by a shift from direct to indirect speech, which
the interpreter explained “as a deliberate attempt to step into the interaction in order to
solve the deadlock” (p. 196). This creative use of interaction to stimulate a shared,
positive outcome for participants in interpreted communication may be an application of
the kind of intuitive agency that is negatively valued by structuralist ideology (i.e., the
unquestioned reliance on linguistics and meaning’s location in the source language)
because it makes the creative effects of interpreter agency (such as the selection of
diction, the management of turn-taking, or the assertion of interpreter wisdom) so
obvious. In other words, if allowing the interpreter to shift their footing (Goffman, 1982)
is all the maneuvering required to solve a communication problem, then it should become
evident that resistance to the interpreter making such shifts can perpetuate problems.
The satisfaction for shared responsibility within these situations where the
interpreter has decision latitude (Lee & Llewellyn-Jones, 2011) is in stark contrast with
the frustration of interpretees such as Roberts-Smith, who are constrained by the
formalities of maintaining the myth of interpreter invisibility and its accompanying
assumption of neutrality.

3.3.2.2.3

Tension 3: Diverse Conceptions of Language

This brings us to the third tension, the orientation to language itself, to language
as such (Benjamin, 1916/1969). Ideologies of language in the context of simultaneous
interpretation effect the social interaction of the interpreted event, the range of possible
meaning(s) for utterances delivered during the event, and the likelihood of understanding
or misunderstanding on the part of some or all participants. Kaufert et al.(2009) provide
an intriguing juxtaposition of two different perspectives on language:
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The assumption underlying that two people speaking the same language
should roughly agree on translation is relatively fundamental to
interpreting and also the assumption underlying the use of backtranslation. However, the people we interviewed who were working with
Aboriginal languages had a different perspective and talked about
language as a constantly changing entity as new words come in, such as
the translation of HIV/AIDS into Cree, and old words were lost. (2009, p.
242)
There are a couple of different dynamics represented in this statement, one dealing with
historical change through language contact and the other revealing a kind of immediacy
need for shared comprehension so as to enable continuation of a communication process.
The point about agreement hides, somewhat, an assumption that the recognition of
agreement is presumed or idealized as being automatic. This is because the ‘rough
agreements’ rely on an established stability of meaning that speakers of the same
language are expected to share. The fact that interpretees usually do share some stability
of definitions should not overshadow the ever-present possibility of misunderstanding
based upon different uses of terms and/or unfamiliarity with particular terms.
Contrast the desirable instantaneity of automatic recognition with the interpreter
who told Kaufert et al. (2009) about “the need for patience in finding the ‘right’ word in
the sense of being the word that was understood” (p. 243). This is a fundamentally
different orientation to language and the attribution of meaning because it a) shifts the
location of definition from the sender of a communicative act or utterance to the
receiver(s), and b) privileges the human experience over the linguistic artifact. This is a
paradigmatic re-framing which allows, for example, another way of understanding the
tension Ng exposes between “adequacy” and “acceptability” in Hong Kong legal
translation and interpretation (2009).
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Ng describes the adequacy criterion in terms of a “semantic mapping between the
English and the Chinese texts” (2009, p. 41), while the acceptability criterion refers to
what is sensible to the average (non-legally trained) Chinese individual in court (p. 4041). The adequacy criterion is premised upon the structuralist assumption that interpreters
interpret between languages (things) rather than for people (beings), and that the
languages of English and Chinese are essentially composed of interchangeable and
corresponding parts. This is patently not the case, and Ng documents systemic
maneuvering within the legal infrastructure to account for instances of “semantic
incongruence” (p. 48). This is necessary because adequacy satisfies a rule, while
acceptability satisfies people.
The possibility of controlling the communication process seems to be re-assuring
to interpretees who are put off by the need to accommodating language difference. Ortega
Herráez et al.(2009) describe the situation in Spain, which they tell us “receives more
immigrants than any other country in the EU and is one of the world’s major tourist
destinations” (p. 150). Their study across sectors (hospitals and social services,
emergency, civil defence, security and the courts) finds “the majority [of community
interpreters] apparently go beyond the functions that would usually be attributed to
community interpreters in countries where this activity has become consolidated as a
profession” (p. 162). Ortega Herráez et al. are supporting more professionalization, with
its prescribed restrictions on the functionality of the interpreter’s role. For instance:
Court and police interpreters would seem to have a narrower, more limited
view of their role, and are subject to certain constraints…the situation is
more controlled by the service provider and perceived as more formal.
(Ortega Herráez et al., 2009, p. 162-163)
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However, looking across the discourse in CL5, there appears to be evidence of
more desirable outcomes of interpreted interaction under conditions of less or reduced
control than in those situations where the interpreter’s range of decision latitude (Lee &
Llewellyn-Jones, 2011) is constrained. Ortega Herráez et al (2009) are likely more
interested in a kind of middle-ground that brings the untrained community interpreter into
the professional community, but perhaps without having to adopt overstrict restrictions
on role that constrain effective intercultural communication. Research in heathcare
(mainly US-based) has found that
Professional interpreters have been linked with increased patient
satisfaction, greater patient involvement, improved understanding, greater
compliance with treatment, improved access, and reduced medical errors
(Brach and Fraser, 2000; Timmins, 2002; Jacobs et al., 2001; Flores et al.,
2003; Baker et al., 1996, Flores et al., 2005). (Garrett, 2009, p. 73)
Evidence of positive gains from interpreted communication in the medical field is
contrasted with Roberts-Smith’s negative assessment of court interpreting:
“The continuing perception amongst many, if not most, Judges and
lawyers is that interpreters are actually an obstacle to communication.
Some of these perceptions are due to a lack of appreciation of linguistic or
cultural differences or what the process of interpretation entails.
Unfortunately, many are also the product of practical experience.” (2009,
p. 29)
In the legal field, what is emphasized are the “consequences of communication failure”
(Roberts-Smith, 2009, p. 29) rather than, as in healthcare, the positive effects of
intercultural, interpreted communication success. This is a classic terministic screen
(Burke, 1966).
The emphasis on failure overrides the recognition of success, making it seem as if
interpreted interaction is always fraught and interpreters are always suspect. Instead, a
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more realistic assessment would recognize that interpreting is probably no more or less
prone to misunderstandings than communicating in one language, as Napier et al’s mock
juror experiment demonstrated (2009). Interpretees simply need to learn the skills of
falsification, especially when an interpretation deviates from reasonable expectation, and
take steps to remedy or co-construct shared understanding, just as with any
communicative repair, by asking questions and paraphrasing to ensure mutual
comprehension.

3.3.2.3

Failure of the Monolingual Illusion
A fascinating result of Napier et al.’s experiment comparing interpreted

information with non-interpreted information was “that both the deaf and hearing ‘jurors’
in this study equally misunderstood some terms and concepts” (emphasis added, 2000, p.
113). With all the insistence that “the interpreter must not ‘clean up’ the evidence by
giving it a form, a grammar or syntax that it does not have” (Roberts-Smith, quoting
Canadian Chief Justice Lamer who was himself quoting another source,118 one must
wonder at the implication that communicating in the same language guarantees either
understanding or truthfulness, let alone accuracy and precision of intended meaning. In
fact, despite insisting (for instance) upon interpreter use of the first person, it turns out
that interpretees are not fooled by the illusion: they may actually be detrimentally
constrained by it. Merlini & Favaron (2009) trace the rationale of interpreters using first
person to a combination of being “frequently echoed in the literature” (p. 189) and having
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Steele, “Court Interpreters in Canadian Criminal Law” in RvTRan [1994] 2 SCR
951), Roberts-Smith 2009: p. 23

127

“advantages; over and above enhancing clarity, brevity, and impartiality, [specifically] it
is thought to create ‘the illusion of a direct exchange between the monolingual parties’
(Wadensjö, 1997, p. 49)” (p. 189)
While this corpus of research on community interpreting generates evidence case
many (if not most) interpretees do not know how to work with interpreters, it may also be
that interpretees are working with interpreters the best they can under the conditions that
the profession of interpreting has itself imposed. Legal discourse has explicitly adopted
both the invisibility imperative and the structural linguistic logic about language.
Revisiting the jurisprudential basis for the presence of a court interpreter, Roberts-Smith
gave us the image of a “cipher” which, by definition, is a “zero, one that has no weight,
worth or influence” (Merriam Webster Free Online Dictionary), i.e., the interpreter is to
have no substance. However, the interpreter’s task is to transform the non-communicative
status of those speaking a language different than officials of the court to the
communicative position of having voice in the language of the court. Assertions that
represent the interpreter’s contribution as non-existent do not foster proactivity regarding
working with interpreters.
For instance, Roberts-Smith (2009) paraphrases Her Honour presiding over the
case of Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs: “The function of the
interpreter is to convey in English what has been said in another language, and viceversa, so as to place the non-English speaker as nearly as possible in the same position as
the English speaker” (p. 25). What position is this? “The position in which he or she
would be if those defects did not exist” (Roberts-Smith, p.17); with defects specified as
“for want of some physical capacity or for lack of knowledge of the language of the

128

court” (p. 17). The language of the court is explicitly privileged and deviations from its
standard deliberately demoted: there is no give-and-take recognition of the mutual value
or inherent equality of different languages.
Continuing interpreter practices and interpreting researcher complicity with this
mal-alignment of non-presence with the de-valuing of difference interferes with the
interpretees’ abilities to conduct communicative repair. To make a repair is to “say ‘no’
to an expression…its motive is intelligibility” (Bolinger, 1953/1965, p. 248 in Schegloff,
Jefferson & Sacks, 1977, p. 361). Speakers routinely self-correct and occasionally make
corrections to others’ speech (Schegloff et al.) By defining out clarifications and other
interactions with interpreters that can be construed as interruptions to a monolingual
flow, interpreters are not only invisible, they become unaccountable, too. Eliciting
feedback and monitoring from interpretees, however, does suggest the possibility for cocreating a way out of the invisibility-unaccountability cycle. Judges and lawyers have not
lost sight of the interpreter’s presence in case law, even if they prefer not to accommodate
interpreters in court. They are aware that permitting an interpreter “adds another
dimension to the Court’s task” (Roberts-Smith, p. 22) by virtue of the interpreter being
“transposed between” the tribunal and the witness (p. 15).
However, the discursive focus on the interpreter still hides119 what it is that the
interpreter’s presence ought to be bringing more clearly into view: shared responsibility
is most crucial at exactly those moments of intercultural, multilingual communication
when the language difference is most keen. Rather than expecting the interpreter alone to
overcome intercultural differences made manifest in language difference, communicating
119

Through the terministic screen process of de-selection (Burke, 1966).
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effectively is a shared activity that requires careful attention from all interpretees if
mutual understanding is to be achieved. This is not a task to be accomplished invisibly by
an individual or even a team of professional interpreters. It is the interpretees who can
judge what it is they want or need to understand, and the interpretees who have the ability
to say ‘no’ and offer a repair to their own or another’s talk. “Self-correction and othercorrection are related organizationally” (Schegloff et al., 1977, p. 362). The organization
of repair bears on interpreted communication at least as much as it does on noninterpreted, single language communication.
The moment for quality intervention in interpreted interaction in order to share
responsibility is identified by Her Honour in Perera, when she “pointed out that
interpretation is not a mere mechanical exercise, but one which involves both technical
skill and expert judgment….perfect interpretation may be impossible – no matter how
accurate the interpretation is, the words, style, syntax or emotion are not those of the
witness and some words are culturally specific and incapable of being interpreted”
(paraphrased by Roberts-Smith, pp. 25-26). This interpretee knowledge is amplified by
“all members of the court” (p. 27) in De La Espriella-Velasco v The Queen—who
“accepted that forensic interpretation, especially in court proceedings, is a complex and
sophisticated process” (p. 27). Specifically:
The interpreter must express, in the target language, as accurately as that
language and the circumstances permit, the idea or concept as it has been
expressed in the source language. The individual aspects of this
expression of what is required, are important. The reference to the ‘idea or
concept’ being expressed acknowledges that the process of interpretation
is not merely the substitution of a word in one language for an equivalent
word in the other and that there is often a lack of semantic equivalence.
That, and social or cultural differences may mean that even the ‘idea or
concept’ itself has no equivalent in both societies. (p. 27)
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Acknowledging the possibility of no equivalent contradicts the criterion of accuracy,
calling for another measure.
Indeed, to avert the outcome documented by Ng, that “…the meticulous efforts on
the part of the legal translator to attain semantic mapping do not always seem to pay off”
(2009, p. 50), what is needed is a real time combination of interpretee awareness of the
need to act communicatively into these moments and interpreter openness to sharing the
mediation of intercultural, multilingual differences with these engaged interpretees
(rather than holding our expertise inaccessibly behind the imposed veil of invisibility).
Even though interpreters express frustration with interpretees, interpreter resistance to
sharing is also evident, although it may not be conscious. Recommendations made by
contributing authors to CL5 locate specific remedies for improving interpreted
communication in increased or improved performance by the interpreter, often specifying
within the field of interpreter training.
Such thinking is a discourse pattern following linear structuralist rules rather than
breaking open a co-creative, cooperative effort of truly sharing responsibility for
meaning-making with interpretees. Paradigmatic shift requires coordination among and
across all the institutions who need effective interpreting, not just a change in one field of
interpreter education and training. The comprehension and meaning-making needs of
institutions using interpreters are significant, although perhaps in different ways than the
needs of the individuals who must persist (with varying degrees of courage and character)
to communicate in another language.
An interesting feature of interpretee criticism of interpreters is a kind of projection
that they, themselves (as interpretees) speak plainly and clearly within a rational or
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logical rhetorical framework that listeners, watchers (if using a signed language) and
interpreters automatically understand. In fact, Napier et al. cite Judith Levi’s (1993)
assessment of the US State of Illinois’ jury instructions (written in English for native
English speakers), in which Levi identifies several problems, such as “incohesive
discourse organization, that is, confusing sequences of points, discontinuity, and needless
interruptions to the flow with unrelated information” (2009, p. 104) among other equally
disturbing features of the monolingual legal monologue. In the mock trial with deaf and
non-deaf ‘jurors’ using English-Auslan simultaneous interpretation, Napier, et al. report:
The results of the comprehension test show that both hearing and deaf
‘jurors’ misunderstood some concepts. In relation to the closed/multiplechoice questions, approximately 10.5% of the questions were answered
incorrectly by all participants. Of the open-ended questions, some
responses were problematic from both deaf and hearing participants.
(2009, p. 107)
Not only are the error/misunderstanding percentages comparable, but in at least one
instance, Deaf ‘jurors’ relying on interpreters did better than the control group of hearing
counterparts (p. 111). Napier et al. conclude, “The material was…challenging as hearing
‘jurors’ misunderstood some aspects of the summation even though they were receiving
the information directly in English” (emphasis added, p. 114).
The proper target of critiquing communication breakdowns in interpreted
interaction involves the complicity of interpretees in allowing noticeable glitches to pass
by without remark. This includes ascertaining comprehension rather than simply
assuming that the interpreter has magically fixed all difficulties. Garrett, for instance,
notes: “No one [in Australian hospitals] is required to ask, [or] document the important
question: ‘How well do you speak English?’” (p. 75). This institutional-level failing to
imagine other ways of communicating is complemented on the patient side with a “theme
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of powerlessness” (p. 76) and “an emergent construct” which Garrett and her colleagues
labeled ‘The Happy Migrant Effect,’ i.e., “patients discounted and minimized the
significance of [very negative] events” (p. 76). Some identified motivators of ‘The Happy
Migrant Effect’ include positive assertions of new country patriotism and appreciation for
comparatively better services than was available in their country of origin, however these
impulses serve to feed generalized Australian English monolingualism, excusing
inadequate simultaneous interpreting, and even justifying its absence.
This critical reading of the meta-discourse in CL5 is posed as representative and
characteristic of normative biases that interpreted interaction is not natural and should be
measured by the standards of same language communication. Evidence of this hegemonic
relationship is provided by the three tensions. 120 First, according to accounts from
interpreters, these researchers report that interpretees do not know how to use
interpreters. That is, there is a perceived lack of practical knowledge about how to
communicate when different languages are involved. Second, this perceived lack of
knowledge is blamed on the interpretees but remedies are aimed at providers: interpreters
and interpreter-educators. This indicates difficulties with interpreting the discourse’s
signposts!
Tebble (2009) introduces the difference between a framing move and a focusing
move, arguing, “framing moves … make a major contribution to the coherence of the
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The attitude that speaking (together) in the same language is better, natural, and
more normal than speaking (together) using different languages is an example of
hegemony, as defined by Gramsci (1971).
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discourse” (p. 211).121 In discussing the example she provides, Tebble suggests that
interpreters might drop framing moves in favour of focusing moves because focusing
moves have “obvious content” (p. 210) while framing moves are discourse markers that
“signal the next stage” or “can be signposts to new topics” (p. 211). She also suggests
reasons why interpreters justify dropping framing moves, such as an assumption that
interpretee can figure it out on their own or a belief that “there is no equivalent
expression” (p. 211). What is missing from the academic research about community
interpreting is acknowledgment of the frame: a frame that established invisibility as a
feature of professional practice. Complaining about invisibility while persisting in a
discourse that excludes interpretees serves to reinforce invisibility.
Which brings us to the third tension, involving language ideologies. Some of the
confusion about what language is and what language does is represented in Tebble’s
(2009) rehash of the common interpreter lament of ‘no equivalent expression.’
Sometimes it is not “the expression” per se that needs to be interpreted but the move that
expression is meant to signal. Every culture has a way to indicate a new topic or a new
stage in an interaction. The challenges of intercultural communication stem less from
lack of equivalent concepts than from different senses of propriety, timing and protocols.
All interpreting discourse that emphasizes the importance of words undermines the
stewardship of interpretees’ identities and cultural ways of being. This is the arena where
interpretees must engage with interpreters for interpreted communication to truly
generate shared meanings and good relations.

121

Tebble’s source for defining framing and focusing moves is Sinclair & Coulthard,
1975).
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3.3.3

Applied Discourse Analysis 3: Interpret All Feedback—Including Input from
Interpretees
Cooperation among interpretees and interpreters is most necessary regarding

backchannel feedback. Tebble’s (2009) example continues with the way systemic
functional linguistics privileges “the feedback that can and should be interpreted is that
given during a turn at talk when only one person is speaking” (p. 211). On the one hand,
this seems almost too obvious to even state; that is, until one considers the many
instances when full interpretation of each interpretee’s turn at talk does not occur. So, on
the surface there is actually already quite a large problem. Also problematic, perhaps
even more so, is slippage allowed with backchannel feedback:
The most difficult feedback to interpret would be the [in this case]
physician’s auditor back channel feedback made while the interpreter is in
process of relaying what the patient has just said; or made by the patient
while the interpreter is in the process of relaying what the physician has
just said. Such interpreting can be achieved with varying degrees of
success. (p. 211)
As a description, this is a true statement of the relative difficulty of interpreting every
interpretee’s backchannel communications on par with each interpretee’s turns at talk.
Understood from the perspective of meta-discursive framing, that is, as a signpost for
people trying to understand where they are in any process of interpreted communication,
Tebble could be read either as advocating partial success or excusing partial failure. The
conditions of interpreting that inhibit utterances occurring in two directions at the same
time both being interpreted are worthy of more attention and investigation.
Writing about the experience of one set of users of interpreting services in the
Australian healthcare system, Garrett reports that she and her colleagues created “an
emergent construct” for interactions that were interpreted based upon a “theme of
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powerlessness [that] appeared central to many patient experiences” (2009, p. 76).
Concerns by users of legal interpreting services in Basque Country “doubt the efficiency
of the interpreting services” enough that they essentially collude with authorities to cut
the interpreter out of interactions, “relegating the role of the interpreter to insignificance”
(González and Auzmendi, 2009, p. 139). These two situations are different in that the
users have different language profiles: in Basque Country, most are bilingual and thus
exercise a choice to use interpreters, whereas the patients in Australian emergency rooms
and hospitals must rely upon family, friends, and bilingual staff to facilitate
communication when interpreters are not provided.
One could argue that the two cases are incommensurate: one is in healthcare the
other in the justice system. The former refers to a situation in which professional SI is not
provided; while the latter refers to a situation in which professional SI is provided but not
used. At the meta-discourse level, however, it is not the difference in
power/powerlessness that matters most between Basque Country bilinguals in court and
immigrants seeking healthcare in Australia but rather the similarity between them:
interpretees in both situations apparently often feel the communication situation is out of
their control. Roberts-Smith (2009) reports that judges’ and lawyers practical experience
of inadequate, absent, or unprofessional SI, and also “because the process of
interpretation has not been understood” (p. 29) has led many in Australia’s court system
to consider interpreters “an obstacle to communication” (p. 29). Official disappointment
often finds a target in the interpreter rather than in the organization, delivery or enactment
of interpreting services.
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While none of the CL5 cases or studies alone characterizes the entire user
experience of community interpreting, taken together they represent user
disenfranchisement with community SI. Only in two instances (in the CL5 corpus) do we
find substantial evidence of a positive effect from the intercultural communication
practice of SI. First, in the case of the Deaf ‘mock jurists’ in Napier, et al’s simulation
that found “levels of comprehension between deaf and hearing participants were similar”
(2009, p. 99). Second, in Merlini & Favaron’s (2009) report on positive outcomes in
healthcare interpreter training by a linguistic decision to refer to “norms” instead of
“rules” to guide interpreter decision-making while interpreting (p. 198). Given the ratio
of only two studies with positive outcomes to eleven or twelve with negative reports in
the CL5 corpus, one might determine that simultaneous interpretation is a failed
enterprise. Critical discourse analysis, however, suggests that an alternative framing is
possible.
Instead of reading the academic literature as an exclusively objective reflection of
reality (which is the functionalist approach), we can interpret the meta-discourse as an
extension of a certain and peculiar set of prejudices and biases. As illustrated above,
discourses about interpreting document prejudice against interpreted communication and
bias in support of non-interpreted communication. By embracing attitudes about language
and communication from the field without questioning where the attitudes come from and
whom they serve, interpreting researchers replicate and perpetuate popular
misunderstandings about simultaneous interpretation.
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3.3.4

Applied Discourse Analysis 4: Ascertaining the Certainty of Facts
The example provided by Tebble (2009) to illustrate the application of functional

discourse analysis is a medical encounter between a physician and a patient. She draws
upon the components of Hymes (1964, 1972) model of the speech event and a
previously-derived generic structure of interpreted medical consultation (Tebble, 1999).
Tebble explains that this structure was empirically established by combining a top down
approach (Halliday & Hasan; 1985; Hasan, 1977) and a micronanalytical or bottom up
approach (Sinclair and Coulthard, 1975; Tebble, 1992), both being methods of systemic
functional linguistics.
The speech act [the smallest unit] occurs within a conversational move of
which there are typically two that occur within a conversational exchange.
One or more exchanges comprise a transaction. A transaction comprises
one or typically a sequence of exchanges of a particular type; and the
genre element is made up of one or more transactions on one topic. Using
this method of analysis the structure of each discourse can be identified
and compared, revealing patterns of generic structure. (Tebble, 2009, p.
209)
As long as there is no challenge to the genre structure by virtue of an intercultural
difference (such as an alternative generic structure for the particular event), positivistic
functional description is adequate.
What is particularly helpful about using a medical encounter as an introduction to
discourse analysis is the care that physicians must take to ensure that they comprehend
what the patient is telling them. Tebble (2009) continues by describing “two significant
strategies used in professional consultations and interviews to check information are the
formulation and the observation” (p. 212). Adopted from conversation analysis (cf
Tebble, 1992), “each is the first part of an adjacency pair: formulation and decision; and
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observation and decision” (p. 213). ‘Adjacency pairs’ is the technical term identifying the
complementary ‘exchanges’ introduced above as conversational moves.
What critical discourse analysis of the CL5 volume offers as an addition and
complement to functionalist description is the observation that turn-taking does not
always follow in neat sequences of sensible adjacency pairs (cf Schegloff, Sacks &
Jefferson, 1974). Throughout the CL5 discourse there is evidence that meanings are not
always transparent; that shared understanding requires back-and-forth, give-and-take
exchanges. The intercultural challenges of interpreted communication manifest at two
levels: the turn and the word. As noted above, problems with turn-taking are frequently
elided. Problems with the word receive the most attention.
The positivist notions that meaning is self-evident and controlled by the speaker
are assumptions that can only hold up if one views language and language use as
permanently fixed. Ng provides a neat demonstration that this is inaccurate even in law:
“there is no such thing as a forever accurate translation of ‘burglary,’ whose meaning has
changed and can be expected to change as time goes by” (2009, p. 44). Likewise, the
structuralist goals of semantic mapping and notions like equivalence establish fixed
targets that may serve more as impediments to effective communication than support;
particularly so in rapidly changing economic and environmental/institutional conditions.
The spread of English as a lingua franca has also generated frustration among
community interpreters who believe they would be better able to render target language
utterances from a native language source than from English spoken non-fluently. Ozolins
& Hale describe the increased anecdotal evidence…of this phenomenon of difficult to
grasp English (in the case of English-speaking countries) of significant numbers of
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professionals, themselves migrants, who increasingly provide the workforce in public
health systems and elsewhere, leading to problems for interpreters no less than for many
English-speaking patients. (2009, p. 5)
Ortega Herráez et al.report a somewhat similar situation in Spain, where
police interpreters who said they did not explain cultural differences were
those working with English, and in most cases using it as a contact
language, so it is quite likely that they did not have access to the cultural
background of the speakers in question, since it was not a native Englishspeaking culture. (2009, p. 157)
Recall that the policing situation in Spain already constrains interpreters greatly,
heightening concerns about anyone using a non-fluent language to give testimony or
otherwise discuss legalities. It is not only English that presents such challenges of
comprehensibility. Basque/Spanish interpreters, for instance, need to be familiar with six
dialects (González and Auzmendi, 2009), and familiarity with many Chinese dialects is
necessary for Cantonese/English interpreters in Hong Kong (Ng, 2009).
Rather than interpreting between languages with well-known common grammars,
interpreters will be increasingly called upon to ‘interpret’ source language utterances that
are idiosyncratic and inventive, rather than conventional. This is quite evident in the
European Parliament where the use of non-fluent, mother-tongue-inflected English as a
Lingua Franca (ELF) challenges conference interpreters (Kent, 2009). These concerns
with the complexity and nuance of languages are dynamic features of transnationalism
that can only be resolved through increased cooperation in interpreted intercultural
interaction. But is insisting on the need enough to make it happen? “It is…critical for all
participants in interpreted encounters to have a mutual understanding of each other’s
roles and needs” (Ozolins & Hale, 2009, p. 3). Achieving increased comprehension by
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interpretees of the interpreter’s professional performance capacities is blocked by norms
that insist on interpreter invisibility and non-intervention.

3.3.5

Going Beyond (Applied Discourse Analysis 5): Where Does the Profession
Want Community SI To Go?
Positive structuralism stops its analysis with description, hiding its prescriptions

which are always latent and implied, and sometimes overtly stated. For instance, Tebble
writes: “Knowing the genre that one is interpreting means knowing the stages of the
speech event” (p. 209). This is an example of the normalcy of hegemonic ideology. It is
perhaps a subtle point, but the idea that one can learn one structure and apply that lesson
to every similar encounter is an oversimplification and a disservice to cultural variability.
Interpretivist analysis goes further. Applying a critical lens suggests that some elements
of the discourse analysis presented so far suggest that interpreters and academics of SI
participate and talk about the practice of SI in ways that co-construct the very dynamics
we seek to remedy.
Specifically, the discourse in CL5 demonstrates concern with language more than
concern with understanding. This was illustrated earlier with the list of quotes illustrating
three tensions in research discourse about simultaneous interpretation. González &
Auzmendi, for instance, put the lens on “the process which the language had to go
through” (2009, p. 137), and Ng’s (2009) study essentially boils down to a debate
between the semantic mapping of disembodied languages (“translation”) to the sociallyexperienced human-to-human co-construction of shared understandings
(“interpretation”). Lee’s advocacy for “absolute criteria” in the assessment of interpreting
performance (2009, p. 174) carries the structuralist paradigm’s focus on language as
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interpreting studies’ proper object of research to its linguistic paradigm extreme as the
sole basis for evaluation. The argument Lee provides is rational:
Since interpreting performance assessment tends to rely on the
demonstration of skills rather than on tasks that test comprehension of the
source speech, understanding may have to be assessed only through the
message rendition.” (p. 174)
Positivist implication? The skill of finding and uttering equivalent words must be
performed ‘right’ the ‘first’ time, all the time. Because (goes the hegemonic ideology)
there is no time for ‘extra’ turns in pursuit of clarification or other information to support
an interpretation most suitable to the unique configuration of participants in any actual
setting.
However, the contribution from Pöchhacker & Kolb (2009) demonstrates what
could happen in real life when interpreters and interpretees share responsibility for
documenting the results of a legal interview with deliberate regard to the future trajectory
of the written document as a proxy for the personified body of the asylum seeker. This
attention and cooperative interaction by the interpreter with the interpretees (and viceversa) resembles more closely that of the doctor who genuinely wants to understand the
health and medical conditions of a patient. These enactments and representations of
interpreting suggest that the problem of interpreter assessment is to construe
‘understanding’ in interactive, not only linguistic, terms.
While the asylum interpreter in Austria (Pöchhacker and Kolb, 2009) takes on a
great deal of responsibility for the written record, Ortega Herráez et al. found 100% of
police interpreters (in Spain) stated that they
would never explain questions of procedure, and we would attribute this
answer to the fact that in police settings there is more control over the
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interpreters (they do not have the opportunity to chat with non-Spanish
speakers) and the fact that there is less procedure to explain. (p. 159)
While it is interesting that the action of “explain[ing] questions of procedure” is equated
with “chat,”122 the point to highlight here involves the matter and perception of control.
“Police interpreters would seem to perceive greater risk in acting on their own initiative,
probably because they work in a setting where encounters are much more ritualized and
restrictive” (p. 159). What Ortega Herráez et al. are expressing is similar to that
suggested by Pöchhacker and Kolb: both sets of authors refer to the relationship between
interpreter’s role performance and the exertion of control by the setting. Sharing
responsibility for the written record “challenges established principles of professional
ethics,” explain Pöchhacker and Kolb (2009, p. 133), because “the production of [the
written record] should, in principle, be the sole task of the recording clerk working under
the guidance of—and from dictation by—the adjudicating official conducting the
hearing” (p. 133) and interpreters are “essentially [to render] what was said rather than
what is to be written” (p. 133).
The attachment to “what was said” is a language ideology that exerts control over
the interpretee’s voice by restricting the interpreter’s role. This articulation of role with
control (or control with role) is constructed in this academic meta-discourse through
authorial metacommunication in a passive voice, one that elides human agency (Pinker,
2007). On the one hand, the discourse about the need for professionalization indicates
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The idea that non-interpreted ‘direct talk’ by an interpreter with an interpretee is
‘only chatter’ (rather than about something of substance for the effectiveness of the
interpreted communication) could be argued as an example of miniaturization (Sen,
2006), in which a whole person and all of their identities are reduced to one
dimension, in this case, that of someone who does not speak the dominant language.
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distress over, as represented in the Basque case, “the lack of standardization” and “lack of
tradition” (González and Auzmendi, 2009, p. 136). Yet Roberts-Smith (2009) makes
similar claims about “a professional structure of recognized and guaranteed
competencies” (p. 33) for court SI in Australia where professional SI is well-established
but still not yet understood as an interactive mode of intercultural communication.
The “facts” in the CL5 research discourse, however, do show normative
structures, traditions and even an ideology regarding professionalization. The intense
focus on the interpreter, the interpreter’s role, and the interpreter’s linguistic competence
(etcetera) effectively eliminates serious consideration of interpretees’ agency and
responsibilities during SI. One could say there is little space for exploring interpretee’s
responsibility for quality in SI because interpreters fill the stage. The structuralist
paradigm, with its building-block-like emphasis on discrete words and assumed
equivalences of meaning, invokes a totalizing differentiation and imposes a discursive
barrier against uses of language that might invite different emphases. The asylum
interpreter’s give-and-take interactions with interprees is a precursor to interpretees
taking more turns paraphrasing and confirming mutual understanding as a new normal of
proactive participation in ensuring mutual understanding.
Again, the structuralist, building-block logic presumes meaning resides
exclusively in diction and other linguistic categories rather than being socially
constructed among conscious beings through mutual processes of communication. Ng
advocates changing the weighting from overemphasizing written translation’s language
criteria of adequacy and acceptability to privileging simultaneous interpretation’s
emphasis on fluency and comprehensibility (2009, p. 51). Researchers in Interpreting
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Studies could also conceivably cooperate to make a deliberate discourse move similar to
that made by Merlini & Favaron when they opted to describe the interpreter behavior of
speaking in the first person as a norm and not a rule (2009).
Garrett (2009) also offers prescriptions for change. On one hand, she advocates
the positive outcomes associated with community-oriented SI. “There are very
compelling safety, equity and quality arguments to support” maintaining universal access
to interpreters for patients with limited English proficiency (p. 78). Specifically, Garrett
elaborates:
Professional interpreters have been linked with increased patient satisfaction,
greater patient involvement, improved understanding, greater compliance with
treatment, improved access, and reduced medical errors (Brach and Fraser, 2000;
Timmins, 2002; Jacobs et al., 2001; Flores et al., 2003; Baker et al., 1996; Flores
et al., 2005)” (2009, p. 73)
On the other hand, Garrett maps a route for aligning advocacy for SI with other
discourses, insisting:
“Interpreter service policy needs to become firmly situated with the
healthcare discourse related to quality, safety and effectiveness [by
establishing] strong linkages between language ability, patient safety and
equity. “(2009, p. 79).
Similar linkages need to be built with interpretees in other fields. “To study
communication,” Carey asserts, “is to examine the actual social process wherein
significant symbolic forms are created, apprehended and used” (1992, p. 30). In this
section I have sought to present a view of the situation of community interpreting in a
changing landscape of transnational backlash and paradigmatic growth. The method has
been to apply critical discourse analysis to a representative sample of academic metadiscourse about community SI, and present these results in a forward-looking way. We
have created the field in which we work, teach, and study. We can change it.
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3.4

Consciousness in CL5
The concept of sharing responsibility acknowledges the relational and interactive

aspects of communication in ways that emphasizing quality and (interpreter)
responsibility alone do not. “How little attention has been paid to language interpretation
and the role of the interpreters in maintaining ethical relationships,” conclude Kaufert et
al.in their review of biomedical research ethics (emphasis added, 2009, p. 247). The
contributions to CL5 show how the relationships inevitably co-constructed among
interpretees, and between interpretees and interpreters, are routinely de-emphasized in
favour of focusing on criteria for (presumedly?) more measurable things such as the
‘quality’ of ‘language’ and/or ‘interpretation’, the definition of role (the interpreter’s, not
anyone else’s), and articulations and assessments of ethics (solely of the interpreter, alone
and in isolation). This skewed pattern of measurement tends to hold true even when the
overt object of analysis or theoretical framing emphasizes the interactive, social
construction of relationships and identities.

3.4.1

Beyond the Brackets: Discovering the Interpreter’s Unconscious
Rather than an either/or competition, can we cooperate to talk a complementary

interplay between structuralism and interactionism into social practice? In discussing the
efficacy of rating scales, Lee asserts there is no alternative for testing comprehension than
“message rendition” (2009, p. 174) and “absolute criteria” (p. 174), while at the same
time acknowledging the performance assessment by scales “is by no means an exact
science” (p. 174), relying to an unspecified (perhaps unspecifiable) degree upon
“intuition” (p. 171). Two of the editors of CL5 pick up on this question about intuition in
their introduction to the volume (Ozolins & Hale, p. 7). Meanwhile, seven of Lee’s nine
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participants “found band scales helpful for consistent rating” and argues that even the
responses of the remaining two skeptical participants are positive: “indicat[ing] that the
band scales appropriately described the level of qualities the raters unconsciously or
consciously expected in interpreting performance” (2009, p. 181).123
On the other hand, comparative literature from the field of second language
assessment cautions, “rater training helps to improve reliability in assessment but has
limitations in eliminating the rater bias and rater effects (Weigle, 1994)” (in Lee, 2009, p.
183). The acknowledgement of bias and rater effects may be what inspired Lee to include
the presence of unconscious expectations by raters of interpreting quality. What she
describes is assessment performance behavior by raters that appears similar to acquired
interpreting behavior by interpreters, specifically Lee lists the rater’s own reliance on
memory, inconsistency by the rater in referring to the source text or referring to it only
when deviations were suspected, and eventually desisting in referring to the source text at
all (p. 183).
Lee proposes what I would characterize as a loose equation for measuring
accuracy based on perceived deviations from the source text, arguing that “the gravity of
which should be considered in terms of the effect on the coherent and faithful rendering
of the message” (2009, p. 175). Deviations and their severity include the presence and
frequency of “omissions, additions, unjustifiable changes or misinterpretations of the
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Lee (2009) explains: “The term ‘band’ usually implies a range of possible scores
and, therefore, band scores may be converted into test scores (Alderson, 1991,
p.73).” In this case, “The number of bands in each criterion was determined on the
basis of the existing weighting, namely 6 points for Accuracy in content, 6 points for
Target Language Quality, and 3 points for Delivery” (p. 176).
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meaning and intention of the speaker” (p. 175).124 Regarding omissions in interpretation,
Ortega Herráez, et al. report:
In general, court interpreters stated that when they omit information it is
for communicative purposes, whereas the health/social services interpreter
stated (quite openly) that when they omit it is because they have forgotten
the information, have not understood it or do not know how to express it
in the target language. (2009, pp. 156-157)
Mentions of the unconscious and conscious omissions in the CL5 discourse sample invite
more exploration of Jemina Napier’s work on these topics. In Sign language interpreting:
Linguistic coping strategies (2002), Napier explicitly emphasizes “what interpreters do
well” (p. 119). She situates her research in the realms of frame theory and discourse
processes. Napier’s results bring positivistic structuralism and interpretivist
interactionism into the foreground as competing paradigms within the field. Her findings
will be explored in chapter six.

3.4.2

Silences...
The theory being proposed is that there has been a “silence” in the discourses

about simultaneous interpretation about the realities of interpretation that interferes with
professional best practices and interpretee empowerment. Discussion of omissions brings
this silence into view. Whether the silence is a manifestation of interpreters’ practical
consciousness that is in process of becoming discursive consciousness is an action
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Note: By contrast, evidence of the communication dynamics of self- or other-repair
to uttered language is relatively unremarkable in typical, monolingual interaction
among engaged and attentive interlocutors (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks, 1977).
These could also be correctable, if normatively permitted, within interpreted
interaction.
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research hypothesis. This ‘silence’ protects and hides the simple truth that there can never
be a single definitive “translation” that perfectly duplicates its original. The practical
reason is because the reference points for meaning across two languages (let alone
between unique individuals hailing from distinctly different cultures) never align in
complete totality. The philosophical reason is because language is only meaningful when
some degree or experience of mutuality is involved: one could almost say that the notion
of ‘original’ is itself a myth.
Whether or not a tree makes a sound when it falls in the forest is irrelevant to a
deaf person who gleans meaning from their sense of sight and physical perceptions of
vibration. The ‘origin’ of meaning is in the simultaneity of co-occurrence . . . imagine
‘message delivery’ and ‘message reception’ occurring in tandem. If a tree falls and the
hearing person is startled by the noise, is this more or less meaningful than the deaf
person who senses the rumble in the ground? Both have ‘received’ a communication: is it
the same one? How could they check? Would they even wonder if they had ‘understood
the same thing’? Interpreting dishevels the flow of presumed mutual comprehension that
is taken for granted when communicating in the same language. Rather than two people
communing on a shared experience of crashing noise, or two people communing on a
shared experience of trembling ground, interpreting allows people to connect their
disparate experiences to the same event. The question of participation involves
interpretees’ desire and abilities to forge commonality by engaging the differences. The
question of professional practice involves the extent to which interpreters mask or present
these differences.
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Challenges by Deaf interpretees to sign language interpreters are signals that they
are aware and sensitive to instances of masking, which is contrary to readers’ experiences
of written translation in which they are too removed to notice evidence of deviation or
omission. Edwin Gentzler refers to translation silences:
“Those ‘silences’ in the text, often known only to the translator, were
often not only the most interesting in terms of creativity, but also the most
revealing with regard to cultural differences” (Edwin Gentzler, 1993, p.
xii in Hatim, 2001, p. 44)
The silences Gentzler refers to are in written literary translations that have been
specifically adapted to conform or appeal to the Western reader. Gentzler comments that
these ‘silences’ are accompanied by “certain costs” (which are left unnamed). Are similar
costs of ‘silence’ involved in simultaneous interpretation? We might consider such
‘silences’ as clues to the presence of alternatively constructed timespaces, each premised
(constructed, maintained and re-created) on the basis of difference.125 This clue to an
alternative chronotope, toward another way of orienting social interaction with the
unfolding of identity, relationships, culture and social reality, raises questions concerning
what would be required from interpretees to enable their creativity to recognize and
engage with the alternative flow of a interpreted communication.
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Derrida’s différance (1963/1973) involves a philosophical and literary critique of
language and language use that highlights the impermanent and unfixable nature of
words. From this poststructural vantage point, the temporal aspect of meaningmaking regards the non-arrival of any single absolute definition; from such a view,
either chaos or creativity can commence. There is much to his philosophy that could
be brought to bear on the challenges of simultaneous interpretation.
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3.5

Addressing the Tensions in Simultaneous Interpreting Research and Practice
The tensions this critical discourse analysis brings into view hold across

interpreters’ and interpreter researchers’ perceptions of interpretees in all the CL5
community interpreting contexts named above, including the outlier chapter on
interpretees in conference interpreting. Conference interpreters at the European
Parliament in 2005 were even more explicit than the community interpreters in their
concern that Members of the EP (MEPs) do not understand or use the system of SI in the
EP properly, referring to MEPs’ choices to communicate in a second or third language
instead of their most fluent language with urgent terms such as “danger” and “loss”
(Kent, 2007).
The similarities among conference SI and community SI settings are concentrated
in terms of what interpretees know and do not know about how to participate in SI, and
appear centralized around matters of exercising voice through the agency of the
interpreter rather than in spite of the interpreter. (The assumption is that attitudes and
attempts at ‘control of meaning’ is an expression of the desire for voice.) These findings
are a reason why consciousness is situated as a reference point for action research. The
speculation is that increases in shared discursive consciousness about how to achieve
voice during SI will generate the circulation of more linguistic and cultural differences,
thus contributing productively to the maintenance of human diversity.
To repeat, the three tensions that become apparent from a critical discourse
analysis of a situated timesnap of interpreting research are:
1

heterogenous realities in the field being opposed to a mythical ideal of
communicative flow;
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2

interpretees perceived as unskilled in the use of SI while interpreters are
constrained from providing appropriate instruction; and

3

ideas about language and meaning that are inconsistent and contradictory; a
confusion that encompasses interpretees and interpreters.

These tensions become apparent by reading the academic meta-discourse
critically, through the lenses of two different paradigms: structural, i.e., functional
linguistics; and interpretivist, i.e., socially co-constructed through the interplay of
language(s) and social interaction. Applying one paradigmatic view to the knowledge
being represented in the other paradigmatic view does justice to the complexity of
interpreted intercultural communication.

3.6

Convergence or Divergence in Interpreting Studies?
The field of translation studies came into being during the 1960s mainly through

the engagement of literary translators with intellectual developments in philosophies of
language and linguistics. The challenges and problems of translating cultural differences
and meanings of artistic works (especially poetry and fiction) into other languages are
taken very seriously. Over several decades, a range of approaches, strategies and debates
for dealing with linguistic differences and the power of the translator have been explored
both generally and specifically, both as abstract principle and within contexts
particularized by cultural boundaries between the language(s) of original literary work
and the target language(s) of translation.
In contrast, interpreting researchers (and professional interpreters) have
historically engaged the intercultural social interaction aspects of simultaneous
interpreting without calling into question the simple functional linguistic paradigm that
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constrains interpretee—interpretee engagement through a rigid delineation of interpreter
role and an evaluative emphasis on fluency and the smoothness of communicative flow).
Perhaps it is the objectification of language captured in print126 that has enabled
translation theory to keep pace with developments and divergences in social theory over
the past decades.
Meanwhile, in the last decade within the field of interpreting studies, Franz
Pöchhacker (2007) celebrates identifying that researchers of simultaneous interpretation
were just beginning to converge into (what he considers) a coherent disciplinary space.
He describes this space as characterized by an emphasis on “the social sphere of
interaction in which interpreting takes place” (p. 12) through “the dialogic interactionist
approach developed mainly for research on community interpreting” (p. 11).
Pöchhacker (2007) traces how interpreting studies has finally moved beyond
gross features of modality (e.g., spoken or signed languages) and (what he describes as)
categorizations based on model or paradigm to
a conceptual continuum, with two broad distinctions: first, between international and intra-social, or ‘community-based’ settings; and, second,
with regard to the format of interaction—prototypically, multilateral
conferencing vs. face-to-face dialogue. Drawing on these two conceptual
dimensions allows for much middle ground, including conference-like
events in the community (especially involving Deaf people) or dialogue
interpreting in diplomacy. (2007, p. 12)
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As mentioned earlier, translation deals primarily with written texts. The spatial and
temporal fixing of written text in a static, stable configuration as a tangible, material
artefact constitutes an object of study that is qualitatively different than the
effervescent spoken word or gestural sign that vanishes along sound and light waves
(except when live interaction is recorded for replay).

153

Within this disciplinary convergence, however, remains a strong and as yet unproblematized emphasis on the source text and accuracy of interpretation measured
linguistically. The root definitions of interpreting from within the field refer to Gerver’s
(1971) complex information processing, bolstered by fascination within cognitive science
to map the linguistic functions in the brain (cf Beaugrande, 1980). While there are
traditions that focus more on target-text construction (e.g., Toury, 1995), “neither version
of the target-text-oriented translation-theoretical [skopos theory127 or Toury’s] approach
has gained a high profile in interpreting research” (Pöchhacker, 2007, p. 17).
In other words, the basic functional linguistic paradigm has not been overthrown;
its challengers have not yet prevailed. Perhaps this is because of the heightened
sensitivity of interpreters and interpretees who are engaged in actual social interaction
with each other, in contrast to authors and animators of written texts for readers with
whom they most likely never meet in person?128 It could be that the spatial and temporal
distances implied by translation has allowed translation theorists to examine more
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“Spearheaded by Hans Vermeer at the University of Heidelberg, the German
functionalist theory of translation, or skopos theory, proved largely compatible with
the decidedly descriptive approach to the target-oriented study of translation as
promoted in particular by Gideon Toury (1995)” (Pöchhacker, 2007, p. 17).
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“The methods [of fieldwork] used will depend on research goals as well as practical
and political realities of the fieldwork situation10” (Farnell and Graham 1998:438).
Footnote 10: “The political entailments of field research are widely acknowledged in
anthropology (see Rabinow 1977; Fox 1991; Clifford and Marcus 1986). They have
received less attention in linguistics (see Aissen 1992). Briggs (1986) discusses
assymetries of power in linguistic anthropology with a focus on the interview”
(Farnell and Graham 1998, p. 443).
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features of interlingual communication with a certain degree of protection from
consequences.129
One of the effects of this removal from the immediacy of spontaneous social
interaction may be part of what has enabled translation theorists and researchers to keep
apace of social theory in general. Meanwhile, the kinship Pöchhacker writes about is not
a convergence of different paradigms, it is a hegemonic consolidation of the dominant
linguistic paradigm of equivalence and fluency. The constraining elements of this
established academic meta-discourse can be conceived as a structural control to limit or
contain the increased variability of meaning-making that necessarily emerges when the
heterogeneous and foreignizing aspects of intercultural interaction are included in the
products and processes of simultaneous interpretation.
Later, the case will be presented that much of the progress which has occurred in
moving the field of interpreting studies toward recognition of the complexities of
meaning-making are largely due to criticism and resistance from culturally Deaf
communities. Pöchhacker nods in this direction, commenting on “the important
contribution of sign language interpreting researchers such as Cynthia Roy (2000)”
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Specifically, during translation the spatial disconnect among reader(s), author(s) and
translator(s) and the temporal asynchronicity as writing, translating, and reading
occur at non-simultaneous times for each participant, creating a bufferzone for
reactions that might be embarrassing or awkward (or perceived as such) in
immediate face-to-face interaction.
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(2007, p. 17) shaping the convergence he perceives on the triadic nexus130 of “dialogic
discourse and interaction” (p. 17). In a general sense I do not disagree with him; this
convergence is occurring. What I am contesting is the extent to which these theories from
other disciplines and sub-fields are changing actual training, practice, performance and
participation in intercultural interpreted communication, rather than co-opted to support
the established functional linguistic paradigm.
Resistance to the hegemony of the functional linguistic paradigm does not often
come from minority language speakers during live interpreting, and there is (as yet, to my
knowledge) no other language group with a voice as consistently challenging as that of
Deaf culture. Instead, resistance comes from the discontented field of translation studies:
its diverse theories and densely developed history. The gulf between translation studies
and interpreting studies establishes a bridge between the empowered Deaf voice in
community interpreting, and the debates and practices of multilingualism in the European
Union, specifically as they play out in the institutional context of simultaneous
interpretation in the European Parliament.

3.7

Into the Field: Simultaneous Interpretation in Action
The preceding critical discourse analysis of a situated timesnap of academic

research about community interpreting, in comparison with a range of theoretical
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“Most consequentially, Cecilia Wadensjö (1998) view of interpreting as managing
discourse in a triadic relationship, with a focus on interactivity rather than monologic
text production, shaped a new paradigm. Centered on dialogic discourse and
interaction (DI), this ‘DI paradigm’ drew mainly on concepts and methods from such
fields as sociolinguistics, conversation analysis and social psychology” (Pöchhacker,
2007, p. 17).
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developments in the field of translation studies, establishes the need for paradigmatic
thinking that includes interpretees as well as interpreter-practitioners, trainers, and
researchers. An inclusive and foreignizing engagement of participants within the field of
simultaneous interpretation is hypothesized to promote meta-communicative
collaboration that can be consciously used for the social good. Meta-communication is
talk that explores both discursive consciousness and practical consciousness. Instead of
the typical literature review, a critical discourse analysis of carefully selected,
representative instances in the research literature shows the effects of selective attention,
particularly in Kenneth Burke’s (1966) sense of a “terministic screen” in which every
utterance entails a selection of speech acts that simultaneously de-selects alternative acts
with their associated indexicalities131 (or thrust, to suggest a synonym in Will’s term) and
entailments. Both entailment and indexicality refer to effects of language use and social
interaction over time. Whether deliberately or unconsciously chosen, language use
inevitably directs the attention toward certain meanings and social realities (selecting
them) and away from other meanings and social realities (deselecting them). This fact
opens the possibility for conceptualizing consciousness, and unconsciousness, as dialogic
131

Urcuoli 1995:109 in (Farnell and Graham 1998, p. 416): “The property that language
shares with all sign-systems is its indexical nature: its maintenance and creation of
social connections, anchored in experience and the sense of the real. Linguistic
indexes may be grammaticalized or lexicalized as ‘shifters’—devices that locate
actions in time and space: personal pronouns, verb tenses, demonstratives, and time
and space adverbs. These are deictic in that they point outward from the actor’s
location. The structure of action fans out from the center, the locus of I and You, to
delineate where and when everything happens relative to the central actors: he and
she versus I and You; there versus here; then versus now; present versus non-present
(past or future). . . . The indexes that embody discourse extend beyond pronouns,
adverbs and verbal categories both to the sounds and shapes of speech that identify
the actor with a particular group and to the speech acts marking the actor’s intent as
others recognize it. In short indexes make the social person [identity, role].”
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accomplishments,132 that is, as outcomes and effects of people engaging with each other
through social interaction and language in use, i.e., through talk.
Vuorikoski claims, “It is a crucial issue in interpreting to find out whether the SI
version allows the listener to formulate an interpretation of the TT message which
corresponds to the one he would have formulated if he had been able to understand the
original speech” (2004, p. 64). Important as this standard has been, rather than continuing
in this equivalence paradigm, this research is motivated to try and understand what
happens if equivalence is assumed as only ever an approximate achievement. In other
words, if receivers’ interpretations of meaning (s) differ, how do people in interpreted
communication make sense and go on? (cf Cronen, 2001). What are the outcomes of
‘going on’ in a democratic institution endowed with the power of making public policy?

132

Michael Billig explores the dialogic co-construction of unconsciousness in Freudian
Repression (1999).
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CHAPTER 4
SIMULTANEOUS INTERPRETATION IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

4.1

Political Context: Justice and Home Affairs
The system of simultaneous interpretation (SI) in the European Parliament (EP)

relies upon technology and the human talent for communication. The purpose of SI in the
EP is to facilitate the European Union’s legislative process in coordination with the
European Commission and the Council of Presidents (“the Council”). The Council puts
forth five-year-long “programmes” that are established by the first Presidency in each
five year electoral term. The main part of this research was conducted in the last year of
the Hague Programme, which (among many, many other things) kicked off the second
phase of policy-making on a common European asylum policy. The asylum dossier
became central to this research project when the researcher was allowed to observe the
different types of meetings involved in establishing asylum law for the European Union.
This access began with an observation of the EP’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice
and Home Affairs (LIBE), included meetings of the Asylum dossier Working Group
(composed of a representative MEP from each political group in the LIBE Committee),
and extended to the Trialogue meetings where the lead MEP on the Asylum dossier
(called the Rapporteur) negotiated with representatives from the Council and
representatives from the European Commission (“the Commission”).
Some Trialogues during the Hague Programme were different than previous
Trialogues because the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) had created the mechanism of codecision, in which the Council and Commission could no longer disregard the EP’s
political voice as elected representatives of the European public sphere. The new
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Trialogue rules require the Council and Commission to engage and compromise, rather
than just consider the EP’s consultation advice. The Asylum dossier was among the early,
precedent-setting co-decision legislation, not the old (one might say disempowered or
disempowering mode of) consultation, so the political stakes for participating Members
and the overall Parliament were high. In addition to establishing a new European Asylum
Support Office (EASO) and improving the existing directives, the Rapporteur was
carrying expectations from all the MEPs to uphold and even increase the influence of the
EP in the overall governance structure of the European Union. The Rapporteur “is
responsible from the beginning to the end of a specific topic” (F53),133 specifically for
coordinating the movement of legislation through all its requisite stages, establishing the
Working Group’s position by negotiating with the representatives from all the political
groups (who are called Shadow Rapporteurs, usually shortened to “Shadows”), gaining
support from the whole Committee in order to negotiate with the Commission and
Council in the Trialogues, and writing the final report.
We have so-called shadow rapporteurs…because if your [political] Group
doesn’t get the Report, you need certainly someone who…makes the same
work as a rapporteur in your group. So, who is from the first to the end as
it was published in the official schedule, knows what is going with this
legislation, makes all the professional negotiation, plus, of course, the
political negotiation in the Group and among all Members. (F53)

133

The coding system for participants in the research is divided into three categories: F
refers to any permanent or temporary staff of the Parliament, who are described as
“officials” or “functionnaires.” The Members, “M,” are divided into two categories,
those representing “Old” Member countries (from before the big bang enlargement
which vastly increased the language regime for simultaneous interpretation) and
those representing “New” Member countries: OM and NM. The numbers are
randomly assigned.
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In the case of the Asylum dossier, the only settings utilizing simultaneous interpretation
were during progress reports and voting in the full LIBE Committee, and voting in
Plenary Sessions.
The English fluency of the participants in non-interpreted Asylum dossier
meetings varied, allowing observation and inquiry about communication dynamics in the
absence of interpretation. In Hymesian terms, these variations in setting occur within one
overall scene of social interaction. The overall scene is European multilingual
democracy.134 Within this scene, across the settings, participants engage in specific
events, generating innumerable acts of communication according to various keys (tones
or moods) and according to particular genres, all within the scope of a single instrument:
the system of simultaneous interpretation. (See Table 2.)

134

The labels “multilingual,” “democratic,” and even “European” can be (and are)
contested. Only the notion and practices of multilingualism are enjoined here.
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Table 2.

Hymesian SPEAKING Rubric Applied to the European Parliament

Theoretical element of
communication events
Scene

Applied element of communication
multilingual European democracy
● fully-interpreted Plenaries

Settings

● partially-interpreted Groups, Committees, Working Groups
● non-interpreted Working Groups
Primary:
● interpretees (Members of the European Parliament) interpreters European
Parliament Interpreters (EPIs)
Secondary:*

Participants

● Members’ Assistants
● Permanent Staff
● Guests
● Visitors
Enabling:**
● Technicians

Ends

Not yet determined

Acts

Every quote is an act

Key

Variable per event setting and participant

Instrument

The system of simultaneous interpretation

Genre

Political

*Secondary Participants sometimes engage as Primary Participants
**Other enabling participants are in the scheduling office of the Interpreting Directorate; no one from that
office was interviewed during this project.

4.1.1

Getting Past the Glitz: Setting(s), Scene and Instrument
During the very last interview I wrote in my field notebook, “The interpreters

[still] assume plenary is the object of interest. Members too.” How people felt about the
plenary meetings in the hemicycle, with its full complement of official languages and
hundreds of interpreters, was routinely assumed to be the only relevant subject for
research about interpreting. After eight months of observation and conversations, it
seemed I had been unable to pierce the established discourse about SI in the EP. Rhetoric
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has effectively established the image of the European Parliament in plenary session as the
icon of multilingual European democracy, crucially not just in the public imagination but
also in the minds of its primary participants: interpreters and interpretees. This high
profile motivated Vuorikoski’s decision to select the plenary for her study.
In the words of Carlo Marzocchi and Giancarlo Zucchetto, who discuss
interpreting in the EP institutional context, the monthly plenary assembly is ”the
climax of an interpreter’s work at the EP, both in terms of peer recognition and in
terms of effort” (1997: 81)” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 16).
That intensity also established Vuorikoski’s baseline for identifying constraints, because
“the interpreter may experience a feeling of having reached the limit of what be
interpreted” (p. 16-17). My motivation was to understand the interpreting occurring
during the other part of the Parliament’s work.
Parliament’s work is divided into two main stages: (1) Preparing for the plenary
session. This is done by the MEPs in the various parliamentary committees that
specialize in particular areas of EU activity. The issues for debate are also
discussed by the political groups. (2) The plenary session itself. [...] (in
Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 78, quoting a Europa website no longer available)
The preparatory work of MEPs (and their Assistants, Secretariat, Commission and
Council staff), constitutes, arguably, the EP’s community work in order to be able to
convene in conference. Interpreters are working in all of these settings.
Behind the primary participants are the invisible technicians who run the enabling
electronic infrastructure. Just as there is “a big pyramid of layers” (F13) in the decisionmaking process, there are also layers of human-designed and operated digital technology
supporting the system of simultaneous interpretation. While the hardware is consistent,
software is fitted both to the physical space of a given meeting as well as the social
purpose of that meeting.
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The equipment was described by a technician as “a global system” (F12) because
it includes a “microphone conference system” for the Members and an “interpretation
system” for the interpreters (F12). The microphone system for Members operates
differently in the large hemicycles where the plenary sessions are held than in the other
rooms where political groups and working committees meet. The interpretation system
operates the same in either setting. The feature that distinguishes the different use of the
Members’ microphone system is the degree of control by the technician. The interpreters’
interpretation system is “always on automatic” (F12), although each interpreter has some
programming capability at their individual desk.
The difference between these two systems, microphone and interpretation, is
significant but undifferentiated in the primary participants’ discourse about SI in the EP.
In seventy-three recorded conversations, Members, their Assistants, and various EU
officials (temporary and permanent functionnaires, that is, Parliament staff and career EU
bureaucrats) would talk about the differences in some features of communication
depending on the physical location, but not in terms of the technological conditions.135
Primary and secondary interpretees (Members and Assistants or Parliament staff,
respectively) would describe Plenaries as full assemblies in which Members give
speeches mainly for consumption by audiences in their home countries. The intended
audience distinguishes the kind of talk that occurs in Plenary from communicating in
Committees and Groups where MEPs argue and negotiate with each other over
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The difference in the degree of the technician’s control of Members’ microphones
did not rise as a salient issue with the 55 interpreters interviewed in 2005. This does
not mean that interpreters are unaware or unaffected by the degree of technician
control, only that other concerns were more pressing during that time period.
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legislation (Committees) and decide upon strategy according to their political party
platform (Groups). Likewise, the distinction between Plenary and Committees or Groups
is described by one of the régie (control room) technicians in social terms:
In the hemicycle, the Members know when they have to speak and how
long they can speak. They have one minute or one half minute speaking
time. The president has to have the complete control of what’s going on.
Nobody is able to turn on his microphone and say, “No, I don’t like what
he’s talking about,” or things like that…. It’s contained because they are
talking about rules, about debates they do in the rooms. If you go to the
hemicycle and listen to what’s going on, then you are not aware of what
they did work. You don’t understand what they’re talking about, because
they are talking about rule number 22. They give a number. You don’t
understand because you had to be in the room or you had to read the
subject to know what’s going on. In the rooms it’s different because every
group has his rooms or his room, and in the room they debate. So number
116 talks to this one and asks a question. He answers. It’s a relay debate.
In the hemicycle they don’t debate. (F12)
In addition to naming the social features of interaction, the technician’s practical
consciousness distinguishes between communication that occurs “in the room” or “in the
hemicycle.”
This is a subtle point, but the users of SI in the EP, the MEPs who are involved in
these social interactions, refer to these differences based on the meeting’s social purpose.
None indicated awareness that the technical conditions for the interpreters’ interpreting
are different in different settings. The phrases “in the room” and “in the hemicycle” do
not appear as significantly in the discourses of MEPs and interpreters. (See Table 3.)
When these phrases are used they refer to the physical, geographic location of meetings
not to label the overt types of social interaction that occur in each setting: “debate” occurs
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in Groups and Committees (not in ‘rooms’) and “one minute speeches” occur in Plenary
(not in ‘hemicycles’).136
Table 3.

Geographical and Social Constructs in Two Discourses about
Simultaneous Interpreting in the European Parliament

Discourse

Setting

Construct

Technicians

in the room

in the hemicycle

Geographical

MEPs

in the Group / in the
Committee

in the Plenary

Social

Between the conference microphone and interpretation systems, there is “a
working reason” (F12) that motivates the degree of automation used to regulate the
control permitted to Members as participants in the meeting. The overt reason is time
management of turn-taking. (Of course the Members know these rules; they abide by
them according to practical consciousness. The point is that they don’t talk about their
effect on the quality or outcomes of intercultural communication, suggesting an absence
or gap in discursive consciousness.) This technological differentiation to regulate control
co-occurs with distinctive patterns of social interaction.137 Mentioning this juxtaposition
now is to establish the overarching logic for comparing “X” communication-without-SI
(as in the case of the Asylum Working Group and other smaller meetings relevant to the
Asylum dossier) with “Y” communication-using-SI (the larger Group and Committee

136

There are time limits for turns in Committees and Groups too, but the one-minute
speeches given during Plenaries are (typically) aimed at home constituencies with
only incidental or tangential meaning for their work with other Members.

137

There is no chicken or egg dilemma here; the human social system and the
engineered technology co-evolved.
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meetings “in the room” when the interpretation system is used, and the Plenaries “in the
hemicycles” where the conference microphone system is used).
There is a continuum of simultaneously-interpreted communication in the EP
anchored at one end by the fully interpreted, high-publicity plenaries and at the other end
by small, un-interpreted face-to-face meetings in which the nitty-gritty details of
comprehensive EU law are contested and confirmed. In the background, technicians
believe they are even more invisible to the system of SI in the EP than the interpreters,
yet they are absolutely crucial to the process and from their vantage point are able to
articulate discursive consciousness about the system:
For the members, the machine doesn’t exist….the machine doesn’t exist.
They know that there are interpreters, but they don’t know there’s a
machine, so they don’t realize that there’s a machine between the
interpreters and the person. So when something works well, they thank
interpreters, but they never talk about the technician or technical stuff. But
if something goes wrong technical, they know how to find them. (F12)
Despite (or perhaps because of) the invisibility, Parliament technicians have knowledge
about the system of SI in the EP that is not present in other discourses, such as those of
European Parliament interpreters and the users of SI in the EP.
Subtle differences in the discourses of participants in communication events at the
European Parliament may represent a limit or boundary between practical consciousness
and discursive consciousness. Specifically, the generic (popular, common) discourse
about SI in the EP assumes that the conditions of participating in interpreted
communication are the same in these two scenarios. In other words, the assumption
appears to be that whether you are “in the room” or “in the hemicycle” the interpreting
should be done in the same way. Intriguingly for me as an action learner, it was only
when the research widened beyond the dualism of “interpretees—interpreters” to include
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the role of the technician that a meta-communicative vantage point on the established
practical consciousness could be ascertained. Which is to say that I had been lost in the
established discourse even though my outsider status provided an external context
serving as a point of reference for comparison and contrast.
What I knew about community interpreting for the Deaf was not sensible in the
pervasive framework of a technician-controlled “microphone conference system.” Even
though I could recognize (at least some of) the conditions and potentials for communitystyle interpreting “in the room” (where “the interpretation system” is used) I was not able
to discern the deeply coded nature of the phrase, “in the room,” nor its contrast with “in
the hemicycle,” until someone with a different practical consciousness put the two terms
in relation. Instead, in keeping with nearly everyone else, what drew most of my attention
were the criticisms of interpreting (which do not distinguish between being “in the room”
or “in the hemicycle”).138 In part, the focus on users’ criticisms came about because of a
previous discourse analysis of what European Parliament Interpreters (EPIs) had to say
about working as a professional interpreter in/for the EP. Themes of “danger” and “loss”
were prominent in the EPIs discourse, which was “as full of complaints (and occasional
compliments) about [MEPs] as their discourse is about [interpreters]” (Kent, 2007, p. 62).
That preliminary fieldwork with EPIs will be elaborated below. Of note now is that its

138

Criticisms of interpreters do name the settings of “in the Group” and “in the Plenary”
as if they are being distinguished but, as will be discussed later, the substance of the
criticisms are the same.
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findings primed me as an action researcher to notice parallels, divergences, and
complementarities in the users’ discourse about SI in the EP.139
Also important is that the preliminary phase of research happened to occur during
the spring of 2004, which was at the end of the first year of the Hague Programme,140
coinciding with the beginning of the Sixth Term of the European Parliament. The EP as
an institution of the European Union emerged from the founding in 1952 of an
international, market-motivated European Coal and Steel Community to regulate the
“free movement of coal and steel and free access to sources of production” (Europa
2010), which next became the European Economic Community (EEC). The first
regulation of the EEC (Regulation No 1, 1958) confirms the legal basis established in the
1957 Treaty of Rome and governs the provision of simultaneous interpretation in the EP
today (as well as in the other European Union institutions).
REGULATION No 1 determining the languages to be used by the
European Economic Community
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY,
Having regard to Article 217 of the Treaty which provides that the rules
governing the languages of the institutions of the Community shall,
without prejudice to the provisions contained in the rules of procedure of
the Court of Justice, be determined by the Council, acting unanimously;

139

The rigor of action research involves collecting as many perspectives as possible on
the whole situation. All selected quotes are either representative instances of
common themes or stark outliers whose very difference opens up another angle on
the social dynamics.

140

The Hague Program set out ten priorities for the five years of the 6th Parliamentary
term, including an emphasis on strengthening fundamental rights for EU citizens and
establishing an asylum support office. http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/
human_rights/fundamental_rights_within_european_union/l16002_en.htm Retrieved
4 March 2014.
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Whereas each of the four languages in which the Treaty is drafted is
recognised as an official language in one or more of the Member States of
the Community;
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
Article 1
The official languages and the working languages of the institutions of the
Community shall be Dutch, French, German and Italian. (European
Economic Community, 1958)
Notice that English is not one of the original languages. Each evolution in institutional
arrangements and enlargement of members includes a provision amending the original
treaty to include official languages of new Member States.
In the European Parliament, Procedural Rule 138 guarantees Members “the right
to speak in Parliament in the official language of their choice” and “Interpretation shall
be provided in committee and delegation meetings from and into the official languages
used and requested by the members and substitutes of that committee or delegation.”141
(See Appendix C for the full text of Rule 138 and its exceptions.) As EU expansion
continues, the original linguistic right of choice continues to be extended to new Member
States despite concerns about the size, cost, and complication of the system required to
enable functional simultaneous interpreting across all language combinations.142
Partly in counter to public and political concerns regarding the cost and
complexity of the system of SI in the EP, official rhetoric promotes the provision of SI
for Members as a distinctively European combination of multilingualism with good

141

16th edition (2004) Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament,
http://www.agora- http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do
?uri=OJ:L:2005:044:0001:0140:EN:PDF retrieved 5 March 2014.

142

Croatia became an official member in 2013.
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governance. “Our policy of official multilingualism as a deliberate tool of government is
unique in the world. The EU sees the use of its citizens’ languages as one of the factors
which make it more transparent, more legitimate and more efficient” (Europa).143
Explicitly linking many languages-in-use with quality decision-making is a fascinating
claim. “Multilingual communication when people speak…is at the core of [European]
Community decision-making” (Europa).144 These quotations from the official EU
website, Europa, establish and promote the rhetorical logic that was active and evident in
the discourse of MEPs in 2008-2009, which had also appeared in the earlier (2004)
interviews with EP Interpreters. Coincidentally, a major feature of the Sixth Term
involved the massive expansion of the system of SI, due to the accession of twelve new
Member nations: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

4.1.2

Context and Instrument: Enlargement and Controlled Multilingualism
The language regime145 for the system of SI in the EP changed considerably due

to the enlargement of 2004, because the number of working languages jumped from
eleven to twenty-two (see Tables 4 and 5). Technically, 23 languages were official
(generating 506 possible language combinations) although Maltese was not being offered

143

Europa is the official website of the European Union, constructed and maintained by
the European Commission. Retrieved 30 April 2008.

144

From the Joint Interpreting and Conference Service of the Directorate General on
Interpretation (European Commission). Originally retrieved 28 November 2005; has
since been relocated (possibly revised).

145

The term “language regime” is being understood in the context of Hymes’ rubric as
the “instrument” of communication in the European Parliament.
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as interpreters were still being trained. This expansion more than quadrupled the previous
number of SI language combinations needing to be spontaneously accommodated by
interpreters from 110 to 462. Extensive planning (Athanassiou 2006, Gazzola 2006) was
required at the administrative level just to imagine how to manage the complicated
language/interpretation regime (cf Podesta 2001a, 2001b, 2001c). Podesta documents and
defends the new language regime called “controlled full multilingualism.” Controlled
multilingualism was invented to accommodate the realization that “symmetrical” SI was
not going to be achieved for every new language.146 The notion of symmetry
encompasses an equitable mirroring of all languages with each other language.
The precedent of full symmetry was established over the course of growth from
four languages (1957 Treaty of Rome),147 to six (1973), seven (1981), nine (1986), eleven
(1995), twenty (2004), and finally to twenty-three (2007) at the time of this research. In
the EP prior to the 2004 enlargement, the system of SI in the EP established norms that,

146

Asymmetry in translation was previously introduced with a quote from Lawrence
Venuti (see p. 122, this dissertation).

147

“ARTICLE 248 This Treaty, drawn up in a single original in the Dutch, French,
German and Italian languages, all four texts being equally authentic…”
[http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.p
df retrieved 4 March 2014]
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since 1995, accommodated a language regime of eleven official languages.148 In standard
historical practice, teams of three interpreters would collaborate to cover all the source
language combinations into one of these eleven official languages, e.g., Polish, or
German, or Portuguese. In interpreter jargon, the language being interpreted into is
known as the target language, distinguishing it from the language being interpreted from,
which is called the source language. Full symmetry meant that every source language is
interpreted into all ten target languages.149
Full symmetry is an ideal that within any given target language booth, every
possible source language that might arise from the interpretees is known to at least one of
the team interpreters. This allows any source language to be interpreted into any target
language, simultaneously, for all languages spoken or listened to by Members in the
meeting. This is why most EP Interpreters (EPIs) must be fluent in at least three or four

148

In a section called “The legal and ideological basis of multilingualism,” Vuorikoski
explains: “It has been said that Europe is on everyone’s lips, but in different
languages. Preserving the cultural identity of the Member States has been considered
essential in the European context, and one way of maintaining cultural identity has
been the language policy which guarantees the official languages of the Member
States the status of an official language in the European Union as well. A plurality of
cultures has been experienced as a value that the community does not want to
surrender; instead, the many ways of thinking have been seen as a challenge rather
than a handicap. (Zeyringer 1991: 7) In fact, the European communities are the only
international community where the languages of all the Member States enjoy the
status of an official language. This policy has been seen to act as a safeguard for
political and legal equality, as citizens are able to follow the functioning of the
institutions in their own language . (Ramos-Ruano 1991: 61–65)” (2004, p. 73).

149

As a geometric metaphor, symmetry invokes the shape and space filled by language.
This is a richer and more satisfying metaphor than the strict mathematical equality
metaphor used in linguistics.
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languages and may be fluent in as many as seven or eight.150 EPIs are combined in teams
so that any source language will be known to at least one member of the team who can
interpret into the booth’s designated target language. Full symmetry in the preenlargement EP was possible for nearly all of the 110 possible combinations of source-totarget languages. So, the Dutch booth, for instance, would have been composed of three
interpreters who, among them, were fluent in the other ten official languages: Danish,
English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Swedish. The
only exception to the full symmetry of direct interpretation between each of those official
eleven languages occurred when Finland joined the European Union in 1995.
The Finnish exception151 involves an accommodation that is strikingly strange to
community-style interpreters. Labelled retour, this process refers to Finnish-fluent
simultaneous interpreters’ interpreting both out of Finnish as well as into Finnish. In other
words, to interpret from Finnish as the source language to another target language, as
well as into Finnish as the target language from another source language. In the
traditional EP language regime, the former is avoided whenever possible, and the latter is
taken as the norm. All interpreters are essentially working ‘one-way’ into their designated
target language. What is unusual about this from the community interpreting point of
150

Language profiles being sought (as of 2012) include: Bulgarian, Czech, Danish,
German, Greek, English, Gaelic, Spanish, Estonian, Finnish, French, Croatian,
Hungarian, Italian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Maltese, Dutch, Polish, Portuguese,
Romanian, Slovak, Slovene, Swedish, Arabic, and Russian. (EUROPA)
http://europa.eu/interpretation/doc/lang_profiles_in_demand.pdf retrieved 5 March
2014.
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“For the first time, interpreters had to work in both directions - Finnish staff had to
translate [sic] out of and not just into their language, a system called ‘retour’ in the
jargon.” Shanghai Star, 2003-10-30 Retrieved 9 February 2013.
http://app1.chinadaily.com.cn/star/2003/1030/fe10-1.html
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view is that community-style interpreters have always interpreted both ways: the target
and source languages switch with the turn-taking among the interpretees. This emphasis
and protocol regarding the direction of simultaneous interpretation has been separated for
conference-style interpreters in the EP since inception, drawing upon norms established
in the WWII War Crimes Tribunal at Nuremberg (which will be described in the next
chapter).
This division of simultaneous interpreting by ‘direction’ drives a categorization
process based upon fluency and involves notions of passive and active use of languages.
The argument emphasizes the potential differences of fluency between understanding
‘what is being said’ (i.e., comprehending the source language) and ‘expressing that
comprehension’ in the target language. A lettering system152 is used to grade linguistic
competence: “A” languages are those in which an interpreter is fluent enough to work
into from any of the other languages that she or he knows, that is, to generate sensible
target language utterances that are sensible to native speakers of that language. The label
of a booth (described further below) indicates that all the interpreters on that team are
working into an “A” language. “B” languages are those an interpreter knows well enough

152

“Languages are classified as “A” “B” or “C” languages. The A language is one
(native tongue or equivalent) which the interpreter masters perfectly and into which
he/she is capable of interpreting consecutively and simultaneously from all his/her
working languages. In exceptional cases an interpreter may have two A languages.
The B language is one which, without being the main language, is mastered to a
level high enough to permit fluent interpretation in consecutive and simultaneous
from the A language. The C language is one which is fully understood and from
which the interpreter works into his/her A language” (EUROPA)
http://europa.eu/interpretation/accreditation_en.htm Interpreting for Europe:
Becoming a freelance interpreter with the European institutions: Language profiles
in demand with the EU interpreting services, published 29/10/2010, retrieved 17
June 2012
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to work into from their “A” (main) language or languages, meaning the interpreter can
perform retour.
The Finnish exception occurred because of the linguistic uniqueness of Finnish
combined with its relatively small user base: it is referred to as an exotic language,
meaning, not one of the most popularly known languages in Europe. Hence, it would
happen that an MEP speaking in Finnish would need to be interpreted into all of the other
languages, and (for instance) none of the three EPIs in, say, the Italian or Dutch booths
during that shift knew Finnish well enough to render a competent interpretation. In this
case, a designated EPI in the Finnish booth would perform retour, rendering an
interpretation of the Finnish source language (their “A” language) into one of the larger
languages, one of their “B” languages (typically French or German in that era). Suppose
the retour language is French. An interpreter in the Italian and Dutch booths (in this
example) with French as an “A” or “B” language would treat the retour from the Finnish
interpreter as the source language and proceed to interpret the French interpretation (of
the original Finnish source) into their respective target language, Italian or Dutch. That
additional maneuver is called a relay. Members would then receive the interpretation in
Italian or Dutch a few seconds later than their colleagues who had received the
interpretation without the additional mediation of the relay.153

153

Dutch and Italian Members who understand French, however, may choose to listen
directly to the retour from the Finnish booth, either to avoid the additional delay or
to hear the communication with one less mediation. The Members’ right to choose is
another variable that complicates implementation of the system of the SI in the EP.
Particularly with multilingual Members, or Members learning another language,
wearing their headphones in and of itself does not identify which language they are
listening to. One has to see the channel selection to determine if an MEP is listening
to their state’s official language or another language in their repertoire.
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Interpreter teams are referred to by their target language and the geographical
booth in which they are located: the French booth, the Slovenian booth, etc. The actual
booths are constructed in the exterior walls of each meeting room and are numbered,
geographically, in sequence from left to right looking up at them from the front of the
meeting space (where moderators are stationed facing the rest of the participants). Thus
the interpreters are behind most of the users, separated by soundproof glass. Eye contact
is possible if Members make the effort, but they usually do not. Each geographical booth
number also corresponds to a language channel, e.g. the interpreter team working into the
target language of English occupies the second geographical booth and channel 2. In this
way, Members become accustomed to channel numbers corresponding with the
languages that they listen to; this design is the same in every room and hemicycle.
Everyone quickly learns that, for instance, French can be heard on channel 3 and Spanish
on channel 8. (See Table 4.)
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Table 4.

Standardized Language Codes for Channels and Booths in the European
Parliament
Language Code &
Booth Name

Auditory
Channel

Bulgarian

BG

20

español

Spanish

ES

8

čeština

Czech

CS

12

dansk

Danish

DA

6

Deutsch

German

DE

1

eesti keel

Estonian

ET

13

ελληνικά

Greek

EL

7

English

English

EN

2

français

French

FR

3

Gaeilge

Irish

GA

23

italiano

Italian

IT

4

latviešu valoda

Latvian

LV

14

lietuvių kalba

Lithuanian

LI

15

magyar

Hungarian

MG

16

Malti

Maltese

MT

22

Nederlands

Dutch

NL

5

polski

Polish

PL

17

português

Portuguese

PT

9

română

Romanian

RO

21

slovenčina (slovenský jazyk)

Slovak

SK

19

slovenščina (slovenski jezik)

Slovenian

SL

18

suomi

Finnish

SU

10

svenska

Swedish

SV

11

Language

English name

български

These codes are from the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). They are used for
simultaneous interpretation of official languages of EU Member States in all the European institutions.
Source: Interinstitutional style guide, European Union.
http://publications.europa.eu/code/pdf/370000en.htm Retrieved 22 March 2013.
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4.1.2.1

Scene: Controlled Multilingualism
In the EP’s sixth term, beginning in 2003-2004, controlled multilingualism

essentially extended the Finnish exception to the exotic languages from Eastern Europe
that were relatively unknown by the established cadre of EPIs. The new EPIs coming in
with the new MEPs were, in many cases, already trained to operate within a different
regime than the experienced EPIs from pre-enlargement. The new EPIs understood, for
example, that they may often be expected to perform retour, that is, to work in both
‘directions’ into and out of their “A” language. Meanwhile, both old and new EPIs had to
provide and work with intermediary relay interpretations to an unprecedented degree.154
Gazzola describes controlled multilingualism as “based on the systematic adoption of
management correctives” (2006, p. 402). These correctives include the asymmetric
solutions of retour and relay described above. These assymmetries introduce two

154

In fact, the definition of an “A” language may be in the process of change.
Historically, the divide was between “active” (A) and “passive” (B, C) languages,
and interpreters only worked into their active languages. The Finnish exception
demonstrated that interpreters could also work out of one “active” language into
another (previously-labeled) “passive” language. The definitions for “A” “B” and
“C” languages posted in footnote 113 (immediately preceding) represents the
historic hard line between “A” and “B” languages, while the definitions from the
official professional organization for interpreters, the AIIC: “Active languages: A :
The interpreter's native language (or another language strictly equivalent to a native
language), into which the interpreter works from all her or his other languages in
both modes of interpretation, simultaneous and consecutive. All members must have
at least one 'A' language but may have more than one. B : A language other than the
interpreter's native language, of which she or he has a perfect command and into
which she or he works from one or more of her or his other languages. Some
interpreters work into a 'B' language in only one of the two modes of interpretation.
Passive languages: C : Languages, of which the interpreter has a complete
understanding and from which she or he works.” http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/scic/whatis-conference-interpreting/language-combination/index_en.htm European
Commission: The conference interpreter's language combination, retrieved 17 June
2012, Last update: 14/03/2012.
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additional communication variables to the system of SI in the EP: 1) the number of
language renditions generated by interpreters 2) alters the listening/receiving stream of
interpretee experience in the dimension of time. In the current EP, while some
interpretees are communicating at the pace of direct interpretation (e.g., Finnish-French
and Portuguese-German), others are (sometimes) communicating at the pace of FinnishEnglish-Slovakian or Lithuanian-German-Polish interpretation.

4.1.2.2

Interpreter Criticism: Danger & Loss
Following Hymes (1962, 1974) interpreters are primary participants in the

intercultural communication scene of intercultural, interpreted communication. Noticing and
exploring these variables of rate/pacing and degree-of-interpreter-mediation as
communication variables is a disciplinary move: “We understand communication insofar
as we are able to build models or representations of this process” (Carey 1999, p. 31). What
captured my attention in the criticism of EP Interpreters during the spring of 2004 was how
unhappy they were with the MEPs choosing not to speak in their official (national) language
(presumed, in most cases, to be the MEPs’ mother tongue). Instead, MEPs were trying to
communicate more directly with other MEPs by making their points in a language they were
still learning, usually English, sometimes French, and occasionally German or another
identified shared language. (For instance, Russian was known to most MEPs from eastern
Europe but would only be used in private if no other options could be found. This seemed to
have more to do with Russian as a language of colonization than the fact that it is not a
language of the EU.)
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The prevalence of what interpreters (and, later, MEPs and other interview
subjects) called “badly spoken languages (EPI #4)” (Kent, 2007, p. 63)155 elicited very
strong reactions from interpreters: “The English that we have to translate from is second
or third language English - from people who do not think in that language (EPI #8)” (p.
66). EPIs identified three dangers and several losses associated with speaking
inadequate/non-fluent English (Kent, 2007).
The dangers of using a less fluent language instead of a more fluent language
(from the EPIs’ perspective) are that interpretees (the MEPs)
1

may not know what they are saying and/or

2

are unaware of the full implications of what they’re saying, which could

3

result in interpreters interpreting something other than what the MEP intends.

I was eager to return in 2009 and discover if the MEPs experienced a sense of danger,
and, if so, how and for what reasons?
The losses vexing interpreters at the Parliamant are both cultural and political.
Culturally, there are losses of nuance, cultural specificity, and a diversity of worldviews.
Politically, MEPs might “lose very important points, or a debate (EPI #7)” (Kent, 2007,
p. 64), be unaware of communication breaking down (p. 65), or face “misunderstandings,
embarrassment, or no reaction at all, when the speaker obviously would like some
reaction from the audience (EPI #13)” (p. 65). These reactions from EPIs came at the end

155

The code EPI (European Parliament Interpreter) and numbering system are
associated with preliminary fieldwork at the Parliament in 2005, published in 2007
as “A Discourse of Danger and Loss: Interpreters on Interpreting in the European
Parliament” (Kent, 2007). Most of that chapter is reprinted here with permission of
the publisher.
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of a tumultuous year, the first year of formal implementation of controlled
multilingualism with its greatly increased language regime. The key (following Hymes,
1962, 1974) of conversational interviews waxed and waned between frustration and
exhilaration. These interpreters had performed durably under great stress. Their discourse
is an important summary of the growing pains of the EP’s language regime as an
instrument of intercultural communication for European governance.

4.1.3

Instrument and Key: Evolution of the SI Regime
Although both training and practice had been underway in the preceding term, in

the span of a summer break the interpreting regime went from 110 language
combinations to 462 (twenty-two of the twenty-three official languages simultaneouslyinterpreted in meetings everyday; minus Maltese because a minimum corps of trained
interpreters was not yet established). The average size of interpreting teams was
increased from three to four interpreters per booth. All of the interpreters in a booth are
“poised for which language combination is called for” by the language choice of
Members speaking from the floor (EPI53). Retour and relay became common rather than
exceptional. The logistics of scheduling when and where interpreters were needed (given
the range and scope of different meetings at various levels in the legislating process) were
stretched to extremes. Old school interpreters bemoaned the loss of institutional
camaraderie with the massive influx of unfamiliar faces, wondering at the audacity of
their new eastern European colleagues, many (if not most) of whom were school-trained
rather than having grown up multilingual. The few permanent EP staff that I was able to
talk with at that time were cynical about the interpreters’ criticism, dismissing it as a
basic concern with future employment. I had to wait until 2008 to discover MEPs views.
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The pitch (Hymes “key,” 1962) of the European Parliament Interpreters (EPIs)
2005 discourse clearly indicated that the dynamics of the system of SI in the EP were in
tremendous flux. The sense of urgency directed my attention to the social interactions of
Members, and to questions about the shared culture and identities being created through
the ritual uses of SI in the EP. When I returned in 2008-2009 at the end of this term, four
years after the initial (2005) conversations with EPIs, it had become clear that the
administrative regime of controlled multilingualism was being challenged by an emergent
pluralingualism in which Members use multiple and mixed languages in addition to the
services of simultaneous interpreters.156 The term, pluralingualism, comes from the
European Commission, which directs language policy for the European Union overall.
The Commission distinguishes pluralingualism from multilingualism but allows the term
multilingualism to encompass both meanings. In the general discourse (EPIs, MEPs,
career/permanent staff of the EP), no one uses the term pluralingualism. Multilingualism
is posed against monolingualism. These concepts will be further defined and evaluated
after the research findings are presented.

4.2

Primary Participants: MEPs on SI in the EP
Europe has given minority nations such as Catalonia the multitiered identity
that is the best hope for solving language conflict: Miguel was Catalan,
Spanish, European, and internationalist, all at the same time, and so calmly
that he hadn’t even really thought about it. He seemed to find my eager
questions kind of odd. Europe has made such diversity work and flexibility
banal. It may be expensive, but it works. (Robert Lane Greene, 2011, p. 275)
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Cecilia Wadensjö (1998, p. 12) has already argued “that interpreter-mediated
encounters are not comparable with monolingual ones but rather form a different
genre subject to different considerations” (Ortega Herráez et al., 2009, p. 152).
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4.2.1

Mission Impossible
Criticisms of interpreting and interpreters by MEPs (and, in some cases, their

assistants) are uniform regardless of the setting: as described above, the differentiation
between the conference microphone system and the interpretation system are not evident
in MEP discourse about SI in the EP. This lack of differentiation also applies to praising
the interpreters and the system of SI, which occurs in both in genuine and obligatory
terms. Rhetoric justifying the use and presence of interpreters appears throughout the
interviews (which I prefer to call conversations as I did not hold to a pre-established
framework or insist on consistency in questioning).157
The frequent repetition of certain phrases suggested the routine incorporation of
rhetoric generated for European publics (touched upon above). Sometimes these were
delivered in what I took to be sincere belief and sometimes the stock phrases were
double-voiced (Bakhtin, 1986), that is, they were delivered with an implied or explicit
commentary acknowledging the statement as public relations. In other words, some
MEPs (and a few of the interpreters in the earlier phase of research) talked with me as if I
was a conduit for public relations directed toward an intended audience of European
citizens in the general public who must be convinced of the value of this elaborate
version of multilingualism. The routine consistency of this rhetoric enabled the
identification of discourse themes and served as a reference point to distinguish more
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Maintaining such an open, exploratory stance is characteristic of action research, and
particularly action learning. See previous footnote (##). My presence as a researcher
was not specifically sanctioned by the Interpreting Directorate of the EP, so the
emphasis is on action learning rather than on collaborative action research. In the
traditional sense of action research, those responsible for the interpreting regime
would have directly engaged and supported the research project.
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thoughtful considerations of the diverse and potentially productive outcomes of
intercultural communication using simultaneous interpretation.
“Interpreters,” explained one MEP, “are professional people. They do sort of a
mission impossible job, and there’s a limit of to how much of the message they can bring
out” (NM74). Despite this limit, many, if not most of the MEPs who talked with me
agreed that there are times that they would be better and more effective if they had
interpreting. The challenges of effectively expressing oneself lead to different dilemmas
than the challenges of understanding others. Both dilemmas hold for monolingual as well
as multilingual Members (see Tables 5 and 6 for participant demographics).
Table 5.

Languages Known by Participating MEPs
Languages known by participating MEPs

1.

Bulgarian

17.

Kiswahili

2.

Cypriot dialect

18.

Latin

3.

Chinese

19.

Latvian

4.

Czech

20.

Lithuanian

5.

Danish

21.

Luxembourghese

6.

Dutch (Nederlands)

22.

Maltese

7.

Estonian

23.

Norwegian

8.

English

24.

Polish

9.

Finnish

25.

Portuguese

10.

Flemish (Belgium)

26.

Romanian

11.

French

27.

Russian

12.

Gaelic (Irish)

28.

Slovakian

13.

German

29.

Slovenian

14.

Greek

30.

Spanish

15.

Hungarian

31.

Swedish

16.

Italian

32.

Turkish
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4.2.2

Findings: Varied Competence of MEPs as Users of SI
By the time I returned in 2008, the new regime of controlled multilingualism had

reached “full cruising speed” (Gazzola, 2006, p. 400). There was only one bad English
speaker158 that I heard in 2008-2009; his colleagues understood that “he is making a
gesture, and so we understand that” (OM44).159 Several Members said that problems with
inexperienced interpreters that had vexed them in the beginning of the term (e.g., 20042005) had improved.
Interpretation, it will change. So the [eastern European language] was
really, really weak at the beginning, which was normal, because the
human source was not enough, so they would change Committees. And,
of course, they could not be involved into the terms, you know, of the
daily use. They could not daily use the same terms, you know? And plus
the interpreter, for example, the legal first, they are not lawyers, so,
sometimes, of course, you get very fast and they don’t know what they are
speaking about, so basically they used the wrong terms…[now] it’s much
better. So, now, more and more often I use it. (F53) 160
The learning curve for new interpreters to the Parliament is steep. According to Duflou
(in progress), new interpreters to the European Parliament must acquire situated

158

The label, “bad English speaker,” was in common parlance at the EP during both
research periods (May-June 2005 and September 2008-July 2009).

159

I approached this so-called ‘bad English speaking’ Member twice. I asked a second
time because at least three people insisted that I really should talk with him. During
the earlier research period, many Members spoke English nearly as
incomprehensibly as this Member, but they had either been discouraged from using
English as a Lingua Franca, or had improved their skill.

160

Remember the key points of criticism from the interpreters at that time (about the
MEPs’ delivery and production of the source language): speed and badly-spoken
languages (see page XXX, this dissertation). Without too much of a stretch, the use
of ‘wrong words’ by the interpreters is a mirror of the use of wrong words by
Members speaking non-fluent languages. The admission of “get[ting] very fast”
corroborates Parliament interpreter’s concern with speed.
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competence. “The intensive learning process beginning EU interpreters go through
cannot be considered as a mere continuation of their formal training as interpreting
students” (Duflou, dissertation in progress). Specifically
[European Parliament interpreting] beginners…need to acquire a broad range
of new, practice-related, i.e. to a large extent context specific, knowledge and
skills in order to become competent practitioners…[and this] professional
competence is not exclusively cognitive in nature, but includes a strong
sensory, embodied as well as a social component. (Duflou, Chapter 5)
Further, she describes the “shared framework conditions” due to “the specificities of the
historical, organizational and material context in which EU interpreters work” (ibid).
Some of those conditions will be explored in the next chapter.
It is clear that that the pressure of the new regime was most felt by the new MEPs
from new Member States, who were working with interpreters new to the Parliament.
Although also pressured, the situation was quite different for existing and experienced
MEPs from old Member States, some of whom have had, e.g., “the same interpreters for
nine years, yes…we know each other” (OM36).
Both old Members from established Member States and new Members from new
Member States complained. Some Assistants who booked appointments with me to meet
with their MEP (or, in a few cases, with themselves in lieu of their MEP) told me they
arranged the interview precisely so I “could improve the quality of the interpretation”
(F15/OM18).161 All of the MEPs who spoke with me volunteered, hence compose a selfselected sample and are thus not necessarily representative of the entire body.

161

Double coding, such as F15/OM18, indicate an Assistant interviewed on behalf of
their MEP (in this case from an “old” Member State) and therefore representing their
MEPs’ views rather than their own.

187

Statistically, participating MEPs represented ten percent (55/785) of the elected
Members. Several Members allowed me second and third conversations and invited me
into observations of Committees, Political Groups and working groups at various levels.
The corpus includes 35 additional interviews with career staff of the Parliament, and a
few interpreters (some of whom had given interviews in 2004 and some whom had not).
At least one Member from every member State was interviewed (in two cases, an
Assistant represented their MEP).
One MEP, who was recommended to me frequently as a person I should speak
with (and whom I observed using occasionally undecipherable English), turned me down
twice, insisting: “There are more important problems than language” (NM75). An MEP
who did meet with me also expressed the perspective that the fact of so many different
languages “is not a very … important problem…[only] marginal” (OM29). This could be
taken as evidence that the system of SI in the EP is functioning quite well. A limitation of
the research is that I was generally prohibited from talking with Members who were not
able to converse with me in English. “There are two types of Members,” one MEP told
me: “Those that know languages, and those that don’t.” (NM28). In practical terms,
although bilingual, my second language is not a European language so I conducted the
research as if monolingual.
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Table 6.

Interviewee Demographics

Interview Demographics of participating Members of the European Parliament*
#of MEPs interviewed

51

#of Assistants interviewed on behalf of their MEP

4

th

10%

#of MEPs interviewed with lay interpretation by an Assistant

11

#of MEPs interviewed with professional interpretation

2

#of MEPs interviewed two times

22

#of MEPs interviewed three times

8

% of total MEPs (575 in the 6 Term, 2004-2009)

#of languages known or partially known by MEPs (range)

1–8

Average number of languages known or partially known by participating MEPs

4½

#of participating MEPs from “old” EU member nations* [coded OM]

34

#of participating MEPs from “new” EU member nations** [coded NM]

21

#of participating MEPs who are women

10 (18%)

#of participating MEPs who are men

45 (82%)

Age range of participating MEPs

33-76

Aged 30-39=2; 40-49=7; 50-59=14; 60-69=14; 70-79=2
Median age of participating MEPs

57

Range of terms served as a MEP

1-4

1st term=32 MEPs; 2nd term = 11 MEPs; 3rd term = 8 MEPs; 4th term = 3 MEPs
Median #of terms served as a MEP

1.7

*Includes a Vice-President, a Quaestor, Chairs and Vice-Chairs of Committees & Political Groups,
Rapporteurs and Shadow Rapporteurs of Working Groups as well as Members not in these leadership
positions.

Interviews with others (no demographic data collected)
#of non-MEPs interviewed or overheard*** in 2008-2009 (including
interpreters)****

35

#of European Parliament Interpreters (EPIs) interviewed in 2005

65

*Member before “the big bang enlargement” of 2004, typically of western Europe.
**Became a Member during “the big bang enlargement” of 2004, typically of eastern Europe.
***Occasionally during observations an insightful or revealing comment would be said by a stranger
sitting near me.
****Includes two administrators from the Directorate General on Conferences and Interpreting, two
Heads of Booth (i.e., managers for each language’s team of simultaneous interpreters), an interpreter
trainer, several administrative assistants representing themselves, a few visitors and interns, some
technicians and a handful or more of permanent officials associated with various Secretariats.
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My knowledge of American Sign Language and work as a professional sign
language interpreter was intriguing to some Members but not most. As it was, I did not
have the personal resources to hire interpreters, and the EP’s rules are designed to prevent
interpreting outside of the formalized structure of controlled multilingualism and its
designated contexts of use. This structural feature of the system of SI in the EP is being
extended through a new program called Ad Personam interpreting, which was in its first
experimental year of operation in 2008-2009. However, despite using only a fraction of
its allotted budget in the first year of operation (NM70), those funds were not authorized
to support this research. Requests for an exception were disregarded. In a handful of
cases, an MEP not fluent in English was motivated enough to talk with me that they did
arrange interpretation either through one of their Assistants or an EP Interpreter who
volunteered to work off-the-record.
I was interested in MEPs’ ideas about the system of SI in the EP: their criticisms,
what they thought SI was good for and when, and how deliberately they considered
themselves users or participants in a special kind of intercultural communication. I also
wondered if MEPs are able to secure SI when they need it, what are the conditions when
they believed they need SI instead of using a shared language, and the extent to which
they consider SI an important mode of cultural production. Contrary to the field of
community interpreting, where a discourse about users’ lack of knowledge is pervasive
MEPs demonstrate a sophisticated range of considerations and consciousness regarding
strategies and purposes of using simultaneous interpretation. See Table 7.
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4.2.2.1
Table 7.
Scenario

MEPs Strategies: Language Choice and Simultaneous Interpreting
MEPs Language Choices and Strategies When Addressing Other MEPs
Same or different official
language?

Language choice

Communicative Strategy

A

We speak the same official
language.

Our official language.

In order to articulate ideas
precisely; neither has
communicative advantage.

B

We speak different official
languages: I know more of
their language than they
know of mine, or we both
know some of each other’s
language.

I speak some words in
his/her language (as a
greeting or warm-up) then
switch to my official
language (for the substance).

To flatter them; to establish
rapport; to make them more
amenable to compromise.

C

We speak different official
languages; I am fluent in
theirs, they are not fluent in
mine.

I negotiate in their language.

They may be overconfident
because I am negotiating in
my second language; I
sometimes win important
points.

D

We speak different official
languages and are mutually
fluent in each other’s
language.

We negotiate in either
language.

There is no communicative
advantage in the language
choice.

E

We speak different official
languages and are equitably
fluent in a shared non-native
language.

We use the shared language.

There is no communicative
advantage in the language
choice.

F

We speak different official
languages: I am not fluent in
theirs but no interpretation is
provided for the language
combination.

I negotiate in their/another
language, to the best of my
ability. Sometimes I win, but
often I am frustrated that I
have not been able to fully
articulate my ideas or
positions.

I am disadvantaged but I
have no choice except to
make the best of it.

G

We speak different official
languages and are not fluent
in a shared language, but
interpretation is provided.

We both use the same
medium of simultaneous
interpretation.

In order to articulate ideas
precisely; neither has
communicative advantage.

An intermediate version of this table appears in Kent (2012, reprinted with permission). The original was
shared in a memo to the President of the European Parliament in 2009. See Appendix A.
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4.2.2.2

Strategic Use and Non-Use of Simultaneous Interpretation
Clever people, thinking hard, can often circumvent the constraints of
value-laden language, but such ingenuity requires recognition first, that
the constraints exist, followed by hard thought on how to get around them.
To accept them is to chain the imagination. To ignore them or to run at
them headlong is to invite frustration. (Neustadt and May, 1986, p. 206)

4.2.2.2.1

Avoidance of Being Interpreted: Rhetorical Uses of a Shared Language

Table 7 charts an emergent categorization of MEPs’ consciousness about
language difference and the choice to use SI or a shared language. Some Members are
highly attuned to each other’s language profiles and alert to the advantages of being able
to utter even a few words in their interpretee’s language. Members with more experience
in the EP, that is, Members from old Member States who had served in one or more
previous terms, were able to use both a ‘dominant’ and ‘non-dominant’ language position
to their advantage. For instance, in scenario B and C, a low level of fluency in the other
MEP’s language is used to soften them up, and a high level of fluency in the other MEP’s
language is used to play up their confidence.
Whether (or how soon) this same-language tactic is recognized by new/more
recently elected MEPs is an open question. Some Members ignore it: “I don’t have a
problem, why should I care,” challenged one English-fluent MEP (NM25), asserting that
his specialization was separate from social culture. Some simply move to the most fluent
shared language without questioning it. “For me,” explained one Assistant to a Hungarian
MEP, “I work in German as well with all my German colleague, which is funny, because
they have a good English, but they know I have a good German” (F53). Others, “try for
the better meaning . . . . bringing in words [so that] we can create a common
expression…a common cultural expression” (OM23).
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4.2.2.2.2

Avoidance of Interpreting: Communicative Equality with a lingua franca

When MEPs are equally fluent in each other’s language or another shared
language, scenarios D and E, there is no language-based communicative advantage. This
is not to say that individual MEPs may be more or less skilled at negotiating, but they are
not able to increase that leverage through language knowledge. The other scenarios in
which no communicative advantage is achieved through language knowledge is when
both/all Members speak the same official language with native fluency (scenario A), or
when both are using the system of simultaneous interpretation (scenario G). Because it is
naturalized, Scenario A is the baseline for assessing all of the other language choice
strategies. Arguably, another scenario (not represented in the chart) of communicative
equity involves Members speaking their mother tongues (an ‘active’ use in the jargon)
and listening to another language that they understand (a ‘passive’ use).162
There is so-called inter-institution negotiation [e.g., a Trialogue] when
you get a big package…and…you start negotiate with the Council. And
under the French presidency, of course, they were pushed. Then all person
who was involved in French presidency, they had to speak in French,
which was funny. Because when we sat down to negotiate, he spoke in
French and then we answered in English. And then, after a while, we
change into English. I mean he change into English, because we said,
okay, go ahead in French. We get it. But we answer in English, because
we are sure in English. (F53)
That particular scenario took place without interpreting: French was ‘passively’
understood by the Members who spoke English as a foreign language (EFL); and English

162

Although this argument is not crafted, there are compelling reasons and evidence
provided to support this Member-defined use of the system of SI in the EP.
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was ‘passively’ understood by the representatives of the French Presidency.163 (It is
asserted by MEPs that Members “must understand [French] but to speak [it] is not so
[necessary]” (OM23). In the case being described with the French Presidency, two
different languages were spoken and both languages were listened to by participants in
those meetings without interpretation.
Such language jockeying is taken as part of the institutional culture.
There was a fight between me and [the Chairperson of our political
Group]. He always “why don’t—you know, your flat French and your
English is very positive is very good”…he’s always laughing at me. “Why
do you use your mother tongue, your barbaric language?” (OM09)
Both French and English were foreign, learned languages for this particular MEP, who
routinely spoke his mother tongue/official language in all meetings that included
simultaneous interpretation. Openly admitting and sharing the pleasure of teasing each
other about language fluencies was reported much more rarely than accusations of
posturing.164
They cannot press you that you speak French, you know? You find a
common language. And there was no interpretation. But if not Mr [MEP],
who has such a good English, and understand French, then we ask for
interpretation….But could be a situation, so, for example, if the Czech
presidency and they decide to speak Czech, then we need it. So it could
happen. But it’s a funny things. No one would come to an idea. Then on
such level, the Czech presidency, one of the, of the person of a low level

163

In the jargon of interpreters, this ‘passive’ understanding corresponds with a “C”
language, one that is understood enough to make a rendition into a more fluent “B”
or “A” language.

164

Someone, however, should be able to make a tremendously fun study of the humor
of multilingualism and use of interpreters throughout the history of the Parliament.
Space and scope prevent due consideration here, but stories and jokes abound. One
historical anecdote involved some MEPs inventing a species of fish as a spoof on the
interpreters working the Committee on Fisheries (PECH).
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say, okay, I don’t speak French. We have to speak Czech, so go ahead,
solve the problem. But the French, they did like this. (F53)
In other words, the French (in the instance described above) insisted on performing their
French identity through speaking French, regardless of the access issues it caused for
other Members. There are always “two factors,” explained an administrator for the
Interpreting Directorate: “catering for convenience…and a political factor. Using a
language is a political statement” (F14).

4.2.2.2.3

Proactive Use of Simultaneous Interpretation: Communicative Equality

The other relevant condition in which communicative equality is achieved is
when both/all MEPs use the system of SI in the EP (scenario G). This equalizing
characteristic of the system, however, is less well represented in the discourse. Separating
genuine appreciation from the official rhetoric is a matter for a more subtle analysis than
is conducted here. The system of SI in the EP seems reluctantly tolerated and frequently
criticized. Rather than articulating a field of equality (Sen, 1992) that can be generated by
the skillful and strategic use of SI, public rhetoric about multilingualism promotes
statements about transparency and democracy that the social practice of participating in
simultaneous interpretation does not consistently deliver. For instance, when asked
whether one knows if another Member is using the SI system to make a political
statement about identity (perhaps the most common accusation) or to make themselves
better understood, most MEPs admit, “I don’t know” (e.g., NM26). One Assistant
described the situation for himself and his MEP:
He and me, we use [the SI] when, pfff, I don’t know, when you get the
risk to use it or you are so extremely tired. But to tell the truth, sometimes,
easier to use English or German - my German is the first language -
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because you work in English. And then, sometimes, I know better the
expression of this topic in English, because I work in - we write the
amendments, we negotiate with the others, the colleagues, the
administrators, so the common language is English. It could be the French
as well, but not my boss neither me, it’s not able. We read French, but we
are not able to negotiate in French or make text in French. (F53)
4.2.2.2.4

Avoidance of Simultaneous Interpretation: Communicative Disadvantage

The dominant theme in the discourse privileges being able to communicate in the
same language. This emphasis on language choice tends to mask another theme,
represented in scenario F. “Some matters be held, for example, for committee meetings
we have only one language is very bad” (NM70). When language difference is the
baseline condition and SI is not provided, MEPs rely on their Assistants to mediate the
communication on their behalf. Sometimes this takes the form of a kind of interpretation
or translating which is regarded functional while acknowledged as non-professional.
Sometimes MEPs simply are not able to participate, and are acutely aware that their
participation is compromised.
On the last sitting of our committee…there are many, many
amendments…and we had not interpreter. So I must to discuss about the
amendment in English. For me it was very difficult because for this case, I
think it is necessary to have interpreter because one level is to understand
in the non-formal discussion. You must understand what every, every
word, what is mean this amendment, what change in original text this
amendment? (NM69)
Two things are interesting about this feedback: one is that interpreting is supposed to be
guaranteed during Committee work. The second is the conundrum of forcing decisions
when Members are unable to understand because of the failure to arrange a mechanism
for securing interpretation when needed in any context of EP decision-making.
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Structurally, “interpretation is given to bodies, not to MEPs” (F14). “Bodies” in
this use are not human individuals, but the various groups composing the institutional
infrastructure: Committees, Groups, Plenary are interpreted, while working groups of
most types are not (unless the Rapporteur has enough status or need to make the request).
The point is, individuals do not have a blanket right to interpretation in the European
Parliament, rather the setting has precedence, and the status associated with one’s role in
that meeting may, secondarily, afford more or less claim on interpretation services.
There are additional restrictions on the provision of interpreting enumerated in the
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure: Rule 81.4a (implementing measures during a “time of
scrutiny” which refers to voluntary agreements between Member States), Rule 90.3
(recommendations related to foreign and security policy), Rule 139 (regarding provision
of interpreters during the transition to the larger interpreting regime) and Rule 179.7
(involving Committees of Inquiry).165 An italicized section of the security rule exception
reiterates the primary of Rule 138 (guaranteeing the provision of interpretation) while
clarifying that decisions will be made whether or not all Members understand:
The non-application of Rule 138 is possible only in committee and only in
urgent cases. Neither at committee meetings not declared to be urgent nor
in plenary sitting may there be any departure from the provisions of Rule
138.
The provision stating that oral amendments shall be admissible means
that members may not object to oral amendments being put to the vote in
committee.
It is possible that the Member’s expressed frustration may have occurred under one of the
special conditions of Rules 81, 90 or 179 but the scope of the conversation at the time
165

The relevant portions of these Rules are provided in Appendix C.
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involved the division of formal and informal settings. More likely, this type of situation
results from the continuation of Rule 139, which provided that “in applying Rule 138,
account shall be taken, with regard to…the availability in real terms and sufficient
numbers of the requisite interpreters and translators” (ibid).166 However, the context in
which the MEP shared the anecdote was to illustrate the frequently made point that “The
places where you need interpreting most are the places where you are least likely to
receive it” (e.g., NM27).
Another Member gives an example of a similar problem that can occur in
Committees even when interpretation is provided.
I started speaking English instead of Dutch…I didn’t have any Dutch text
in front of me, so I had to rely on the the English…I had tabled that
amendment in English…I added this as an extra argument…but not as an
excluding argument…I read over that when I read the English—when I
drafted the English text, because my English is okay, but I’m not a native
English speaker…So, in fact, this was a language problem…because the
spirit of my amendment was certainly not to put it as an extra
condition…if I would have tabled that in Dutch, the services would have
translated that into correct English or in the right spirit of English.
(OM09)
This Member discovered a downside to working in a lingua franca, despite its
apparent convenience. Adding “an extra argument” or “an excluding argument” entail
different political manuevers, they call for quite different responses from colleagues and
opponents. As much time as is (supposedly) wasted in correcting interpreters’ errors, an
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There is, in fact, a constant call for interpreters to build the corps sufficiently to meet
demand. Anti-interpreter rhetoric, stressful working conditions and relatively low or
unreliable pay (speaking generically for all kinds of interpreting in all settings)
currently exacerbate pressures regarding this career choice. Arguably, the EU’s
emphasis on language learning competes with promoting the skill of communicating
effectively by knowing how to work interpreters well.
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equal or greater share of that (supposedly) lost time must be spent trying to un-do simple
syntactical errors of non-fluent language users. “Simultaneous translation [sic] creates
problems, but it is astonishing that the number of real blunders is that low” (OM03).

4.2.3

Primary Participants: Two ‘Sides’ of a Unified Discourse
As mentioned previously, findings from a preliminary round of research with

European Parliament Interpreters (EPIs) about the system of simultaneous interpretation
in the European Parliament were previously published (Kent, in Hale, Ozolins and Stern
2009). During the submission and revision process an anonymous reviewer succinctly
summarized the function of that chapter in a volume on community (not conference)
interpreting:
It gives voice to the interpreters’ attitudes and frustrations. They express
fears concerning democracy and efficiency in policymaking, identified as
grounded in a linguistic problem, more precisely in the choice of the
members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to restrain from utilising the
interpreters’ services and rather speak in a foreign lingua franca. (email
correspondence, Sandra Hale, Mar 5, 2009)
The matter of voice for the interpreters is an extension of the desire for voice that appears
to underlie the reasons that MEPs choose a shared language or lingua franca when
possible. Table 7 shows that MEPs are motivated more by a desire for rhetorical
influence than by communicative equality, but EPIs observations (at the beginning of the
term, when there were almost as many new MEPs as there were new EPIs) centered
around their observations of MEP failure to achieve voice.
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4.2.3.1

Interpreters on Interpreting for the European Parliament
“I’m talking about the magic of language that’s being killed.” (EP
Interpreter #3)
Much of the EP interpreters’ discourse mirrors the European Union’s public

rhetoric about democracy and equality. Many interpreters are aware of criticisms that
interpretation is merely symbolic and/or too expensive. It is of pragmatic professional as
well as theoretical interest that conference interpreters, like community interpreters, have
not yet generated proactive arguments as to the immediate and long-term value of
simultaneous interpretation. The following re-constructed discourse summarizes a
specific EP interpreter concern about language use that appeared in nearly every
interview: whether MEPs choose to use their best expressive language or to speak less
fluently via a lingua franca. Every quotation in this section is from a professional
interpreter for the European Parliament during the spring of 2005, which was several
months into the first year of the ‘big bang’ enlargement. Their descriptions and
explanations are eloquent, requiring minimal exposition and spare commentary. Each of
the selected quotations is a complement to similar sentiments; together they compose a
compelling discourse about the choice of monolingualism (the use of a presumably
shared language) over multilingualism (the collaborative use of many languages).
Interpreters for the European Parliament consistently and regularly complain
about speakers’ reading of prepared texts. “The difficulty here is...speed and badly
spoken languages” (EPI #4). Comments range from critique of the delivery (fast reading
of prepared text) to doubt regarding intention (such as MEPs seeking to say something
without actually communicating anything meaningful). Mentioned by the majority of EP
interpreters, the problems with MEPs’ speed-reading-as-talk was not accompanied by as
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much frustration as MEPs’ lack of fluency in a lingua franca. “It’s Globe-ish again. It’s
bad English. It’s sometimes bad French” (EPI #2). The general view is represented by
this interpreter’s comment: “People are getting used to a lower level of quality and a kind
of communication that relies on broken English” (EPI #8).
“The English-speaking look-alikes” (EPI #9) are described by interpreters in
detail:
It’s not as if it’s English spoken by Englishmen. That’s one kind of
English, but...it’s mainly another kind of...Pidgin English that’s spoken
by...non-natives. Many of the new Member States have sometimes a very
proximate knowledge of English and that makes for a completely different
kind of English, a kind of jargon. Sometimes they don’t know the value of
certain words or expressions, and that’s a danger. (EPI #6)
The sentiment of danger was common among EP interpreters, because “you’re not really
sure they know what they’re saying” (EPI #6). Consequently, the output from interpreters
into the target language “might be slightly different. It might not be exactly what the
speaker is trying to say. Obviously you aren’t doing this on purpose, but are desperately
trying to understand something and then say something in the target language” (EPI #13).
These three dangers arise repeatedly in the discourse of interpreters for the European
Parliament:
●

interpretees possibly not knowing what they are saying,

●

interpretees being unaware of the full range of implications of what they are
saying, and of

●

interpreters inadvertently saying something other than what the speaker intended.
Accompanying the risks of reduced understanding and actual misunderstanding,

many interpreters also talk about a related loss. “You lose the implications of what they
say, the turns of phrase that indicate that something special is going on” (EPI #8). What
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that “something special” might be was described primarily along the dimension of
national culture. “The fact that a Greek tells you something, or a Swede tells you
something, gets lost” (EPI #15). Interpreters do not mean the symbolic label or name of
the nation; rather, they are referring to something ineffable, a subtle yet distinct quality of
mind:
When you speak a language, you implicitly accept the categories of that
language. What you can express is limited by the categories that exist in
that language. That means you might find yourself in a position where
your political discourse is dictated by what is accepted, what is
fashionable or not fashionable in a given language. For example, the
Anglo-Saxon way of expressing yourself carries with it a certain
perception of the world. When a Lithuanian or a Greek or a Portuguese
uses English, in some way I think they are giving up part of their world
and replacing it with a sort of internationalized sort of worldview. (EPI
#8)
Comments about the relationship between language and meaning appear
frequently throughout the interview transcripts. Usually the naming of variation in
worldview is accompanied by a tone of grief (sometimes articulated, sometimes implied),
a Hymesian key ranging from sorrow to desolation that the scope of meaningfulness
possible from the interactions of these cultural differences is being reduced to a single,
flat mode of interacting. At the same time, some interpreters try to argue in support of
MEPs’ use of a lingua franca instead of simultaneous interpretation:
If everybody has a lingua franca where there are no advantages or privileged
positions among the speakers, then why should they use interpreters? But
that is also never the case. You always have someone who speaks native,
mother tongue whereas others are required to have this foreign language,
and you don’t have this equality any more...If someone is struggling with the
language you can lose very important points, or a debate. (EPI #7)
Likewise, native language speakers are not bothered by people speaking
their language wrong because they know it’s not their mother tongue and
they will try and understand and grasp the meaning of what the person who
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is speaking is saying. I think that all the other people who share that
language as a tool will not be bothered too much by the fact that that person
speaks badly. I think the only people who are bothered by it are the
interpreters because they actually hear where the communication breaks
down once in a while. (EPI #3)
What do European Parliament interpreters mean by communication breakdowns?
The same issues are repeated with more specificity: “We see that [MEPs] lexicon is
reduced by seventy or eighty percent when you venture into another language” (EPI #2),
and “[MEPs] can’t tackle important things with their bad language” (EPI #14). These factors
can lead to palpable problems, such as “misunderstandings, embarrassment, or no reaction at
all, when the speaker obviously would like some reaction from the audience” (EPI #13). The
frequency of such breakdowns is unclear from the current corpus of data, because while
some interpreters observe such instances of breakdown only “once in a while” (EPI #3),
others say, “We witness the contradictions every day – the mistakes – every day” (EPI #2).
At the time of these conversations (2005), I was nonplussed. Why does a norm of
using a weak lingua franca instead of the fully-expressive rhetorical range of one’s best
official language exist in a political context of international decision-making?
Parliament’s interpreters would speculate:
People tend to think better of themselves than they are. Then what
happens is they decide to abandon their mother tongue and speak in one of
the foreign languages because they think they know it, when they don’t
know it, or [don’t] know it adequately. (EPI #10)
Some interpreters are also unwilling to pass ultimate judgment: “They have the
impression to communicate better, but do they communicate better? I don’t know. It’s
getting across general ideas, but the finesse, the nuances get completely lost” (EPI #4).
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The key/tone of concern, with its implicit question of consequences, kept me asking
more questions: what is being lost when a less-fluent language is used? What is being gained by
this language choice? How much will the loss cost? What benefits accrue from what is gained?
If it’s a Polish speaking bad English, I have no clue [what they mean].
And this is becoming part of our work more and more. The English that
we have to translate from is second or third language English – from
people who do not think in that language. (EPI #8)
If speakers are not fluent enough to think in the language they are using, “It’s like Finnish
and English: you need to be a Finn to understand that kind of English” (EPI #1), or, “...a kind
of Swenglish that will not be easily understood by the interpreters unless they have Swedish
or Danish...because they won’t understand the structure behind or why they use certain
words” (EPI #6). The combinations are myriad: “Unless you know Spanish grammar, [their
English is] very difficult to follow” (EPI #5). The examples resonate with the Member who
explained how he had erred in generating an “extra” or “excluding” argument.167
In retrospect, it seems that interpreters were observing (and objecting to) language
users in the European Parliament converging to a monotone form of English. Interpreters
described this movement toward lingua francas (especially English) and away from their
best language in a key of regret. “The nuances are lost and everybody gets to something
grey. The passion is lost. It becomes more generalized because that’s all you can say in

167

Sometimes this happens in community interpreting contexts, where the minority
language speaker adopts false cognates from the mainstream language, causing
confusion for the interpreter. For example, when a Spanish speaker uses the term
‘asalto’, it can be unclear to the interpreter working into English whether they intend
‘assault’ as a general category or the specifically Spanish meaning of ‘armed
robbery’ (Hale, 2004). Another example from a workshop presentation by Cecilia
Wadensjö (Critical Link 5, 2007, Sydney Australia) involved Russian and the
perfective/imperfective verb form. Second language users can generate a
grammatical conflict with unidiomatic uses that “obscures the meaning.”
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that kind of language” (EPI #3). Not only is the content and complexity of conversation
reduced, but “people pretend that they understand and they don’t. Because they’re too
embarrassed to admit they don’t know English” (EPI #2). Interpreters find “it’s difficult
to say [to an MEP], ‘Look, don’t speak English anymore” (EPI #1). “Trying to do so? It’s
very, very delicate...” (EPI #6).
Interpreters agree with the democratic principle that language choice is an actual
and legitimate right: “You can’t stop people from speaking other languages. They’re
quite proud about it” (EPI #4). “Senior officials from Member States want to show off
their language skills” (EPI #12). Such desires and pressures add up: “It’s very hard to tell
them, ‘Look, with your English, you’re better to not speak it if you can’t say it” (EPI #1).
When I finally began talking with MEPs about their point-of-view four years later, they
claimed they were choosing English because of perceived weaknesses and problems with
the interpretation.
MEPs’ concerns regarding the achievement of voice during interpreted
communication is expressed in terms of “loss” and “risk.” These terms mirror and echo
the concerns expressed by EP Interpreters. Table 8 compares the emergent themes of
MEPs’ sense of loss and risk in using the system of simultaneous interpretation with the
European Parliament interpreters’ corresponding perceptions of “danger” and “loss.”
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Table 8.

Comparison of Dangers, Risks, and Losses between Members of the
European Parliament (MEPs) and EP Interpreters (EPIs)

Dangers
according to EPIs

Risks
according to MEPs

Losses**
according to EPIs

Losses
according to
MEPs

MEPs possibly not
knowing what they are
actually saying in nonfluent language.

Of not controlling the word
choices made by interpreters
when I speak in my official
language rather than a
language I share (to some
extent) with colleagues.

Of a worldview and the
categories implicit in
that worldview.

Of control of
meaning.

MEPs being unaware
of the full range of
implications of what
they are saying in a
non-fluent language.

Of not controlling the
meanings made by
interpreters when I speak in
my official language rather
than a language I share(to
some extent) with colleagues.

Of implicit qualities of
logic & understanding
from each
national/cultural,
perspective.

Of control of
meaning.

EPIs inadvertently
saying something other
than what the MEP
intended when the
MEP speaks in a nonfluent language.

Of the interpreter
misunderstanding or
misrepresenting my meaning
when I speak in my official
language rather than a
language I share (to some
extent) with colleagues.

Of continuity in the
communication process.

Of speed and the
sense of immediacy
generated when
using the same
language as other
MEPs.

Main Danger
perceived by EPIs

Main Risk
perceived by MEPs

Main Loss
perceived by EPIs

Main Loss
perceived by
MEPs

The use of non-native
languages by MEPs
lacking native or nearnative fluency.

Having to trust the
interpreters.

National, linguistic,
cultural diversity of
thought and
thoughtfulness.

Control.

**EP Interpreters refer to losses and dangers when MEPs choose against maximal utilization of the
simultaneous interpreting system by speaking any language in which they are not fully fluent. The original
version of this table was shared in a report submitted to the Bureau of the European Parliament (2009).
See Appendix A.
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4.2.3.2

Loss, or Danger and Risk?
Reducing the discourse by primary participants about SI in the EP to the one term

they share in common, it is “loss.” In this sense the Members and Interpreters mirror each
other. The terms “risk” and “danger” are complementary. Here, these two sets of
participants and their ‘sides’ of the discourse echo each other. The risk of losing control
of meaning (as perceived by the MEPs in using the SI) complements the dangers of
inadequate control of meaning (as perceived by the EPIs when MEPs do not use the SI).
These perceived dangers and risks associated with (perceived) loss of control combine
into an overall discourse of complaint. The repetition of the complaints generates general
suspicion and distrust of simultaneous interpretation. This discursive atmosphere, along
with direct experience, contributes to MEPs’ choices toward lingua francas and away
from interpretation, reinforcing the concerns of EPIs who must still grapple with the
source language, regardless of its dysfluency.
Although this was not explicitly stated by any of the interpreters who spoke with
me, EP Interpreters also ‘lose control’ when interpretees speak in pidgin, English as a
foreign language, or contact languages rather than in the idiomataic grammar of the
official languages. As many interpreters explained, “your [bad language] still has to be
interpreted!” (e.g., EPI #53). One could argue that EPIs’ frustration is as much with not
understanding as MEPs’ frustration is with not being understood. In other words,
discourse about the system of SI in the EP exposes the essence of all communication: the
dual questions of a) what knowledge is being mutually comprehended, and b) what kinds
of identities and relationships are being enacted.
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The pervasive presence of these strongly-felt sentiments indicates the extent and
depth to which culture is being produced and shared among these individuals who a)
have different roles and responsibilities within the European Parliament, and b) come
from diverse cultural backgrounds and linguistic profiles. Because the overall system of
controlled multilingualism inhibits and discourages immediate feedback and corrective
action (due to time pressure and the presumed invisibility of the machine), MEPs
perceive a loss of control of their words and meanings.
This apparent powerlessness is both comparable and distinct from, say, the users
of community-style interpreting such as patients in Australian hospitals who receive no
professional interpretation services except from family or friends. As seen in Table 7,
Scenario F, Members of the Parliament are often thrust into circumstances where they
must simply make do. At other times, conditions and pressures of the settings (in the
hemicycles, in the rooms) force a fast temporal rate. Members’ attempts to pack meaning
in dense source language deliveries guarantees the absence of some of the intended
information in the target language (in particular, one minute speeches but also during
debate). Because the overall system of controlled multilingualism is not differentiated in
the discourse as anything other than one system, for one purpose, using SI is considered
risky in many situations. MEPs find it preferable to utilize a language in which they are
less fluent but which gives them the feeling of individual control rather than the less
controllable, shared system of simultaneous interpretation.

4.2.4

Finding: Simultaneous Interpretation as Social Interaction
Virtually all of the Members I spoke with were multilingual (review Table 5).

However, Members of the EP who are not fluent in other languages (especially English)
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often find themselves in situations where communication is curtailed because interpreting
is not provided for most of the smaller, face-to-face working meetings. “I usually speak
in my language, but … my second Committee168 is Economic and Monetary Affairs and
we have only three times, I don’t know, interpretation the last five years in this
committees, not good” (NM70). The reasons why the lack of SI is “not good” affirm the
criticisms provided by EP Interpreters when Members insist on a shared language even
when SI is provided:
English is not my mother tongue so I would not pretend even that I could
do the job in English all the time. Definitely, for example, on transport
legislation which is very detailed, you really need your mother tongue to
be clear on what you’re saying. (OM71)
This is not just an individualized problem of expression:
We have some problems with the English language because we are not
native speakers, and when both are not native speakers it’s very difficult
to have a good communication about a commission document, about
amendments, and if you read some amendments it’s sometimes only one
word to change. And that’s very difficult to have all the nuance in your
own translation from Dutch to English and then from English to Spanish,
Portuguese. (F10)
Specifically, “You must understand what every, every word, what is mean this
amendment, what change in original text this amendment? This very difficult and for this
case I think must be interpreter” (NM69). If the crux of the interpretation regime of

168

In this case, the MEP was not able to ask for SI in both Committees because “the
sessions are paralleled” and “you have to pick” which Committee to schedule the SI,
even if you will be going back and forth between the two meetings (NM70). Also,
one must be a full Member (not a Substitute, in most cases) in order to qualify for
making a SI request.

209

controlled multilingualism is to respond to real demand, who defines what MEPs express
as real need? And what are the implications if real need is not accommodated?169
I was invited during the last few months of the legislative year to observe two
different contexts in which SI was not provided, the Baltic Intergroup and the Asylum
Dossier Horizontal Working Group. The Baltic Intergroup included many ELF speakers;
the group would definitely have benefitted from the provision of interpreting. Although
there was a great deal of pressure on the communication in the Baltic Intergroup
meetings,170 for reasons that will become clear, the analysis centers on the Asylum
Dossier: a “package” of previously-passed legislation up for recast and a new initiative
for establishing a European Asylum Support Office (EASO).

4.3

Working on the Asylum dossier
After the announcement of the Asylum dossier Working Group in the LIBE

Committee, I observed two Horizontal Working Group meetings with the Shadows, six
Trialogue meetings with representatives from the Council and/or Commission (one of
which was “unofficial”), five Political Group meetings, three additional LIBE Committee

169

“As described in the Code of Conduct, language facilities in Parliament shall be
managed on the basis of the principles governing ‘controlled full multilingualism’.
The resources to be devoted to multilingualism shall be controlled by means of
management on the basis of users’ real needs, measures to make users more aware of
their responsibilities and more effective planning of requests for language facilities”
(Committee on Budgetary Control, 2013).

170

Some Members of the Baltic Intergroup believed the permanent administration was
trying to force them to discontinue meeting altogether. The status of Intergroups is
liminal, as they are not part of the formal decision-making structure of the EP’s
legislative work. However Members consider the work done in Intergroups to be an
essential and necessary informal mechanism complementing the formal process.
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meetings and three Plenaries when the Asylum dossier was on the agenda. I was also in
the Plenary when the proposal was voted on by the entire Membership in the very last
session of the Sixth Term. I interviewed each Rapporteur, Shadow Rapporteur and/or
their Assistant(s), and some Secretariat staff (the bureaucratic administrations composed
of permanent EP staff which maintains records and manages logistics during and between
EP terms for the Committees and Groups). Throughout all the observations I was rarely
introduced; only one MEP introduced me/my role to a Political Group—perhaps because
the Independents were such a small group my presence would surely be noticed. In the
other Groups and Committees, it was taken for granted that if I made it through the door I
was allowed to be in the room.
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Table 9.

Asylum Dossier Meetings
The Asylum Dossier: Observed Meetings
Setting and Date
in 2009

“in the room”
=
interpretation
system171

Civil Liberties Committee (LIBE) 17 Feb

“in the
hemicycle”
=
operator system

No SI provided

172

X

Trialogue (with Council) 3 March

X

Trialogue (with the Commission) 3 March

X

Trialogue (with the Commission & Council) 1
April

X

Plenary 2 April

X

Horizontal Working Group 15 April

X

Unofficial Trialogue (with Council) 16 April

X

LIBE Coordinator’s Meeting 16 April

X

LIBE 16 April

X

EPP-ED Political Group debate 21 April

X

Horizontal Working Group 22 April

X

LIBE 22 April

X

IND-DEM Political Group debate 22 April

X

Trialogue (Council & Commission) 23 April

X

Trialogue (Council & Commission) 28 April

X

Greens Political Group debate 28 April

X

PSE Political Group debate 28 April

X

EPP-ED Political Group debate 28 April

X

Plenary 6 May

X

Plenary 7 May

X

171

“In the room,” all floor and interpreter microphones function on automatic: whoever
is first to speak gets the floor (the Chairperson can turn off individual microphones).
Turn-taking is supposed to be managed by the Chair (or a Vice-Chair) but Members
can, and do sometimes, speak spontaneously.
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All microphones are controlled by a technician who is following the oral directions
of the Chairperson who is running the meeting. No Member can initiate a turn
speaking until the Chair has signalled to the technician to turn their microphone on.
The technician can also turn any Member’s microphone off it they go over the time
limit (following the lenience of the Chair, which varies).
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Access to closed meetings (namely, of Political Groups) was not overtly policed
except during very high profile discussions or special visits, however if there was ever
doubt about my invitation someone would check and I could refer them to the MEP who
had invited me. The hemicycles have a public gallery so no permission was required to
attend for Plenaries. I was introduced during one informal Intergroup meeting (not the
Baltic Intergroup) that involved less than a dozen people, but not in a Member’s special
meeting on the Kurdish question (about three dozen people). The Trialogues generally
involved about a dozen people but I was never introduced. After I had become known,
one participant volunteered her initial reaction to my presence:
Interviewee: You sitting there is just – you are just – you are very
different to the rest [laughter] of the people sitting there. But I mean, you
are ____ another one ____, so I mean – but I mean there’s a lot of people
that sit there takes notes for MEPs or whatever they do, minutes and stuff.
But that’s somehow attentive in a different way or whatever. . . In the
beginning I remember the first meeting where I didn’t know who you
were – and I felt that you were… I dunno, I was really confused. And you
didn’t look or behave or anything that remotely could sort of place you in
like the Secretariat or the Presidency or anything; so I was a bit – And
then I didn’t ask, because I thought okay you were with somebody, and
that was none of my business or whatever, [laughter] but that was quite
funny. No but it was just – I just noticed this because the meeting rooms
are quite sort of – they – there’s a hierarchy; you sit in little groups. So in
then in the back there’s this mix of NGOs, and you can have a Head of
Unit sitting there, you could have – it’s a strange mix. But still you can
normally identify people somehow by the way they sit there.
Interviewer: So I was unidentifiable.
Interviewee: Yeah. I mean, I would not be able to [laughter] say what you
were doing there. (F13)
Mainly, what I was doing there was taking a lot of notes. (Audio recording was only done
for interviews with prior informed consent.)
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4.3.1

A Co-Decision Trialogue
The need for a common EU policy on asylum was established at the 1999

Tampere Summit, which established a deadline of five years for the first phase of
legislation and implementation. The original directives were completed in 2004: referred
to casually as Qualifications, Procedures, Reception Conditions, Dublin, Eurodac, and the
Long Term Residents Directive. These directives established the minimum foundation for
a Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Three of the original six directives were
up for recast in 2009: the Reception Conditions Directive, “the Dublin 2 Regulation,
which determines the member State responsible for the asylum case” (M78), and the
Eurodac Regulation, “which is the fingerprinting system that goes along with asylum
payments” (OM78). Recasts are a procedure instituted with the Lisbon Treaty (2009).
Recasts allow revisions and improvements to the execution of law previously
institutionalized by the Commission and Council without input from the Parliament.
Recasts are one of the ways that the EP has gained influence in the overarching process
of Europeanization, particularly in terms of democratic representation of the citizenry.
With the new Lisbon Treaty and legislation, the execution is part of the
competence of the European Parliament …now the European Parliament
is involved…and, therefore, what we have to change a lot of things in
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each law, European law, we have to change it at the end the execution that
the European Parliament is involved and which way. (F53)173
The chance to re-cast was eagerly received by MEPs, who were following up on the
Hague Programme’s prioritization of the CEAS asylum process begun at the 1999
Tampere Summit. Tampere established the goal that “by 2010 we should have the second
phase starting where we would not only have minimum standards, but we would actually
set up common standards” (F84). In providing guidance for the 6th Term of the European
Parliament, the Hague Programme was following in step with this previously established
timeline.
Following the usual process, the EU Council of Presidents (‘the Council”) and EP
Committee Chairmen determined that asylum policy comes within the competence of the
Committee on Justice and Home Affairs,174 known by its French acronym LIBE. That
first “sorting” is followed by a second “sorting” within the LIBE Committee itself, by a
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The Parliament has now become a co-legislator, which is a significant change since
Vuorikoski’s work in 2004. The principle of co-decision established in the
Maastricht Treaty is now in effect and was at play in the Asylum package
negotiations: “The European Parliament is not a legislative body in the sense that the
national parliaments are as it does not have the right to initiate legislation (Antola
1996: 63)” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 77). “The most important legislative body is the
Council (Antola 1996: 64), which has to receive the proposals from the Commission;
Parliament’s involvement comes in the final stages of the legislative procedure
(Noël, 1993, p. 26, in Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 77). Since the Maastricht Treaty, the EP
”has increased its powers enormously, but could be described as still only on the
edge of constituting a legislature” (Philip Norton, 1995, p. 192, quoted in Raunio,
1996, p. 18). While the powers of the EP have been on the agenda over the years,
there have not been any deep-going changes since the time of this quotation even
though the principle of co-decision, approved of in the Maastricht Treaty, did
increase the influence of the EP in the legislative process” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 77).

174

There are twenty Standing Committees in the EP, also two permanent
subcommittees and a varying number of temporary committees. All of the legislative
work is categorized according to the competence of each Committee.
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group of “one Coordinator from each [political] Group…[who] organize the Committee
meetings and…distribute Reports” (F84). The three asylum directive recasts were
accompanied by a new initiative to establish a European Asylum Support Office (EASO).
All four together composed the Asylum Dossier.
Within the LIBE Committee in the spring of 2009 were representative MEPs from
six European political Groups: ALDE, EPP, Greens, GUE, Socialists, and UEN.175
“Being the lead committee is the important thing” (F84). In this case the lead was the
EASO dossier and there “was no fight over this one” (F84). A complicated point system
is deployed when necessary following the D’Hondt system of derogation from the
number of seats held by each political party. “The small groups, if they want to get
interesting Reports, they better save the points. So they don’t take many Reports” (F84).
In this case, a Green party MEP was named Rapporteur for the EASO dossier as well as
Shadow Rapporteur on the other three asylum dossiers. Each of the other dossiers was
assigned its own responsible Rapporteur from the EPP, the Socialists, and ALDE. “The
UEN didn’t demand anything” (F84).
There may have been a slight hope that the whole dossier might be approved on
the First Reading because the Commission was “really pushing…really keen to get this
done and out” which is “not always the case” (F84). Technically, the First Reading refers
to the initial, formal establishment of the Parliament’s stance on a given piece of
legislation through a voting process in Plenary. The details of the First Reading are
175

Political Groups represented in the LIBE Committee at the time of research: ALDE Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; EPP - European People’s PartyEuropean Democrats; the Greens-European Free Alliance (technically Greens-EFA);
GUE - European United Left-Nordic Green Left (technically GUE-NGL); Party of
European Socialists (PES); and UEN - Union for Europe of the Nations.
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arrived at through a process of intra-Parliamentary Working Group meetings and
Committee meetings, and inter-institutional Trialogue meetings with representations from
the Council and the Commission. The Council’s and Commission’s representatives meet
with the Rapporteur, Shadow Rapporteurs (or their Assistants) and other representatives
from the EP’s permanent Secretariats in order to discover their “mutual recognition”
regarding “what has been adopted” (F84).
In this instance of the Ayslum Dossier, the Commission was under the Presidency
of Jose Manuel Barroso. The Council was currently under the leadership of the Czech
Presidency. The Council operates in six-month shifts, whereas the Commission’s
appointed President (like the elected MEPs) stays in office for five-year terms. The
Czechs were the last presidency of this Parliamentary term and were motivated to achieve
a co-decision success. As it became clear that agreement would not be reached on all
points and the Trialogue negotiations would continue into the next legislative term
(Parliament’s 7th, 2009-2014), necessitating a Second Reading, a representative from the
incoming Swedish Presidency also attended meetings.
During the first set of Trialogue meetings, the “First Reading position [which] we
have to defend in the Second Reading” (F84) becomes clear, as do any potential “red
line” issues.176 During the First Reading on the Asylum dossier, the Council brought five
amendments, three of which were acceptable and two of which were not. There was a
sticking point in the Dublin Regulation regarding the concept of detention, because “in
Spain you’re not allowed to detain asylum seekers for more than forty days” (F84) and

176

The metaphor of the “red line” is drawn from Europe’s wars and the military custom
of drawing a red line on maps to show the fronts of battle. (OM63)
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none of the other EU countries had a similar restriction. There was also a significant
debate with several amendments from Rapporteurs and Shadows trying to establish a
solidarity mechanism. The Dublin Regulation
determines what country…will have to treat an application…”You”
[asylum seeker] arrive on the coast of Italy, and somehow you manage to
move on to Spain…The Spanish government will say, “Where did you
arrive?” “Ah, I arrived in Italy, but I come in -” “Well then you have to go
back to Italy.” You have to apply for asylum in the first country of arrival.
Dublin is the regulation that allows a Member State to send people back to
where they originally entered the European Union. (F84)
The issue of solidarity is crucial to a common policy. “The Parliament Reports are
always about minimum harmonization - our party . . . we raise a maximum
harmonization” (F10). The minimum standards included this “very unfriendly instrument to shuffle people around…and some Member States are using it a lot, or the
ones doesn’t have a southern maritime border” (F84). In the Dublin recast, the red line
was being drawn around the use of the words “voluntary” or “binding” (F84). Whether
and how Member States are required to support those countries bearing the burden of
“massive influx” (F84) demonstrates “that a solidarity mechanism is somehow important.
Because of course it undermines a little bit the asylum system if you have countries that
say, ‘Sorry, we up North, we don’t care about you down there’” (F84).
Another issue regarding the Procedures Directive also generated amendments and
debate in the LIBE Committee but did not rise to the level of a red line in the Trialogue.
The Procedures Directive “simply sets up a frame for the procedures to - for applying for
asylum…to set up the minimum standards for Member States to apply to when people
apply for asylum” (F84). The Procedures Directive governs the rules regarding the
provision of simultaneous interpretation to asylum seekers.
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4.3.2

“It Pops Up Every Time”
The draft document included providing SI in a language the asylum seeker is

“supposed to understand.” One MEP insisted that this was just a bad translation of the
French word, a bit of sloppy work by someone from the Commission working in a hurry.
It certainly caught my attention! I began to inquire of the MEPs, Assistants, and other
staff present or involved with the Asylum dossier: “There was something about…there’s
this clause about language, about interpreting…?”
Ah yeah. That’s about – but this is one that has been – it pops up every
time we deal with any asylum law. You – when you are asylum seeker
and you get your answers, do – can you claim or can you insist on having
it in a language that you are presumed to understand? Or what does it –
suspected to, or what is the word you use? That you are assumed to
understand? Or should it simply say “a language that you understand”?
‘Cause of course there’s a big difference if you are from Nigeria and are
likely to speak English, or if you are from say Malawi or something where
you don’t necessarily – not necessarily have a mother tongue of any
European language, and that means that you get in writing an explanation
why are sent back to Spain? (F84)
There are two issues, one involving whether or not simultaneous interpreting is provided
(and in what language/s), and the other regarding the extent to which written
communication is expected to suffice (and in what language/s).
As explained in the introduction, the focus of this study is on interpretation
because of its immediacy and the co-presence of interpretees in social interaction with
each other. In this context, how translation becomes an issue (for asylum seekers as well
as MEPs) is when decision-making about diction and the processes of ensuring
comprehension of written documents are (or should be) resolved in face-to-face
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interpersonal interaction.177 Because of the need to provide written translations into all
official languages of the European Union, clarity of any law in the language which it is
drawn up in is vital to ensuring translations will be understood and interpreted by
Member States in accord with each other, all across the EU.
Debate in the EP about communication access during asylum proceedings using
simultaneous interpretation for asylum seekers is apparently well-worn: “We had ongoing discussions on the definition of language for I don’t know how long” (OM71). An
Assistant explained,
This whole language issue within the Asylum dossiers… it’s an issue
which has been fought over many times in the past…the discussion has
been had a million times before; in which case, for [Ms MEP], I guess she
didn’t want to bring it up once again. We know that we’re never going to
win that one. Is it highly unlikely that the Parliament is ever going to win
that argument? It didn’t even win it within itself, because those
amendments weren’t adopted. (F09)
Despite the earlier loss on an unequivocal statement of the quality of interpreting
provided to asylum seekers, amendments were raised to revise the Commission’s first
wording, “supposed to understand.” One direction was to strengthen the asylum seekers’
rights, by “saying ‘understands’ full stop” (OM71). This effort had been made before.
It was introduced but it was not adopted – because it is the Socialists – the
Greens and GUE – the left – we all supported that but we didn’t have a
majority, because the Liberals and the EPP went against it, because they
don’t want that fight with Council, and maybe they don’t really care. Do
the EPP really care if an asylum seeker understands them or not? (F09)

177

Asylum seekers may often be provided with written information only.

220

Members of the more conservative EPP group would counter, “Do the Greens really
understand the reality on the ground?” (F09). So the left and the right within Parliament
have a ‘red line’ regarding language accessibility.
Many explained “we have been pointing that out several times” (M71). One
Assistant explained her MEP’s position: “The discussion has been had a million times . . .
since we’ve been discussing this topic in Parliament the argument has been had and
we’ve lost it – this specifically in the face of Council” (F09). “I’ve been doing this job for
five years now and I know on another instrument we have been discussing hours with
Council on how to define language, you know?” (OM71). The other amendment referred
to precedent. One of the Shadow Rapporteurs on the EASO directive
went back to the Return Procedure and…saw the definition used,
‘understands or’ et cetera. And then I phoned with the legal services of the
Commission and they confirmed if I would propose that specific
definition, that that would improve the Commission text as much as
oversight of the Commission … to follow the definition as already
adopted in another instrument” (OM71).
That pre-existing definition is in the Returns Directive,178 Chapter III, Procedural
Safeguards, Article 12 on “Form,” Paragraph 2:
Member States shall provide, upon request,179 a written or oral translation
of the main elements of decisions related to return, as referred to in
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Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of The Council of 16
December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for
returning illegally staying third-country nationals. Official Journal of the European
Union. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do
?uri=OJ:L:2008:348:0098:0107:EN:PDF retrieved 8 March 2014.
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paragraph 1, including information on the available legal remedies in a
language the third-country national understands or may reasonably be
presumed to understand. (ibid)
“The return procedure clearly is something else,” explained one of the
MEPs distinguishing it from the directives up for recast, “but in my field,
you cannot treat on the language an illegal migrant who is to be returned
to his home country different in that respect than somebody who is
coming in, you understand?” (M71)
4.3.3

Negotiating Language Policy under Co-Decision
While acknowledging that “the language issue is important” (OM71), it was

understood that “the argument has been had and we’ve lost it – this specifically in the
face of Council” (F09). Strategically, in the co-decision procedure,
if we [MEPs] have a feeling that we could get a deal in the First Reading,
it means that we will try to find views that we can agree on; we’ll
compromise on what we’ve find are not essential but also stick to our
guns when it comes to more essential parts. For asylum immigration
packet [the three recasts], we don’t expect First Reading certainly. On the
European Asylum Support Office, I think [the Rapporteur] has a bit of a
chance … but I still think it’s unlikely. (NM80)
Practically, “on the language; they can’t even negotiate that” (F09) because Parliament
“didn’t even win it within itself, because those amendments [about understanding the
language] weren’t adopted” (F09). Also, according to one Assistant, “there are no
organizations sending letters or special cases to [Mr MEP],” even though “there are some
179

The section continues in Paragraph “3. Member States may decide not to apply
paragraph 2 to third country nationals who have illegally entered the territory of a
Member State and who have not subsequently obtained an authorisation or a right to
stay in that Member State. In such cases decisions related to return, as referred to in
paragraph 1, shall be given by means of a standard form as set out under national
legislation. Member States shall make available generalised information sheets
explaining the main elements of the standard form in at least five of those languages
which are most frequently used or understood by illegal migrants entering the
Member State concerned.” (ibid)
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problems with interpreters and problems around passports, and sometimes – that kind of
problems we heard about during visits at centers” (F08). Instead, “general reception
conditions and a humane treatment that kind of is the first priority. You cannot believe
your eyes if you visit Greece or Malta or Cyprus” (OM71). Also, “access to legal advice,
what happens to unaccompanied minors” (F09) and (as already described) the solidarity
mechanism by which non-border countries support the border countries in matters of
asylum and illegal immigration were taken as more foundational to the CEAS than
language/communication access.
Establishing another European agency was expected to garner some ideological
opposition but not enough to thwart the EASO. For instance, one of the left groups might
oppose on grounds of political principle rather than practical justice:
…should there be one or two MEPs…which is against, which would be
for a matter of principle, some Nordic members are usually against all
new agencies for a matter of principle. So I don’t know what they would
do on this one concerning asylum, because everybody in the group is
absolutely in favour of whatever can protect asylum seekers’ rights. But
there might be a problem, because when the Parliament decides to find us
a new agency, then there are always some national delegation which are
against, especially northern countries. But in this case, I still had no
chance to check with my Nordic members, so I don’t know what would be
their position. (F11)
Likewise, “a [conservative] German EPP is totally against having any more European
agencies because they’re fed up with European money being decentralized after agencies
doing something that they consider isn’t that important” (F09).
Nonetheless, most Political Groups were able to deal with
the [EASO] report in Working Group was [because of] the fact we had a
very clear line, and this is communicable to Mrs. [MEP], that we will
support all of her amendments. And as far as these were seen as making
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her chance of getting a First Reading agreement better but not necessarily
leading to it. (NM80)
An Assistant to the Shadow Rapporteur from another Political Group, however,
prioritized other end-of-term responsibilities and campaigning for re-election:
It’s better to wait for the vote because of – [Mr MEP] thinks it’s not
possible to reach agreement with Council and Commission before the
elections. So he said these last three months it’s not good to table a lot of
amendments on such reports now; it’s better to wait for some outcomes
after the elections. (F10)
Such a decision not to table amendments in the First Reading does have
consequences, as “new ideas can’t be introduced. So if we thought, ‘Oh, it would be a
good idea for the Asylum Support Office to blah,’ we can’t introduce it if we didn’t think
of it before” (F09). This sequential element of First Reading and Second Reading
combined with the co-decision procedure motivated most Shadows “given the fact that
this is just before European election, we to draw a line now” because “there’s a logic to
the First and Second Reading. In Second Reading you can only table amendments that
have been tabled in the First Reading” (NM80).
There was a chance to-redraw the line of language access for asylum seekers with
the EASO Directive, but the battle needed to be won in the recast directives first. An
example is shown for the Procedures Directive, see Table 10.
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Table 10. Amendment Reporting Process
Amendment 14 - Recast – Rule 80a of the Rules of Procedure
Proposal for a directive
Article 9 – paragraph 4
Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

4. Detained asylum seekers shall immediately be
informed of the reasons for detention, the
maximum duration of the detention and the
procedures laid down in national law for
challenging the detention order, in a language they
are reasonably supposed to understand.

4. Detained asylum seekers shall immediately be
informed of the reasons for detention, the
maximum duration of the detention and the
procedures laid down in national law for
challenging the detention order, in a language they
understand.

Source: 1st DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers (recast) (COM(2008)0815
– C6-0477/2008 – 2008/0244(COD)){LIBE}Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs.
Retrieved 8 March 2014.

4.3.4

Simultaneous Interpretation as Social Interaction (SI squared)
When the Rapporteurs and Shadow Rapporteurs from a Horizontal Working

Group, such as the Asylum Package, report back to the full LIBE Committee (or any
Committee) on the status of Trialogue negotiations with the Commission and Council,
they use the system of SI in the EP to communicate with each other. By the time such
reporting occurs there have been several small meetings and numerous conversations
among the Rapporteurs and Shadows (and/or their Assistants) with each other and within
each of their respective Political Groups. In the instance of the EASO and Asylum
dossier, the first LIBE Committee’s discussion and debate regarding the red line issues
and ideas (via amendments) regarding strategies for compromise lasted approximately 34
minutes.
Politically, numerous amendments were brought and voting occurred along
customary Group lines. “In a lot of amendments, GUE, Greens and Socialists voted
together” (F11). In this instance,
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Either an alliance planned in advance or just… how would I say…
convergence of intentions, the liberal [ALDE] group and the popular
group [EPP] voted together. And when these two groups join, they have a
majority in the LIBE committee. So whatever the liberals don’t like from
the GUE amendments, we never have a chance to pass because we need
them to make a majority. (F11)
Prior to the voting, debate on the Amendments in the LIBE Committee was focused on
the red line issues. At one point, a heated exchange occurred between the Maltese
Member speaking English, and a Dutch Member speaking Netherlands. The issue
involved the red line matter of the solidarity mechanism for burden sharing. The
interview transcript180 that follows [below] involves misunderstanding, switching
languages (technically called codeswitching), and the notion of voice.

4.3.5

Codeswitching and Voice
As mentioned above, all of the meetings of LIBE’s Horizontal Working Group on

the EASO and Asylum dossier were conducted in English. The level of these meetings
does not usually warrant the provision of simultaneous interpretation, so, in this case,
Rapporteurs and Shadows not fluent in English made do by sending Assistants or staff
from their Group’s Secretariat who were fluent in English on their behalf. This strategy
was utilized for the Trialogue meetings too. Interpretation was only provided during the
LIBE Committee Meeting (and the brief Coordinator’s meeting preceding it). Review
Table 9. The one LIBE Committee Coordinator’s meeting (held prior to the full
Committee meeting) that I observed involved only French and English. That
Coordinator’s meeting dealt with a surprise move from the EPP regarding postponing the

180

Written by the researcher in a field notebook as it occurred.
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timetable for voting on EASO and the Asylum dossier; the last minute tactic was soundly
rejected with a decision to move ahead with the already agreed timetable and address the
amendments on the agenda.
Thirty-four minutes of this LIBE Committee meeting were devoted to EASO and
Asylum dossier amendments; fifteen booths were staffed at the beginning of the session
(and a sixteenth, the Danish booth, became staffed at some point).181 There were
approximately seventeen MEPs and 90 other participants present, including observers
from the Council of Presidents. During the debate on the asylum amendments, only four
languages were uttered from the floor: Dutch, English, French and Spanish. At one count
(perhaps corresponding to the use of Spanish) twelve of the seventeen Members were
wearing headsets (hence presumably listening to a simultaneous interpretation); at
another count (perhaps corresponding with the use of French and/or Dutch) ten of the
seventeen Members were wearing headphones.
The Maltese MEP presented some recommendations (speaking English)182 on
behalf of another MEP, who was Rapporteur/Shadow on one of the directives up for
recast but was not in attendance. Then the Dutch Member who was Rapporteur on an
asylum package directive and Shadow on all the other asylum package directives
presented recommendations, speaking in Netherlands. Suddenly the Dutch Member
switched to English, with “a question for [Mr MEP]” because of a recommended point
181

These may have been interpreters in training (for any language combination, not
necessarily Danish). Taking the opportunity to practice definitely seemed to be the
case in the Swedish booth, which was occupied by one person not a team.

182

Maltese was not yet being provided within the interpretation regime due to training
and qualification issues. English is recognized along with Maltese as an official
language of Malta: this MEP was raised bilingually.
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that “limits the scope of my amendment. We already agreed that Dublin doesn’t increase
cost. Could you clarify your intention with your amendment?” (Field Notebook II, p. 18)
When the Maltese Member’s turn to respond arrived (six minutes later, after two other
MEPs had turns), he said (in English) it was “a tough time getting a compromise. I’m
willing to listen, maybe there is a misunderstanding” (ibid). A week and a half later, I
was able to interview the Dutch MEP about that interaction.
Researcher: Things got a little intense between you and Mr. MEP.
Something was going on there.
Interviewee: Yeah.
Researcher: Yeah, and –
Interviewee: We misunderstood each other.
Researcher: Okay. Yeah, I mean it’s – I mean I don’t know either of you
well, I mean at all, but I was like, okay.
Interviewee: This is politics.
Researcher: So one, you gave your presentation in Dutch, but then you
shifted to English when you were confronting [MEP] and then when you
were debating this particular point –
Interviewee: Yeah, point because I was annoyed, yeah.
Researcher: So spell that out for me. You shifted to English because you
were annoyed, because why?
Interviewee: I don’t know.
Researcher: I mean how did the annoyance figure in?
Interviewee: I think that normally one would speak, in my case Dutch or
whatever language is your mother tongue, just because it’s also important
that you express yourself clearly in the right wordings, but you also
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sometimes feel that because of translation you cannot give the right
emotion to – you understand – the right emotion to what you’re trying to
say. So when I get a little bit excited, I might shift to English or even
French even though it’s not my mother tongue and I make many mistakes,
but just to have a direct conversation instead of having it translated first
without the dynamics of my voice, you understand.
Researcher: Okay. You’re like: I want you to hear that I’m really upset
right now.
Researcher: Well, I want them to understand – I don’t really realize when
I do it to be honest. So I mean this is a Euro bubble and many languages
are available and it’s easy happens that within one meeting we speak
French, Dutch, English, German all together, you know. So you just shift.
Even though you make many mistakes, I couldn’t care less if I’m able to
express myself in a specific language then we just move forward.
There is an intriguing mix of practical and discursive consciousness in this MEP’s
responses.
The “dynamics of voice,” for instance, are clearly linked with the expression of
emotion, a non-verbal characteristic that interpreters may or may not mimic.183 This is a
layperson’s use of the word, voice, referring to the non-verbal quality of sound. Included
in this instance of use (that is, of saying the word “voice” to label what motivated the
codeswitch) is a practical use of the metaphor used in the sociolinguistic definition of
voice, which involves uptake: e.g., “I want them to understand.” The presumption is that
achieving “understanding” will motivate an uptake of meaning, resulting some kind of
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Community-style sign language interpreters who are professionally certified by the
Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf (US), for instance, are expressly enjoined to
convey “the tone and intent” of utterances (Hymes’ key), however individual
practitioners’ skill and ability varies. Conference-style interpreters in the EP are
often criticized by Members as being ‘flat,’ a criticism that Deaf individuals also
levy against signed language interpreters who fail to capture the key: those nonverbal tonal qualities of emotion and attitude.
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compromise, ideally a compromise that is in line with, or at least closer to, the position
this MEP proposes should be staked out.
This particular codeswitch into English appears to be a variation of Scenario B
(from Table 7 on MEP’s language choice strategies) in which mutual fluency in a shared
language is not equal however there is a desire to connect not only on the informational
level but also on the phatic level, i.e., an emotional plane.184 Indeed, as this MEP
explains, the goal is not avoiding language mistakes, it is to “shift . . . . [so] we just move
forward.” MEPs frequently do “just shift” (i.e., codeswitch) from one language to another
in the middle of talking without necessarily realizing that they’re doing so; as admitted by
that Member, “to be honest.”
Codeswitching is a pervasive feature of social interaction among Members in the
EP. Its relative frequency is testimony to both operational elements of the system of SI in
the EP: the EP Interpreters and the technical infrastructure, that is, the equipment
programmed and operated by technicians.185 First, the fact that such code switches
between languages can be done essentially without the Members’ deliberate, conscious
awareness is an example of practical consciousness (knowing what to do, when to do it,
and how to do it) that provides evidence of the alertness of the EP Interpreters, who catch
and respond to these shifts so quickly that Members can perform them practically when
184

Phatic communication is the use of language to make contact, not to convey
information.

185

Occasionally, Members will shout on the floor without the microphone, particularly
during hot debate. This can occur in both settings, that is, in the hemicycle under the
technicians’ control or in the rooms under automatic controls. It is more likely to
occur in the rooms during Political Group and Committee debates than in the
hemicycles during plenaries, partly as an effect of jockeying to be the next ‘first
person’ to talk and trigger the microphone to automatically turn on.
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they need to, without adding the formal protocol (desired, when possible) of announcing
a language switch so that everyone can prepare.

4.4

Simultaneous Interpretation and Social Interaction in the EP (SI2)
What Members want to hold in awareness is the content of the legislation they are

negotiating, not the interpretation process. In fact it is extremely challenging to do both,
simultaneously. When the evidence of intercultural communication arises because of the
language choices of their colleagues or the inevitable (although minimal, percentagewise) errors of interpreters, the established discourse tends toward complaint:
highlighting perceived dangers, risks, and losses of interpreted communication. Not
evident in discursive consideration is acknowledgment of the basis of comparison.
“Danger,” “risk,” and “loss” are measured against a non-existent ideal: the
presumed absence of comparable risks, losses or dangers in shared language
communication. While I was engaged in fieldwork, I referred to this as ‘monolingual’
interaction using a lingua franca or shared language. This confused people who
understood themselves as multilingual even if they were using a common language in a
given communication event. Eventually, I came to think of the basis of comparison as a
bias for homolingual communication: the preference to communicate in the same
language rather than in a different language. See Table 11.
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Table 11. Distinguishing “lingual” terms
Monolingual

Intralingual

Homolingual

A person who knows one
language

Communication among people in
one language (the same language)

A preference for communicating
in the same language

A constant in terms of time &
space (unless/until learn another
language).
Also a form of identity.

Activity of communication in a
specific instance. Time-bound.
Refers to the language not the
person. Objectifies language as
external from use, as if language
“exists” on its own without people.

Description of language use in a
given space and time.
METAPHOR for “the same
language” — a jargon, set of
values, common mission, etc.

Multilingual

Interlingual

Pluralingual

A person who knows two or
more languages with some
reasonable degree of fluency.
Also a form of identity.

Activity, in a specific instance, of
communication involving two
languages that are understood to
be different. Time-bound. Refers
to the language not the person.
Objectifies language as external to
use, as if language “exists” on its
own without people.

Use of more than one language
in a given space and time.
Descriptive.

While maintaining and promoting multilingualism in Europe is the stated goal of
EU language policy, the system of SI in the EP seems designed to erase linguistic
differences by creating the illusion of interacting in the same language. The evidence of a
culturally-constructed homolingual illusion is evident from the discourse, embodied in
the practices of social interaction already identified (with more to come), and arises from
the capabilities of electronic and digital technology.
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CHAPTER 5
CONFERENCE INTERPRETATION AS A TRANSLATION MACHINE

5.1

Distinctions of SI in the EP
Different types of simultaneous interpretation are encountered by Members in

various settings in the Parliament, from the high-profile SI during Plenaries to
individualized whispering (generally referred to by the French label, chucotage) that may
occur if, for instance, Members travel on Delegations to other countries. Most MEPs
seem to learn ‘what to do’ and ‘how to do it’ by observation and experimentation.
“Theoretically everything is okay but practically,” explains an MEP from ‘old’ Europe,
I have to find a way to speak differently in my own language. When we
start working here, translation [sic] requires a different way of talking,
you have to account for [it]—speaking short and friendly for the
translation [sic]. If it is too complex the message will not pass through.
(OM20)
Members were very reflective when asked direct questions about the interpreting, but in
general the discourse works to discourage giving much attention to the system of SI in
the EP. The system of use is “not so clear at first,” says an MEP from ‘new’ Europe. “It
becomes clearer over time” (NM02).
Overall, the system of SI in the EP can be understood as “a colossal machine”
(OM66). At the hub of this machine are
the technicians, the fellows dressed in blue, they make the whole system
run. They are the twenty-fourth box: the engineers. Suddenly it happens,
the voice stops and you don’t get the interpretation. Suddenly there is
silence. Psst! (OM57)
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While speaking, the Member gestures as if he’s using a screwdriver. From the
technician’s perspective, however, “For the Members, the machine doesn’t exist…They
know that there are interpreters, but they don’t know there’s a machine, so they don’t
realize that there’s a machine between the interpreters and the person” (F12). The
invisibility of the technology contributes to “a tendency to treat the interpreter
instrumentally” (F04), such as in this Member’s description: “It is automatic
interpretation.” He points as if to each interpreter booth. “I speak in Greek, it goes to the
English pivot, to the French interpreter, to the French colleague” (OM24).
From the Members’ point-of-view,
There are two kinds of meetings: the whole series of official meetings, of
which the translators [sic] are base, and, parallel, hundreds of small
meetings, not for everybody—[mainly] Members with the larger
languages. These are not translated [sic]. For the big, official meetings, in
the first minutes of the planning meeting we decide which languages—
roughly 50% with translation [sic] and 50% directly—so we’re not losing
the time for interpreting. In the small meetings, Frangleis works very well.
On the second part, informal networks are created. We know who we can
communicate with…of course, some of the Members are completely
excluded, in a way marginalized. Both realities are true, both are real. In
the second [smaller] one, the people discuss several languages, this
expression you know in one language, this expression in another. It is
typical of the nobles, not the spectacle to show how he is prepared, but
that this is the better expression. (OM20)
Questions of marginalization, the use of lingua francas, “the better expression” (diction),
and “losing the time” are themes that recur frequently in the discourse and will be
examined more closely later. Of note now is the salient division between formal meetings
in which interpreting is provided as a matter of course, and informal meetings in which
interpreting is rarely if ever provide (historically and certainly during the time period of
this research). Politically, “an effective Member is one who can play at all levels”
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(OM66), encompassing the most and least formal, including meetings with no
interpretation as well as those guaranteed to provide it. The different demands of social
interaction in these two opposite communication infrastructures drive the tensions in the
overall discourse about SI in the EP.
For the technician, the interpreting machine is more finely distinguished by the
setting and roles of participants. The setting is either in the hemicycle Plenaries, that is,
“in the ‘cycle;” or “in the room” for the Political Groups and Standing Committees.
Participants’ roles are essentially binary: there are the interpreters “in the booth” and the
Members “on the floor.” The first two sections of this chapter will describe the two main
settings for formal interpreting (hemicycles, meeting rooms) and the subsequent two
sections will describe the two main roles from the technological and geographic vantage
points (interpreters in the booth; Members on the floor). The rest of this chapter will
elaborate “the human problem” (F12) by mapping the discursive tensions about
intercultural, simultaneously-interpreted communication in the EP.
The representative diversity of MEPs who participated in this research is
quantified in Tables 12 and 13. Table 12 shows the range of political party membership
and Table 13 shows the spread of national identities. The highest participation is from the
center-right party, which was the largest political group in the EP during the 6th term
(2004-2009). The random sample of self-selected volunteers in this research is
proportional to the size of each political group in the Parliament (indicated by rank).
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Table 12. Political Party Memberships of Participating MEPs
Ranking by
number of seats
won (of 785) in
elections

Political Party Membership of Participating MEPs / # of
participating Members

Position
in
Political
Spectrum

1st (288)

European People’s Party – European Democrats (EPP-ED)

18

centerright

2nd (217)

Party of European Socialists (PSE)

14

left

Alliance of Democrats and Liberals for Europe (ALDE)

11

right

4 (43)

Greens – European Free Alliance (Greens-EFA)

5

center-left
to left

5th (41)

European United Left – Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL)

4

far left

United for Europe of the Nations (UEN)

1

far right

rd

3 (104)
th

th

6 (40)
7

th

(30)

Independence/Democracy (IND/DEM)

1

far right

8

th

(22)

Non-Attached Members

0*

(mostly)
far right

*One appointment was scheduled but the Member did not appear.

Table 13. Member States of Participating MEPs
Member States of the European Union represented by participating MEPs
1.

Belgium

14.

Latvia

2.

Bulgaria

15.

Lithuania

3.

Cyprus

16.

Luxembourg

4.

Czech Republic

17.

Malta

5.

Denmark

18.

The Netherlands

6.

Estonia

19.

Poland

7.

Finland

20.

Portugal

8.

France

21.

Romania

9.

Germany

22.

Slovakia

10.

Greece

23.

Spain

11.

Hungary

24.

Sweden

12.

Ireland

25.

United Kingdom

13.

Italy

*Appointments were scheduled with one MEP each from Austria and Slovenia. The former was a no show
and the latter appointment was missed by the researcher.
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5.1.1

SI “In The Hemicycle”
The microphone conference capacity of the electronic technology is used in all the

meetings, but differently during the plenary sessions. The plenaries are important to
Members because “that’s when one has the most audience” (F05). Members give oneminute speeches that are broadcast to national audiences back home. These overtly
political speeches are nearly always delivered in the MEP’s national language.
Technicians are monitoring “24 booths with four interpreters and 22 languages spoken . .
. . [and] all the languages are in real-time translated [sic] in all the languages” (F12).
Intriguingly, the technicians are in control of the communication during the hemicycles.
This is accomplished by putting the conference microphones into what is called operator
mode.
In the hemicycle, the Members know when they have to speak and how
long they can speak. They have one minute or one half minute speaking
time. The President has to have the complete control of what’s going on.
Nobody is able to turn on his microphone and say, “No, I don’t like what
he’s talking about,” or things like that. (F12)
From the technical point of view, Plenaries are “contained” and the participation
of Members is “programmed” (F12). When the system is “in operator mode nobody …
can do anything, just do a request…only [the technician] can give him the microphone”
(F12). The only exception is the President running the meeting, who “has full control of
his button…He can always open or close his microphone and can always close another
microphone” (F12). The reasons for this level of operator control is to prevent the
automatic functions of the system from allowing someone to break the rules. Specifically,
“in the hemicycle they don’t debate,” instead “everything is arranged before the meeting”
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(F12). This programming includes knowing which languages will be spoken, when and
by whom:
Interviewee: Interpreters know before the meetings that’s what they will
have to translate [sic] in those languages for that speaker, because every
speaker is programmed… in any ‘cycle, every speaker we know at what
time what speaker will talk about what.
Researcher: Right. So then the interpreters aren’t surprised. They know
the Hungarian guy is coming up.
Interviewee: Yes.
Researcher: And then they’ve already decided; they already know who’s
working…
Interviewee: Yes, everything is arranged before the meeting. (F12)
These Plenary sessions are ‘the glitz’ of the European Parliament’s system of
simultaneous interpretation.
The main hemicycle at Strasbourg is an impressive circular room filled with
semicircular rows of 750 blue desks, a grey carpet, grey-black chairs and white lighted
walls with a softly-glowing sheen. The interpreters’ booths, along with technicians’ and
media booths, are placed in two horizontal rows evenly-spaced between floor and the
ceiling, appearing like long slits in a spaceship along the curved, shiny walls. Interpreters
are visible in internally-lighted booths. Depending upon the angle of viewing, the glass of
unlit booths is opaque or reflective. Galleries for the press, visitors and other observers
ring the top. The new hemicycle in Brussels is equally elegant. It is “much nicer” (F13)
than the previous facility.
The one-minute speeches are “a talk for the record, not to be understood [by other
Members]. I am speaking to constituents, not to Members” (OM08). After the speeches
there is discussion (that is called ‘debate’) but “it is not debate, its just monologues. You
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may include questions but they don’t have to respond, only if they feel like it” (OM42).
The ‘debate’ after the speeches is also programmed. Plenaries are organized as a public
presentation to an international audience. They are for Members “to be heard by
constituents” (OM33). “Debate in Plenary is not really a creative process, [although]
Members might make important statements that give you insight to dig deeper with those
in charge” (OM61). The highly-regulated conditions of social interaction are what make
Plenary so convenient for functional linguistic research.186
The reference to ‘those in charge’ refers to the clearly-defined decision-making
hierarchy of designing legislation that is conducted by the European Parliament: the
Parliament’s institutional competence, in the parlance of the European Union. “The
[Political Group] Coordinators are the main players—they decide what proposals to take,
who will be the Rapporteur, and how to organize the debate” (OM20). Likewise, “in
Committees, the political procedure is in the hands of very few people—the Rapporteurs
and Shadows. All the conclusions are made elsewhere [than in the Plenary]” (OM61).

186

Vuorikoski (2004) cites Marzocchi and Zuchetto (1997) in support of her selection
of plenary for her study. “The plenary seems…to provide suitable conditions for
research,” (Marzocchi and Zuchetto, 1997, p. 82) for the reasons they outline
(professional recognition and intensity of effort by European Parliament interpreters)
and also because the plenary session of the European Parliament is an ideal speech
situation for functional linguistic research based on comparing target text
interpretations with original source material. Drawing on Kalina, 1998, p. 130),
Vuorikoski reports, “obtaining relevant and authentic material has been a major
problem for SI studies.” She continues: “One solution to these problems has been to
select a speech situation which is characterized by features that remain constant. This
is the plenary session of the European Parliament, where the speech situation is
governed by strict rules of procedure. Furthermore, each speech is interpreted in ten
languages. The setting is thus a source for material that provides an ideal opportunity
for comparing interpreters’ versions with the originals” (2004, p. 22). Note: her
research was conducted previous to the “big bang” enlargement.
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The label of conference interpreting suits the Plenary setting very well. In Plenary
sessions, the Members talk about issues and politics, making a show of debating with
each other. While there may be ideological or practical messages delivered to colleagues
(the other Members) during Plenaries, the speech performances are explicitly in each
MEPs official language for national consumption at home more than for actual
interaction with their peers in the hemicycle. The lines of debate and compromise
regarding legislation are hashed out “elsewhere” in (less formal) Working Groups and
Trialogues. The lines of real engagement for debate and negotiation are confirmed in the
formal Political Group and Standing Committee meetings that occur “in the room,” not
“in the ‘cycle.”

5.1.2

SI “In The Room”
In contrast with the glamorous hemicycles designed as the public showcase of the

European Parliament, the Political Groups and Standing Committees do their work in
large meeting rooms. “In the rooms it’s different because every group has his room or
rooms, and in the room they debate” (F12).187 The conference microphone system is used
in the rooms similarly to how they are used in plenary but the interaction of Members is
much more fluid. “In the other [non-plenary] rooms, there’s no programmation of the
speaker, so they debate…so number 116 talks to this one and asks a question. [Number
116] answers. It’s a relay debate” (F12). The two significant differences between SI in
the hemicycle and SI in the room involve control and interaction. Technically speaking,

187

Notice that this section is composed of quotes from technicians, not Members.
Remember that Members do not tend refer to “rooms” or “hemicycles” but rather to
the types of meetings: “Committee,” “Group,” or “Plenary.”
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whereas the technician functionally controls turn-taking via operator mode in the ‘cycle;
in the room, the microphones run on a First On First Off (FIFO) system, with which “up
‘til four Member’s microphones can be on simultaneously in the meeting room” (F37). It
is practically an inverse relationship of interpersonal interaction with technological
control: in the Plenary, a rigid schedule of turn-taking and time limits is enforced by a
technical engineer according to a pre-designed script; in the Group and Committee
meetings, the social interaction is managed by technology running on a kind of auto-pilot
with minimal override.
I observed Political Group Meetings nine times (the EPP four times; ALDE three
times; the Greens and GUE twice each, and the PSE and IND-DEM once apiece, see
Table 14) and Committee meetings fourteen times; as well as several formal Working
Groups, seminars, book launches and pre-Committee meeting Coordinators’ Meetings
(see Table 14). I tracked which booths were staffed with interpreters and what languages
were spoken by Members on the floor. To determine the language, I would channel surf
with my headset to find which booth was not working during a given Member’s turn. I
took as evidence when the speaker’s voice from the floor was piped through that
language channel. A technician explained, “by default every time the floor—for the
moment no interpreters are speaking, on every channel you get the floor” (F12).
Depending upon what channel a Member (or guest or assistant or any person with
business in the room) is listening to, if that booth is working you hear the interpreter. If
the booth is not working, “the system will switch on the floor” (F12). For the first several
months, I relied on this method without question because the languages associated with
each channel are fixed and the geographical booth numbering matches the channels.
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(Review Table 4.) Then I learned that the technicians can “re-affect the programming of
each geographic booth. So for the speaker it’s completely invisible and the interpreters
are in another booth” (F12). I observed this when it became ‘visible’ during a meeting of
Working Group C of the EPP-ED188 when the Chair responded with good humor to a
complaint from Members on the floor:
There is no Greek translation coming from the Danish booth, this is
wonderful. The Danish interpreters? The Greek members are happy? You
can speak Danish? The Danish interpreters have moved to the Greek box!
This is becoming wonderful!
Such a switch might happen because the interpreters “would prefer being in front, have a
better view or things like that” (F12).
The descriptions to follow represent relatively mundane examples of these
meetings in order to establish the baseline, a fairly-normal pattern of intercultural
communication using the formal provision of simultaneous interpretation in the regime of
controlled multilingualism. In the Political Group observation, there was one particularly
sharp exchange which, in retrospect, illustrated an unusual and striking shift in the
dynamics of language use that opens insight into some of the factors motivating
Member’s language use choices.

188

Working Group C was the Legal and Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the European
Peoples Party - European Democrats. See Table 12 for a list of political party
acronyms.
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Table 14. Types of Observations—General

Type of Observation
(excludes Asylum dossier meetings)

“in the room”
=
FIFO System*

“in the
hemicycle”
=
Operator
System

Dalai Lama’s speech***

X

Plenary (Strasbourg)****

X

EuroParl TV Studio

No SI provided

X

Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET)

X

AFET

X

AFET

X

LUFPIG (intergroup)

X

COCOBU (Coordinators)

X

EPP-ED Group Seminar: “What Values to
Promote in Europe?”

X

Euro Crisis Workshop

X

Greens Political Group

X

Book Presentation

X

Environment Committee (ENVI)

X

Employment Committee (EMPL)

X

EPP-ED Working Group C

X

Baltic Intergroup

X

EPP-ED Political Group

X

Plenary (Strasbourg)

X

Industry, Research and Energy Committee
(ITRE)

X

ITRE

X

PSE Political Group

X

Plenary

X

EPP-ED Coordinators Meeting

X

EPP-ED Political Group

X

ALDE Political Group

X

ALDE Working Group B

X

GUE Political Group

X

IND-DEM Political Group

X

Baltic Intergroup

X

Book Launch

X

Baltic Intergroup

X
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Type of Observation
(excludes Asylum dossier meetings)

“in the room”
=
FIFO System*

Greens Political Group

X

ALDE Political Group

X

Plenary

“in the
hemicycle”
=
Operator
System

No SI provided

X

Press Conference: E-Learning for
Interpreters

X

GUE Political Group

X

The Kurdish Question (special meeting)

Informal interpretation provided by a non-professional.

*In FIFO, all floor and interpreter microphones function according to the First On First Off principle, with
up to four microphones active at a time. Whoever is first to speak gets the floor. The Chairperson can turn
off all microphones with a single switch. Language channels for listening are permanently established.
Programming determines whether the language heard through the headset comes from the floor or the
channel’s designated interpretation booth. Members can switch channels in order to listen to the language
they prefer.
** In Operator Mode, all microphones are controlled by a technician who is following the directions of the
Chairperson who is running the meeting.
*** Watched via EuroParl TV from an MEP’s office.
**** Observed from inside an interpretation booth.

5.1.2.1

Example: A Political Group
During this Political Group meeting, twenty booths were staffed: German,

English, French, Italian, Dutch, Greek, Spanish, Portuguese, Finnish, Swedish, Czech,
Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Hungarian, Polish, Slovakian, Slovenian, Bulgarian, and
Romanian. Danish and Maltese interpretation was not provided. All booths were active in
the beginning of the meeting, but a check partway through discovered that the Lithuanian
booth had stopped interpretation. This was confirmed again at a later time. At one point,
it also seemed the Romanian booth may have stopped as well, but this was short-term if
at all. (It is always possible that a few booths are staffed with interpreter-trainees (if no
one present requires that language); and (as noted above) sometimes a geographic booth
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may be staffed by interpreters working a different language than the one normally
associated with that channel (but the language channel they are working on would remain
the same to avoid confusion for Members on the floor. These factors introduce the
potential of researcher fallibility regarding language identifications and counts.)
With only one exception, each Member spoke their national language. There were
two Chairs (or a Chair and Vice-Chair) whose voices are interspersed between turns of
Members from the floor. One consistently spoke German and the other French. Most of
their contributions were logistical, simply rote thank you’s at the conclusion of a
speaker’s turn and introduction of the next speaker. Nearly every single speaker’s turn
was done in a different language and no one seemed to miss a beat in terms of the
ongoing continuity of communication. Dutch (NL, using the International Standards
Office (ISO) Language Codes, see Table 4) was the first language I recorded for tracking
purposes during this meeting. The subsequent 69 turns (70 in total) went like this:
NL, DE (German, for Deutsch), NL, DE, FR (French), EN (English), FR,
DE, EN, DE, EN, DE, EN, DE, ES (Spanish, for Espanol), DE, FR, EN,
IT (Italian), DE, IT, FR, DE, ES, FR, DE, RO (Romanian), ES, DE, ES,
FR, EN, ES, EN, DE, ES, NL, EN, FR, DE, FR, EN, FR, EN, FR, EN,
FR, ES, FR, ES, FR, EN, FR, DE, FR, DE, FR, EL (Greek, a translation
of their script), EN, FR, DE, ES, DE, ES, FR, EN, FR, NL, EN, FR.
Eight of the twenty languages that SI was provided for were spoken from the floor.
These eight source languages were simultaneously-interpreted into all twenty
target languages provided for by the SI system of controlled multilingualism, which
means customized to the language profile of known participants who would listen to the
interpretation into their national language during the meeting. (“Provided that people
listen…that’s another matter” (OM42). Listening behavior and headphone use are a
recurring theme in the overall discourse that will be described later.) The source
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languages spoken by Members during this political group meeting are ranked by amount
of use from the floor, given as an approximate percentage of the total observation time of
105 minutes, from opening gavel until the conclusion of the meeting. I estimated the
length of speakers’ turns in minutes. (See Table 15.) The goal was not to nail down an
exact measurement with the precision of seconds but to be able to provide a general
characterization of a typical meeting in a room.
Table 15. Languages Spoken from “The Floor” during a Political Group Meeting
“In a Room”
Language Spoken by an MEP
“in the room”

Total Minutes this language
was spoken in this meeting
(in minutes)

Percentage of Meeting Time
(105 minutes, total)

Spanish

36

34%

German

31

29%

English

19

18%

Dutch

7

4%

French

3

3%

Italian

3

3%

Greek

3

3%

Romanian

2

2%

The frequency of use of languages is a function of the language profiles of
Members in the Group, the relevancy of the topics to national constituencies, and the
distribution of positions of status among Members (namely the Rapporteur and Shadow
Rapporteur positions although of course any other Members with political interests in the
subject can, and do, contribute). Such variables preclude any possibility of this particular
breakdown (or any other breakdown from one meeting or plenary session) being
representative of language use in the Parliament overall. Also, to re-emphasize: the
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percentages of source languages spoken from the floor demonstrate only one side of the
SI system.
The other side of the system involves the interpretations rendered by the
interpreters into all the languages required for listening comprehension. In this case,
100% of the time of the meeting for the twelve languages that were not spoken from the
floor (except, as noted above, Lithuanian. The Member may have been going back-andforth between two concurrently-scheduled meetings); and, for the eight languages that
were spoken as source languages, 100% minus the time that their language was in use by
a Member on the floor. For example, the Spanish booth worked 66% of the meeting
(interpreting from any of the other seven source languages into their target language),
while the Greek and Italian booths each worked 97% of the time (also interpreting from
any of the other seven source languages into their respective target language). In this
particular meeting, I did not detect either a retour or a relay.189
My first visual scan about five minutes after I settled in discerned roughly one
third of the MEPs present wearing their headphones. Some time later, as more Members
arrived and the debate heated up, approximately half of the sixty-two MEPs present were
using headphones. Unless I had interviewed them, I did not know the MEPs’ language
profiles. The guest and assistant section seats are not positioned in a way to see “the
nameplate…[which] says which language—and the officials have a list” (F30).190 It was

189

Recall: Retour is to interpret from the booth’s language into another language
(untraditional). Relay is when an intermediary interpretation is needed to
accommodate a language combination that none of the interpreters assigned for a
particular meeting possesses.

190

It may have helped to acquire this list but it was a resource I did not imagine existed
and learned about long after I had established an observation protocol.
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not possible to assume whether the two-thirds to half of Members without headphones
were fluent in all the languages used, disinterested in the topic being debated, or satisfied
to understand some colleagues and not others. (As mentioned above, more on Member
use and non-use of headphones to come.)
Throughout this meeting, the system of simultaneous interpretation worked without
any discernable problems. Of special significance is that serious battle was engaged
vigorously and aggressively by several Members in two opposed camps on a particular
referendum. A long-time Member (on one side of the argument) told me a month later, “it
was the worst I’ve ever seen” (OM44). Another MEP (from the other side of this argument)
grinned expansively when I asked him nearly three weeks later if he remembered the
details of the exchange: “I remember it well!” (NM27). The fact of simultaneous
interpretation did not diminish Members’ pleasure in political banter and repartee.

5.1.2.1.1

English: A Language for Control?

I first noticed the use of English as a language of control in a Political Group
meeting. English, French and Italian were the main languages used on the floor (as source
languages for the interpretation into other languages). This Group meeting (in the room)
was called to order in English, and once most Members were paying attention the
Chairperson switched to speaking in French. Later, when there was a spurt of quick
interjections and repartee, the Chair shifted back to English and continued in English, as
did Members speaking from the floor. This persisted until the burst of heightened
interaction was contained. English was used a third time in the group to overcome a
rising tide of murmurs that swelled into the background during a Member’s somewhat
lengthy turn (compared with the average time spent speaking by Members prior).
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This last occurrence was the one that caught and focused my attention on the
codeswitching to English, because it was the first time I heard this Vice-Chairperson use
English instead of Italian. This Vice-Chairperson had already spoken several times,
consistently in Italian. It was a surprise and clearly a departure from the norm when this
Member used English with an accompanying increase in volume to quiet the growing
background murmur. It seemed to be the English as much or moreso than the volume that
drew everyone back to the central, shared task. Once noticed, I observed this
phenomenon repeatedly in all kinds of meetings (both in the rooms and in the
hemicycles). English is used regularly in an authoritative bid to command attention.
In a different meeting (a Working Group of one of the Standing Committees), a
Spanish MEP “lost her temper” (as explained to me later by an MEP who witnessed the
event) “and shouts at” (OM66) a Member who had interrupted somebody else with a
Point of Order. The Member (who typically speaks Spanish) burst out in English,
referring to herself in third person: “She agrees with that!” This dramatic codeswitch
drew attention to a compromise that some Members [according to my source] were not
letting on was possible. Repeatedly I observed English used to interrupt flows of
communication occurring in other languages or to draw everyone’s focus to an particular
assertion of voice. This tactic was used Members accorded authority to facilitate the
meeting by virtue of their position/status (being a Chair or Vice-Chair) and by Members
from the floor trying to establish a rhetorical position.

5.1.2.2

The Committees
As mentioned earlier, the bulk of the work of the European Parliament is

organized through the institutionalized organization of formal Committees. The Standing
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Committees, their permanent administrative staff (called Secretariats), and their
competencies (areas of expertise and responsibility) persist as the EP’s bureaucratic
infrastructure, while the Political Groups change in composition, alliances, and strategies
from election to election. I was invited to observe the work of five different Committees,
including sub-committee Working Groups and Coordinators’ meetings. The Foreign
Affairs Committee detailed below seemed routine. Observations of the Committee on
Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL), the Environment, Public Health and Food
Safety (ENVI), Industry, Research and Energy Committee (ITRE) and the Civil Liberties,
Justice and Home Affairs Committee (LIBE) all yielded a similar pattern.

5.1.2.2.1

Foreign Affairs Committee Meetings

The Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) is one of the larger Standing Committees
in the European Parliament. I observed a series of meetings during one week at the
Brussels Parliament complex. AFET Committee Meetings are streamed through the
Parliament’s internal television system for Members and their Assistants to track from
their offices and for journalists to watch from the Press Bar. Soundbites may later be
broadcast over the internet. From my observer position seated in the room (specifically in
the visitor’s section on the floor), the technical orchestration of the system of
simultaneous interpretation (i.e., the regime of controlled multilingualism) was seamless.
Twenty-three languages were actively interpreted: 21 of the 23 official EU languages
(except Irish and Maltese) and two non-EU languages as well: Tajik and Russian. The
President of the Republic of Tajikistan, Emomalii Rahmon, brought his own (solo)
interpreter, and Mr. Konstantin Kosachev from the Russian Duma brought a team of
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interpreters. The use of relay and retour during this AFET meeting did not seem to
generate any disturbances within the communication dynamics of the group as a whole.
Per my fieldwork protocol, I noted what languages were used, and (roughly) for how
long. See Table 16. As with the other similar tables, all measurements and calculations
are approximate. Of the total time, 7% was given to non-EU languages (Russian &
Tajik), while 23% was given to official EU languages other than English. If the two nonEU languages are removed, then the ratio of English to all other official EU languages in
this meeting was 3:1 (75% to 25%).
Only Members have microphones but everyone on the floor has access to their
own set of headphones: Members, Assistants and Visitors. Some regular participants do
bring their own earphones. (I was in some observations where there were more people
than seats; I always tried to arrive early in order to secure a seat with headphones.) There
were 27 booths available for use in the largest rooms: when a Member begins to speak in
a language you do not know, you simply tune your headphones to the channel number of
the language booth to which you prefer to listen (review Table 4). Members have
preferences and reasons for selecting an interpreted language for listening, depending on
their own language repertoire, levels of fluency, motivation for language learning and
overall experience with the system. For instance, Members learn which interpreters,
whom they recognize by voice, and/or booths (according to reputation) tend to produce
performances that meet their listening criteria). “At a certain moment, you know Mr A is
better than Mrs X or Mrs B is best with that combination” (OM09).191

191

This Member’s observation contradicts Vuorikoski’s statement that “it is practically
impossible to tell the various interpreters apart” (2004, p. 22).
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Table 16. Languages Spoken from “The Floor” during a series of AFET
Committee meetings “In a Room”
Language Spoken by an MEP
“in the room”

Total Minutes this language
was spoken in this meeting
(in minutes)

Percentage of Meeting Time
(510 minutes, total)

English

346

70%

Nederlands

30

5.8%

Tajik

20

3.9%

French

19

3.7%

German

17

3.3%

Polish

17

3.3%

Russian

16

3.1%

Greek

10

2%

Spanish

10

2%

Hungarian

3.5

.7%

Lithuanian

3.5

.7%

Slovenian

3.5

.7%

Danish

2

.4%

Estonian

2

.4%

Romanian

2

.4%

Swedish

2

.4%

Bulgarian

0

0%

Czech

0

0%

Finnish

0

0%

Italian

0

0%

Latvian

0

0%

Portuguese

0

0%

Slovak

0

0%

All of the interpreters, as observed on a consistent basis without exception, are in
their booths ready to go at the scheduled start times, and none of them bolt out at the
end—even when meetings go over the announced end time (which happens
occasionally). When there were unplanned recesses or the meeting ended early, there was
likewise no rush to get out of the booth. This professionalism generates a sense of the
interpreters enjoying their work, their colleagues, and the atmosphere.
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5.2

The Technological Hub: Two Synchronized but Separate Systems
Completely separate from the Member’s use of the conference microphone

system for speaking is the “interpretation system” used by the Parliament’s interpreters in
their respective language booths. In combination, the two systems compose the global
system of technology for SI in the EP.
Table 17. Discursive Relations among Geographic References
Geographic Reference
Phrase used in discourse

“on the floor” or “from the floor”*
“in the room”

“in the booth”

“in the ‘cycle” or “in the
hemicycle”

*Includes utterances from the Chair, Vice-Chair and other participants at the head table (Secretariat staff,
guests, etc).

5.2.1

SI “In The Booth”
The interpretation systems runs on the automatic setting that is never used with

the conference microphone system. It involves two channels, A and B. Channel A is
fixed as the outgoing language for that booth. Channel B is programmable by each
interpreter, individually, if they will be responsible for giving retour interpretations.
Depending on the size of the meeting room or hemicycle there may be one to three dozen
booths. Each booth is equipped with three or four consoles (also called a “desk”) with
inputs for the interpreter’s headset),192 a channel knob, and an array of pre-sets for
interpreters to select incoming languages from other booths that he or she predicts may be
useful or even necessary. Channel A is the outgoing language: the interpreters are always

192

“If I would be an interpreter,” a technician said, “I would have my own
headphone…because I don’t know how many ears have been on this headphone”
(F12). Most interpreters do bring their own headsets (F36).
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working into Channel A to be heard by the Members according to the ISO-numbered
channels on their dial (Table 4).
In any and every booth,
the desk is programmed. These are the seven output channels available
from the desk. So—German, that we can’t change. This is called Channel
A. So [in this case, German] is the default channel from the booth, the
same channel as the name, the physical name from the booth. (F12)
The pre-set buttons allow the interpreter to tune to languages from other booths when
they do not know the language being spoken by the Member on the floor:
You [the interpreter] know you will have to work in half an hour to reduce
[for example] the Hungarian person to German, but you don’t understand
Hungarian and you know you will have to listen to the English booth
instead of the floor. So you can arrange your pre-set here to English, and
when your turn comes you listen to the English instead of the floor. (F12)
In this example, both retour and relay are occurring. An interpreter in the Hungarian
booth will be prepared to interpret from Hungarian into English: this is the retour. She or
he will have pre-programmed Channel B on her or his desk to go out on the English
Channel (#2) as if coming from the English booth.193 When the Hungarian Member
begins to speak from the floor, the retour interpreter in the Hungarian booth will press
Channel B and override the English booth’s Channel A output.194

193

“On most consoles, interpreters themselves can define with what channel their B
coincides…In some of the older meeting rooms, though, it is the technician who
assigns the channels and who needs to make the switch allowing the Czechs [for
example] to use the German channel” (F12).
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Using a Hungarian Member in this example was spontaneous and arbitrary. This
particular scenario became more complicated in the 7th term (2009-2014) because of
the need to incorporate Hungarian Sign Language in the retour and relay.
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Every booth without an interpreter with competence in Hungarian will also have
already established an incoming pre-set from the English booth in their respective
consoles. When the Hungarian Member begins to speak, the working interpreter in these
booths will select their pre-set to the English booth. Thus,
the retour interpreter in the Hungarian booth rendering the Hungarian
speaker into English will be heard by any interpreters in other booths who
switch from floor to the English channel—by pushing the pre-set button—
and by any listener in the meeting room who is listening to interpretation
into English. (F36)
All of the rest of the Members (as well as everyone else in the meeting, Members’
Assistants, Secretariat officials, guests and visitors) who do not understand either
Hungarian or English will wait for the relay. The relay is the second interpretation from
those booths whose interpreters are depending on the Hungarian booth’s retour into
English so that they can render an interpretation into their respective languages, be it
German, Czech, Portuguese, etc. This is just an example, as “the Hungarian booth might
work into English on Channel B, or they might work into French” (F12).
Channel B is invisible to the Members. From their perspective, there is only the
matched pairing of channel numbers and languages managed by one dial. But for the
interpreters, every booth has the capacity to send out on two channels, default Channel A,
their assigned language, and Channel B, a retour language. Theoretically, any booth
could provide a retour. In practice, only interpreters of the so-called exotic languages195
perform interpretations both into and out of their language. Retour interpreters work for

195

The phrase “exotic languages” is used by interpreters to refer to languages that fewer
interpreters have competence in, compared with more frequent language
combinations in the professional corps.
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two audiences: directly for listeners on the floor and for their colleagues to render an
additional relay interpretation into a third language for listeners on the floor.
If the retour [of a given language] is into German, the pre-selection for the
B channel will be the German channel. When retour from Czech into
German is needed, the retour interpreter [in the Czech booth] will push
the B button and thereby ‘usurp’ the German channel; i.e. the German
booth will not be able to ‘send’ from that moment, as their channel is
occupied by the Czech retour interpreter. (F36)
That is another example using the same mechanism described above with Hungarian and
English. Although there is no explicit requirement, “the rules are to translate in English.
Channel B is normally English, French or German, because these are the three languages
that are the most understood from every interpreter” (F12).
In addition to being able to establish up to five or six pre-set incoming languages
(which are labelled in a small digital screen), the desk/console also indicates the
interpretation source of the auditory signal that the interpreter is listening to at every
moment. This is important information for the interpreter to know: “A plus [symbol: +
]means direct interpretation from the floor” (F12), i.e., that the booth an interpreter has
chosen to listen to is actually “listening to the floor” (F36). “A minus sign [ - ] means the
booth is working on relay” (F36).
A technician said the meaning of the minus sign is: ““Be careful. This
interpretation is not the first interpretation. It’s a relay’” (F12). This is the example we
had above, in which a Hungarian Member’s speech is being interpreted via retour from
the Hungarian booth on the English channel: “if I’m listening to the English booth and
trying to translate [sic] what comes out from the English booth instead of translating [sic]
the speaker” (F12) from the floor. In other words, although the signal is being transmitted
through the English Booth’s Channel A, the interpretation did not originate in the English
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booth but in the booth of an exotic language (e.g., in our examples the Czech or
Hungarian booth).
Finally, a “zero [ 0 ] means the booth is inactive, possibly because its output
language is being spoken on the floor” (F36). This is the common situation when, for
instance, a Portuguese Member is speaking from the floor, the Portuguese interpreters are
just listening. In a rare instance, this technician explained that an interpreter might see a
double minus [ -- ], to indicate a double relay, say from Romanian to French to English to
Latvian (F16). “An X means ‘they are listening to themselves.’ We can listen to ourselves
to check the headphones or to check the microphone. The system permits that” (F12).
The controls available to interpreters are the same in the rooms and in the
hemicycles. In the hemicycle/Plenary meetings, interpreters are provided with the
program and know exactly the sequence in which everyone will speak and in which
language. In the rooms, the interpreters receive no information about which Members
will be present, nor when they might speak. In the rooms “there is no programmation of
the speaker, so they debate” (F12). In other words, the interaction is spontaneous, not
planned as it is in the Plenaries. One interpreter expressed the wish for more detailed
information about Members’ presence and participation in the meetings. “We can only
bring our own list of Members belonging to the Committee, Delegation, or Political
Group…or look it up on the intranet or internet…normally we do not receive a list of
MEPs who will attend the meeting” (F36).
The difference, therefore, between the environmental conditions and settings for
interpreting ‘in the ‘cycle’ and ‘in the room’ is quite significant. Even during debate ‘in
the hemicycles’ for Plenary sessions, the Members’ communication is directed ‘outward’
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to national audiences as political representation and public relations. Because of the
nature of mass communication, plenary programs are carefully coordinated. ‘In the
rooms,’ however, Members’ communication is directed ‘inward’ towards each other and
the products of the Parliament, which is legislation. The ramifications for the interpreters
‘in the booth’ are profound:
So the Czech member speaks Czech, usually, 99 percent of the time.
There are some Members – I speak about Daniel Cohn-Bendit.196 I don’t
know if you know him. He’s German and French and he speaks both
languages as well. So sometimes he speaks German; sometimes he speaks
French. It depends on who he’s talking to. So if he’s talking to another
Member that understands French, he speaks French. So the interpreters,
one time it’s the French booth that works and one time the German booth.
(F12)
Although it can be rough at the start of a term, the interpreters do learn Members’
language profiles and speaking preferences, as well as their rhetoric al tendencies.

5.2.2

SI “On The Floor”
From the technician’s perspective, a Member
can’t do errors. I don’t know how. The only error they can do is take the
headphone and trying to change his channel and it doesn’t work, of
course, because he doesn’t have the headphone connected to the correct
selector. That’s the only error, but he can’t make errors and he isn’t aware
of what’s going on in technical. He just has to know he has to speak in
this microphone, not too far from the microphone and not too close to the
microphone. (F12)

It may have been a technician’s programming error in the confusion (described above) of
the Danish booth working physically out of the Greek booth. Sometimes I observed
Members begin to speak and their microphones did not activate. Occasionally Members
196

Not interviewed as a participant in this research.
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would continue to speak even though the microphone was not working. Interpreters
cannot hear from within the booth and are thus unable to interpret for Members who are
not familiar with the language that Member is speaking.
Human error can also enter the system with the interpreters’ programming of the
desks. For instance, “they have the possibility to connect their headphone” (F12) in “two
official jacks [pointing at them on the desk]…that they’re supposed to use…but
sometimes, I don’t know why, they prefer to connect [pointing to another spot]… So they
disconnect this wire that sends the signal” (F12). This physical manipulation can create a
cascade effect:
So [interpreters in the booth] turn the desk and that pulls on the wires and
sometimes creates bad contacts. You see, if I disconnect this desk I will
also – so this system is connected on one bus. That’s a digital bus. On one
bus we can connect ten desks. So instead of connecting these four and
these four that make eight and two in another booth, we connected two,
two, two, two….So if there’s a crash on one booth there are still two other
desks remaining in the booth. So that’s just a reason to secure a bit more
the system, because every desk is connected in a daisy chain. Every ten
desks are connected in a daisy chain. For example, if the first desk in the
chain crashes, even if they work, they won’t have the signal anymore…if
it’s the last desk chain there’s no problem…if it’s the first . . . (F12)
Speculating on why the interpreters might use the incorrect jack, the technician replied:
For me, it’s because they don’t know that they can plug the headphone in
here. On the other system, there was the connector here, so—on the side
of the booth. So maybe they – I don’t know…usually they did that, so it is
like . . . . habituated? I don’t know. They do the same thing they did
before, even if they don’t have to or they don’t need to. (F12)
From the researcher’s vantage point, I was only aware of a very few glitches that could
have been attributed to either the technicians or the interpreters.
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5.2.2.1

Making Human Errors Impossible?
“If it goes badly,” a technician told me, “it is twenty or ten percent interpreters’

errors and the rest is how the meeting is arranged […by…] the technician who is in
charge of the meeting, he has to react to the situation or adapt the situation in real time”
(F12). The technicians aspire to be invisible: “When they don’t know I exist, it is that I
did a good job because there was no problem” (F12). Promoting this degree of
unawareness for Members is an overt goal of the system of SI in the EP, a kind of
intentionally-designed unconsciousness. “What the Parliament dreams about is something
that would work alone…to make human errors impossible” (F12).
One of the questions that I wondered about, often, is how much the ambition for
the technology to cocoon the Members so they can work without comprehending the
significance of the Parliament’s fascinating intercultural communication milieu spills
over into expectations for the interpreting. Like the technician who said, “there are a lot
of errors made that could be solved just by knowing how the system works” (F12), I
wonder if some of the frustrations with interpreting expressed by Members could be
alleviated if Members understood how the system of SI in the EP works, what it has
already accomplished, and how it could further achieve the goal of a common European
identity.
Although surely an overstatement, one Member explained that “where politics
happens is everywhere else” (OM40) than within the official, formalized system of SI in
the EP.
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5.2.3

Meetings with No Provision of Interpretation
A significant amount of the legislative work of Members of the European

Parliament occurs in contexts without professional simultaneous interpretation.

5.2.3.1

A Coordinator’s Meeting
I was introduced by the Member who invited me to the Budgetary Control

Committee (COCUBU) Coordinators Meeting197 as a researcher looking at “how we can
cope with our language system.” Coordinators’ meetings occur just prior to Committee
Meetings with the goal of delineating in advance the lines of engagement from each
political group in the imminent debate. Every political group selects an individual to
become the group coordinator regarding work being done in each of the Parliament’s
permanent or temporary working committees.
In this particular Coordinators’ meeting there were six men and eleven women
from various countries and the Commission, all speaking English with no simultaneous
interpretation. The Chair (a position that rotates among the Coordinators – at least in this
case) provided an overview of the agenda and invited questions and input. Not everyone
spoke, but of those who did their English was readily understandable despite accents,
except for one person whose accent became more prominent for a few phrases. In my
notes, I recorded this incident as “lapsed into thicker accent, hard to follow.” No one
asked for clarification. This left me wondering if I was the only one who struggled in that

197

Quotes are coded differently in this section by randomly-assigned Participant
Number (P1, P2, etc). No demographic or other identifying information was
collected. Most of this dialogue is summarized without attribution.
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moment, or whether there is a culture and criteria as to when one asks and when one does
not ask to clarify someone’s enunciation.
One Coordinator provided some background on dynamics between his group’s
Shadow Rapporteur and the Rapporteur of a Report on security, explaining that there
appeared to be a deviation from this working group’s customary practice in terms of
procedures. The current Rapporteur (from a specific political group) was not engaging
with the Shadows as much as last year’s Rapporteur had, which this Coordinator
characterized as “strange” (P1). Another topic, regarding a category of lump sum
payments made to Members as part of their compensation package, was named as “the
most politically sensitive” (P2). The group jumped among topics occasionally, leaving
me unclear at times what plan of action was being decided for which problem: the
security matter itself or the unusual dynamics with the non-conforming Rapporteur?
A comment about “the hardest topic” (P3) seemed to refer to the dilemma around
transparency regarding how Members are paid but may have referred to sensitivity of
confronting a Member whose political competence was under question. Praise was given
for previous accomplishments, probably as rhetorical prelude to, “I know we won’t agree
on this, but I put it out” (P4). Background information was added regarding “an on-going
[dynamic with another EU institution]… not here in the report. I tell you in case it comes
up in discussion . . . we fear the usual suspects will bring it in” (P2). An assertion of “no
foul play” (P1) was expressed from those most closely involved with the actual matter.
Finally, a new/breaking concern was shared, including references to previous similar
situations and the warning, “this will be the hottest topic for the next months” (P5).
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The previous paragraph illustrates that the challenges of understanding apply as
well to Members using English as a lingua franca (ELF) as they do to interpreted
communication. In this Coordinators’ conversation, the subjects and dynamics are so well
known to the interpretees that much communication occurs by hint, innuendo, and
indirect reference. I was confused at key junctures such as topic shifts and points of
decision-making. This was obviously largely due to my outsider status, however I suspect
that even general familiarity with the context would not have been enough for full
comprehension of everything.
While the general conversation was conducted all in English, there were periodic
side conversations in other languages that occurred around the table. The extent to which
these involved clarifications of the immediate dialogue or were sidebar commentaries and
tangents is unknown. Although the absence of simultaneous interpretation did not seem
to adversely affect the communication of the group in the immediate interaction, the
scope for understanding and misunderstanding in the upcoming budgetary control
Committee meeting was framed by what was understood/misunderstood by Coordinators.
Specifically, the indexical (forward-acting) elements and features of discourse included
●

identifying deviations from past practice

●

predicting political sensitivity and logistical difficulty

●

brainstorming issues not in the report but expected to be raised

●

sharing perceptions and beliefs regarding identified issues

●

outlining the intended goal(s) of amendments, such as either the continuation of
an historical stance or to soften criticism or to provide balance, and

●

anticipating the tone (key) of amendments and debate as competitive or
cooperative.
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The Coordinators’ previous experience within the Budgetary Control Committee
and a history of working together as Coordinators from/for their respective Political
Groups generated a congenial atmosphere. The key (tone) of this COCUBU meeting was
focused, respectful, efficient and relaxed: collegial. Using English as the lingua franca
did not appear to create problems for anyone other than the outside researcher. The
function of this group in streamlining and sorting sticking points in the decision-making
process was fulfilled.

5.2.3.2

Intergroup Meetings
I was also privileged to observe two intergroup meetings, the Land Use and Food

Policy Intergroup (LUFPIG) and the Baltic Intergroup. Intergroups are unofficial,
informal groups that gather Members of different Political Groups and Committees to
discuss issues of common interest. Assistants also attend, either with or in place of their
Member. LUFPIG ran under Chatham House rules of non-attribution; the Baltic
Intergroup never mentioned these (at least not in any of the meetings or parts of meetings
that I was able to attend).
Because Intergroups are unofficial, interpretation is not provided. Members must
choose a common language and work with it. In both groups there were Members with
non-fluent English who managed to participate and (apparently) make themselves
understood. On this superficial evidence, one could argue there was no need for SI,
however the tenor of discussion (Hymes’ key) was often critical, challenging, and
unapologetic. “The turns,” I wrote in my fieldbook, “sound like speeches, not like
conversation (impression).”
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My field notes describe “direct confrontation; sophisticated matter-of-fact
deconstruction of logic behind the Commission’s stance” as LUFPIG Members discussed
a draft framework with a representative from the Court of Auditors.198 “The will to hide a
fundamental fact leads to obscure arguments,” said one Member (PA),199 leading another
to assert that the Commission’s stance was “fundamentally untrue” (PB), which led to
making a distinction between “the political level” and “the technical level” (PA). There
was “no disagreement with the facts” (Pc) but “simplification” (PD) was needed
regarding the definition of some terms, in order “to explain down” (PD) to effected
individuals in remote locations. The Members discussed “what’s missing” (PA) from the
draft as well as what it currently covered, and there was a discussion about “something
wrong in the philosophy of the penalty” (PF) to wit: “We agree in principle but [the
enforcement] is too weak to influence [the targeted group of people]” (PF).
Describing what was missing and critiquing what was present in the written draft
framework involved a high register of political discourse. The term “simplification” itself
was identified as needing definition: “No one ever stood up and said I want things to be
complicated, [this does] not equal watering down. We have to solve the underlying
problems” (PD). An overt linguistic question came up only once, as a matter of curiosity:
“how do you say ‘width’ in plural?” (PG). This is quite different than the example shared
198

The Court of Auditors is an institution external to the European Parliament with the
responsibility “to improve EU financial management and report on the use of public
funds” (Europa. http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/courtauditors/index_en.htm retrieved 19 March 2014).

199

As with the Coordinators meeting, participant (P) coding is random and anonymous
(PA, PB, etc). While some of these Baltic Intergroup Members did participate in the
research; these quotes were collected during observation and in casual conversation
either before or after meetings, not during interviews.
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with me after the meeting by one of the (non-interviewed) participants, which concerned
a resolution “some years ago concerning Israel and Palestine” (PH). The English version
included the phrase, “withdraw from the occupied territories” (PH). The Member
explained to me how that general statement allows ambiguity not possible in French,
wherein it must be specified if one is referring to “all” or “some” territories (PH).
Linguistic differences like these are a “source of conflict” (PH).

5.3

In This House: Discourse about Simultaneous Interpretation
Now that the contrast is established between the settings characterized by the

formal provision of SI and the Parliamentary settings deemed informal and thus usually
not interpreted, we can finally look closely at the discursive tensions revolving around the
use of the system of SI in the EP. In terms of social interaction, the two primary activities
of Members involve speaking and listening. Because social interaction in the EP is
conditioned by intercultural communication, both behaviors require choices: Members
choose whether or not to speak their own language or a lingua franca, and Members
choose whether or not to use the headphones to listen to colleagues whose languages they
do not know. Generally, Members called the official language of their country “my
language” or “my mother tongue.” Two of the fifty-five Members interviewed happened
to have a native language different than the language of the country they represented as
an MEP, but they did not claim their mother tongue (or “father tongue” as one labelled
his first, native language) as their principle language in the Parliament.
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5.3.1

Speaking in the Mother Tongue
Committee Meetings are usually open to the press and therefore the public, so if

interpreting is provided for your language: “In principle, use only your national
language” (OM33). Most Members emphasized only the speaking aspect of using the
system of SI, but others included listening: “By principle, use the interpreters and listen
to [my language’s] interpreters” (OM09). Some Members defined the conditions for
using the mother tongue: “If it is for a Hungarian topic, then it is pragmatic for the
Hungarian press” (OM28). “Some moments,” explained another Member, “are external.
It is absolutely easier to use English or French, but symbolically it is important to speak
Polish. This is a political decision” (OM20). Whether persistently or selectively, speaking
one’s national language is understood as “a way of saying, ‘I defend my community’”
(OM35) and “to show there are other languages” (OM60). Sometimes this seems to be
taken as a challenge: “If others are trying to underline their nationality, we will do the
same” (NM64), and “At the end of the day, Romanian will be there” (F01).
Members assert “there are many reasons to use your own language” (OM40) and
“lots of arguments for it” (OM44). No one disagreed that “the best idea, the best way to
express yourself, is in your mother tongue: the nuances, the big subjects, the political
ones” (NM02). Reasons are because “the words come easier, the expressions” (OM21),
you can be “more literate—using quotations and pictures” (OM07), and “the most
obvious, the most important is that everyone can argue better in their mother tongue”
(OM22). In practice, however, “You can clearly see the difference between Members
from small countries and large countries” (OM25). Specifically, “Old Member States
have more confidence to speak their own language than new Member States. They are so
used to this tower of Babel” (NM64).
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For instance, “if you’re from Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Lithuania…you have
the fear that people won’t understand you” (F01). At a further extreme, “if we speak
Meridian,200 we thought people would think, ‘Oh, he’s stupid!’ (NM64). However,
“psychologically, we saw others—Chairs—speaking their language, which is not even
popular in Europe, like Dutch” (NM64). Nonetheless, because of the prevalence of
mother tongue speakers in the Parliament, “I got the impression that everyone speaks
their mother tongue. It gives me prestige [to do so] and the impression that Meridian is
equal to others” (OM66).
Despite the benefits of expression and argumentation afforded by speaking in the
mother tongue, some Members say “No, no. People don’t listen” (OM31). “If you speak a
minority language, people don’t even put their headphones on” (OM66). Because of this
widely-observed phenomenon (and others), “Mr [MEP] never talks in his mother tongue,
only in English, sometimes in French, to leave aside all potential risks” (F01). The
substance of these “risks” is a question at the heart of the European project. By the end of
this chapter, the contours of tension should become plain.
Political Groups are not open to the public so there is more latitude for language
choice without inviting the external criticism that might come from not using the national
language in a Committee Meeting. “If you use English [in Committee] you can be damn
sure someone is emailing or calling: ‘Why aren’t you using your own language?’”
(OM54). Committee Meetings are sometimes broadcast to the public. They occur in the

200

“Meridian” is a convention invented by Veerle Duflou (in preparation). She uses it to
protect interpreters’ confidentiality in her research on norms for interpreters in the
European Parliament. Meridian stands in for languages that, if named in context,
could give away the identity of the research participant.
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room under the FIFO microphone system, which allows for relatively spontaneous
interaction among Members. From the interpreters’ perspective (in the booth), the FIFO
regime in the room is very different than the Plenary sessions in the hemicycle, where it
is universal to speak the national language of your own country. “I am most aware of the
translation [sic] in Plenary, because this is where there is the most foreign speakers”
(OM03). Not to speak your national language during Plenary would be “a PR disaster”
(F05). While there may be some constituent fallout from not speaking your own language
in a Committee Meeting, Members do sometimes choose a lingua franca that is not their
mother tongue. Language choices in the Plenary, however, are almost completely
restricted by social and political pressure to speak one’s national language.

5.3.1.1

Monolinguals in the European Parliament
As one Member noted rather laconically, “Not everyone is like people from

Luxembourg who know three languages” (NM56). Successful monolinguals were
presented in what seemed to be a token-like fashion: “I have a Romanian colleague who
has no other language really, but communicates very effectively” (NM02). “Some
colleagues who are monolingual,” explained another MEP, “did very well. They have
excellent political advisors and assistants” (OM54). One English-speaking Member
admitted, “I never made much of an effort [to learn languages]” (OM44). That Member
was a clear exception among the participants in this research, some of whom knew as
many as eight languages, with the gross average of 4 1/2 languages known or partially
known by MEPs (review Table 5). This “multilingual reality” (as it might be described in
EU official jargon) prompted one Member to assert: “There are two kinds of Members:
those who speak languages and those who don’t. They are excluded. They exclude
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themselves and shouldn’t come here. The political party should not propose them. It is a
waste, even if they are intelligent” (OM20).
The general attitude was expressed less dramatically by other Members: “If you
are fluent in another language you can enter the building, otherwise you are outside”
(OM60). Likewise, “If you want to be useful here you must be fluent in two
languages…to lobby or speak with your colleagues” (NM26). Furthermore, “if you want
a career in the upper levels, you must have two plus your own language” (OM54). The
contradiction between this expressed norm of multilingualism and the value of
communication in one’s mother tongue articulates the border between the formal system
of SI in the EP provided in the rooms and publicized through the hemicycles, and the
informal system where the red lines of decision-making are negotiated and legislation
crafted in legal language.

5.3.1.2

A Flaw in the Research? Or a Reflection of the System?
My second language and professional career as an American Sign

Language/English interpreter may have facilitated my entry, but it did not help me
diversify the pool of action research participants beyond the sphere of English speakers. I
had hoped, too optimistically, that this research would warrant active support through the
provision of EP interpreters for interviews with non-English speaking Members. That
would have allowed the possibility of opening up another kind of practical knowledge
from the point-of-view of monolingual Members regarding how they do, in fact,
successfully navigate the intercultural communication differences. Such communication
access for so-called informal purposes, however, was judged according to the
institution’s rule-based “balance between the mother tongue and practicality. The
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division of formal and informal is very clear” (OM22). This boundary between the formal
and informal is upheld by the rules, and above all else, as one administrator emphasized,
“this is a house of rules!” (F25).
In other words, the system of SI in the EP has been designed in such a way,
through this ‘very clear division’ between the formal and informal levels of social
interaction, that it winds up discriminating against monolinguals. “It depends on the
rules. It depends on the meetings” (OM59). The Ad Personam interpreting services being
piloted at the time of this research (2008-2009) is a mechanism that could alleviate some
effects of linguistic inequality but only if the EP acts culturally to recognize the value of a
monolingual perspective. The bias against monolingualism is an aspect of the
intercultural challenge faced by the European project: borrowing a label from the
technicians, it is “a human problem.”
The system does only what you tell it to do and it doesn’t make mistakes
or quite never makes mistakes, only if there’s a bug or if this bug is
arranged. The system, it’s like a calculator. You can key it one million
times, two plus two; it always tells you four. It never does something else.
(F12)
Of course, “interpreting is not only for monolinguals but people who know other
languages, too” (F25). There is something more going on than just a twist of the
promotional rhetoric about Member States being able to send their best people regardless
of their language profile. While there is definitely an institutional bias against
monolinguals built into the infrastructure of EP decision-making practices, there is also
social resistance to using interpreters even when it is expedient.
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5.3.2

Speaking with a Lingua Franca
The option of using a language other than one’s national language/mother tongue

is the practical outcome of multilingualism. Lingua francas are spoken by Members in
formal meetings where interpreters are provided as well as during informal meetings
where professional EP interpreters are not provided. One Member put the dilemma of
voice this way: “Whom do you address? Who do you touch with your own words and
who through the translator [sic]?” (OM59). Tensions in the discourse about whether or
not and when to use one’s mother tongue or a lingua franca reveal values and attitudes
about interpersonal communication in the intercultural context of the European
Parliament. How these influence political negotiations is represented in Table 7 on
MEPs’ Language Choice Strategies. After I had shared some of my preliminary findings
during our second conversation, a Member commented: “Now I start to see why your
study is interesting” (OM44). When I followed up in our third conversation, the same
Member clarified what was so interesting: “ the fact that they [other language speakers]
have motives for [their language choices]: there’s an agenda behind it, or could be”
(OM44).
Being able to distinguish the relative weight of “an agenda” behind a colleague’s
use of lingua francas is a way to understand the difference between practical and
discursive consciousness about the system of SI in the EP. “It is purely political,”
according to a Member expressing his discursive consciousness, “to speak second and
third languages” (OM20). The knowledge that using a lingua franca is just as political as
using one’s mother tongue appeared, for most Members (based on the way our
conversations tended to go), to exist at the level of practical consciousness only. Few
Members could explain how, for instance, “it gives an enormous tactical advantage to
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negotiate in your second language, if capable. Because [other Members] are so
comfortable and confident in their mother tongue” (OM61). At the level of practical
consciousness, Members might say, for instance, “if you want to have contacts, then you
have to try [to use another tongue]” (OM12).
This interpersonal dimension of communication is reinforced by experience: “It is
an asset to know English, French, German. You can make yourself understood, persuade
your colleagues, establish personal relations and even friendships” (OM03). Such
assertions of valuing the interpersonal dimension of communication are unremarkable in
and of themselves. However, in the context of the complaint-ridden anti-discourse about
SI in the EP, these sentiments contrast sharply with negative reactions to the suggestion
that interpreters could be utilized in the informal situations just as well as the formal
ones. “We are not just making statements. We are making laws” (OM57). It is as if the
Members’ mission (“They come here to make policy” (F25)) is unrelated to the culture
being generated by their interactions. As an outsider, this disconnect seemed obvious but
it took a long time to wade through all the themes and realize that this artificial separation
of process (social interaction/culture) from outcome (the rule of law/society) comes down
to a matter of diction.

5.3.2.1

Pluralingualism, not Multilingualism
Discourse about language policy in the European Union overall clearly influences

the discourse about interpreting and languages in the European Parliament. Slippage in
the precise use of crucial terminology appears common and acceptable (at least in the
language I could access: English). A study on potential linkages of multilingualism with
creativity contracted by the European Commission argues, for instance, that the
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distinction between plurilingualism and multilingualism “is significant” (Europublic
SCA/CVA 2009: 9) but, despite the recognized significance, these differences “are
subsumed under the term ‘multilingualism’ for the purposes of this report” (2009: 4).
Vuorikoski follows suit:
Simultaneous interpreting can be labeled as a sub-category of interlingual
translation, its basic function being that of conveying the meaning of the source
text, delivered orally in one language, into a target text, delivered orally in another
language. With a view to the research material of the present study, focus will be
on the aspect of multilingualism as the key motivation for interpretation activity.
(2004, p. 51)
Likewise, writing about multilingual management in the European Parliament, Gazzola
(2006) reiterates a (by then) decade-old definition: “both [multilingualism and
plurilingualism] being defined as referring to the presence or use of more than one
language (Clyne, 1997: 301)” (2006: 394). Minimizing the difference between
“presence” and “use” is stunning: the conflation is remarkable and significant because the
confusion harries the discourse about SI in the EP.
Presence refers to space. Specifically (in the context of languages), presence
refers to the condition of proximity of human bodies within the boundaries and borders of
a geographic location. Relevant examples from the Parliament include “the room” or “the
‘cycle;” other examples might be a neighbourhood or school. Use refers to practice, the
human doing of behaviors as applied activity over time. There is a problematic outcome
of talking as if presence (in space) and usage (in time) are essentially one-and-the-samething. One of these always co-occurring dimensions of communication, space or time,
drops out of awareness completely or is reduced to an unquestioned narrow conception.
In the discourses about simultaneous interpretation in the European Parliament, the
temporal dimension is routinely de-selected (cf Burke’s terministic screen). The
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discourse dynamic of preferring the word “multilingualism” over “pluralingualism” is a
social transaction (Emirbayer, 1997).201 The social agreement to say and write
multilingualism instead of pluralingualism normalizes, through the ritual of repetition, an
exclusive emphasis on only the spatial dimension of communication. Simultaneously, the
repetition of the word multilingualism ritualizes ignoring the temporal dimension of
communication (explicitly through terminological de-selection of pluralingualism). At
the discursive extreme, such normative dynamics of language use train people to forget
that another option exists, and can lead to repression of the knowledge that one
previously knew and have experienced an option (Billig, 1999).
The fact that the term, multilingualism, is preferred over pluralingualism, even
made to substitute and replace pluralingualism, entails comprehensive consequences. The

201

Emirbayer (1997) summarizes and elaborates a distinction by Dewey and Bentley
(1949, pp. 105, 108, and 111), critiquing the idea of inter-action as a form of
substantialist thinking, not as relational as it seems to imply. “Entities remain fixed
and unchanging throughout such interaction, each independent of the existence of
others, much like billiard balls or the particles in Newtonian mechanics” (p. 285).
From a non-substantialist relational perspective, “the very terms or units involved in
a transaction derive their meaning, significance, and identity from the (changing)
functional roles they play within that transaction” (p. 287). Emirbayer continues:
“Relational theorists reject the notion that one can posit discrete, pre-given units
such as the individual or society as ultimate starting points of sociological analysis”
(p. 287). The premises of this dissertation are relational. Specifically, “the relational
point of view sees agency as inseparable form the unfolding dynamics of situations,
especially from the problematic features of those situations” (p. 294). It includes
“basic assumptions, beginning with the notion that cultural formations entail, not
individual ‘attitudes’ or ‘values,’ much less disembodied ‘systems,’ but rather
bundles of communications, relations, or transactions” (p. 300). An application of
relational theory is Baktin’s point of departure: the utterance. “Words, concepts, and
symbols derive their meaning only from their location within concrete utterances,
but these in turn only make sense in relation to other utterances within ongoing flows
of transactions: ‘The utterance is filled with dialogic overtones. . . . Each individual
utterance is a link in the chain of speech communication…’ (Bakhtin, 1986, pp. 9293)” (in Emirbayer, 1997, p. 301).
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Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR) states: “Plurilingual
and pluricultural competence refers to the ability to use languages for the purposes of
communication and to take part in intercultural interaction . . .” (emphasis added, 2001:
168). The emphasis is added because the original (cited here) is misquoted at least twice:
in the EC creativity study cited above (2009), and in a (2007) Council of Europe
publication that the 2009 EC study attributes as the source for their (mis)quotation of the
(2001) CEFR. In both of those (mis)quotations “interaction” is replaced by “action.”
The notion of “intercultural action” versus “intercultural interaction” may be
figural to the current rituals of language choice in the European Parliament. A different
choice of diction might further aid clarification. Emirbayer (1997) describes the
significant epistemological difference between an interaction and a transaction. Both
terms refer to some kind of relationship, but the English word ‘interaction’ implies
activity between separate entities as if they are permanently fixed and unchangeable: as if
there is a substance to a person or a word that exists regardless of society or language. In
a ‘transaction’ all entities are affected and changed (to lesser or greater degrees, but
always in some way) because they (e.g., persons and words) are understood as
meaningful only and always in relation to others (other people, other words). The
conceptual and practical difference of action between rather than transaction among
human agents reinforces the one-dimensional discursive emphasis that Members display
regarding communicating across the dimension of space rather than communicating
within the dimension of time.
Of course time is a significant theme in the discourse about SI in the EP, but (as
will be seen below) in an extremely narrow way. The spatial emphasis in the discourse
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about SI in the EP invokes and reinforces a transmission view of communication (Carey,
1995). That is, it reduces communication to the movement of information from one
person (embodied in a physical location) to another person (embodied in another physical
location) whether or not these bodies are co-located in the same room or hemicycle or
dispersed in different geographic settings.
The ramifications of Members’ one-sided practical consciousness about language
choice and the use or avoidance of interpretation plays out in historical terms. The
American communication scholar James Carey explains: “If the archetypal case of
communication under a transmission view is the extension of messages across geography
for the purpose of control, the archetypal case under a ritual view is the sacred ceremony
that draws persons together in fellowship and commonality” (1999: 15). The themes of
discourse regarding SI in the EP reveal a contest regarding which rituals of social
interaction should be most honored.

5.3.2.2

Speaking with a Lingua Franca, continued
The caveat of the Member who referred to the tactical advantage of using a lingua

franca “if capable” underscores the question of language choice. “Some insist on English
and I wish to god they’d use their native language” (OM44). However, many Members
believe “it gives a better impression if you speak their language” (OM09) and, “In
ordinary situations, it is useful to have one language” (OM29). What constitutes an
“ordinary” setting in the pluralingual space of the European Parliament? “Some say using
a lingua franca “takes energy and concentration, it is easier to have interpretation
everywhere, but this is impossible” (OM12). Others say, “with a default language, you
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don’t have to listen so hard. You [do] miss some nuances” (NM28). There appears to be
general agreement that by “using a lingua franca, you put part of yourself aside” (OM16).
The limitations of a lingua franca include being “stuck saying words that I know,
not the words that I want” (NM56) but, despite this, others believe that “the important
thing is to get the message, not if the language is perfect” (F11). The double standard of
how Members’ speaking is evaluated compared with how the Interpreters’ renditions are
evaluated appears to be unconscious. One Member had the discursive consciousness to
recognize the ripple effect: “Anyone speaking a second language is diminished. The
range of articulation and meaning is significantly smaller than I would like. The
interpreted language is thinner” (NM28). Other Members draw different distinctions: “If
you are using language already adjusted to the debate, then it’s simple. But if you want to
make a complicated speech? Forget it” (OM33).
Of course some Members are equally fluent in more than one language and
codeswitching between languages is no issue for them. “Some people freely use their
languages” (NM64). Choosing a less fluent language is often considered a matter of
politeness. “Some people do lose nuance if they are not speaking their mother tongue, but
they do it out of politeness for the Chair” (F30). The politeness ethic is so strong that this
leaves many Members “perpetually on the back foot” (NM28). “You can see the
hesitation when they speak English or French, but from their own language? It [the
mother tongue is] so necessary!” (F02).

5.3.2.3

Informal Meetings and Making Do
As has already been described, “in non-formal situations, [we have] no right to

ask for [interpreting]” (NM69). Using a lingua franca in those meetings is considered
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more intimate, there is a lower circle of people, he can tell more quicker,
is sure of the quality of the verbal communication, he knows what he’s
saying, knows the interpreter can’t make a mistake. It leaves this
opportunity out. If there is a misunderstanding he knows it’s him, he can’t
blame the interpreter and tries again.” (F17/M41)
The references to speed (“more quicker”), quality, mistakes, misunderstanding, and risk
(‘to leave this opportunity out’) are significant markers in the discourse about SI in the
EP. In a way, they anchor the tensions regarding Members’ language choices, opening
insight into language ideology and the politics of the regime of controlled
multilingualism. It turns out that interpreting is not provided to all Members in some
formal meetings in addition to the customary denial of SI in the (so-called) informal
working groups. For instance, “in the Budget Committee, many can’t use their language”
(OM33). Sometimes, because a Member is not in an assigned leadership position or
otherwise because of how the resources are distributed, there is no interpreting provided
“in Group or Committee, where it is most important” (NM64). “It is a problem for
smaller countries,” elaborated another Member. “We have to ask. The larger ones are
always covered” (NM56).
Even those in leadership positions usually have to make do. “Rapporteur and
Shadow Rapporteurs are without interpretation. They are negotiating on compromise
amendments, this takes place outside of interpretation” (OM03). A Member described a
recent experience:
As Rapporteur…[it was] the last meeting. There were many amendments
that were not on the list. There was no interpreting. I must discuss in
English. It was very difficult. One level is to understand the discussion,
but the other is every word, to know what has changed. For this I need
interpretation. (NM69)
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The importance of words and meanings are recurring themes in the discourse about SI in
the EP. Sufficiently fluent multilingual Members, however, do not tend to perceive a
problem with the linguistic inequality.
We have excellent interpretation [in general] but…when I’m Rapporteur,
in negotiations with the Council and Commission, we use English without
interpretation. That was a new experience. I enjoyed it—learning the
technical language. (OM07)
Since it is “very rare that you can’t come up with a language no one knows anything
about” (OM44), these meetings are “part of our daily work” (OM36), and the rules
preclude interpretation on the basis of the formal/informal division, Members may
become hesitant to assert their real need for interpretation, instead relying on their
assistants and other colleagues.202 “It is hard to ask for an interpreter just for me”
(OM62).
“There was a Shadows meeting,” recalled a Member, “a German colleague spoke
[and another MEP] translated [sic] for him. The rest spoke English. He told me he would
have spoken more with interpreters and explain better” (OM65). Another described a
situation where “the French Member would have been more comfortable with an
interpreter” (OM09). Speaking about her MEP, an assistant explained: “either he has
interpretation or he doesn’t participate. Or, he participates but isn’t motivated. He could
say, ‘I’m against that or support that position,’ but not explain why” (F11).

202

The term “real need” occurs in the 2006 European Court of Auditors' Special Report
No 5/2005: Interpretation expenditure incurred by the Parliament, the Commission
and the Council. The phrase, “real need” thus has a politically-defined meaning
within the perceived resource environment of the European institutions. This
meaning may not converge with the actual needs of real Members.
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What happens in these situations is that a non-professional fulfills the function of
interpretation. “In an informal meeting, if there is a Frenchman or a German, someone
translates [sic]” (OM55). Members “use an assistant or another way to communicate”
(NM02). You have to “make sure you have your staff with you to cover all the bases”
(OM44). “A French colleague,” for instance, “uses an assistant to make a sequential
interpretation” (OM33). If a Member has a real need for interpretation and the system
cannot (or will not) provide it, this is
my personal problem. I must arrange [an accommodation] with my
personal funds or maybe I can negotiate with the political groups. We
already have the funds for office staff. These are complicated
arrangements so the need is not so often. (NM27)
And, it does happen that “some Members use personal interpretation: they pay. I could
pay” (NM27).

5.3.2.4

English as a Lingua Franca (ELF)
As is probably already obvious, “for informal, a lingua franca, now in most cases

English” (OM09). These are “small meetings [such as] Members against the Council,
[and] multiparty meetings with experts from outside who are specialists in particular
fields. They are usually in English, sometimes French or German” (NM64). Members
explain: “If I have to find a lingua franca most often it is English” (OM16), and “if there
is no interpretation, [the language is] invariably English” (OM45). The justifications for
using English as a Lingua Franca (ELF) are as consistent as the criticism against it. “The
lone language we are able to use is bad English” (OM35). “Everyone knows we are
making mistakes in English” (NM20). It is “awful English. Most of the time you
understand that” (OM22). “When we speak together in English it is so bad English”
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(OM35). English as a lingua franca (ELF) is a point of humor: “[My Chairperson] has
one weakness: he is very bad in English, extremely bad!” (OM31); and a source of pride:
“ELF,” claims a Member, “is a European language” (NM28). While some “hope it’s not
Brussels English” (NM20), this “seeming English” (OM16) is described as “a special
language of communication, Brussels English. It is simplified, international: not a
sophisticated grammar” (NM20).
A common assumption is “everybody knows English. The minimum is [my
MEP’s] level. And he does fine” (F15/M18). “Most colleagues,” explained another MEP,
“are very good with English—Brussels English. The exceptions are Greeks, Portuguese,
some Italians. Some French colleagues understand English but won’t use English”
(OM36). Indeed not everyone is thrilled with ELF: “What is upsetting me, is English is
always in” (OM59). “I don’t like English as a lingua franca, I prefer to speak other
languages whenever possible, that are closer to colleagues’ mother tongues” (OM61).
“InterParliamentary Delegations are a problem, [because] not all want to use English”
(F01). “I prefer more use of the smaller languages, that they would be equally
represented. I don’t feel very pro-English language everywhere” (OM06). Based on these
sentiments, an ELF-speaking MEP asks, “Is Anglo dominant? Yes, but not so much”
(OM08).
Despite some resistance to English (or other languages) as a lingua franca, many
Members “force themselves to use a language they know only half-well” (OM40). A
Member explains, “English today is the modern Latin, the modern Greek—it is a
language of traffic…English is a commodity! Even in China! Even in France!” (OM08).
Another Member says, “Of course, if you cannot speak English you are handicapped”
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(OM09). “The common language in this place,” explains a permanent EP official, “is
English. It rocketed in significance since 2004. The younger generation has very strong
English and are weak French” (F04). “Speak English if you want to be heard!” insists
another Member. “Who understands Meridian? Nobody! Forget it! A Polish man? [sic] A
French?” (OM31). One perception is, “When you speak English you’re okay, you get by
in all the meetings” (NM24), however others say, “If you’re not perfect English, then
they are not interested in your ideas” (NM27). There are Members for which “you have
to concentrate on his English, it’s probably his fourth language—he’s slow and rusty. But
he can make himself understood” (OM28).
The values associated with speaking ELF, the reasons Members’ give for using
English as a lingua franca, often highlight a presumption of understanding. “My Member
prefers English because he knows if he tells it there will be no misunderstanding” (F02).
Other Members agree: “If you use English, it’s easier” (OM33). “It’s absolutely easier to
use English or French, English is understood better, quicker. I use it with staff—it is
pragmatic—they all use English” (OM20). Another assistant expands, “It is easier to
communicate in English, the message gets through better, all the details. And for
efficiency. Even rhetorically we can make a show about something” (F05). Members’
experiences in non-interpreted meetings where they have to use ELF (or another lingua
franca) reinforce the choice to keep using ELF even when interpretation is provided.
“Interpretation from Meridian is, um, not so good sometimes. [My MEP] prefers English
because he knows if he tells it there will be no misunderstanding” (F02).
Nonetheless, some Members remain dissatisfied with ELF. “The assumption is
English would be the easiest. It facilitates the dialogue…to express in a common
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language” (F01). But “maybe,” says another permanent staff official, “everybody speaks
English but not in the same way” (F06). For one thing, “ELF speakers have “a great
problem with native speakers of English and German—their accent, vocabulary,
speed…” (NM27). Speaking of speed, “We don’t have that much time,” adds another,
“we can speak quicker in English” (OM42). Clarifying the choice even further, “I speak
English not to rely on the native language,” explains an official with one of the
Secretariats, “because I can’t control the interpretation” (F34).

5.3.3

Control (Loss Of)
The specific word, ‘control,’ was not always used by Members; when it was said

the context was usually accusatory, e.g., “the interpreter can take control of the flow”
(OM42). Instead, the main word that riddles the discourse is ‘loss.’ “I don’t want to be
misunderstood. I don’t want the interpreters, because of German,203 to lose information”
(OM08). Assumptions about the value of understanding and the significance of
information are deep and seemingly unquestioned. “Even ideally we are losing 10-15%
of understanding the content with interpreting” (OM20). The emphasis on information
reinforces the spatial analysis presented above, specifically, how the discourse about SI in
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This sentiment is common to Members no matter what language, but German syntax
presents a special challenge because the verb specifying the relations among subjects
and objects comes at the end of the sentence. Also, e.g., “The verbal humor exploited
by the speaker in isolating the concept ’Außen’ (’foreign’) without the second
element ’Politik’ (’policy’) is rather literary, or at least understandable to the
listeners of German only. In such instances, interpreters would have to fill in some
additional words in order to make the syntax acceptable. Yet there is usually no time
for such editing, as this would prevent the interpreters from attending to the next
incoming unit. None of the three interpreters conveyed this unit of the argument”
(Vuorikoski, 20204, p. 168).
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the EP prioritizes the transmission of information across space rather than considering the
implications of repetitive behavior (ritual) on identities and relationships (culture) over
time. The value placed on (automatic) understanding rides on another deep assumption.
Specifically, Briankle Chang (1996) argues that it is just as legitimate to comprehend and
build relationships from the starting point of misunderstanding as it is to base interaction
upon initial assumptions of common understanding.
Some Members display empathy: “It is not easy for the interpreters to deliver the
message, complete and accurate” (OM06), and “Interpreters must be in a horrible
dilemma: they have to choose a meaning then next sentence, oops!” (OM42). In terms of
evaluating interpreting performance, experiences range from critical through
inconsequential to genuine appreciation. Critically, Members say: “I don’t know, it is
very difficult to decide [about the quality of interpretation]. It is case-by-case” (OM29)
and “What we are doing here demands a lot of nuance. Sometimes the interpreting is
mediocre and sometimes much worse than that” (OM57). More neutrally, other Members
say: “We simply take it for granted that the service is there” (OM16], and “simultaneous
translation [sic] creates problems, but it is astonishing that the number of real blunders is
that low (OM03). Many Members and permanent staff say: “The whole system works
really well. You would assume there would be more problems but it’s really rare” (F07);
“The quality of the translation [sic] is quite good here, and also the quality of the
interpreters—they are fantastic people” (OM59); “We do have extremely good teams of
interpreters. We can’t fault the interpreters or the services they provide” (F30); and
“There is much better quality here than anywhere else” (OM20).
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Member concern with misunderstanding and loss of content (information) are
among the main motivating factors for choosing English as lingua franca. The general
sense is that with ELF, “I can be completely certain that what I say reaches the ones who
are listening…to the English—and sometimes in the translation [sic] too” (OM42).
Again, the question of listening is intimately intertwined with language choice as a
demonstration of respect (or lack of respect) and appreciation for linguistic diversity.

5.3.3.1

The Headphone Challenge
“You cannot,” a Secretariat official insisted, “use headphone use as a measure of

listening—Members are multiply fluent” (F30). As described previously, I made an effort
to track headphone use in the meetings I observed. It is certainly true that there can be no
direct equation made between wearing a headphone (or not wearing one) and listening or
not listening. “If Members are not interested in the report,” the same official continued,
“they will chat with their friends but still want their friends to pay attention to their
report!” (F30). “They only put on the headphones,” she concluded, “for those they don’t
understand” (F30). “We are very, very clear on what we want to do,” this Member
expands the observation: “Those who have interest follow. They will reply and you can
tell if they understand” (OM31).204
Nonetheless, Members do evaluate the use of headphones by colleagues as a
measure of attention. I repeatedly observed what this Member said: “Most Members sit
without headphones” (OM43). For instance, in the AFET meetings I observed, I noted

204

This is a rare expression of discursive consciousness about the process of
pluralingual communication (i.e., involving interpreters).
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1

“a small rustle of movement” (quoting my fieldnotes) as MEPs reached for
headsets as a German colleague began to speak;

2

only the Chairperson reaching for a headset (within my range of vision) when
a Hungarian colleague announced, “I will speak in my mother tongue;” and

3

about 50% of Members within my field of vision continuing to wearing
headsets during the Chairperson’s response, in English, to a speech made in
Tajikistan by the Tajikistani President.

Computer technology could be designed and programmed to monitor Member’s use of
headphones and microphones, including what channel they’re speaking or listening to,
how much of time, etc., but sources were very clear that this would be an unacceptable
violation of privacy with too much potential for political misuse.
During the AFET observations, as with many others, I jotted down that “the
headphones are giving me a headache. Squeezing too hard! Hurts ear and presses on my
brain. Swapping ears helps (one on/one off method).” Agreeing with my observation that
the earphones hurt, a technician told me, “They are quite unbreakable…the only thing I
am happy these headphones are here is because nobody wants to steal them” (F12). One
Member’s conjecture about why colleagues avoid earphone use was gender-based: “I
think he [referring to male MEPs in general] is ashamed to use a headset, to show that
you don’t understand” (OM40). Other Members refer to EFL: if you have “a short reply,
try to do it in English. The Chair is English—it’s easier. Otherwise they have to take the
earphones, listen and understand, and sometimes they misunderstand” (NM64).
The discourse makes it seem as if misunderstanding only happens when
interpretation is involved. A Member (not interviewed) spoke during a Committee
meeting: “If it will be easier in English, I can read the question in English? I speak in
Polish if there is an interpretation.” There is a time element embedded in the courtesy of
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notifying colleagues about the language choice so they can don the headphones if they
are interested in the topic.
The time component is emphasized if there is a need for relay. During a
Committee meeting, a Slovenian Member was given the floor and began speaking then
stopped, waiting…the Chair said, “It must be the relay.” With or without relay however,
some Members are absolutely explicit about the discrimination: “Colleagues don’t put
their headphones on when an arcane language is being spoken. It is postcolonial disdain”
(OM28). “Can I use Danish here?” another Member inquired in English. I note that
apparently the answer was ‘yes’ as he proceeded to speak in Danish. At least half-adozen of his colleagues in AFET did not put on their earphones. Then I realized he was
one of the Members I had interviewed, and surmised that he was providing this
demonstration for my benefit, which he later confirmed so I could witness the noncooperation and disinterest in using the headphones/listening to colleagues speaking socalled ‘arcane’ or ‘exotic’ languages. “I did it for you,” he explained, grinning.
Not long afterwards a Member who I never spoke with was called upon to give
her report as Rapporteur. She opened with a sentence in Dutch followed by English, “I
will speak in Dutch.” I record in my notes “a murmur through the room that sounded like
disappointment: a collective groan.” The Rapporteur did proceed in Dutch and it
appeared nearly all of the Members were wearing headphones. Perhaps there was a
difference in substance or relevance between her topic and the Danish Member’s topic in
the preceding example. Later, the Dutch Member responded to her colleagues’ questions
in English.
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Clearly there is social pressure to avoid the headphones and, by extension (or
perhaps it is the other way around) to minimize reliance on interpretation. As articulated
by this Member: “I don’t like to be a prisoner of language” (NM25). Such dramatic
framings and a consistent emphasis on the loss of control characterize much of the
discourse about SI in the EP. Given the emphasis on not using earphones, and the list of
reasons justifying this non-use, I began to wonder what message is sent by actually using
the headphones? “I sometimes use two headphones,” bragged one Member. “ Often I am
able to guess what they say. Maybe I am automatically filling in? I am not worried about
it” (OM31). “You have to take your earphones and listen. This is not a demonstration of
incompetence,” insists another (NM64). “Make sure and listen to everyone around the
room” instructs a third: “There is nothing worse than to not listen” (OM44).
In principle, headphone use shows the readiness to listen to a colleague you do
not understand. Listening, in the European Parliament, to the simultaneous interpretation
of a language you do not know is the ultimate measure of pluralingualism. In contrast
with ELF, which creates an illusion of shared language but still involves insiders (who
know the lingua franca) and outsiders (who do not), wearing earphones and learning to
communicate through the system of SI in the EP is the ultimate expression of support for
cultural difference. Although the use of a lingua franca, such as ELF, is presented as a
relational move, pluralingualism through interpretation is a step beyond serial
monolingualism (aka, multilingualism) because it preserves difference and enables
relationship simultaneously. Rather than reinforcing the use of a common language as the
only way to demonstrate and experience the phatic qualities of communication, skillful
and strategic use of SI in the EP could establish the ritual basis for a common European
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identity by invoking community in a new way. This new and alternative kind of beingpresent-with-each-other-while-using-different-languages invites a systemic re-balancing
of the spatial and temporal elements of communication. Many languages, used at the
same time, in the same place, among people communicating with each other enables
meanings, understandings and relationships to be created and regenerated across
nationalized boundaries of difference. A new equilbirium can be achieved by shifting the
basis of identification from language and information to social transaction and
interpreted, pluralingual communication.

5.3.3.2

Re-Learning How to Speak
“I admire [the interpreters] for what they are doing. I know how difficult it is. I

listen to colleagues: some of them are brilliant. Some are not clear in any language. You
can’t get a better interpretation than the source” (OM61). Along the same lines, “In
Committee, on the whole, it is possible to follow the argument. Sometimes, I don’t know
if it is the interpreting that is inadequate or the Member who is inadequate” (OM44).
Generating the source language for simultaneous interpretation has become a matter of
discursive consciousness. “At the beginning of term,” explains a Member, “people think
about it, about being clear and not too complicated. After several months they get used to
it. We learn how to speak to be understood: as brief as possible, as clear as possible”
(OM20). Another confirms: “I started with complicated language. Over the years, I came
down, to spell down things so that twelve-year-old can understand. Far from where I
started” (OM61). “My wording,” says another, “is simple, not complicated” (OM62).
“We’re not using a sophisticated language,” continues another. “You want to get
your point. Use short sentences, simple words. You’re used to tv and radio—you have
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fifty seconds, be short and clear. Don’t use strange words” (OM31). The soundbyte
mentality applies to mother tongue as well as ELF, and explicitly privileges the
transmission/spatial dimension of communication: it is information-centric. Relationally,
one Member explained that “You can ask to repeat if you think it is possible to mend [a
misunderstanding]. But if [a colleague] thinks he is understandable [and he is not], people
will ignore him and he will have to learn the hard way. This happens with native
language too, if you come at people out of the blue” (OM33). “You have a short time,”
says another Member, and therefore “must give a clear message. After one to two years
people stop thinking about the form they use. Some deputies [the original label for
MEPs] never achieve this, but the majority do” (OM20).
As a kind of thought experiment, I asked a technician about the possibility of an
interpreter asking a Member to clarify what he or she meant before plunging into an
uncertain rendering: “Oh, to interact,” he replied. “The machine is not made to offer this
possibility” (F12). “The machine cuts that off?” I wondered. “The machine doesn’t cut
nothing,” he asserted. “If the human expressed the need of this possibility, the machine
can offer this possibility” (F12). Some Members express ultimate belief in a
technological solution, e.g., “We won’t need interpreters in the future because of machine
translation” (OM35); but someone else mentioned off the record that “there was an
experiment with machines …it was such a failure.” Other Members pinpoint “the real
problem is the time limit. You have to be concise, to the point” (OM08). Encompassing
ELF, other lingua francas, mother tongues and the electronic technology, a Member
claimed: “The instruments are not very important. Being in the mainstream…you have
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just one instant, one moment to come, to be in the center or this possibility is lost”
(OM20).

5.3.3.3

Time
The perceived need to control time is the hidden ideology that justifies complaints

about misunderstanding. Misunderstandings are a scapegoat, framed as impediments to
the pace of communication. “The interpreting is a very good thing. They are strongly in
place: when they stop, everything stops” (NM26). Understood as “the most organized
workforce in the institution” (F04), some other permanent Parliament staff resent that
“interpreters have power” (F04). Although interpreters are constrained from intervening
in misunderstandings, “they will stop if it is too fast” (OM35). According to a technician,
The president of the room…has a Slow Down light. If interpreters think
the speaker is speaking too fast, so maybe speaks like this, ‘Blahblahblah
[speaking very fast],’ and they can’t follow the speaking, they have a
button on their desk that gives a signal to the president and blinks this
letter, so the president has to know. He has to say to the speaker, ‘Please
slow down because the interpreters can’t follow you.’ This system is
programmed that at least two interpreter desks have to press the Slow
Down button to give the signal…it could be two people in the same booth
[or in different booths]…to be sure that the one didn’t press the button just
like this [demonstrating brushing over it by accident.] (F12)
During more than thirty hours of simultaneously-interpreted meetings, I observed only a
handful of requests from a Chairperson asking colleagues to slow down for the sake of
interpretation.
European Parliament Interpreters keep pace with the typical rate of speech.
Members express two sides of the same coin: on one side, “When it’s slow, it becomes
tedious” (OM44); on the other, “You have no time. The regime here is such…first you
have to get the speaking time from the Group…the Liberals [in this Member’s particular
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context] have seven minutes to speak, for all others only one to two minutes. You can’t
say, ‘No, you didn’t understand me’” (NM64). Another Member concurs: it is “not only a
language issues…Yesterday I had two minutes, sometimes only one minute. I am lucky if
I get three minutes” (OM42). “The scarcity of time in an institution like this” (OM03) is
taken for granted. “If you add thirty seconds per speaker for interpretation, that increases
the meeting by three hours while [also] eliminating three topics” (OM03). This is the
reason justifying why “most use English even though there is interpretation: it hastens
things up, doesn’t create delays” (NM24). “Sometimes the English [interpretation] is
slow,” says another Member, giving a different twist to the constitution of time: “then I
listen in French. For instance with the Greek President, it is difficult to keep track,
especially when he is going fast” (NM28).
“If Greek is spoken,” explained another Member, “then you have the pivot. All
the translations [sic] are delayed” (NM26). There can be “an uncomfortable hiatus,”
which one Member likened to “dead air [being] the worst thing you can have on the
radio” (OM44). This is born out by at least one Member’s overt impatience: “I have no
time for waiting! The interpretation is taking too long. There is too much time waiting”
(NM01). Others disagree: “Concerns about timing are not really valid,” expressed an
administration official, “there is no time loss” (F25). A Member agrees, “there is some
delay, in some cases but it does not hinder work or listening” (OM07). Others are even
more blasé: “I never think about time. I am so occupied with listening and learning
languages” (OM40). The relationship between language choice and time was best
summarized by this Member: “You have no time to think about language: you have to

293

take part in the debate. Sometimes it is better, necessary to use your own language. And
sometimes another” (OM20).
The relentless pace shows up most problematically in two ways. “Sometimes,”
one Member said, “people use language to get more power, if we have to move
rapidly…sometimes this [multilingualism] is misused” (NM54). A few may be offended
when “they cut off things [a colleague] had to say” (OM03). The most obvious
breakdown of what controlled multilingualism is the way it is performed during voting.
Here, a Member said, “the time delay is insurmountable” (NM28). “Votes are moving at
a high rate,” explains an MEP, “600 votes in three hours. If inaccurately interpreted—it
can throw you off and you’re lost for six votes before you find your place” (OM44).
Another Member explained,
Today during the vote, I can’t follow the Dutch translation and I don’t
understand the Spanish [spoken by the Chairperson]. I tried English. After
five minutes I switched. I switched five times and always too late, and
sometimes the numbers were wrong. Visually, I can follow who is in
front, if they vote For [he raises his hand], then I [raises his hand], but if
they vote Against, then I am too late. (OM31)
Forcing Members to guess at the timing of yes/no votes by relying on visual cues from
other Members is probably not in the best interests of European democracy.
In this chapter, I have presented the discourse about the system of SI in the EP in
a way to let it speak for itself. The major themes have all been introduced: the use of
one’s own language/mother tongue or a lingua franca, EFL, Member control of diction
(words and meanings) as well mistakes and misunderstandings, risk, quality and speed.
The question of marginalizing monolinguals has been raised, the application of
multilingualism problematized, and the concept of pluralingualism introduced. Before
elaborating the findings and presenting the conclusion, it is necessary to place the
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institution of the Parliament and the system of SI in the EP in historical time. Although
the once-vaunted European Constitution failed,205 a quote about it serves as the discursive
bridge for placing the current discourse about SI in the EP in its most relevant historical
timestream (Neustadt and May, 1986):
We [the European Parliament] organized the Convention Debates, we
organized the Charter Debates. In fact, the success of the Charter led the
Heads of certain governments at the Summit to decide to have a
Convention on the future of Europe, and that is the genesis of the
Constitution. And I don’t think we can say that it was very very successful
and it took place in eleven languages…and then say multilingualism had
nothing to do with the success of that particular formula. Everyone is
respected if they are allowed to speak their own language. (F38, in 2005)
Compare the sentiments in that quotation with this one, from a book review of The
Origins of Simultaneous Interpretation by Frances Gaiba (1998):
It is no exaggeration to say that without simultaneous interpretation, the
1945-1946 multilingual Nuremberg trial of major figures of the Nazi
regime could not have taken place… for the interpreting profession, it was
an exemplary—and almost unparalleled—instance of human and technical
triumph over the linguistic obstacles that can otherwise impede the
implementation of the loftiest sentiments of fairness. (Morris, 1999)
Vuorikoski also echoes the sentiment:
It has been said that Europe is on everyone’s lips, but in different languages.
Preserving the cultural identity of the Member States has been considered
essential in the European context, and one way of maintaining cultural identity
has been the language policy which guarantees the official languages of the
Member States the status of an official language in the European Union as well. A
plurality of cultures has been experienced as a value that the community does not
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Referendum votes from France and Belgium went against the Treaty during the first
research period (May 2005). The sense of disappointment in Parliament’s halls was
palpable, but Members remained resolute. They found another way to consolidate
the European Union with the Lisbon Treaty, which came into force with some
fanfare during the second research period (2009) by linking it to the European
Parliament’s 50th anniversary.
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want to surrender; instead, the many ways of thinking have been seen as a
challenge rather than a handicap. (Zeyringer 1991: 7) In fact, the European
communities are the only international community where the languages of all the
Member States enjoy the status of an official language. This policy has been seen
to act as a safeguard for political and legal equality, as citizens are able to follow
the functioning of the institutions in their own language. (Ramos-Ruano 1991:
61–65)” (in Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 73).
The system initiated at Nuremberg has evolved in sophistication and capacity to enable
the regime of controlled multilingualism at the European Parliament. It also has had a
serious effect upon Deaf communities and other linguistic minorities who require
interpreting at the interface of their daily lives and the major institutions of society. The
next chapter will explore this history, beginning at Nuremberg and then providing a case
history of professional interpreting and American Deaf Culture.
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CHAPTER 6
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF A SYSTEM
OF SIMULTANEOUS INTERPRETATION

6.1

Timestream Placement of the Discourse about SI in the EP
Placement is Neustadt and May’s (1986) term for the locating an organization in

its proper historical timestream.
To link conventional wisdoms of the present with past counterparts and
future possibilities; to link interpretations of the past with the experiences
of their interpreters, and both with their prescriptions; to link proposals for
the future with the inhibitions of the present and inheritances of the past all these mean to think relatively and in terms of time, opening one’s mind
to possibilities as far back as the story’s start and to potentialities as far
ahead as relevant (judged, of course, from now, hence subject to revision
later). That entails seeing time as a stream. It calls for thinking of the
future as emergent from the past and of the present as a channel that
perhaps conveys, perhaps deflects, but cannot stop the flow. (Conveys?
Deflects? In what degree? A critical concern!) Perception of time-in-flow
cannot help but be encouraged by purposeful study of stretches of history,
regardless of whose it is or what the focus” (1986: 246).
Recall the concept of indexicality, which refers to the forward-acting impulse of language
use in the present. Looking backwards, at the time of utterance and enactment,
indexicalities are entailments206 that shape social transactions through their persistence in
language use.
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Entailment is the long tail of indexicality, the social meanings which always
accompany referential/denotational meaning. “Through indexicality, every utterance
tells something about the person who utters it - man, woman, young, old, educated,
from a particular region, or belonging to a particular group, etc. - and about the kind
of person we encounter - we make character judgments all the time…” (Blommaert,
2004, p. 11).
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6.1.1

Nuremburg: The Originating Scene
The possibility of generating mutual understanding among the four languages of

plaintiffs and defendants after WWII was weighed from the beginning against a need for
speed, yet the ramifications of this tension have received practically no investigation.
Scholarship on the Nuremberg International War Crimes Tribunal is extensive. However,
as of 1998, Gaiba estimated only a dozen pages involved interpreting; these are spread
across a mere four sources: Conot, 1983; Neave, 1978; Persico, 1994; and Tusa & Tusa,
1983. The absence of interpreting from historical analysis is interesting precisely because
everyone was concerned with how long the Nuremberg trials could take because of the
language differences. “The language problem had surfaced as soon as the talks began in
London” (Persico, 1994, p. 53). The attitude that language difference is a problem was
commonsense: consecutive interpretation would simply take too long.
Regarded as the birthplace of professional simultaneous interpretation, for our
analysis what is important is that the crucible of an international court of law for crimes
against humanity established the exemplar for the performance of simultaneous
interpreting in all settings. Requirements imposed on Nuremberg interpreters were
dictated by unquestioned imperatives concerning speed, expectations for accuracy based
largely on a myth of linguistic equivalence, and the ability of humans to interface
seamlessly with electronic technology.
Cast as “this dumb idea that the Americans were putting on” (Gaskin, 1990, p.
85), the solution to the language problem was generated by an interpreter. Colonel Léon
Dostert had interpreted for General Eisenhower, and for both “the German Army,
occupying his town during the First World War and for the American Army which
liberated it” (Gaiba, 1998, pp. 133-134). An American military officer born in France,
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Dostert contacted two officials close to Chief Justice Robert H. Jackson and arranged
with IBM to provide a demonstration to Chief Justice Jackson’s aide (Charles Horsky)
and his son Bill, convincing them of the idea (Persico, 1994).
Whether Dostert had a flash of insight (spawned, perhaps, by his experiences as
an immigrant), reasoned his way through the juxtaposition of time with pluralingualism,
or simply extended the knowledge he had of the recently patented Filene-Finlay
equipment being built and distributed by IBM (Gaiba, 1998), somehow Dostert realized
that the new “IBM System” (Tusa & Tusa, 1983) could enable interpretation to be
conducted in parallel, that is, simultaneously, rather than in sequence (consecutively).
“Our work in Nuremberg was based essentially on the Filene-Finlay system” (Uiberall, as
cited in Gaskin, 1990, p. 43-44). Siegfried Ramler, another long-term Nuremberg
interpreter, described the need “to make trial proceedings and documents understandable
to judges, prosecutors, defendants, and defense counsel in Courtroom 600 [of the
Nuremberg Palace of Justice], as well as to audiences around the world following the
proceedings?” (2008, p. 50). Others credited the engineers:
There was a primary difference between the subsequent trials and the
international. The international was [run by the] four powers, and there
had to be [simultaneous translation [sic] in] four different languages, and
that is a big job. It wouldn’t have been done at all except for the ingenuity
of IBM engineers. They made possible the simultaneous translation [sic]
system, provided earphones for every seat in the courtroom.
The subsequent trials, although they were international trials in the
sense that they were done under international law, were all American, so
that we only had the simultaneous translation [sic] of German/English and
English/German, and that simplified things a great deal from the
administrative point of view. (Robert King, in in Stave et al, 1998, p. 159)
The subsequent trials are instances of community interpreting; there was also community
interpreting at Nuremberg (see Section 6.1.7).
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Neglecting mention of community interpreting in the historical record, and/or
hiding it within the duties of translators, is one of the ways that dehumanization became
embedded as a control mechanism for simultaneous interpretation. The emphasis on
information contained in the language is another tactic of dehumanization that was
necessary for the trials to be conducted. By separating information from the person,
communication could occur without regard for the Other. In this case, a most despicable
“other” (in the bodies of the defendants) but also for everyone associated with the trial in
any capacity: victims, rescuers, bystanders, uncharged perpetrators, etc.

6.1.2

The IBM System

There was anxiety about getting the system in place. “The equipment went astray” during
shipping (Tusa & Tusa, 1983, p. 218) and “everything depended on having the
interpreting system in place on opening day” (Persico, 1994, 12). When it did arrive, only
three weeks in advance (Gaiba, 1998, p. 39), “the British Signal Corps did all the wiring,
and laid many miles of wiring in there. It was a very sophisticated network” (Chapman,
in Gaskin, 1990, p. 93). Dan Kiley, who designed the layout of the courtroom and built
the interpreters booths along with some other specific furniture, described it as “a
quadrilingual translation [sic] system. Earphones, and so forth” (in Stave et al, 1998, p.
26). While the wiring was being installed, the interpreters were playing at a mock trial in
the courtroom’s attic. “We played various roles which we had to guess at because no one
had seen a war crimes trial before. . . . we discovered a number of things that we had not
thought of before” (Uiberall, in Gaskin, p. 42-43). In a review of Gaiba’s The Origins of
Simultaneous Interpretation, Morris summarized the complicated process this way:
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Those responsible for the arrangements as they affected the interpreters
tried to ensure that the latter had the best possible conditions for their
work, subject to time and space constraints. Having dared take the risk of
making use of an untried approach - the ‘simultaneous’ technique had
been used in the pre-war period only for the reading out of pre-translated
versions of speeches or simultaneously providing multiple-language
versions of consecutive interpretation - they tried to build in as many
measures as possible to enable the interpreters to do the best job possible.
They also recognized the human element. Arrangements were made to
provide discreet signals when a speaker needed to slow down, or if it
became necessary to interrupt the proceedings for reasons related to
interpretation. A monitor in the courtroom constantly kept an ear on all
working interpreters, and was prepared to replace anyone who showed
signs of fatigue, if necessary interrupting the proceedings to do so. (1999,
p. 352)
One of the most prominent features of the IBM system as it was used during the
Nuremberg trials was awareness of and attention to the social implications of using the
brand new technology. Acknowledging these implications required participation by
interpretees: speakers and listeners were actively involved in the overall facilitation of the
simultaneous interpretation process.
Alfred Steer, Administrative Head of the Language Division at the trials,
explained: “We had a system of two lights: a yellow one meaning ‘Please slow down,’
and a red one meaning ‘Please stop the proceedings momentarily’” (Gaskin, 1990, p.
38).207 The lights were an outcome of the mock trials:
In the first place, there is a certain speed beyond which you cannot
possibly hear and talk, so there had to be a system to keep people from
getting too fast. Then someone came up with the idea of light signals: a
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Ramler describes three lights (or calls one two different colors): “As with traffic, we
developed a system of orange and red lights which would be flashed by the monitor,
signalling speakers in the courtroom. The yellow light was a signal to slow down and
to prevent two parties from speaking at the same time. The red light, used sparingly,
gave a sign to the presiding judge to declare a recess” (2008, p. 51-52).
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yellow light coming on for ‘slow down’, and a red one for ‘stop’. The
latter was for situations where the interpreter could not carry on because
he had a coughing spell or something – it happened once or twice – and
then you pushed the red button, and everything stopped until you were
ready to go on. (Uiberall, as cited in Gaskin, 1990, p. 43)
The role of a monitor was invented to watch for impending interpreter failure.
“Occasionally an interpreter would freeze,” Ramler explains, “either because of a
translation [sic] difficulty or because of a shock effect arising from the nature of the
testimony” (2008, p. 50). The monitor sat very close to the currently-working interpreter
because “sometimes it was possible to step in and help” (Uiberall, in Gaskin, p. 43).
Administrator Steer described how it worked: “I’d press the red one, which was in front
of Lord Justice Lawrence, he would stop everything and I’d make the shift” (Gaskin,
1990, p. 38). Ramler says, “The interpreters at the microphone appreciated [Lawrence’s]
understanding of the challenges we faced and his admonition to counsel and witnesses to
speak slowly” (2008, p. 49).
Most surprising (looking back from today’s standard practice), the following was
widely understood and accepted:
Interpreting in these cases had a lot of pitfalls, and very often at the end of
the day we [interpreters] were not exactly overjoyed at the way it came
through. We would run upstairs to the reviewing people and say, ‘Hey,
that wasn’t exactly the best way to do it. Have you checked that?’ You
had a lot of safeguards against mistranslations—I don’t think any that
occurred remained in the transcript. (Uiberall, as cited in Gaskin, p. 47)
The reviewing process was the work of a third team of interpreters (Gaiba, 1998; Gaskin
1990). Peter Uiberall, “one of the longest-serving interpreters at the Nuremberg Trials”
(Morris, 1999, p. 351), says it was a fight to convince the personnel people to allow the
third team (Gaiba, 1998). Interpreter monitors (know as team interpreters in the field of
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community interpreting today) and transcript reviewers were communication
accommodations made in recognition that “the human element” (Morris, 1999, p. 352)
had to be taken into account, including the effects of time pressure on spontaneous
performance.
Making corrections and edits in the record after the fact was an embedded aspect
of the Nuremberg precedent. “Upstairs in the court-house we had a section which was
called the reviewing section, where the transcript of the preceding day was gone over by
interpreters of the third team” (Gaskin, 1990, p. 45). Uiberall continued to describe the
teamwork functions of the interpreters:
It was absolutely necessary to have three teams of interpreters: two teams
alternated in the court-room, with one team on stand-by in the radio room
behind, with phone connection [ready to relieve failing interpreters], and
the third team was up in the reviewing section, going over the previous
day’s transcript word for word: hearing the original, seeing the text of the
translation [sic] and correcting it. (Gaskin 1990, p. 45)
It was not unusual for the interpreters to receive help from others in the courtroom.
Besides debates over meaning among the legal counsel, Uiberall explained how
defendants in particular were highly attuned to the interpreters when he said:
Whenever an interpreter got stuck on some technical term that a German
witness used, you would see either Speer or Schacht or both quickly whip
out a piece of paper, write the English term on it, and send it along the line
to the defendant who was sitting closest to the interpreter, who slipped it
under the glass partition. So we were grateful to them. They were
interested in good translation [sic], as we were, and were helping where
they could.” (Gaskin, 1990, p. 84)
Additionally, “many of the German lawyers understood English, monitored our
interpretation, and occasionally would object if they thought a given translation [sic] was
in error” (Ramler, 2008, p. 49).
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6.1.3

Interpreters on Trial
IBM was “eager to pioneer the world’s first system of simultaneous

interpretation” (Persico, 1994, p. 54), which they called the International Translator
System (Tusa & Tusa, 1983, p. 110). The IBM System enabled up to five different
languages to be transmitted along separate audio channels; the human beings required to
produce the essential interpretations of the languages distributed across those channels
were the last addition to this revolutionary technology. “The system would only work,”
explained Chief Justice Jackson’s executive, Brigadier General Gill, “if every delegation
recruited top-notch interpreters” (Gaiba, 1998, p. 45).
Discovering individuals able to operationalize IBM’s technology so that it could
function as desired proved difficult. “Only one prospect in twenty had the mental agility
to listen and talk at the same time” (Persico, 1994, p. 112). The requirements applied to
prospective interpreters were as strict as those applied to the electronics. The skillset
required for simultaneous interpreting was quickly differentiated from the skills required
for a) consecutive interpreting, which utilizes notetaking and allows an interpreter to
work with whole messages rather than fragments; and b) translating written texts, which
occurs ‘off-line’ and ‘behind-the-scenes’ at the translator’s individual pace (Gaiba, 1998).
Seigfried Ramler, an interpreter at Nuremberg, explained that simultaneous interpreting
“called for the ability to think of the second best word instantly, or the third best word,
because you could not afford to stop” (U.S. Courts, 2010).
By his own account, Steer in his administrative capacity tested approximately 400
potential interpreters, having the most success with individuals from small countries such
as Belgium and Holland or who worked in telephone services:
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The Paris international telephone exchange was a superb place to pick
people up, because they had to deal with conversations in all languages.
But I found that only about five per cent of experienced [consecutive]
interpreters could do this Nuremberg job, because of the nervous control
that was needed, and because it was simultaneous. (Gaskin, 1990, p. 39)
Uiberall emphasized the significance of the time element: “Before 1945, simultaneous
interpretation had not existed in the form in which we used it at Nuremberg. . . .
something entirely new had come up: we had to do spontaneous interpretation, immediate
interpretation” (Gaskin, 1990, p. 43-44). A mixture of concern, discomfort, and
skepticism led planners of the tribunal to doubt this new means of manipulating time
(Gaiba, 1998, p. 37). “The decision to use it at the trial was hard to take because no
delegation felt comfortable with the multilingual character of the trial and most believed
at first that simultaneous interpretation would not work at all” (Gaiba, p. 32). Indeed, “it
was hardly credible that one system could provide access to five languages, and beyond
imagining that translations [sic] would ever be able to keep up with the proceedings”
(Tusa & Tusa, 1983, p. 110).

6.1.4

The Ideology of Speed
The ideology of speed is only touched upon here, but it completely infiltrates the

interpreter’s role space208 and functional production. Griffiths (2004) briefly summarized
an early champion of “the cult of speed” (p. 52), referring to Italian futurist Marinetti’s
New Religion-Morality of Speed (1916), where he writes of “a new good: speed, and a
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The concept of a multidimensional “role space” (Lee & Lewellyn-Jones, 2013)
replaces the inaccurate and unnecessarily restrictive concept of interpreters’ “role.”
Role space will be elaborated later in this chapter.
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new evil: slowness” because “slowness is naturally foul” (p. 52). Griffiths also quoted a
critic:
Paul Virilio writes in Speed and Politics (1986) that “Western man has
appeared superior and dominant, despite inferior demographics, because
he appeared more rapid. In colonial genocide or ethnocide, he was the
survivor because he was in fact super-quick (sur-vif). The French word
vif, ‘lively,’ incorporates at least three meanings: swiftness, speed
(vitesse), likened to violence — sudden force, abrupt edge . . . and to life
(vie) itself: to be quick means to stay alive . . .” (p. 55).
For the Nuremberg trials, only those interpreters who were quick enough survived the
encounter with the IBM system. “More than 200 people were tested before the trial to
obtain the first 36 simultaneous interpreters” (Gaiba, 1998, p. 48). “We staged mock
trials to judge whether candidates were able to respond instantly to the verbal stimuli
without falling behind” (Ramler, 2008, p. 52). Turnover during the trial was calculated at
104% (Gaiba, 1998, p. 56). Steer explained this phenomenon further:
I acted as an interpreter on a few occasions, but I wasn’t very good at it.
You need a certain amount of absolutely iron nervous control, so that you
can absolutely rely on the fact that you’re never going to stutter or stop,
ever. (Gaskin, 1990, p. 38)
A court clerk, Ron Chapman, observed the situation: “The interpreters couldn’t wait until
the whole question had finished, and then translate [sic] it, because it would take so long,
and it would lose its continuation” (Gaskin, p. 93). Uiberall, who eventually became
Chief Interpreter (Gaiba, 1998), described the Russian interpreters in this way:
[They were] excellent – I never saw them flounder. And it is very difficult
to translate into Russian, for the simple reason that the Russian is so much
longer: there are more words, so you have to speak faster and get more in
during the same period of time. (Gaskin, 1990, p. 70)
In fact, Steer explained, “if the lag got longer [than eight to ten seconds], the interpreter
would soon get into trouble, because you can only hold a limited number of words in
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your memory under those conditions” (Gaskin, 1990 p. 39). Steer added, “it tickled me
no end that [defendant Albert] Speer was the first one to grasp that this idea [of
simultaneous interpreting] was workable and was saving an enormous amount of time”
(Gaskin p. 85). Ramler adds another perspective: “After the trials started, Herman Göring
was overheard to say, ‘This system is very efficient, but it will also shorten my life!’”
(2008, p. 50).
The repeated emphasis on saving time, not being able to wait, needing to speak
faster so as to compress language into less time than its grammar requires, and otherwise
not losing time, demonstrate that speed was determined to be the single most significant
criteria driving the professional delivery of simultaneous interpretation. “I know for a fact
that it was such a stressful thing for these translators [sic] that two or three of them had
nervous breakdowns during the trial. It was really terrible, because they could not afford
to get a word wrong,” says Chapman (as cited in Gaskin, 1990, p. 93). “We had no body
of experience to draw on,” explains Ramler, “and had to develop the necessary skills on
our own. These challenges were the impetus to create a system of simultaneous
interpretation, now in general use throughout the world, but pioneered on a large scale by
our group at Nuremberg” (2008, p. 50).
In addition to creating speed as the primary baseline metric for assessing the
functionality of a simultaneous interpreter, the normal processes of communicative repair
were denied to interpreters. All of the participants at Nuremberg, including judges,
defendants, interpreters, administrators, witnesses, reporters and public observers, erected
a social taboo to isolate the interpreter from the inherently interactive process of coconstructing meaning. This interaction taboo grew out of the imposed value of speed,
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general dehumanization of the interpreter as a participant in the communication process,
and the linguistic paradigm’s emphasis on source language as the only relevant standard
by which to measure accuracy.

6.1.5

Iron Nervous Control and the Interpersonal Reduction
Steer, quoted above describing his inability to perform to the specification of

speed admits, “I couldn’t attain that sort of assurance. . . . We found that the job of
interpreting was so nerve-racking that the individual could not do this day after day” (as
cited in Gaskin, 1990, p. 38). By assurance, Steer is probably referring to closure. Closure
is the skill Ramler (U.S. Courts, 2010) names as “the ability to think of the second best
word instantly [emphasis added], or the third best word.” There is a fallacy implied in
Ramler’s description: the metaphor of number is an example of the myth of linguistic
equivalence in that anyone or everyone would rank the first, second, and third “best
words” similarly, despite interpreters’ professional knowledge that “there is no such thing
as an exact translation of any word” (Uiberall, as cited in Gaskin, 1990, p. 48).
Isolating the interpreter as a linguistic functionary making simple digital decisions
(“this” word or “that” word) is a mechanism of control: the interpreter is forced to
eliminate the relational. Cultural distinctions in terms of social interaction and the nonverbal are erased or suppressed in favour of the more palpable variables of language use
at the levels of, say, morphology and syntax. This is evidenced by models for assessing
the quality of interpretation, which always begin with an evaluation of the accuracy of
diction (literally, ‘exact translation at the level of word) or sense (more loosely, at the
level of phrasal or aggregate meaning) from source to target text (see, for example,
Figure 2 in Pöchhacker, 2001, p. 413). In Pöchhacker’s diagram of the communication
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process, the success of the communicative interaction is represented as following linearly
from “an accurate rendition of source” (p. 413). The underlying assumption is that the
faster an interpreter generates an “adequate target-l[anguage] expression” then an
“equivalent intended effect” is (shown as) achieved (p. 413). In other words, the
interpretation is deemed successful on the basis of linguistic criteria alone. Notably, the
temporal direction of evaluation is backwards rather than forward in time: the “source” is
taken as definitive, as if everyone always says only and exactly what they mean, all the
time; or as if saying what one means, exactly and precisely, guarantees that one will be
understood as one intends. These assumptions institute constraints within the
communication transaction that inhibit voice.
In other words, the cost of misunderstanding (or even failure) at the cultural or
social level is presumed to be lower (as in, not worth worrying about too much) than the
gain of connected knowing (i.e., of co-creating a relationship across difference that is
solidly based in mutual understanding, cf Belenky et al, 1997). The supposedly lower
cost of damaged relationships is quantified in an absolute sense (i.e, source-determined
accuracy), which may not correspond with anyone’s desired outcome. What has occurred
is that only one area of work-related demand on the interpreter is acknowledged: what
Dean and Pollard (2001) identified as the linguistic category.209 Completely disregarded
are the three other sources of work demands: environmental, interpersonal, and
intrapersonal. As the control for the system of SI in the EP, the simultaneous interpreter
was produced to maintain the flow of communication transaction, but interpreters are
209

Robyn K. Dean & Robert Q. Pollard, Jr. 2001. “Application of Demand-Control
Theory to Sign Language Interpreting: Implications for Stress and Interpreter
Training.” Journal of Deaf Studies and Deaf Education, 6(1), p. 5.
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denied the use of controls to manage the various demands put upon them.210 The specific
items included in each category of demand sources for sign language interpreters will not
coincide exactly with the demand sources for interpreters in the European Parliament, but
they are an excellent reference point, particularly as the EP expands it’s Ad Personam
community-style interpreting services.
Ignoring the full range of demands in the (now) institutionalized automatic pilot
of the IBM system’s interpersonal reduction inhibits interpreters and interpretees from
cooperating with each other to generate and confirm shared understandings. How sign
language community interpreters are beginning to work comfortably in role space with
relational autonomy will be explained in the next section about interpreting and the
American Deaf community. Relational autonomy (Witter-Merithew, Johnson &
Nicodemus, 2010) is the ability (one could perhaps go so far as to say the authority) of
interpreters to exercise decision latitude, accounting for all demands and including the
dynamic flux of alignments with interpretees through exercising an enlightened role
space. Witter-Merithew et al. explain: “effective autonomy is achieved when the social
conditions that support it are in place and give the practitioner—and consumers—the
confidence to take charge of choices” (p. 50).
Although these will not be detailed here, some of the disciplinary methods used to
ensure interpreters’ conformity to the need for speed and limits of interaction include
ridicule (see Kent, 2009) and banishment or threat of banishment. For instance, the latter
210

Ramler describes “a trance-like element in this process” of “total concentration,
staying in tune with the flow of the speaker, and keeping him or her in sight, to
achieve simultaneity” (2008, p. 52). The phenomenality of this experience of
concentration is thwarted by different fluencies of ELF and other lingua francas used
non-fluently.
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is exemplified in textbooks and scholarly literature on international business, which
routinely include negative anecdotes or other aspersions against the use of simultaneous
interpreters (e.g. Luo & Shenkar, 2006; Veruyten, 2006).211 These social sanctions
emerge from the simple engineering standard utilized at Nuremberg: failure. “We had
repeated instances when an interpreter would simply fail, break down, be unable to
continue, and we would have to put in a substitute at as short notice as possible, so that
the court wouldn’t be delayed any more than need be” (Steer, as cited in Gaskin, 1990, p.
38).
Harry Fiss describes himself as a translator at Nuremberg, although he interpreted
too, but not in the courtroom.212 Fiss was in charge of the prosecutions files. “By that I
mean I would get a call by an attorney who needed Document So and So for crossinterrogating Göring. I would have to come up with it translated, analysed. All that work
would be done by the whole translation division under me” (in Stave et al, 1998, p. 97).
Fiss was also called upon to interrogate witnesses, including Rudolf Höss and Otto
Ohlendorff).

211

Verluyten (2006) gives an account, Mr Adams goes to China, in which the interpreter
“was never seen again” after “a misunderstanding” in which “the interpreter made a
mistake” while interpreting the idiomatic English expression, “you might as well get
up and have a cup of coffee” (p. 19). This is clearly misplaced blame. The source
text is problematic, and it seems the audience must have been desperate for a break if
so many of them left so quickly that they could “pour back into the room” upon
being called back.

212

“I didn’t work inside the courtroom. I could only translate; I couldn’t do
simultaneous interpretation…I failed the exam! I couldn’t do it! Not because my
German wasn’t good enough. I just couldn’t do it. You have to have a special talent
for that. It takes a lot out of you. These guys need a rest every two hours. It’s a very,
very strenuous job.” (Fiss, in Stave, 1998, p. 102).
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How I was able to do this, I’m wondering. It’s amazing that I was able to
not manage to feel anything all. I just did my work…the same numbing of
feelings that helped the SS execute people also helped the survivors…I
was able to talk to this SS man who had killed I don’t know how many
hundreds of thousands of people, smoking a cigarette and telling me with
great pride how he made this killing machine more and more efficient.
That was Ohlendorff. (p. 98)
Fiss also wrote “a kind of novel” that was never published about the interrogation of
Höss (p. 98). Here is an excerpt:
Mr Booth was saying, “What’s your name?” and I was acting as the
interpreter. Höss answered in a controlled voice. “Your rank and arm of
service.” Mechanically the questions and answers came in one language
and were converted into another. (emphasis added, p. 98)
Continuing, Fiss switches to first person, as if he is conducting the interrogation, not
interpreting it.
I said to him, “You told us once that you’d be willing to sign this
confession,” and Höss stared at the document and said, “Yes, but there is
something wrong,” and then he pointed to the second line. “What’s
wrong?” Höss said to me, “Right here.” He moved his finger across the
page. “It says here that I personally arranged the gassing of three million
persons between June 1941 and the end of 1943.” “Well, isn’t that what
you said?” “I’m afraid not. I said that only two million were gassed. You
have to get the record straight. The rest died of other causes.” “Other
causes?” “You know, the usual thing, malnutrition, dysentery, typhoid.
We had an awful lot of typhoid cases.” “I see.” Mr. Booth leaned back
and sighed. “Okay, change it then.”
As the narrator of this account, Fiss puts us in the interpreter’s position. In the absence of
technology, when there is no glass between the interpreter and the interpretees,
communication is personal. Recall the community interpreting situation when an
interpreter (in a medical context), shifted from direct to indirect speech, “step[ping] into
the situation in order to solve” a “disagreement” (Merlini & Favaron, 2009, p. 195-
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196).213 Perhaps this is why Fiss asserted that his job “was far more interesting” than the
courtroom interpreting (in Stave, 1998, p. 102).
Both in the courtroom and without, interpreting the War Crimes Tribunal was
traumatic. Fiss wrote about his experiences soon after they happened, at a time when
“nobody wanted to hear anything about the Holocaust” (p. 100). He explains, “I think
that a lot of people kept silent and tried to repress it and not think about it and not talk
about it. They repressed everything, including anger” (p. 100). Even though Fiss did talk
about it, felt anger and even “acted it out” (p. 100), there are still moments when his
memory is blank. In the scene with Höss,
[Mr. Booth] pushed the fountain pen across the table. Höss picked up the
pen, unscrewed the top and without further ado crossed out the three
million and put in two million over it. Then he signed his name and then
he blew on the paper until the ink was dry. I never could remember what
happened afterwards. (p. 99)
The tactics of coping with trauma were fused with the performance of interpreting: the
disembodied “mechanical” voice, silence, and repression were normalized as features of
simultaneous interpretation because everyone involved in the trial had to find ways to
cope with its horrors.

6.1.6

The Social Construction of Technology
In a landmark article about the social construction of the automobile, Kline and

Pinch (1996) demonstrated conclusively how “users of technology acted as agents of
213

This instance was previously described on p. 121 as an example of agency on the
interpreter’s part. This example also illustrates cooperation from interpretees in
seeking shared understanding rather than insisting on a literal rendition of ‘what I
said!’ This example can be more accurately and deeply described in terms of the
concepts of relational autonomy and role space that are introduced in Section 6.5.
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technological change” (p. 764). Compare the automobile with the IBM system, and car
drivers and passengers with interpreters and interpretees. Kline and Pinch showed how
farm workers in the rural United States acted with “interpretive flexibility” by adapting
the automobile to a wide range of practical uses that were unintended by the
manufacturer. By interpretive flexibility, Kline and Pinch refer to the
new meanings . . . given to the car by the new emerging social group of
users . . . To the urban user the car meant transport. For the rural users we
have identified, the car, as well as being a form of transport, could be a
farm tool, a stationary source of power, part of a domestic technology
[such as a laundry machine], or perhaps all of these. (p. 777)
Kline and Pinch’s analysis shows a dynamic of competing interests among social groups
who are brought into contact with each other by the technology.
While the automobile industry struggled for decades to establish closure on the
social meaning and practical uses of the car (Kline & Pinch, 1996), the first interpreters
and the first consumers of simultaneous interpretation accepted the component
specifications for the simultaneous interpreter without apparent question or critique. This
model was picked up by the first wave of interpreter trainers without doubt and is
evidence of the ideology of speed. No one imagined other, additional or different ways of
using simultaneous interpreting because there was social consensus that the interpreter
was supposed to blend in as an invisible part of the machine.

6.1.7

Nuremberg’s Hidden Community Interpreting
Intriguingly, Siegfried Ramler describes working as a community interpreter

(even though he does not use this label), prior to the start of the Nuremberg trial. He
handled the logistics of housing for troops and officers. “Serving as interpreter, I would
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give the house’s occupants one hour to clear the premises, allowing them to take along
only items they could carry…while it was unpleasant to evict people from their homes, I
approached this task as politely as possible” (2008, pp. 36-40). Further, Ramler (and
certainly others) were involved with interpreting the interrogations that occurred prior to
the Trial’s start.
Immediately after my arrival in Nuremberg, I was assigned to interrogations,
starting early in the morning and often lasting late into the evening. These were
designed to build the prosecution’s case and validate documentary evidence. The
interrogations involved defendants and witnesses called to clarify and explain a
given segment of the prosecution’s case…Guards brought the defendants up from
their prison cells to one of the interrogation rooms in the Palace of Justice.
Present in the room would be a prosecution lawyer, a court reporter, and the
German-English interpreter, which was my function during the pretrial
phase…When I think back to my most memorable experiences during the four
years I spent in Nuremberg—over a year with the international trial and three
additional years with the subsequent proceedings—the interrogations in
preparation for the major trial stand out, as Germany’s erstwhile leaders presented
spontaneous and unfiltered testimony. This was the first time, just weeks after
their capture…that these men were required to answer questions and comment on
their roles during the [Nazi] regime. The interrogations often paralleled an
autopsy, where doctors trace the development of a disease leading to the patient’s
death. Their testimony yielded ‘history in the raw,’ expressed spontaneously
before formal testimony on the witness stand could be shaped and filtered by
defense strategy. (emphasis added, 2008, pp. 47).
A photograph shows Ramler at work, approximately two feet away from a defendant.
The caption reads: “Charged with kidnapping, enslavement, extermination, and crimes
against humanity, former Obergruppenführer and SS General Warner Lorenz is
questioned by interpreter Siegfried Ramler during the pre-trial phase of the Nuremberg
proceedings” (p. 46). Ramler explains, “During the pretrial phase the language
interpretation required me to translate [sic] the Counsel’s questions into German, and the
defendant’s or witness’s responses into English. Some of the accused, such as Göring and
Ribbentrop, understood English but preferred to wait for the translation and respond in
German, giving them time to think” (p. 48).
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These situations are examples of community interpreting. What stands out is the
intimacy of close proximity, the “spontaneous and unfiltered” and “raw” reality of
interpreted interaction. In the case of ousting people from their homes, this is an old story
of interpreters aligned with power. Chinua Achebe describes it in his (1958) classic
Things Fall Apart:
When they had all gathered, the white man began to speak to them. He
spoke through an interpreter who was an Ibo man, though his dialect was
different and harsh to the ears of Mbanta. Many people laughed at his
dialect and the way he used words strangely. Instead of saying “myself”
he always said “my buttocks”. But he was a man of commanding presence
and the clansmen listened to him. He said he was one of them, as they
could see from his colour and his language…the white man was also their
brother because they were all sons of God. And he told them about this
new God, the Creator of the world… (p. 102).
Achebe also depicts breakdowns in the interpreted communication, a combination of role
confusion (or abuse) by the interpreters and the failure of participants to monitor turntaking and make sure everyone is equally understood by each other.
Ramler’s other example involves a small group situation which, given the topic, is
unavoidably intimate.214 These are the situations that community interpreters work within
daily. Power and interpersonal dynamics, combined with challenges of mutual
understanding, are palpable, sometimes even visceral. There is no distance provided by
technology. This is the fundamental difference between simultaneous interpretation
performed in the conference mode at the European Parliament and the community mode
in the neighborhoods, towns and cities where people live in proximity with those who do
and do not share a common language.

214

Interesting that Ramler notes the agency of interpretees, too, in their strategic use of
simultaneous interpretation as an intercultural communication tool.
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It may be an overstatement to describe the emphasis on the IBM system of
conference interpreting over the face-to-face encounters of community interpreting as
collective amnesia. Nonetheless, the discursive evidence (in history and contemporarily)
illustrates clearly how one mode became popular while the other was ignored. Was this a
conscious oversight? A deliberate over-valuing of one mode over the other? Most likely
not; instead the disparity of emphasis is an example of an ideology (speed) and its
hegemonic values. In particular, the desire for control associated with the perceived
objectivity of machine technology rather than the messy immediacy of human emotion
intertwined with inevitable flaws of subjectivity. The absence of attention to community
interpreting before, during, and after Nuremberg is perhaps due to the phenomenon of
discursive repression.
The lopsided value placed on conference interpreting over and against community
interpreting suggests the mechanism of repression. Technological utopianism may have
presented conference interpreting as a panacea for the ills of community interpreting: a
legacy of being on the wrong side of history that practitioners may prefer to forget. This
could be one of the sources for the interaction taboo (see section 6.2.7), which prohibits
participants in SI from engaging with the interpreters ‘directly,’ encouraging everyone to
act as if the interpreters are not co-participants in the communication.215

215

A question this dissertation does not explore is who decided that interpreted
communication should be judged and evaluated according to how closely it mimics
same-language communication? This collective pretence perpetuates the interaction
taboo by reducing the interpreter to a non-human status. The interpersonal reduction
of the interpreter to a machine (see section 6.2.8) prohibits shared responsibility for
meaning by discouraging proactive engagement with co-creating mutual
understanding.
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6.1.8

The Interaction Taboo
The conditions of the Nuremberg Tribunal combined with the IBM system created

a perfect petri dish for the ideology of speed: insert bilingual or multilingual human being
with iron nervous control and out spurts the professional simultaneous interpreter. No one
seriously questioned the machine model until it reached beyond the conference and into the
community. The history of the social construction of technology illustrates how unusual it
is for a new technology not to be adapted by its intended consumers. Nonetheless, the
system of SI as it was created at Nuremberg has now grown into the current version of
controlled multilingualism represented above in the discourse about SI in the EP.
Creative adaptation of the technology as a tool for pluralingualism has not been
exercised. Instead, the “simple Derridean point” (Chang, personal correspondence,
October 15, 2011) about the essential communicative equality of misunderstanding and
understanding has been suppressed by a discourse that privileges the easy speed of
presumed mutual comprehension. Unchallenged, the primacy of the conference-style
model, exemplified by the regime of controlled multilingualism (i.e., the system of SI in
the EP), results in the common sense that “the time delay is unsurmountable” (NM28).
Eventually, the model of simultaneous interpretation was exported out of the legalistic
conference setting and into the community, effecting the daily lives of people in need of
communication accommodations in order to negotiate with the institutions relevant to the
quality of their every day lives.
The Deaf community in the United States was open to and excited by the
expansion of communication access but unprepared for having their cultural center
disregarded. The tension built to outrage at the imposition of external control on a
cultural system of interpreting that had already developed indigenously and continues to
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prove successful at integrating Deaf people as members of a distinct linguistic minority
into the larger texture of American life. Although it required decades to develop the
discursive conscious to articulate the practical consciousness of interpreters with “Deaf
heart” (e.g., Colonomos, 2013), it is now crystal clear that Deaf resistance to what they
identified as a machine model of interpreting is has much to do with the insistence on
speed and language without regard for the give-and-take often required for genuine
comprehension. Conference interpreting privileges the speed of information transfer and
calls it quality by a measure (usually called accuracy) that assumes a simplistic
transparency of meaning and disregards how these enactments shape social transactions.
Deaf people, familiar with their own cultural model of community-based interpreting,
understood intuitively that they were being asked to sacrifice cultural values and identity in
order to be granted access into mainstream culture. They were to give up the imperative of
ensuring understanding in favour of speed, and thereby surrender the integrity of their
relationships with each other and outsiders for a fake sense of inclusion. In other words, Deaf
people called the bluff on the ideology of speed and its lopsided communication emphasis on
the transmission of information in space. During the height of Deaf activism in the 1990s,
‘Stop separating your head from your heart,’ was a common accusation against sign language
interpreters schooled in the ways of conference interpreting. If the European Parliament seeks
to seriously protect the linguistic heritage and diversity of its citizens’ national languages,
then Members of the European Parliament must embrace their pluralinguistic contributions
and model co-constructing a common European identity. Lessons from community
interpreting about pluralingualism may be of at least equal value to all of the multilingual
policies which, in practice, support serial homolingualism.
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Table 18. Timeline of Developments in Community and Conference Interpreting
Community SI (e.g., Signed Languages)

Date
19251926

Invention of the Filene-Finlay system,
manufactured by IBM

1941

1st simultaneous interpreter training program:
la Faculté de traduction et d’interprétation
(ETI) at the Université de Genève

1945

United Nations Charter drawn up in five
official languages, Arabic added in 1973.

19451946

Nuremburg War Crimes Tribunal using the
“IBM translation system”

1948

A Mathematical Theory of Communication by
Claude Shannon (American)

1952

Earliest version of the European Parliament,
the “Common Assembly” of the European Coal
and Steel Community

1957

Treaties of Rome lead to the “European
Parliamentary Assembly” of the European
Economic Community

1957

ISIT Paris Institute of Intercultural
Management and Communication

1958

ESIT Paris School of Interpreting and
Translation at Université de la Sorbonne
Nouvelle

1958

European Economic Council: Regulation No. 1
determining the languages to be used by the
European Economic Community institutes
language rights for national languages in (what
becomes) the European Union

1st linguistic argument for ASL published by
William Stokoe (American)

1960

Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf (RID)
founded (US)

1964
1965

RID incorporates (US)

Conference SI (mainly Spoken Languages)

Merger/Brussels Treaty consolidates EU
Institutions

1972
1973

Audism: concept coined and defined by Tom
Humphries (American)

1975

Conference of Interpreter Trainers established
(US)

1978
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European Parliament’s language regime
expands to six

Interpreting for International Conferences:
Problems of Language and Communication by
Danica Seleskovitch (Serbian-French)

Community SI (e.g., Signed Languages)

Date

1st cognitive research of ASL, “The signs of
language”, published by Edward S Klima and
Ursula Bellugi (American)

1979

Association of Visual Language Interpreters of
Canada founded

1980
1981

National Registers of Communication
Professionals Working with Deaf and
DeafBlind People (UK) founded

1982

RID rejects ASL as an official organizational
language

1984

1st public criticism of the “machine model” of
interpreting, RID national convention

1985
1986

European Forum of Sign Language
Interpreters founded

1987

Deaf President Now! protest at Gallaudet
University (US)

1988

Australian Sign Language Interpreters
Association founded

1991
1992

Conference SI (mainly Spoken Languages)

European Parliament’s language regime
expands to seven

European Parliament’s language regime
expands to nine

All six languages of the United Nations are
recognized as both official and working
languages.

Slovak Republic and Finland recognize Sign
Language in law

1993

Czech Sign Language recognized by law

1995

European Parliament’s language regime
expands to eleven

1996

Alex Ndeezi First Deaf Signer elected as a
Member to the Ugandan Parliament

Oralism: defined by Paddy Ladd (British)

1998

European Parliament passes a resolution for all
Member States to recognize their national sign
languages

World Association of Sign Language
Interpreters founded

2003
2004

European Parliament’s language regime
expands to twenty

2007

European Parliament’s language regime
expands to twenty-three

2009

Ádám Kósa, Deaf Signer from Hungary elected
to the European Parliament
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Community SI (e.g., Signed Languages)
Insign pilot project (http://www.eu-insign.eu/)
for Deaf citizens to communicate through a
web-based platform with the European
institutions

6.2

Date

Conference SI (mainly Spoken Languages)

2014

Deaf Resistance and Intercultural Critique
Taking the US American case, a disconnect in perceptions between the culturally

Deaf viewpoint and the general perspective of professional sign language interpreters has
inspired over forty years of debate regarding what makes a good simultaneous interpreter.
Lou Fant (1990) describes the founding of the Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf (RID)
as an “unexpected outcome” (p. 6) of a federally-funded Workshop on Interpreting for
the Deaf at Ball State University which “surely would have come about shortly
afterwards” if it had not happened then and there (p. 6). According to minutes published
in Fant’s retrospective, sixty-six people launched the professionalization of sign language
interpreting; one third of these founders were Deaf. Seven of the Deaf sustaining
members also self-identified as interpreters (p. 5). Due to adequate federal funding for
training, unprecedented rapid growth ensued.
Within a few years, however, there was a backlash from the Deaf community
which, in important respects, continues to the present day. “Deaf individuals are being
asked to give their trust to someone they have not met before, who has no prior or even
current connection to their community, and who might not understand their values and
culture” (McDermid, 2009). The distinction between “conference” and “community”
interpreters is often brought sharply into focus on this point: elites will not suffer
interpreters with inadequate linguistic fluency or cross-cultural knowledge while the
Deaf, as a linguistic minority, seem to lack the institutional leverage to guarantee
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uniformly high quality standards. This has not stopped the Deaf community from
insisting on improvements. Indeed, a diagnosis of oppression emerged as both logical
explanation and empowered resistance after 1983 when RID, by then the national
certifying organization for professional sign language interpreters in the US, failed to
recognize American Sign Language as an official language of the organization (MJ
Bienvenu, 2009).

6.2.1

A Black Swan
Thinking in terms of time allows one to recognize that the disruptive effect of the

IBM System’s model of SI on the cultures of Deaf people is an example of a “black
swan,” that is, an historical event with deep consequentiality that was not predicted and
which has not previously been adequately explained (Taleb, 2005). Charlotte BakerShenk published the first treatise against “the machine model” of interpreting (1986).
Writing on behalf of an unnamed group of colleagues (presumedly including Deaf
individuals), Baker-Shenk explained how the basic interpreting or machine model of the
sign language interpreter’s role assumed two “equals” who use the interpreter “machine”
because they do not share a common language (p. 52).
Baker-Shenk elaborated that although the interpreter may make some “cultural
adjustments” to accurately convey the messages of each party, still both parties are on
their own: every individual must take solo responsibility for their interaction (p. xx). Five
years later, after the Deaf community had adopted and extended the definition of the
machine model, Baker-Shenk (1991) clarifies that her original use of
the term ‘machine’ model ... was to describe the interpreter’s role
...functioning ...ethically...as machines. This machine model clearly
reveals the basic tendencies of people in power (the dominant class) both
323

to deny the reality of their power and to deny that power is part of what’s
going on in every situation. (pp. 123-124)
Persistent, critical pressure from Deaf interpretees required practitioners, interpreting
trainers, and sign language interpreting researchers to take notice and eventually respond.
The Conference of Interpreter Trainers (CIT), established in 1979, became a
venue for improvement. By 1999, Anna Mindess reported that spoken language
interpreting professors at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (California) told
her “that they consider sign language interpreters very advanced in our discussions about
the cultural aspects of interpreting and in the idea of interpreters as bicultural mediators”
(p. 161). CIT has continued to steadily increase its reputation. In the main, however, the
advances of signed language community interpreters have not been much noticed by
spoken language conference interpreters.

6.2.1.1

Deaf Voice
Widening the context to its full historical import, the resistance of conference-

style trained simultaneous sign language interpreters in adapting to the Deaf communitystyle model is parallel in contemporary timestream with the resistance of MEP
interpretees to pluralingualistic social transaction. The dynamics of controlled
multilingualism in the EP promote competition among exclusive homolingualisms. The
discursive emphasis on fast information transfer unilaterally promotes and reinforces the
transmission or machine model of interpreting: a translation machine. A counterdiscourse
of pluralingualism is a corrective to the unintended but devastating consequences of
valuing the ease of speed over the quality of shared comprehension. Deaf people, with
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their unique linguistic and cultural differences, reintroduce the relational by valuing the
time required to ensure mutual understanding.

6.2.2

The Deaf Case: Practical to Discursive Consciousness
Deaf people knew perfectly well how to work with interpreters long before the

birth of the sign language interpreting profession in Evansville, Indiana in 1964, but they
had never had to explain it to anyone before. “There have always been information
sharers, and their responsibility within the Deaf community is to ensure that community
members understand the information” (Stone, 2009, p. 19). The roots of community
interpreting were premised in an “original cultural system that [had] been unconsciously
derived and unconsciously manifested” (Sherwood, 1983, p. 14). It was almost four
decades before sign language interpreter-researcher Dennis Cokely (2005) distinguished
between “evolved” and “schooled” interpreters as part of an effort to explain the
intergroup conflict that was created by the unexpectedly rapid growth of the sign
language interpreting profession.
Evolved interpreters are indigenous. They grow up within the community
interpreting for family and friends as necessary and have, therefore, internalized the
norms of social behavior in practical ways, just like every other member or close friend
of the community. Historically, as Sherwood points out, evolved interpreters had
practical consciousness in the sense meant by Giddens. They simply knew what to do in
order to make intercultural communication with hearing (non-deaf/non-signing) people
work, and they did it. A somewhat similar phenomenon is described by old-school
interpreters for the European Parliament, who recount how they simply ‘fell into’
interpreting because they grew up in multilingual families and were good at it, compared
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with the new-school interpreters who learn languages formally because they have
consciously determined to pursue interpreting as a career.
In the US, when schooled sign language interpreters began entering the field in
large numbers, they added to the force of a new way of interpreting already imposed on
the Deaf community by an influx of outsiders. These new ways were strange and painful,
experienced by Deaf persons as alienating and oppressive (e.g., Baker-Shenk, 1986; Fant,
1990; Moore & Levitan, 2003). Over the years, through advocacy and resistance, Deaf
people built up a vocabulary for describing the machine model and as well as preferred
practices and features of “interpreting culturally rich realities” (Cokely, 2001; Mindess,
1999). Recently, sign language interpreting researchers have
●

re-discovered Deaf norms for interpreting (Adam, Carty & Stone, 2011; Forestal,
2011; Stone, 2009),

●

created a multidimensional model of the interpreter’s role space (Lee &
Llewellyn-Jones, 2011),

●

developed the concepts of relational autonomy and decision latitude (WitterMerithew, Johnson & Nicodemus, 2011) and

●

adapted a “demand-control schema” (Dean and Pollard 2001, 2011) that is being
widely adopted as the premier model for professional development and ethical
performance in community interpreting.

The scaffold for professional practice is now substantial, but its constructs had to be
forged in opposition to the machine model within a context of intense backlash.
The next few sections trace a cultural-level development from practical to
discursive consciousness that the American Deaf Community had to pursue in order to
resist the imposition of those antagonistic standards of interpreting that infiltrated Deaf
cultural timespace during the process of professionalizing signed language interpretation.
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6.2.3

Caught up in the Machine
The implications of professionalization, specifically of “investing professional

authority” (Brunson, 2006) in interpreters were not predicted (Fant, 1990) by the tight
community that launched and led the organizing process in the 1960s. Related to, yet
different than, the systems of spoken language interpreting at international venues such as
United Nations and the young institutions of the European Union that sprang from the
Nuremberg precedent, community interpreting involved visual-gestural American Sign
Language and spoken (sound-based) English. The spread of the conference interpreting
model to community interpreting is an example of a phenomenon known in
organizational management as isomorphism, in which rational procedures (such as
trainings) that are established and practiced in an institutional context generate a tendency
to sameness across a given field of activity (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Isomorphism
literally means taking the same shape. Schooled sign language interpreters ‘took the same
shape’ as spoken language conference interpreters because the field of activity was
presumed to be the same and the rational procedures (instantaneous decision-making
because you cannot afford to stop, etc.) were unquestioned.
With uncanny insight, Deaf people pinpointed the machine-like nature of the
inherited conference interpreting model. “The ‘machine’ or ‘conduit’ model...greatly
limited [interpreters’] responsibility for either party’s understanding of the other’s
message. Like a typewriter or telephone answering machine, we [interpreters] were only
to transmit what we had received without altering its contents in any way” (Mindess,
1999).
“The focus of this [machine or conduit] metaphor is on interpreting the
language of the participants, with the assumption that the primary
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difference between Deaf people and hearing people can be explained by
differences in language and modality (signed vs. spoken language). The
assumption is that the responsibility of the interpreter is to convey each
person’s words, which would otherwise be inaccessible due to the
modality difference. (Emphasis in original Hoza, 1999: 44)
Without historical context, and never having had a reason to defend the evolved
community interpreting model, the amazing communication accommodation of
simultaneous interpretation was suddenly experienced as contributing more to the
oppression of Deaf people than alleviating it.

6.2.4

“I was a Robot”
In For Hearing People Only, Moore & Levitan report one of too many such

instances when interpreters’ authority to assess and act upon practical interaction
dynamics was suppressed by the pervasive “machine” logic. “We’ve read Lou Ann
Walker’s harrowing account of ... [being] terribly constrained by the code of ethics” in
such a way that “a young, poor black woman who had killed her sister’s vicious
boyfriend in self-defense... [who] should have been acquitted ... was found guilty and
sentenced to prison. Walker, who sympathized with the woman, was helpless to aid her in
court: ‘I was a robot.’” (1999/2003: 522).216 Paul Preston, interviewing 150 hearing (not
deaf) children of Deaf parents explains their disagreement with the model perpetuated by
the professionalization of interpreting:

216

Angelelli (2001) describes this behaviour in machine model terms: “The invisible
interpreter follows the traffic flow instead of controlling it, ignores differences in
register, and is indifferent to the parties’ access or lack of access to the message. The
invisible interpreter is not active in the cross-cultural brokerage but rather, treats the
message at the linguistic level only” (p. 134).
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A more mechanistic approach is thought to provide deaf people with
unfiltered interactions with the Hearing world; any attempt at clarification
merely sustains the barriers between the Deaf and Hearing. Most
informants who were professional [evolved] interpreters, however, cited
their family experiences as favoring a less rigid and mechanistic approach
to interpreting. (1994, p. 145)
Baker-Shenk acknowledges how her label, machine model, which she originally intended
to be specific to ethical decision-making, had been taken up and used to describe another
dimension of the enactment of simultaneous interpretation.
Let me clarify my use of the term “machine” model. I first used this term
at the 1985 RID Convention...since then, it has been used in a different
way, specifically referring to the linguistic process of word-for-sign or
sign-for-word, machine-like transliteration. (1991, p. 123)
A representation of “rigid mechanical Sign” by an interpreter is provided in a work of
fiction by T.C. Boyle (2006/2007, p. 57). Identity theft has placed a young deaf woman in
police custody; she does not know why. When the interpreter arrives she explains:
There’s some huge mistake. All I did was run a four-way stop ... and they,
they ... Iverson took his time. His signing was rigid and inelegant but
comprehensible...He held her eyes. His mouth was drawn tight, no
sympathy there. It came to her that he believed the charges, believed she’d
led a double life, that she’d violated every decent standard and let the deaf
community down, one more hearing prejudice confirmed. Yes, his eyes
said, the deaf live by their own rules, inferior rules, compromised rules,
they live off of us and on us. It was a look she’d seen all her life...
It’s crazy. It’s wrong, a mistake, that’s all. Tell them it’s a mistake.
The coldest look, the smallest Sign. You get one phone call. (p. 8, 12)
Boyle’s realistic example merges both the ethical and linguistic dimensions of
mechanical interpreting. Cynthia Roy elaborates:
Interpreters often describe their role “as the person in the middle” by
using a metaphor which conveys the image or impression that they serve
as a bridge or channel through which communication happens. This
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channel is supposed to relay a message from one speaker to another
faithfully, accurately, and without personal or emotional bias. The
performance of this role has been compared to a machine, a window, a
bridge, and a telephone line — among others — when trying to compress
the complexity of the role into a simple, singular analogy or metaphor.
(2000, p. 101)
Roy’s distinction between a metaphor and a model is important; it is crucial to recognize
what the metaphor teaches and reveals about the model. Criticism by Deaf people about
the imposition of this alien model of interpretation focused on the interpreter because it
was through the interpreter’s adherence to the model that Deaf people experienced the
destruction of cultural ways of relating to and interacting with others.

6.2.5

The Schooled Sign Language Interpreter217
Campbell McDermid (2009) published a study on the social construction of sign

language interpreters in Canada that illustrates the current state of tension between Deaf
people as members of a linguistic minority group and sign language interpreters as
professionals in the business of delivering a communication service that is intended to
leverage social justice. “At one time,” McDermid writes, “a successful interpreter was
compared to an inanimate translation machine (Frishberg, 1986; Humphrey & Alcorn,
2001; Page, 1993), a metaphor that ‘ignore[d] the essential fact that the interpreter [is] a
human being’ (Frishberg, 1986)” (2009, p. 108). McDermid, like many writing in the
field now, casts the machine model as an artifact from history, a framing which implies it
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Caveat: The differences and similarities between evolved and schooled interpreters
are not absolute. The analysis presented here is based on historical, aggregate trends
and generalized characteristics: exceptions exist. Evolved interpreters are not
automatically better than schooled interpreters; everyone should be trained (and
trainable).

330

is no longer influential. However, evidence of machine model outcomes are persistent
(Campbell, 2009). These adverse outcomes were predicted by Fenton (1993, in
McDermid 2009: 106) based on similar trends between evolved and schooled interpreters
unfolding in New Zealand. McDermid describes machine model outcomes in
contemporary Canada (2009).
Going back through recent decades, McDermid finds documentation of a trend
that “…deaf Canadians [are] …distressed by the condescending views of some
practitioners (Cripps, 1994; Cundy, 1989; Straitiy, 2002)” (in McDermid, 2009), and are
concerned that schooled interpreters demonstrate “…inability to interpret successfully . . .
especially from ASL to spoken English (Cripps, 1994; Cundy, 1989)” in (McDermid,
2009). In other words, schooled interpreters are often better with source messages from a
dominant spoken language group ‘down’ a language hierarchy than they are with source
messages ‘up’ the language hierarchy. In light of these concerns and dynamics, it is no
surprise that McDermid cites another study finding that 14 of 15 interviewed deaf parents
expressed positive views regarding the use of their hearing offspring (Mallory et al, 1992;
McDermid, 2009) as evolved interpreters.
In sum, McDermid (2009) describes the education and training of American Sign
Language/English interpreters in Canada218 as a process of social construction that has
shifted the performance of interpreting from its original locally-produced and homegrown
roots to a style shaped exclusively by the experiences of being trained in school.

218

Families of sign languages do not necessarily follow spoken language families. For
instance, American Sign Language is linguistically related to LSF, langue des signes
francais (French Sign Language) and spoken French, not to British Sign Language
(BSL) or spoken English.
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McDermid adopts Cokely’s label of “evolved” (2005) to describe the original interpreters
who had a deaf relative and/or worked at a residential school for the Deaf (Carbin, 1996;
Cokely, 2003; Deninger, 1987; Napier, 2006; Van Herreweghe & Van Nuffel, 2000) and
“were invited to interpret by the [Deaf] community” (2009, 105; Cokely, 2003; Evans &
Bomak, 1996; Fenton, 1993; Van Herreweghe & Van Nuffel, 2000). In the literature,
these evolved interpreters are set in sharp contrast with “schooled” interpreters (Cokely,
2005), whose faults and weaknesses are extensively documented and continue to vex the
Deaf Community (e.g., Elliott, 2013).

6.2.6

Challenging the Machine219
The Deaf invention of community interpreting is not emphasized in the academic

literature on simultaneous interpretation. Members of American Deaf Culture understand
the creation of the first professional organization for signed language interpreters as an
“offshoot of the Deaf civil-rights movement” (Moore & Levitan, 2003). This Deaf claim
to ownership of the Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf (RID) and thus to signed
language interpreting informs education, training, and professional development
discourses within the field, but is rarely explicitly stated in the professional literature.
One way to regain the evolved interpreting model is to demonstrate that this is the model
that has been in open competition with the machine model for the last several decades.

219

The author (a certified interpreter with no Deaf family) writes as an outsider, hoping
that insiders will follow and fill in the many holes. In particular, records and stories
from the NAD and other Deaf-centered and Deaf-led organizations who were
engaged in the struggle over certification can probably only be gained by core
members of the Deaf community with direct ties to these individuals.
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The Deaf version of evolved community interpreters has been being expressed
through the practices of evolved interpreters for several decades, and sign language
interpreters have changed the model of interpreting directly because of Deaf criticism. It
is interesting that spoken language community interpreters do not appear to be under
similar pressure from their linguistic minority constituencies as signed language
interpreters have been from the Deaf communities whom we serve. This may be because
spoken language minority groups are encountering their own versions of moving
practical consciousness to discursive consciousness in order to defend and uphold their
own versions of evolved interpreters. The only comparable parallel I have found in the
literature to date is with Aboriginal interpreters in Australia (Cooke, 2009).220 The crux
of the criticism directed at signed language interpreters always involves culture.
Specifically, the oppressive effect of the adopted professional model of conference-style
simultaneous interpretation is that it promotes the Nuremberg/IBM system, forcing
minority language participants to give up significant aspects of their cultural ways of
being.
Deaf resistance to standard simultaneous interpretation illustrates the importance
of both the ritual and the transmission aspects of communication. James Carey (1992)
explains how these two aspects are represented as models of communication (the
“transmission” model and the “ritual” model). He explains the historical existence of
these models, side-by-side (although in different power ratios), in American society and
elsewhere. What the history of simultaneous interpreting shows is a colonization of time
220

Cooke (2009) describes how interpreters for Aboriginal communities in Australia
also place strong cultural expectations on interpreters that are counter to the model of
the dominant society.
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by the ideology of speed. This is accomplished by insisting on the linguistic fallacy (all
words in all languages have equivalents), accompanied by the myth of accuracy (as if
interpreters can singlehandedly determine meanings once and for all), and insisting on
communication being accomplished as fast and automatically as possible. The inevitable
result of interpreting speed and automaticity is homolingualism.
The core of Deaf feedback is that there are cultural problems with the
prescriptions of the Nuremberg/IBM transmission model of simultaneous interpretation.
Specifically, Deaf people’s criticism of the machine model draws attention to the narrow
emphasis on the transmission of information in the IBM system; which is what is playing
out in the system of SI in the EP. This transmission model ignores the ritual aspects of
communication, resulting in disregard for the relationships and identities of the
interpretees. This social neglect applies to all of the participants and includes the
interpreter(s), too. Deaf Americans (in particular) and others have been making the case
that there is always more to communication than information alone. Revising the
community interpreting model means insisting that ritual elements of social interaction
are as important as the information content has radical implications because it brings us
face to face with the interaction taboo.

6.2.7

Confronting the Interaction Taboo
The interaction taboo takes many forms, but it always involves not speaking about

an issue of cultural difference, and probably always involves a power imbalance due to
social status. Specifically, the interaction taboo supports a ban on interpreters facilitating
the social aspects of an interpreted interaction in order to assist interpretees with
comprehending each other. Dean and Pollard critique this as a problem of ethics (see
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Figure 1), arguing that the profession uses a deontological, rules-based approach that
ignores interpreter responsibility for the outcomes of interaction. Instead, they argue for a
teleological ethics (which can also be “too liberal”) that is responsive to “the complex
situation dynamics in which the individual is continually evaluating potential and actual
decisions with respect to the outcomes of these decisions may, or are, causing” (2011, p.
157).

Ethical and Effective Decisions and Actions
Too Liberal

Therefore
ineffective
and/or
unethical

	
  
Figure 1.

Too Conservative

Liberal

Conservative

Therefore
ineffective
and/or
unethical

Ethical Decision Making in a Practice Profession

Source: Dean & Pollard, 2005. Consumers and service effectiveness in interpreting work: A practice
profession perspective. The above figure, labelled “Figure 11.1,” appeared on page 270 of Interpreting
and interpreter education: Directions for research and practice published by Oxford University Press.
Used with permission.

In the deontological ethical framework (“too conservative”), interpreters “adherence to
preordained rules” (Dean & Pollard, 2011, p. 157) leaves interpretees to fend for
themselves.
Although some interpretees recognize and are able to act on their meta-awareness
about the unusual situation of interpreted intercultural transaction, generally a
deontological ethical approach leads to continued repetition of unsatisfactory intercultural
dynamics. A blatant example comes from McDermid, whose study of American Sign
Language (ASL) and Interpreter Training Program [ITP] programs found that
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“Instructors were…advised to avoid criticizing the students for their inappropriate
behavior or attitudes, as this was probably due to the values of today’s society” (2009, p.
121). Issues of intercultural difference and different social status are complicated and
require sensitivity to facilitate. It turns out that schooled interpreters with no previous
exposure or familiarity with Deaf ways typically have only practical consciousness (not
discursive consciousness) of proper social behavior, and this practical consciousness is
only evident within their own personal/cultural contexts (e.g., Cokely, 2005; McDermid,
2009; Preston, 1994). “Younger students in particular, took for granted their cultural
identity, lacked any self-awareness around who they were and just dismissed issues of
culture and power” (McDermid, 2009). Such limits on practical and discursive conscious
appear vividly apparent in the intercultural, pluralinguistic transaction-contexts of
simultaneous interpretation.
Equipping interpreters and interpretees with discursive consciousness specific to
both intercultural communication and ethical decision-making regarding the socially just
mediation of unequal relationships will go a long way toward addressing the anxiety
observed in students “when they were asked to participate in Deaf community events”
(McDermid, 2009). The interaction taboo prevents conversation between teachers who
are concerned with a perceived values conflict between ITP and Deaf Studies Programs’
non-deaf students and the Deaf community (McDermid, 2009).
The interaction taboo also supports a subtle conflation in which values of
individualism are combined with a pathological judgment about Deaf persons and the
Deaf community. For instance, McDermid includes these two labels together as if they
always co-occur: “…Some students begin their programs with an individualistic,
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pathological view of the Deaf community, as suggested by the research (Humphrey &
Alcorn, 2001; Mindess, 1996). These learners believe there is no difference between
hearing and Deaf cultures (Peterson, 1999)” (McDermid , 2009: 126).
While it may be the case that the distinct attitudes of cultural imperialism and
audism generally co-occur, it is stereotyping to assume that they do. Allowing that
students may only embody one or the other of these problematic attitudes enables
important wiggle room for growth through the uncomfortable process of realizing one’s
own complicity in the dehumanization of other human beings. Likewise, enabling
conversation about the intersection of various identities (Holvino, 2010) in any given
student and how these can play into interpreted interaction will open space for instruction
about religious motivations in interpreting (McDermid, 2009), analysis and diagnosis of
why interpreting attracts mainly white and middle class students (McDermid, 2009: 116),
and perhaps crack the field’s gender bias (McDermid, 2009) and attract more men. While
McDermid’s study results may seem disheartening in the sense that they demonstrate
weaknesses in the current curriculum for schooling interpreters, what he has achieved is a
snapshot that can serve as a benchmark against which to measure future improvements.
Encouragingly, he also reports that the instructors who participated in his study
“recognized their duty to prepare future citizens of the Deaf community” (McDermid,
2009) and are doing their best to undo the interaction taboo.

6.2.8

Exposing the Interpersonal Reduction
Given historical context, it hopefully becomes more clear why the social justice

critique of oppression in interpreting practice is often aimed at the interpreter. The
empowerment argument, however, cannot afford to stop with a reconfiguration of the
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interpreter’s role. In the absence of discursive consciousness about pluralingualism, the
cultural aspects of evolved interpreting, combined with the historical timestream of the
social construction of technology, cannot undo the interaction taboo. Casting all the
responsibility for effective intercultural communication on the interpreter alone is an
interpersonal reduction that dehumanizes the interpreter and the interpretees.
If interpreting is understood to involve relationships as much as information, then
reducing the complicated whole of interpreted intercultural interaction to a single
interpersonal dynamic between the interpreter and the Deaf consumer is a fallacy of
selective observation. Surely there are sometimes issues at this level, but just because the
interpreter is the obvious crux of the interpreted communication, it does not follow that
whatever goes wrong must be the interpreter’s fault! The interpersonal reduction needs to
be recognized as a residue of the machine model that perpetuates the transmission model
bias of privileging information over relationship.
Overcoming the interpersonal reduction and interaction taboo can shift entrenched
dynamics of suspicion that Deaf consumers have about, for instance, being
“[mislead]…into thinking that [interpreters] are more qualified than they are (Ontario
Ministry of Education and Training, 1998b, para. 1) (McDermid, 2009). Interpreters
“lack of awareness of how issues of power and oppression shape their work (BakerShenk, 1986; Taylor & Straity, 1992)” (McDermid 2009) is, ironically, supported in
some ways by interpretees’ preferences for flow (Kent, 2012). Widening the scope of
criticism of the machine model to include the interpretees’ participation in rapid turntaking, rushing through the delivery of information without allowing processes of
confirmation for mutual understanding, de-valuing the significance of cultural
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differences, and other features of the transmission model of interpretation over and above
the establishment and performance of culturally-respectful relationships, will enable
interpreters to act as “agents of change” (McDermid, 2009; Witter-Merithew, 1995),
building productively upon the discourse foundation of basic generalizations that
reinforce the fact of different cultural norms, such as those for reciprocity (McDermid,
2009; Smith, 1983; Still, 1990).

6.2.9

Reconstructing the Model
In 1979, Jemina Napier explains how the Conference of Interpreter Trainers (CIT)

was established and “set the benchmark” of professional community interpreting for
other countries (2010, p. 357). CIT was established six years before Baker-Shenk
publicized Deaf criticism of the machine model of interpreting. By 1999, Anna Mindess
reported that spoken language interpreting professors at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies (California) told her “that they consider sign language interpreters
very advanced in our discussions about the cultural aspects of interpreting and in the idea
of interpreters as bicultural mediators” (p. 161). The international Critical Link
conferences on community/public service interpreting have included signed language
interpreters on par with spoken language interpreters since their inception in 1995.
A critical discourse analysis placing the profession of sign language interpreters
into a relevant historical timestream establishes the link between the steady, persistent
and determined progress of the Deaf community to return community-style interpretation
back to its own original cultural roots against the imposed domination of an externally
imposed system of conference interpreting. Bonnie Sherwood (1987) recognized that
Deaf ways are so normal to Deaf people that the norms for interculturally-appropriate
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interpreting existed only in practical consciousness. The process of creating discursive
consciousness offers insight into the intergroup conflict created by the unexpectedly rapid
growth of the sign language interpreting profession.
Recent scholarship by Eileen Forestal (2011), Adam, Carty & Stone (2011), and
Christopher Stone (2009), have established the historical basis of Deaf norms for
relationship-based community-style simultaneous interpretation. The re-emergence over
the past decade of Deaf interpreters, that is, of professional interpreters who are nonhearing and culturally Deaf, has been described as “shifting positionality” (Cokely,
2005b, p. 3). The shift is from a position of dependence or oppression to one of
empowerment and agency. Observable “resistance among hearing interpreters to
chang[ing] how they [work]” (Forestal, 2011, p. 134) is, I suggest, a “parallel process”
(Alderfer & Smith, 1982) that mirrors the resistance of interpretees (as seen in the
European Parliament) to working with interpreters at all.

6.3

Disrupting Homolingualism: Social Construction of the Automobile
As I tried to talk with MEPs and officials of the EP about the monologic of

multilingualism, for a long time words failed. My own practical consciousness was being
stretched. I kept talking about the ‘monolingualism’ I was observing in the popularity of
English as lingua franca (ELF), perceiving ELF as resistance to using interpreters.
Mirroring the experience of linguist Michael Reddy regarding “frame conflict in our
language about language” (1979), my discursive consciousness was limited by the
boundaries of my cognition as it had been already shaped through exposure to language
and social interaction.
Reddy describes the challenge of his own “frame restructuring” (Schön, 1979):
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I confess it took nearly five years for me to come around…what stood in
the way was never a counter-argument, but rather the simple inability to
think clearly about the matter. My mind would seem to go to sleep at
crucial moments, and it was only the mounting weight of more and more
evidence that finally forced it to stay awake. (p. 176, 1979).
The (then) new frame of radical subjectivism was the subject of Reddy’s struggle to
restructure his intellectual/cognitive frame. I was dealing with the practical consciousness
of homolingualism: that impulse and desire to communicate with others who speak the
same language that I witness in myself and others. Homolingualism is evident in
intellectual domains and disciplinary sub-fields as well as in regard to natural languages.
The Deaf community is remarkable in several respects, one of them being the degree to
which they are willing to embrace everyone who relies upon their eyes for language,
regardless of their level of fluency, as long as they make the effort to express themselves
using a signed language.
The parallel with ELF and every other attempt by language learners to make the
phatic gesture of connecting with another human being in their (different) language is
obvious. But the Deaf community’s extraordinary cultural affinity seems to have
endowed them with a capacity for resistance against linguistic imperialism (Phillipson,
1992) that exceeds the combined constraint of homolingual bias and the ideology of
speed. It is this capacity that seems to have motivated the development of discursive
consciousness regarding the deep practical values of relationally-based community
interpreting. So Deaf people resist the machine, and in response the profession of
community interpreting continues to evolve toward a pluralinguistic field increasingly
characterized by equality of voice. Indigenously, Deaf communities have sociallyconstructed communication norms that balance the relational aspects of simultaneous
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interpretation with the informational aspects of message transfer. The fact that few other
linguistic groups have challenged the professional model of the interpreter so clearly and
effectively is perhaps a commentary on the scope and intensity of the underlying speedplus-automatic transmission equation.
In a landmark article in the history of technology, Ronald Kline and Trevor Pinch
demonstrate conclusively how “users of technology acted as agents of technological
change” (1994: 764). They locate their argument with others (Douglas, 1987; Fischer,
1992; Martin, 1991; Nye, 1990) in “support [of] a more specific claim that the use of an
artifact or system has not only resulted in unforeseen consequences, but that users have
helped to shape the artifact or system itself” (Nye p. 765). Using a specific model (the
Social Construction of Technology, Pinch & Bijker, 1984), Kline and Pinch show how
farm workers in the rural United States were so responsive to the invention of the
automobile that the automobile industry was compelled to
1

counter the activities of specific social groups (including aggressive anti-car
campaigns),

2

engage in marketing campaigns to discourage the wide range of applications
invented for vehicles (and especially the engines in them) by the individuals
who purchased them, and

3

to develop new products that were responsive to the “interpretive flexibility of
the rural auto developed by farm men and women during the first decades of
the century (1994, p. 783-784).

As noted, such intensive and contentious social negotiation is strikingly absent from the
development of the conference-style system of simultaneous interpretation. Despite the
pervasive evidence of interpreter failure at Nuremberg, no one questioned the exclusive
loading of meaning-making onto the interpreter(s) alone.

342

The discourse about the system of SI in the EP shows that simultaneous
interpretation, as a social technology, remains the expectation. “You can barely see
them,” says an EP official, shading his eyes as if looking into the far distance (F04).
“You only meet the interpreters through the glass,” explains an MEP, “That’s why
Delegations are so important” (OM44). The interaction taboo of interpretees with
interpreters was architecturally formalized after the Nuremberg trials when interpreters
were moved off the floor and out of the immediate social interaction into separate,
segregated booths: behind the glass. The argument being constructed here is not to un-do
the physical arrangements, but rather to explore the social and discursive codes that have
reduced the expression, effectiveness, and equality of Members’ voices. How have
Members come to believe in homolingual communication in such a pluralingual
environment?

6.4

Deaf Invention
As an historical development, the unexpectedly rapid growth of the signed

language interpreting profession in the U.S. catapulted the American Deaf Community
into confrontation with the larger “hearing” world. This is a classic case of intergroup
conflict. What was striking about the institutional climate of the U.S. signed language
interpreting profession in the 1980s and ‘90s was how it became an extended site for a
ferocious battle by culturally Deaf people to preserve ASL and residential schools for the
Deaf as incubators for a vibrant, empowered, diverse cultural community within an
encompassing American national identity. (Nationalism was not an overt part of the
ASL/English bilingual-bicultural movement for cultural education and language
preservation, but its assumptions are microsocially embedded (e.g., Wilcox 1989) in the
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gender and class structure of prominent Deaf activists, protestors, and educators and
macrosocially evident in the widespread “English Only” backlash against all bilingual
education programs in the US (e.g., Olson, 1991).
There are many factors feeding the successes and sustained passion of
ASL/English bilingual and bicultural activists. Certainly, the pervasiveness of cultural
violations (notably by signed language interpreters, teachers of deaf students, and others)
throughout the 1970s and 1980s (not to mention the previous century of repression)
contributed to the professional organization of the Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf
becoming a focal point for concentrated criticism. Judgments rendered by American Deaf
participants in interpreted communication combine outcome with delivery. This
combination clearly reflects a cultural imperative to evaluate interpreter performance
according to Deaf-defined criteria rather than criteria imposed externally by non-Deaf
people.
The ultimate measure of success for intercultural, interpreted communication was
historically defined by the Deaf community in regard to ghostwriters, who were valued
because (among other skills) they could speak English well, but “the judgment for
‘speaking well’ comes from the success of the interaction rather than the intelligibility of
the speech as judged by non-Deaf people” (emphasis added, Adam, Carty & Stone, 2011,
p. 383). Also, assumptions about the English fluency of Deaf ghostwriters spread “by
‘word of mouth’ with respect to the success of previous correspondence or interaction”
(emphasis added, Adam, Carty & Stone, 2011, p. 386). These judgments are based in a
future orientation to time, the outcome of interpretation in relational terms of satisfactory
mutual understanding, rather than a past orientation to time, which emphasizes the
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accuracy of ‘translation’ [sic] by looking ‘backward’ as it were, to a fixed, supposedly
immutable and inerrant, ‘source message.’
A similar emphasis on Deaf-defined criteria for the quality of interpreting is
expressed by Deaf translator/interpreters working in broadcast television, who place “the
greatest importance on the Deaf consumer understanding [the target tanguage]
information” (Stone, 2009, p. 109). This informational emphasis, however, is inherently
relational, i.e., it highlights the “construction of relevance” (p. 171) between the Deaf
Translator/Interpreter and their audience as essential to the transmission of information.
The precedent for the relational model used in broadcast television
interpreting/translating exists in the traditional Deaf culture practice of ghostwriting
(Adam, Carty and Stone, 2011), and the practices and principles of such a relational
model are evident in the work of a growing group of professional Deaf interpreters in the
United States (Forestal, 2011; Stone, 2009).

6.4.1

Back Reaction from the Deaf Center
Carol Padden and Tom Humphries wrote an essay called, “A Different Center,” in

which they explained how the “the meanings of DEAF and ‘deaf’ are, at the very least, not
the same. DEAF is a means of identifying the group and one’s connection to it, and ‘deaf’
is a means of commenting on one’s inability to speak and hear” (1988, p. 33).221 Padden
& Humphries recount a friend’s confusion in understanding the label, ‘HARD-OF-

221

Throughout this dissertation, Deaf is always capitalized to signify the identity group.
Hearing and speaking ability has not been addressed, neither literally nor
metaphorically. Padden & Humphries’ essay is in Deaf in America: Voices from a
Culture.
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HEARING,’ which

is literally defined in exactly opposite terms depending on the central

point of reference. In spoken English, the measurement is made from the assumed
standard of sound, so a little hard-of-hearing means a person can hear quite a lot. Very
hard-of-hearing is someone approaching auditory deafness. However, from the culturally
Deaf center, “A-LITTLE HARD-OF-HEARING is a small deviation from DEAF, and thus is
used for someone who is only slightly hearing. VERY HARD-OF-HEARING is someone who
departs from the center greatly, thus someone who can hear quite well” (p. 41)
A common source of so-called mistakes and misunderstandings in
simultaneously-interpreted intercultural transactions comes from the juxtapositions of
larger world[s] of meaning where there are conventions for describing
relationships between conditions and identities. Within this world of
meaning—compared [in this example] to that of English and others—
there is a different alignment, toward a different center. (p. 42)
Despite the shock and disillusionment of intergroup conflict, the Deaf center has held.
The core cultural values of ensuring mutual understanding and relational relevance have
acted back on interpreting researcher-practitioners, who have steadily studied and
reflected upon the objects of Deaf criticism and begun to provide models that explain and
illustrate the concerns at the heart of community interpreting as social transaction.
Dean and Pollard’s (2001) Demand-Control Schema rejects “one static level of
[linguistic] demand” (p. 5) and foregrounds that “interpreting is best understood as a
practice profession rather than a technical profession (Dean & Pollard, 2011, p. 156).
Practice professions like medicine, teaching and law enforcement do
involve the learning and application of technical skills, but these technical
skills are always applied in dynamic, interactive social context (i.e., with
patients, students and citizens/suspects, respectively). In contrast,
technical professions such as laboratory science and engineering apply
technical skills in situations that are more removed from social interaction
with consumers. (2011, p. 156)
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Recognizing interpreting as a practice profession allows the first major move of
recognizing the non-linguistic demands of the work. The DC-S emerges from a theory of
occupational stress which Dean and Pollard adapted from Karasek (1979). Karasek’s
“model posits two phenomenological dimensions that affect workers in a given setting or
situation. These dimensions are termed demand and control, and the ‘strength’ of each
dimension ranges from low to high” (in Dean & Pollard, 2001, p. 2)
The term demand refers to the requirements of a job, which may include
aspects of the environment, the actual task being performed, and other
factors that “act upon” the individual. The term control refers to the
degree to which the individual has the power to “act upon” the demands
presented by the job, perhaps by making decisions, bringing skills or
resources to bear on the task, or altering the environment or other aspects
of the task demand. (p. 2)
In addition to explicating the ways demands and controls appear in simultaneous
interpretation, Dean and Pollard introduced the concept of decision latitude from Karasek
and his colleague Töres Thorell to the field as a control element within interpreters’
professional practice and performances of interpreting.
Dean and Pollard explain that their “concept of control includes the skills and
other resources a worker has to cope with demands presented to him [or her] and
especially [her or] his degree of authority and freedom to exercise decisions about which
skills and resources to employ and how to do so” (p. 6). The concept and practice of
decision latitude is now being elaborated as a crucial element of “relational autonomy” in
which interpreters “[develop] awareness of the various aspects of autonomous decisionmaking” (Witter-Merithew et al, 2010, p. 49).
Interpreter autonomy is in reality relational as a result of the inherent
social structures upon which it depends for its existence…effective
autonomy is achieved when the social conditions that support it are in
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place and give the practitioner—and consumers—the confidence to take
charge of choices. (p. 50)
Relational autonomy and decision latitude, within an identified “constellation of
demands” (Dean & Pollard, 2011, p. 164) and the growing discursive consciousness of a
broad range of controls (for interpreters and for interpretees), cohere in a new,
multidimensional model of the interpreter’s role space.
Role space is “dynamic, reasoned, situational, and negotiable” according to Lee &
Llewellyn-Jones (2011). See Figure 2. The interpreter’s role space is defined and
delineated by three primary areas that they represent on a three-dimensional X, Y, and Z
cube. In their model, the horizontal axis, X, indicates the realm of participation alignment
(e.g., Garrod & Pickering, 2006); the vertical axis, Y, indicates the dimension of
interaction management (e.g., Grice, 1968; Giles, Coupland & Coupland 1991); and the
forward-back Z axis represents the presentation of self (e.g., Goffman, 1981). Lee and
Llewellyn’s basic premise involves a distinction and a similarity between the interpreter(s)
and interpretees:
The interpreter has a different reason for being in the interaction
compared with the other participants; however, interpreters can avail
themselves of some of the same strategies used by the other participants to
present themselves in the interaction. (2011, p. 4)
Rather than relying upon a deontological ethical code with strict prescriptive rules, they
call upon a standard of interpreter integrity to ground “a sense that what is happening is
appropriate for this given interaction” (p. 3).
Individual decisions made by an interpreter are not made in isolation from
one another; rather the interactions among decisions (and not a single
decision point itself) creates the manifestation of the role of an interpreter
in a given interaction. (p. 2)
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Figure 2.

Interaction Among Three Axes of Interpreter Role Space. Reprinted with
permission from International Journal of Interpreter Education. (Lee and
Llewellyn-Jones, 2013).

This integrity requires the relational autonomy called for by Witter-Merithew et al (2010)
and echoed by Roderick Jones (2014): “our training should … help our students and
future colleagues … to acquire the autonomy to develop their own interpreting strategies,
such that they can develop over the whole course of their career” (p. 9).
Role space replaces the one-dimensional conception of the interpreter as a passive
instrument with a technical function. Interpreted interaction is not characterized by
homolingual continuous action, but is rather a series of one-way turns in which the
interpreter fluidly adjusts alignment with participants in keeping with emergent
interpersonal and intercultural demands, with reference to the circumstances of context.
The initial unfamiliarity of a simultaneously-interpreted, pluralingual communicative
arrangement does not need to lead to non-cooperative, non-accommodating, and non-
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aligning behaviors by a machine model interpreter. That, Llewellyn-Jones and Lee argue,
is “not natural communication” (Conference Handout, 2012).
While the focuse here has been on community interpreting for the Deaf, Diriker’s
(2004) study of academic conference interpreting discovered “anecdotal accounts of reallife SI assignments …[that] challenge the analogy of ‘interpreters as electronic devices’
and foreground the individual, as well as the social factors, that influence the interpreting
process” (pp. 47-48). In sum, Dean and Pollard (2012) argue that conceptualizing the
work of simultaneous interpretation in terms of demands and controls “matters” (p. 80)
because the Demand-Control Schema provides “a concrete method for thinking
about…the work and work decisions … [and] to replace intuitive or habitual work
processes with conscious and deliberate ones” (p. 79).

6.5

Holding Time with a Relational Model of SI
The stunning feature at the Deaf center regarding simultaneous interpreting is the

imperative to hold time.222 Buber’s metaphor of holding ground may be a way to begin to
explain practical skills of the evolved interpreter, including making active decisions about

222

The idea of this generative metaphor (Schön, 1998) is that Buber's (1923) notion of
"holding ground" provides an initial label for describing what Deaf interpreters,
ghostwriters, and evolved and schooled/ally interpreters do that is most appreciated
by Deaf interpretees during interpreted interaction. Holding ground is a metaphor for
ethical interpersonal communication: it specifically refers to a co-constructed
interactive process in which a person (“I”) holds your own ground while being open
to the other (“Thou”). Buber’s concept of holding ground is elaborated by many
scholars, including Stewart (2006) and Pearce (1994/2007).
In practice, holding ground means that you should not abandon or betray your
own commitments, values, beliefs, and perspectives in order to 'be with,' engage with
or listen to another – but rather that you can hold these while also holding—even if
temporarily—the reported ideas, experiences, beliefs, perspectives, and even
challenges of another. (J. Brooks, personal communication, August 25, 2012)
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shifting functional alignments within the domain of time. Forestal (2011) found, for
instance, that one of the most frequent reasons Deaf interpreters223 paused a research
video to share their thinking with her was to “express reactions toward the HI and the
dialogue between the HI and the HC” (p. 87).224 Their most common criticism involved
the failure of the hearing interpreter to manage or ‘hold’ time. In Boyle’s (2006) story,
rather than forcing a continuation of interaction with an apparently disinterested police
officer, the evolved interpreter shifts to a kind of consecutive interpreting that divides
time among respective interpretees, ultimately enabling important information to be
communicated while simultaneously validating Dana’s humanity (and taking nothing
away from the officer, whose attention is diffused by multiple responsibilities at the scene
of a crime).
References by the Deaf interpreters to temporality in Forestal’s (2011) study are
most prevalent when the information is most dense. This was also when Deaf Interpreter
(DI) research participants “discuss[ed] how the HI [Hearing Interpreter] should work
with the participants in terms of chunking the information differently or when they
wanted to convey the material to the DC [Deaf consumer]” (p. 87). This is when
participants “wanted to tell the HI to ‘hold on or slow down’” (Participant F, p. 77), that

223

The situation of two sign language interpreters working together, one who is Deaf and
one who is Hearing, is comparable to relay interpreting in the European Parliament.
In this case, the Hearing interpreter renders spoken English into sign language and the
Deaf interpreter is afforded the role space and decision latitude to undertake the labor
of making sure the information is understood by Deaf interpretees. Likewise, a
similar process should occur in the other direction, when the burden is on the Hearing
interpreter to make sure that the Hearing interpretee understands.

224

Forestal’s codes are HC: Hearing Consumer, HI: Hearing Interpreter, DI: Deaf
Interpreter, and DC: Deaf Consumer.
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“the HC [Hearing consumer] was going on too long on one part and … should pause”
(Forestal, p. 81), or, “There is a run on here. I can’t see any separate ideas…Oh boy…HI
is going on too long…hold on…” “Wait, I would ask to stop…Hold on” (Participant B, p.
79), or “hold it…to go at a slower pace” (Participant D, p. 73).
“Taking the time to explain” (Participant D, as cited in Forestal, 2011, p. 71) was
most necessary when the information was “very detailed” (Forestal, p. 70). “Whoa, there
are so many things to point out…I will ask the HI to pause here…” (Participant B, p. 80).
In fact, the highest percentage (21/120 = 18%) of video stoppages per section of the video
occurred during the (staged) discussion of the US Federal Housing Authority’s mortgage
loan criteria. Forestal concluded there was “a lot of information to go through”
(Participant B, p. 84), so “more pauses would be needed for clarification and additional
time to review” (p. 84). For instance, in the densest chunk of information, there were
“three things to explain…ask the HI to stop [to] allow [more time]… [to give] each one at
a time, rather than pour all three at once” (Participant B, p. 74).
The temporal problem identified by Forestal’s (2011) participants is twofold,
involving both the duration of turns and the density of information. Sometimes, they
identify “the HC was talking was too long…the HI will have to notify the [HC]…to
break up the information more…and [stop] more often” (Participant F, p. 76). Other
times they “expressed a wish that ‘[the HI] would stop long enough to allow time to
interpret’” (Participant F, p. 76). They suggest two specific remedies: for “the
information to be parceled out in smaller chunks or pause as cued by the DI” (Forestal, p.
75). Forestal’s findings on the density of information are in keeping with Vuorikoski’s
(2004) research on spoken language source texts in the European Parliament.
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Problems with source texts and adequately paced turn-taking between the HI and
DI in relay are parallel problems that HIs frequently have with HCs. What Deaf
interpreters are asking of their hearing interpreter teammates is what hearing interpreters,
both evolved and schooled/allies, have been ‘asking’ (or needing to ask!) of interpretees
since professional signed language interpreting began: care about achieving mutual
understanding and participate in the co-construction of relationships, rather than just
letting them happen as fallout from the transmission machine’s insistence on what
Participant F described as the “non-stop flow of information” (p. 83).
The Deaf interpreters sought to be authorized to manage time in order to achieve a
“balance of working” with both the Deaf and Hearing consumers (Participant E, as cited
in Forestal, 2011, p. 70). This distinguishes the interaction component of Forestal’s
research from the television audience translator/interpreters in Stone’s (2009) research.
Otherwise, U.S. Deaf interpreters expressed the same goals and strategies as British
Translator/Interpreters: to “make sure the DC understood before moving on to the next
part” (Participant E, p. 70); not “throw [information]…without processing” (Participant
B, p. 91); avoid marginalization (p. 121); and to create “an interactive dialogue” (p. 121).
Dialogic communication is needed by Deaf interpreters with the hearing
interpreter teammate just as much as with the deaf consumer: this parallel process also
parallels the hearing interpreter’s need for dialogue with the hearing interpretee. Here is
the rub of the original interaction taboo of pretending the interpreter is invisible being
extended into relay processes between team interpreters. Hope for the social
transformation called for by Forestal (2011) resides in this co-constructive social
transaction. If Deaf interpreters win their agency and are authorized to utilize role space
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and hold time, the achievement may spread to spoken language interpreters and
interpretees, establishing a relational and identity-aware model for community
interpreting.

6.5.1

Interpreters’ Unconsciousness
The greatest support for the reality of human consciousness is that one does not

know what one does not know until it is learned. Some things are learned as a result of
intentional study; other things are learned unwillingly, as if by force. There are things a
person comes to know which seem appallingly obvious in retrospect, and other things one
can come to know that are simply informative or intriguing. Learning that is significant is
often accompanied by emotion: this is illustrated by Archimedes’ expression of
“Eureka!” and backed up by neuroscientific studies on insight, commonly thought of as
‘Aha!’ moments (Kounios and Beeman, 2009). Surprise indicates the presence of
something new or unexpected. This is why a study on omissions by sign language
interpreters caught my attention, because participants and researchers expressed
“amazement” (Napier, 2002, p. 160) and “astonishment” (p. 178) when they realized “as
much information is lost unconsciously, as is selectively omitted as part of a conscious
linguistic process” (emphasis added, p. 178).
The context of Napier’s study is to demonstrate that interpreter omissions are
often strategic. That is, the interpreter makes a conscious decision to omit information in
service of accomplishing another task or aspect of the interpreting process.225 She also

225

This aspect of conscious, strategic omissions is not taken up by Vuorikoski, who
uses omissions as a measure in her study but not as an automatic measure of failure
(2004, p. 31).
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finds that omissions occur that interpreters are aware of but are somehow unable to do
anything about. Although Napier does not elaborate it is not hard to surmise that what
prevents interpreters from addressing omissions they are aware of and do not want to
make are the dynamics of social interaction. Interpretees’ criticisms might be more
productive if they learned and understood this. The typical linguistic model tends to
characterize any omissions as an interpreter failure, because the linguistic model only
focuses upon the transfer of information. (Which is why Vuorikoski augmented her
method.226) However if Napier’s findings are evaluated from an identity and relationship
perspective, the range of omission types suggests an impasse in social interaction. The
problem then, is apparently not resolvable by the linguistic model. A new paradigm that
acknowledges social interaction might enable more adaptation. For instance, a social
transaction paradigm allows the speculation that the interpreter cannot change unless the
interpretees change, too.

6.5.2

Interpreter Omission
Napier (2002) problematizes the commonsense assumption that interpretational

omissions are always errors or mistakes of transmission. Her goal is to establish selective
reductions (of utterances in the source language) as a metacognitive strategy of
interpreters to enhance message equivalence (of utterances in the target language). In
other words, Napier documents conscious effort on behalf of interpreters to contribute to

226

“While omissions, substitutions and errors may be observed in quantitative terms, SI
quality is not based on word-for-word equivalence only…The present study will
move a step forward on the basis of modern SI theory with the aim of finding a
method for analysing how to operationalize the elusive ’gist’ of the message” (2004,
p. 31).
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“meaning potential” (p. 179).227 To accomplish this task, Napier utilizes an omission
taxonomy she invented in 2001, and describes the limits of consciousness and
unconsciousness made evident through the research project’s findings in the stages of
task review and final reflection. The distribution of results across the awareness
continuum provides a foundation for the development of an epistemology of SI premised
on interaction (rather than, as it is presently, interaction-tacked-on to the previouslyestablished functional linguistic model).
Napier designed a five-type continuum of “potential interpreting omissions based
on levels of consciousness and strategic-ness” (p. 84). See Figure 2. From left to right the
continuum proceeds from most conscious (strategic) to least conscious (unaware). She
places conscious strategic decisions to omit at the left end and completely unconscious
omissions at the other end, with three degrees of gradient between them. Results show
that the three intermediate types of omissions, those that are made or recognized by the
interpreter as they occur but without deliberate strategic intent, occur with particular
features of language use that prefigure Vuorikoski’s (2004) and Forestal’s (2011)
findings, including subject-specific terminology, names, repetition and redundancy,
ambiguity and idioms, and inaudible words or phrases.

227

Napier’s construct of “meaning potential” is undefined but might a synonym (or
similarly relative to) the sociolinguistic concept of voice (Blommaert, 2004). Napier
(2002) “suggest[s] that omissions should be considered within a framework of
omission potential…by doing so, it is possible for interpreters to recognize the
sociolinguistic and sociocultural factors that may influence their production of
different omission types. The framework allows for recognition of the fact that
omissions can be used strategically to achieve the meaning potential of an utterance,
but there is also the potential to make erroneous omissions, which may skew the
contextual force of the message” (emphasis in original, p. 179).
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Figure 3.

Napier’s Interpreter Omission Taxonomy (reprinted with permission from
Sign Language Interpreting: Linguistic Coping Strategies, 2002, p. 179).

Napier carefully identifies these linguistic components of speaker utterances in
order to establish a distinction between omissions that interpreters are aware of at the
moment of their occurrence but did not necessarily wish to make from omissions that
interpreters made with full strategic intentionality to enhance clarity or organization of a
message. The relative equivalence, percentagewise, at both ends of the consciousness
spectrum is intriguing: twenty-seven percent of the total number of omissions (of all five
types, combined) were of the highest order of strategic consciousness and twenty-six
percent were completely unconscious, with the remaining 47% of omissions spread
among the three intermediate but inadvertent types.
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Two startling ramifications leap to view. First, nearly one half of omissions occur
for reasons of source text production or social transaction among interpretees. Second,
roughly equal amounts of omissions qualify as conscious strategic selective reductions
(i.e., are planned with an eye to the future, 27%) and as unconscious omissions
(specifically not within the awareness of the interpreter, 26%). Napier reports the firsttime realization of some participating interpreters at discovering “the commentary going
on in their own head” (p. 160), described as an “internal self-critical commentary” (p.
159) that all ten of the interpreters who participated in her study utilized with or without
strategic consciousness. These findings open new ground for the field; it could represent
a move toward a new kind of discursive consciousness.
Conscious decision-making based on metalinguistic awareness is revealed to be
an under-acknowledged component of the interpreter’s skillset (Napier, 2002). Most
surprising to Napier and the participating interpreters, was the finding that “as much
information is lost unconsciously, as is selectively omitted as part of a conscious
linguistic process” (p. 178). In other words, despite professional training and as attentive
as interpreters are to source language messages and target language meanings,
interpreters do unknowingly miss a measurable quantity of information.
The rigor of Napier’s research design enabled the identification of “specific
features of language use [that] elicited the occurrence of particular omissions” (p. 148).
The common characteristic of all these features (listed above) is their origin: they are
elements of production of the source language. Notice how the research gaze is focused
at the linguistic level of diction and lexicalization, rather than on the interpersonal or
psychosocial dynamics of interaction. Because of Napier’s precision and expertise an
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example is available. One line of source text produced the highest percentage of
unconscious omissions.
Taken in isolation, “So, over to you for a minute,” is a simple sentence. No
density of subject matter or terminology, nothing obscure or highly specific. The
explanations provided by participating interpreters as to why this particular utterance was
omitted make sense. Napier reports:
All the respondents remarked that they probably had not heard this phrase
because they were still concentrating on the difficult interpretation of the
previous sentence…and therefore experienced cognitive overload. (p.
153)
Setton’s (1999) cognitive-pragmatic reasons for failure are not marshalled; Napier allows
the interpreter’s self-report stand. She also does not describe any exploration with her
participants of the communicative action implied in the utterance. Given that the source
text is explicitly characterized as a monologue (it is a lecture given by a professor to
college students), this particular phrase represents a change in footing.228 In her literature
review, Napier refers to Erving Goffman’s (1981) concept of footing as one of the ways
speakers define their relationship with an audience (p. 50). In particular, footing has to do
with the way speakers align themselves within a particular frame for the communication
event. Footing is crucial to Lee & Llewellyn-Jones’ (2013) depiction of interpreters’
shifting alignments with participants in role space.
Footing is crucial to Lee & Llewellyn-Jones’ (2013) depiction of interpreters’
shifting alignments with participants in role space, because it is particularly useful for

228

Tebble might identify the speech act, “So, over to you for a minute,” as a framing
move with the metalinguistic function of alerting students to a shift in the genre
stages of classroom interaction (2009, p. 210).
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noting changes in interaction dynamics, such as the signal from a professor that there will
be a shift from the monologue of a didactic lecture to participatory dialogue, perhaps in
the form of a question-and-answer session or a period of open discussion. In other words,
what is suggested by Napier’s text, even though she does not spell it out, is that some
unconscious omissions during simultaneous interpretations may occur as the result of a
combination of linguistic and dynamical factors, not exclusively on the basis of lexical
complexity or other problems with the source text. If I put myself in this situation as an
academic interpreter, for instance, and I have become accustomed to the mode of
delivery, then I may not even be tuned to the possibility of a shift in the interaction and
certainly not while struggling with some particularly dense content.229
The evidence that omissions may occur for reasons that are not lexical, or for
reasons in addition to what can be explained by functional linguistics, reaches toward the
meaning potential of the domain of inquiry that Napier opens up. She herself is explicit
and consistent in her focus on linguistic coping strategies. However a change in footing is
an interaction dynamic that interpretees can become aware of and use as a moment to
assert shared responsibility for the quality of communication and understanding in the
interpreted interaction. Notice, for instance, the temporal delimitation, “for a minute.”
Without having been alerted to the change in interaction structure, students relying upon

229

Another possibility, that the interactional shift is too obvious to be expressed, is
suggested by one of Vuorikoski’s findings in regard to references to democracy in
MEPs speeches. “The material at hand reveals an unsystematic rendering by the
interpreters of these key concepts and key points that are related to democracy. The
word ’democracy’ in its various forms is often omitted as if it were something selfevident that does not have to be repeated” (2004, p. 129).
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the SI are automatically disadvantaged unless/until other interpretees notice and co-create
adequate shared time for everyone’s participation.
As a discourse process, the effect of isolating research to only the linguistic level
of simultaneous interpretation is to keep the focus of analysis on what interpreters do
(with languages) while keeping the analytical gaze averted from what the interpretees are
doing (in co-constructing relationships). In Napier’s (2002) case study, the interpretees
include every non-deaf student in the class as well as the Deaf student(s) as co-learners.
The professor is the responsible figure with the most authorization to manage the
dynamics of interpreted intercultural communication. The discursive and social isolation
of the interpreter that is reproduced in researcher discourse reinforces social practice that
de-authorizes both interpreters and interpretees from addressing or otherwise attempting
to repair common communication breakdowns. At least interpretees could begin to learn
the symptoms for the large percentage of accidental, unintended omissions (47%) that
occur within the interpreter’s awareness but cannot (currently) be remedied because of
limitations imposed on the role. The interaction taboo (Kent, 2012) is what makes
interventions to restore omitted information seem beyond control.
Such skills development would also create openings for interpretees to notice
other deviations from the desired quality of communication of which the interpreter may
be unaware. While it is obvious that the pace and density of delivery are significant in the
‘over to you’ instance (and, perhaps less obviously, the turn-taking pace), Napier’s
overall findings in this study suggest that there is no stand-alone factor that influences the
rate or type of inadvertent omissions, but instead that there is a combination of
unfamiliarities:
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1

lacking familiarity with the specific knowledge domain encompassed by the
subject of the communication event, and

2

lacking familiarity with the conventions of discourse use characteristic of the
setting or scene of the communication event.

In other words, one zone of unfamiliarity involves particular content (a, above), the other
zone of unfamiliarity involves institutional process (b, above), and the two are
interrelated in terms of their relative influence on interpreter and interpretee effectiveness
in a simultaneously-interpreted communication event (again, in keeping with Forestal
(2011) and Vuorikoski (2004)). While professional interpreters make varying degrees of
effort to become familiar with both the genre setting and the particular subject matter, the
interactive challenges of intercultural communication are not able to be resolved without
the concern and involvement of interpretees.
If interpretees are concerned with the subset of omissions that interpreters make
strategically (as the Deaf respondents who participated in a panel organized by Napier
state that they are), one way to build shared responsibility and enhance quality might
involve collaborative practice with identifying and resolving the omissions that
interpreters do not wish to make but are constrained from acknowledging have occurred.
This applies equally to the concerns MEPs expressed about the quality of interpreting in
the EP. Such an endeavour will necessarily invite the discovery of omissions that were
made unconsciously, as well as open inquiry into the reasons supporting omissions made
strategically.
What could prove to be the long-term significance of Napier’s work on omissions
is that the development of this discourse theme may result in an increase of proactive
accountability by original speakers and receivers: by the former in the generation of
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source texts and by the latter in confirming comprehension. Increased responsibility by
interpretees in terms of diction, delivery and reception accompanied by improved skill in
perceiving and responding to the dynamics of interaction could constitute a substantial
leap toward mutual accountability for co-creating meanings and understandings during
simultaneously-interpreted communication. Rather than reinforcing premises that the
interpreter must cope alone, analysis and training could evolve to embrace the full
implications of the interactionist paradigm.
In discovering the interpreter’s individual unconscious regarding unknown
omissions, Napier (2002) opens the possibility of discovering additional contents of
unconsciousness within the entire field of Interpreting Studies. She cites a broad literature
specific to metalinguistic awareness but only a small subset (1996-2000, at the time of
her publication) is within the domain of interpretation (most of her references to
metalinguistics are drawn from research on literacy). It is appropo, therefore, that Napier
reports that most participants in her study “only became conscious” of their applied
metalinguistic competence when they began talking about it (p. 191). In other words, they
began to develop aspects of their practical consciousness into discursive consciousness.
In addition to linking metacommunication and consciousness, Napier establishes
equivalence between spoken and signed language interpreting of university lectures,
bridging as well the perceived gap between conference and community interpreting.

6.6

Interpreting as Chronotopic Calibration: Making Timespace Visible
Many Members of the European Parliament are sophisticated users of

simultaneous interpretation. Their discourse about conference SI in the EP
overemphasizes interpreter omissions and misunderstandings probably because this is the
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most tangible evidence of not being ‘in control’ of the pluralingual communication
process. MEPs either overlook or are unaware of the other reasons for interpreter
omissions, such as their own complicity in delivering source texts rife with noninterpretable features. Only a few MEPs recognize the possibility of omissions that are
made strategically by interpreters in order to refine a point and enhance voice. Many
MEPs do concede the pressures of the context that force interpreter omissions by virtue
of institutional demands not to slow down or stop the proceedings.
Many members of Deaf cultures are also sophisticated users of simultaneous
interpretation. Their discourse about community SI and sign language interpreters
overemphasizes the power position of the interpreter because this is the most tangible
evidence of not being ‘in control’ of the pluralingual communication process. Deaf
interpretees often overlook or are unaware of omissions (unless they are informed by
another bilingual participant, in similar fashion to an MEP’s Assistant monitoring
interpreted renditions by European Parliament interpreters). Some Deaf interpretees
recognize conscious omission strategies of interpreters for refining voice within the given
institutional context. Many Deaf interpretees also recognize time pressure and other
factors adversely affecting the decision latitude of all participants, including the
interpreters. Usually any manifestation of these is called oppression.
As reference groups for each other, conference and community interpreting
participants (interpretees and interpreters alike) bring language ideology into view,
helping us perceive flaws in the laissez-faire assumption that the invisible hand of the
translation machine is sufficient. The critical lens will be sharpened by including
informal interpreters in the field of international business as another comparison group.
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Automatic processes of this machine, human-enabled or not, cannot regenerate human
diversity or cultivate collective intelligence. The transmission machine only drives the
road of homolingualism. Its passengers, interpretees and interpreters, are indeed out of
control, subject to the constraints of a fancified IBM system designed for speed, now with
safeties disabled.
Carefully-created checks and balances for ensuring shared understanding made
the original use of the IBM system at Nuremberg capable of handling the pluralinguistic
challenge of simultaneous interpreting. Communication rituals indigenous to the cultural
practices of Deaf people ensure understanding by creating the time to check in, ask
questions, and explain. Interpreters and interpretees who cede their agency, their
relational autonomy (Witter-Merithew et al, 2010), to the dictates of the transmission
machine, whether in conference or community settings, surrender culture, identity and the
power of voice. Only humans in collaboration with each other can adapt to the flux of
pluralingualist priorities during interpreted transaction.
This human factor of deciding, consciously, to choose the mode of social
transaction and its target, authorizes the reference group comparison of interpreters to
managers and administrators in international business.230 Although it is unlikely that the
established term for distinguishing conference and community interpreting will evolve
from mode to timespace calibration, perhaps mode can come to include chronotopic
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“Reference group theory which systematically takes account of positive orientations
toward non-membership groups can serve as a corrective of [Sumner’s] prematurely
restricted conclusion [that negative associations are usually directed to outsiders and
positive associations reserved for insiders]. In-groups and out-groups are often subgroups within a larger social organization, and are always potentially so, since a new
social integration can encompass previously separated groups” (Merton, 1957, p. 298299).
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calibration as part of its essential definition. Conference interpreting, with its emphasis on
information, tends to homolingualism by erasing difference. Community interpreting,
with its emphasis on identity and relationship, tends to pluralingualism by maintaining
cultural difference. In each case, interpreters are stewards of both aims: information void
of identity (re)generates a homolingual machine; identity without information promotes
stereotypes and prejudice; each of these reifies structural inequality.
When identity and information come into conflict or competition, interpreters
become stewards of the transactive social relationships among interpretees in that
moment of timespace. Pluralingual transaction, by definition, does not conform to any
one homolingualism. Instances of non-awareness, of unconscious omission or
misunderstanding when you think you’ve understood but you have not (the Johari
Window zone of ‘not knowing what you don’t know’),231 will occur for everyone,
interpretees as well as interpreters. Moments of uncertainty and not knowing ought to be
more frequent in interpreted communication than in homolingual transactions, if only
because homolingualism reinforces similarities and mutually disregards deviations.
Social interpreting transcends the traditional modes of conference and community
interpreting by prioritizing the immediate relationship among interpretees in service of
the emergent aspect of communication that is most salient in the lived experience of
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The Johari Window is a model for interpersonal interaction represented in a two-bytwo grid. The horizontal axis is the self, the vertical axis is the other. The columns
represent what is known and not known to you and the other, resulting in four
quadrants. Luft (1984) labels the quadrants open, blind, hidden, and unknown. Open
is what both you (the self) and the other know; blind is what they know about you
that you’re unaware of; hidden is what you know that they don’t; and unknown
“refers to behaviors, feelings and motivation known neither to the self nor to others”
(p. 61).
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group dynamics: information or identity. Social interpreting is about helping interpretees
connect: intellectually (premised in mutually comprehending information) or phatically
(based in a felt commonality). Social interpreting may involve light and humorous topics,
but its emphasis on ‘the social’ is to highlight the relationships (when necessary) so that
information shared is information understood. Shifting between the chronotopes of
information and identity is a transcultural calibration made possible by asserting human
agency within the special communication practice of simultaneous interpretation.
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CHAPTER 7
SIMULTANEOUS SOCIAL TRANSACTION,
PLURALINGUALISM AND SHARED IDENTITY

The reference points established to contextualize this critical discourse analysis
(consciousness, control, reference groups (culture), and voice) have been used to show a
structure to the discourse about SI in the EP.232 Hopefully it demonstrates how discursive
consciousness can be developed from practical consciousness through the rigorous
application of action learning. The discourse shows a convergence of two frames for
thinking about language, language difference, and the social innovation of simultaneous
interpretation. One frame is the European Union’s comprehensive strategy for
multilingualism and the other frame is the regime of controlled multilingualism
governing how Members can and cannot use the system of simultaneous interpretation in
the European Parliament.
Embedded within these interlocking frames are ideas about language and
communication that emanate from history and animate ideology about social interaction
and how identities come to be shared. “There are two ways to understand European
identity,” explained an MEP, “through a common same language or putting the national
first, and Europe second” (NM20). This is the European experience, predicated on the
forcible standardization of language to consolidate nation-states through the construction
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Other relevant histories about interpreting not cross-correlated here include Jesús
Baigorri Jalón (1999), Aleksandr Šveitser (1999), Kayoko Takeda (2010),
Małgorzata Tryuk (2010), and Wolfram Wilss (1999).
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of an imaginary community (Anderson, 1983).233 The European Union today is trying to
counteract that historical harnessing of homolingualism, but they are constrained from a
creative solution because they have not (yet) been able re-frame the problem. Hence, as
the discourse shows, there are problematic communication dynamics, i.e., an interaction
taboo and the interpersonal reduction of interpreters to machine parts, which together
feed doubt about the real value of simultaneous interpretation. Ineffective modeling of
pluralingualism as a unifying field of linguistic equality is now hypothesized as a reason
that the European Parliament has failed to inspire a sense of commonality among
Europeans across the European Union.

7.1

The Language Problem
In Methodology for the Human Sciences, Mikhael Bakhtin refers to “Humboldt’s

main problem: the multiplicity of languages,” adding, parenthetically, “the premise and
the background of the problem – the unity of the human race” (1986, p. 168). Wilhelm
von Humboldt put ‘the problem’ this way:
Just as individuals by the power of their idiosyncrasies impart to the
human intellect a new impetus in uncharted directions, nations may do the
same for linguistic formation. However, between linguistic structure and
success in all other types of intellectual activity, there prevails an
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Kroskrity (2000) describes how Michael Silverstein (2000) uses “the Whorfian
model as a basis for critiquing Benedict Anderson’s less penetrating treatment [of
“the emergence of a distinctive nationalist ‘we’” (p. 21)]. “Whorf, Silverstein argues,
demonstrated a concern for examining the fit between cultural and linguistic tropes
of reality suggested by actual usage and any codable reality that might be behind
such a project. Whorf demonstrated how ‘habitual thought’ emerged from the
dialectic of linguistic and discursive practices, on the one hand, and phenomenal
cultural experience on the other. But Anderson, in contrast to Whorf, ‘seems to
mistake the dialectically-produced trope…for the reality, rather than seeing…[their]
dialectical workings…[as] the facts to be characterized and explained’” (p. 22).
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undeniable relationship. This relationship, moreover, lies principally—and
we shall consider it here from this aspect only—in the inspiring breath
which structural linguistic power infuses, in the act of transformation of
the world, into ideas. (1971(1836), p. 22)
It appears that Humboldt is more concerned with power than with unity, since he links his
quest for powerful linguistic structure with the nation by arguing that the nation precedes
the individual: “As language in its intricacies is but an effect of the national linguistic
sense, those problems concerning the complex structuring of languages (from which also
stem their most important variables) cannot be solved adequately if one does not
subscribe to this viewpoint” (p. 22).
In other words, from Humboldt’s perspective, there is only one way to solve
problems concerning the complex structuring of languages: state force. He couches the
bald assertion with ornate and flowery verbage:
Such is the nature of this infusion that it diffuses harmoniously through all
parts of its dominion. If it may be deemed possible that a language
originates in a nation exactly in this manner, as the word most
meaningfully and intuitively evolves from the worldview, most purely
representing it anew and molding itself in such a way as to penetrate every
nuance of thought easily and unobtrusively, then this language must—so
long as it maintains its vital principle at all—evoke the selfsame power
trained in the same direction with equal success in every individual. (p. 22)
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There are problems with Humboldt’s logic.234 He describes the top-down “infusion” of
linguistic structural power, wielded by the nation, as a painless process: diffusing
harmoniously, evolving and penetrating easily, without intrusion; and also having an
equilateral effect upon everyone (no exceptions). Both assertions are patently untrue. The
selection and imposition of official languages over regional dialects and other nonnational, non-official languages was and still is politically contentious two centuries later.
Humboldt, were he able to debate the point, might retort that he is referring to the innate
learning of linguistic structure along the lines championed by Noam Chomsky (1998) and
Steven Pinker (1994). Yet, read in context, Humboldt is conflating fluency in a language
with the enculturation of ideology by the state. This conflation persists in the multilingual
ideology (and information policy, see the upcoming section Spinning in the Discourse) of
the EU as well as in discourses about controlled multilingualism in the EP.235
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“Already in Wilhelm von Humboldt (1988) there are strong resonances both with
Locke (for instance, on the semiotic linkage of the linguistic sign with ideas [pp. 5659]) and with Herder (for instance, on language and poetry as the expression of the
spirit of a people [pp. 42-46, 60]), and mixed strains may be found in varying
degrees…However, the core principles around which Locke’s and Herder’s
respective language ideologies cohere contrast markedly in certain fundamental
respects….Nevertheless it is important to take direct account of the correspondence
between the language ideologies of Locke and Herder and their implications for
linguistic theory and practice. We focus especially on the structures of inequality that
we have found to occupy a significant place in these ideologies” (Bauman & Briggs,
2000, p. 196).
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Bauman & Briggs (2000) describe how Locke’s philosophy of language resonates
with “the mechanical philosophy of the seventeenth century” (p. 145) and go on to
critique “the profound impact [of Locke’s Essay] on thinking about language during
the following three centuries” (p. 149). They argue that “Locke…characterizes his
Essay, a founding document of linguistic and semiotic inquiry, as an effort to make
language and human understanding safe for science—and for society” (p. 147).
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All humans do learn the grammar of at least one language (barring extreme
isolation or massive cognitive impairment), but there is no way to guarantee a “selfsame”
uniform effect of ideological persuasion. This is, however, the essential presumption of
homolingualism. If the structure of language could enforce a singular ideology among all
persons, then there would be no dissent, only patriotism. No democracy would be
possible because there would be no basis for competition among political parties. To
achieve the kind of “equal success” Humboldt appears to value, then humans must be
denied the move from practical to discursive consciousness. Lacking the critical faculty
necessary to reflect upon the action of language in the world, people would be stymied at
the cognitive level of practical consciousness.
Alternatively, to achieve Humboldt’s encompassing dominion, something must be
done or used to limit and domesticate which individuals plateau in practical
consciousness and who will be encouraged to progress to discursive consciousness.
Giddens’ (1979) distinction between a) the ability to use a language in practical, everyday
communication and b) the ability to explain what language is and how language works, is
possible because of the extent to which people are aware of choosing to use certain words
at certain times in particular circumstances in order to achieve specific goals. The art of
rhetoric is the application of discursive consciousness within the realm of practical
communication. Humboldt continues:
The ingress of such a language, or of one closely approaching it, into the
history of the world must establish an important era in the course of
human development, and precisely in the area of its loftiest and most
marvelous productions. Definite intellectual courses and a definite
impetus, propelling the mind along such a path, cannot be conceived
before such languages have originated. They therefore constitute a true
point of inflection in the internal history of the human race. If they must
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be regarded as the apex of linguistic structure, they are the initial stage of
a soul-stirring culture rich in phantasy. (p. 22-23)
Was Humboldt arguing that such a pervasively-powerful language had not yet
occurred?236
Is Humboldt’s aim to survey the diversity of some of the world’s languages in
order to identify the structural mechanism relating language and intelligence for
exploitation by the state? How can he hold lofty marvelous intellect in such veneration
and yet seek to determine how to send the mind along “definite courses” with “definite
impetus”? Bakhtin (1986) briefly contextualizes his mention of Humboldt’s problem with
his (Humboldt’s) framing: “the premise and background of the problem—the unity of the
human race” (p. 168). Bakhtin then narrows Humboldt’s problem to “the sphere of
languages and their formal structures (phonetic and grammatical)” (p. 168). Pointedly,
Bakhtin adds: “But in the sphere of speech (within a single or any language) there arises
the problem of one’s own and another’s word” (p. 168).237
Wilhelm von Humboldt wrote in German near the beginning of the 19th century.
His attitudes are painfully ethnocentric. His work, however, is recognized as part of
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Humboldt would not have championed English over German, but “Locke believes
that the practices he promotes will further social as well as intellectual order: ‘I shall
imagine I have done some service to truth, peace, and learning if, by any
enlargement on this subject, I can make men reflect on their own use of language’
([Epistle]III.v.6). It seems worthwhile to stress that ‘language’ here means English.
Although gentlemen should learn Latin and scholars would be wise to study Greek,
it is the ability to convey one’s thoughts in English that really counts” (Bauman &
Briggs, 2000, p. 164).
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Heteroglossia may be the microsocial manifestation of the macrosocial phenomenon
of pluralingualism.
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a long tradition of thinking about language and society that emerges
clearly in the writings of Vico, Herder, and von Humboldt, who argue that
verbal art is a central dynamic force in shaping linguistic structure and
study. Attention to poetics from Sapir, the Russian formalists, and
members of the Prague school contributed to the development of
performance and poetics in the 1970s and 1980s. (Bauman & Briggs,
1990, p. 59)
Although ostensibly concerned with the relation of the intellect and language, von
Humboldt essentially established the ideological frame for linguistic diversity in Europe
with the premise that language difference is a problem that can and should be solved.
Bakhtin’s rebuke is to refine the problem from formalized structures of language to the
creative level of language use: the actual words uttered in the dynamic flux of social
transactions.

7.2

Re-Setting the Problem
Donald A. Schön, known for his work in social systems theory, wrote about

language and problem setting in social policy (1979/1993). “In order to dissolve the
obviousness of diagnosis and prescription in the field of social policy, we need to become
aware of, and to focus attention upon, the generative metaphors which underlie our
problem-setting stories” (1993, p. 148). As we’ve seen, the original metaphor for
interpreting is a notion of translation-as-transmission, the rapid transfer of information.
This brings us to what Schön calls “frame awareness,” which is “likely to bring us into
sharper and more explicit confrontation with frame conflict” (p. 150). Schön’s
recommended response to frame conflict is
frame restructuring…constructing a new problem-setting story, one in
which we attempt to integrate conflicting frames by including features and
relations drawn from previous stories, yet without sacrificing internal
coherence or the degree of simplicity required for action.” (p. 152)
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The task of this concluding chapter is to outline an alternative frame by shifting the
problem from language diversity per se to social transactions among people
cooperatively communicating using different languages.
First: to recap the situation. The stories represented in the discourse about SI in
the EP are ambivalent. Expressions of criticism and dissatisfaction tend to target the
interpreter or the interpretation as if a) language use is transparent, rendering
misunderstandings as not normal, and b) speed is the best measure of effectiveness
(combined with something called accuracy, but one apparently can’t be accurate and
slow, only accurate and fast). Rather than recognizing and working with the pluralingual
reality, language diversity has been set up as if there should be a fix, rather than being a
material condition inviting continuous mediation. The solutions are problematic: English
as a lingua franca (ELF) is motivated by a homolingual impulse and creates a code or
contact language that can exclude the interpreters (who are nonetheless still supposed to
‘get it right’) as well as other Members who have not learned the code.
Multilingual MEPs who tend to choose to speak ‘directly’ to those they can by
codeswitching among the languages they know are also motivated by homolingualism.
Like those chosing a lingua franca (English or otherwise), discounted is the ‘indirect’
communication with all the rest of their colleagues through simultaneous interpretation.
In most of these cases, the verbal art of rhetoric is reduced to the most simple and basic.
Ritualistically, each time this happens speed is reinforced as preferable to ensuring
mutual understanding, strengthening the taboo of interacting to collaboratively determine
meaning and continuing the interpersonal reduction of the interpreter to a component of a
machine. The interaction taboo has at least two forms: Members are implicitly
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discouraged from interacting with other Members whose languages they do not know,
and Members are structurally prevented from interacting with the interpreters.

7.2.1

Frame Conflict in English
Following Schön’s lead, Reddy (1993) argues that if improving communication is

the goal:
It will not do to set out post-haste to ‘solve the problem’ of inadequate
communication. The most pressing task is rather to start inquiring
immediately about how that problem presents itself to us. For problem
setting, not problem solving is the crucial process. What kind of stories do
people tell about their acts of communication? When these acts go astray,
how do they describe ‘what is wrong and what needs fixing?’ (p. 165)
Reddy’s clarity is exceptional and his argument so particularly relevant to this context
that he bears quoting at length. Reddy presents evidence that
the stories English speakers tell about communication are largely
determined by semantic structures of the language itself. This evidence
suggests that English has a preferred framework for conceptualizing
communication, and can bias thought processes toward this framework,
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even though nothing more than common sense is necessary to devise a
different, more accurate framework. (p. 165) 238
Specifically, Reddy demonstrates that “as a meta-language, English…[is] its own worst
enemy” (p. 166).
Reddy took the exact case of “What do speakers of English say when
communication fails or goes away?” (p. 166) and found a dead metaphor. Dead
metaphors are called dead because most people would not recognize them as a metaphor
at all, because they are so ingrained in regular, every day talk. Dead metaphors are taken
completely for granted as having a literal meaning instead of invoking, as they used to, a
fresh, living metaphorical image.

7.2.1.1

The Conduit Metaphor
The dead metaphor that Reddy noticed involves “the figurative assertion that

language transfers human thoughts and feelings” (1993, p. 167). He gives the logic of
this framework the label of
238

Emirbayer, cited for his emphasis on transactions in order to conceptualize a
relational sociology, mentions “One social theorist, Norbert Elias, [who] points out
that substantialist thinking corresponds closely to grammatical patterns deeply
ingrained in Western languages [such as English]… ‘Our languages are constructed
in such a way that we can often only express constant movement or constant change
in ways which imply that it has the character of an isolated object at rest, and then,
almost as an afterthought, adding a verb which expresses the fact that the thing with
this character is now changing. For example, standing by a river we see the perpetual
flowing of the water. But to grasp it conceptually, and to communicate it to others,
we do not think and say, “Look at the perpetual flowing of the water”; we say,
“Look how fast the river is flowing.” We say, “The wind is blowing,” as if the wind
were actually a thing at rest which, at a given point in time, begins to move and
blow. We speak as if a wind could exist which did not blow. This reduction of
processes to static conditions, which we shall call “process reduction” for short,
appears self-explanatory to people who have grown up with such languages. (Elias
1978, pp. 111-112)’” (Emirbayer, 1997, p. 281).
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the conduit metaphor…[which leads] to the bizarre assertion that words
have ‘insides’ and ‘outsides.’ After all, if thoughts can be ‘inserted’ [into
words], there must be a space ‘inside’ wherein the meaning can reside . . .
[or] perhaps, somehow, the listener has erred. In the framework of the
conduit metaphor, the listener’s task is one of extraction. He must find the
meaning ‘in the words’ and take it out of them. (p. 168)
Reddy’s point is that “the conduit metaphor is a real and powerful semantic structure in
English” (p. 175): linguistically, it is a semantic pathology.239 The conduit metaphor
contrasts starkly with what he calls the toolmaker’s paradigm:
In terms of the conduit metaphor, what requires explanation is failure to
communicate. Success appears to be automatic. But if we think in terms of
the toolmaker’s paradigm, our expectation is precisely the opposite.
Partial miscommunication, or divergence of readings from a single text,
are not aberrations. They are tendencies inherent in the system, which can
only be counteracted by continuous effort and large amounts of verbal
interaction. In this view, things will naturally be scattered, unless we
expend the energy to gather them. They are not, as the conduit metaphor
would have it, naturally gathered, with a frightening population of wrongheaded fools working to scatter them. (p. 175).
The homolingual impulse may be a kind of collective ‘gathering’ reaction to the
complexity of pluralingualistic discourses. Pluralingualism, like heteroglossia, can be
said to characterize all discourse, with discourse defined as language-in-use (Blommaert,
2004).
If so, the spontaneous emergence of English as a lingua franca (ELF) among
Members of the newly-expanded European Parliament could be understood as an effort to
use linguistic resources in order to establish more (or a specific kind of) social order. This
may be only marginally different than, say, the emergence of Nicaraguan Sign Language
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A definition of semantic pathology, and more of Reddy’s explanation of the conduit
metaphor as a specifically English language problem, is included in Appendix F.
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among school-aged children brought together for the first time from around their country
in the 1970s (Kegl, Senghas & Coppola, 1999). Despite being exposed to numerous adult
role models using American Sign Language, ASL was not suited to the culture or
environment that shaped their lives in Nicaragua. Researchers watched in astonishment as
these children literally created their own language while transacting among themselves.
The salient difference in these two cases is between children engaging exclusively with
practical consciousness and adult MEPs transacting with a mix of practical and discursive
consciousness.

7.2.1.2

Members on “Words” and “Meaning” in the Discourse about SI in the
EP
One MEP’s Assistant was emphatic: “We are often wasting time…a vicious

circle…it’s a trade-off of national identity for expressing yourself in a way that you
consider best. We need to give a clearer message, now” (F01/NM17). Another MEP’s
Assistant was equally insistent: “He always reads the speeches, one minute. He never
speaks freely. To give as much content as possible” (F17/NM41). The sense of urgency,
of wasting time, of needing speed and therefore packing as much content as possible into
a one-minute speech, guarantee exclusionary, homolingual effects such as interpreter
mis-renderings and the ideological naturalization of the (dead) conduit metaphor. Other
Members refer to “the” meaning: “We have concern with the sharpness and rightness of
the interpretation as far as the meaning is concerned” (OM06). And perhaps the ultimate
dead conduit metaphor question: “How do you translate [sic] a word that doesn’t exist in
other languages?” (OM35)
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Members distinguish between interacting during the debates and defining the
terminology that will be written into law. For instance, the need for “precision is more in
legal writing. English is easier in dialogue to convey points, using various words”
(NM24). ‘To convey’ is explicitly a (dead) conduit expression. Interpreters are explicitly
evaluated in (dead) conduit metaphor terms: “Sometimes…we have interpreters who are
able to interpret not exactly word-for-word but the spirit—the central part of the
message” (emphasis added, OM35). “In the beginning,” says another Member speaking
about ELF, “I didn’t know the dossiers. I understood the translation [sic] but had trouble
to pick out and sense the meaning” (emphasis added, OM62). According to the dead
conduit metaphor, ‘the message’ and ‘the meaning’ are like material objects: linguistic
packages being moved, without transformation, through space. According to non-living
logic, these packages simply need to be plucked out of the air and properly opened at the
other end of the pipeline.

7.2.1.3

Semantic Pathology and Social Policy
Musing about the social implications of the pervasive semantic pathology of the

(dead) conduit metaphor, “a case that involved more words than any pathology I had ever
heard of” (1993, p. 180), Reddy wondered what does this “matter…to the man [sic] on
the street, to mass culture, to federal policy?” (p. 185). What is the “practical impact” of
“the English language [having] a less than accurate idea of its own workings, and…the
power to bias thought processes in the direction of [the conduit] model?” (p. 185)
Although it is surely unfair to lay the whole blame on English and the dead
conduit metaphor, I wonder how much English contributes to the confusion in the
European Parliament regarding the distinction between multilingualism and
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pluralingualism. Understanding the term, multilingualism, as a signal rather than a
meaning allows us to examine the code to which this signal belongs and interpret it,
nonrandonly, among pre-established sets of alternatives.240 The discourse about SI in the
EP shows a strong correlation between multilingualism and language learning which,
combined with the popularity of EFL, indexes a preferential bias for homolingualism: use
of the word multilingualism signals homolingualism. The social order that is reproduced
by any move to a common language is a classic hierarchy. Not only does it make sense
that the vast European populace does not identify with controlled multilingualism in the
EP as a basis of commonality, incessant homolingualism reflects entrapment in the
ideology of speed with its accompanying belief that controlling information is the best or
only way to achieve and maintain power.
Language use achieves such effects on social organization because of the way it
orients us to the dimension of time. As described previously, communication has both
spatial and temporal dimensions (e.g., Carey, 1992). The spatial aspect of communication
is most evident in the use of information for power and control, while the temporal aspect
of communication is most evident in the repetition of rituals and the regeneration of
culture. The ritual and cultural elements combine with the information and power
elements to generate social identifications and intercultural relations. It is the
transactional, social quality of language use that leads Members to say things like,
“Language is to the highest extent the core of culture” (OM08) and, “Our language will
never fly from our borders” (OM54).
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This jargon is from the (1949) Mathematical Theory of Communication developed
by Claude E. Shannon and later popularized by Shannon and Warren Weaver. See
Appendix F.
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Perhaps the core feature articulating the intersection of language and culture is, as
Blommaert explains,
an elementary semiotic principle . . . the ‘double arrow of indexicality’,
the fact that every sign [each word, symbol, behavior and/or collection of
these] presupposes things and entails things when it is used (Silverstein
2006). We select [a sign] because of the presuppositions it conventionally
carries, and addressees understand it on the basis of the entailments it
triggers. It is at once a repository of past meanings, and a vehicle for
future meanings. This is not rocket science, but the impact of this simple
semiotic statement is quite significant. If we broaden the statement
somewhat, we see that a sign always contains three analytical dimensions:
one towards its past, another one towards its future. The third one, in
between both … is the present, characterized by the sign’s non-random
emplacement. (2012, p. 53)
Aggregations of indexicality in discourse generate what Bakhtin (1981) calls a
chronotope. Literally, a chronotope is a timespace: they can be thought of as timescapes
that are socially constructed through uses of language, influencing the ways we organize
ourselves in space (and are ourselves then organized by space and time). The ideology of
speed that justifies the homolingual orientation of MEPs within their pluralingual
environment is repeated (ritualized) to such an extent that it evokes and animates the
postmodern condition of timespace compression (Harvey, 1990)241 in the social
transactions and institutionalizing culture of the European Parliament.
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Harvey’s complicated argument involves the way capitalism has utilized technology
to collapse time and space so that distance and duration become less meaningful as
dimensions of every day life. Key features involve acceleration of production and
consumption, especially of “accelerating turnover time and the rapid write-off of
traditional and historically acquired values” (1989, p. 291). A result of the
postmodern condition is “the loss of a sense of the future except and insofar as the
future can be discounted into the present” (p. 291).
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7.2.1.4

Calibration and Chronotope Variation
Bakhtin scholar Michael Holquist elaborates: “Chronotopes provide the clock and

the map we employ to orient our identity in the flux of existence” (2009, p. 10). What
Bakhtin had realized in analyzing ancient and Renaissance literature is that a careful
reader could discern the conception of time characteristic of that era through the authors’
use of language. In “Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel” (1981), Bakhtin
contrasts “adventure time” (Greek and Roman, circa 100-300 A.D.) with “folkloric time”
(particularly in reference to books by French friar and physician Francois Rabelais, the
first one of which was published in 1532). Both of these chronotopes stand in stark
contrast to our own, even though each remains evident in popular and literary culture.
Other contemporary examples of chronotopic calibrations that are alternative to, and
contest, timespace compression are available.

7.2.1.4.1

Contemporary Chronotopes: Two Examples

In Wisdom Sits in Places (1996), Basso writes of a horrifying moment in his
fieldwork with the Western Apache, when he fears having jeopardized his entire research
project because of “my actions, which were wholly unwitting but patently offensive” (p.
10). Keith Basso’s guide and teacher, Charles Henry, an Apache historian, has identified
a problem with Keith’s mis-pronunciation of a particular Apache place-name. Charles
brings this matter to Keith’s attention. Keith does not immediately recognize the depth of
its significance. After his fourth failure to repeat the name correctly, Keith tries to close
the episode by relying on the audio-recording: “I’ll work on it later, it’s in the machine. It
doesn’t matter” (p. 10).
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It does matter, Charles insists, first in English and then in an explanation to
another Apache member of the research team, Morley Cromwell. Morley’s main function
was as an interpreter. Keith’s knowledge of Apache and Charles’ knowledge of English
enables some (homolingual) communication between them, but neither is fully fluent in
the other’s language. In the text, Basso provides a (written) English record of Morley’s
(spoken) interpretation of Charles’ explanation in Apache. Then Basso explains:
Charles’s admonition, which Morley proceeds to translate [sic] without
dulling its critical edge, leaves me unsettled and silent. That Charles has
taken me for someone in a hurry comes as a surprise. Neither had I
foreseen that my failure to pronounce the stubborn Apache place-name
would be interpreted by him as displaying a lack of respect. And never
had I suspected that using Apache place-names might be heard by those
who use them as repeating verbatim—actually quoting—the speech of
their early ancestors. (p. 10)
The integrity of Charles’s admonition is maintained by Morley in the transformation from
Apache to English. Morley does not mistake Charles’ point of criticism through either
misunderstanding or misrepresentation. The quality of Morley’s work as a cultural
interpreter is praised by Basso’s expressed appreciation.
There are layers to the communication issue between Keith and Charles. Each
language has different coordinates for determining the meaningfulness of everything that
is said. To apply the analogy of information theory, each language has different sets of
alternatives from which to make a nonrandon selection (this jargon is explained in
Appendix F). In this case, Keith eventually comes to learn the significance of quoting
place-names rather than simply saying them. It is unclear from the anecdote whether the
realization comes in the immediate interaction, or as the result of longer-term exposure to
the meaningful coordinates of Western Apache cultural life.
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As an ethnographer, Basso is attuned to noticing the indicators of difference. He
recognizes that when difference is present, more effort is required and transformation of
the usual set of alternatives for decoding signals may become necessary: that is, he is
using a version of Reddy’s toolmaker paradigm. Basso’s use of the label, interpreting, in
this situation is technically correct. The criticism he receives is pointed: Keith Basso is
moving too fast. Keith is perceived as impatient or for some other reason unwilling to
remain involved in the social transaction until he has oriented himself properly to both
the landscape and Charlie and Morley’s ancestors through the culturally-correct use of
language. Basso explicitly identifies this Apache use of language as a chronotope that
constitutes the temporal backdrop for cultural existence.
Another example of chronotopic calibration comes from the Xavante of Brazil.
Laura Graham (1995) writes in her cultural ethnography, Performing Dreams:
Warā [men’s council] discourse is formally represented so as not to be
construed as the product of individual speakers. Rather than evincing a set
of one-to-one correspondences between individual speakers and discourse,
warā discursive practice represents discourse as a collage of multiple,
articulating voices. It pragmatically illustrates the emergent
intersubjectivity inherent in any discursive interaction. In the Xavante
model, truth is not a universal standard against which individual
statements are measured; truth can be contested, for it is constructed from
many voices. (p. 142)
By orienting to timespace in a creative and co-constituting way, Xavante maintain
language uses and cultural practices that enable collective decision-making that balances
the maintenance of internal cultural tradition with adaptation to new intercultural
contingencies.
Graham’s (1995) study of dream interpretation and performance among the
Xavante details a comprehensive process of reality co-construction. Rather than
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positioning Warodi (the dreamer) as possessor, defender, and sole interpreter of his
dreams, Warodi shares his dream-songs only as a first step in producing community
knowledge. While listening to his account during men’s council, the warā, other elders
add their own voices, singing and making other contributions to the telling: refining and
rehearsing the upcoming collective, public performance. At each step in the process all
participants enact the collaborative construction of meaning and cultural identification
that the ultimate performance is intended to model for the community as a whole.
Even though Xavante conceptualize a dream to be the experience of an
individual self—Warodi was the one who initially “experienced” the
dream—its telling nevertheless [becomes] a cooperative endeavour...By
collaborating in the telling, the participants altered the nature of Warodi’s
dream experience beyond what their collective singing had already
accomplished. As participants in the telling, the elders transformed more
of Warodi’s dream (or what was represented as a dream) into collective
experience…Moreover, in their telling the elders were actually doing what
Warodi was proposing…demonstrat[ing] the way for the Xavante to
remain forever. (p. 167-168)
Graham makes note of the polyvocal mode of these collective constructions of wisdom.
By formally representing discourse production as a collaborative rather
than an individual endeavour—a hybridization of voices—warā
discursive practice pragmatically embodies a conception of language and
speech acts that was articulated by Soviet theorists such as Bakhtin,
Vološinov, and Vygotsky and…emerging in recent critiques of speech act
theory. (p. 166-167)
This is not the homolingualism of a presumed superior or prior set of alternatives from
which nonrandon selections can be made, but a coordinated effort to draw pluralingually
upon the collective intelligence and insight of the entire community.
Considered as a communication strategy, the cultural practice of sharing dreams is
a powerful discursive tool for maintaining the integrity of specific cultural identity.
Practically, performing dreams places the Xavante at the center of timespace by
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calibrating the telling of dreams to position themselves as agents who successfully
resolve environmental changes and overcome external political threats. Likewise, Basso’s
study of the Western Apache practice of “speaking in names” (1996), draws explicitly
upon Bakhtin’s notion of chronotope (p. 62). Basso quotes a definition from The Dialogic
Imagination (Bakhtin, 1981) that highlights the linguistic fusion of time and space with
particular points of geography. He explains the fundamental relationship with the land
that forms the logical basis for Western Apache conceptions of self and culture: a
relationship that they understand as mutual and co-constituting. The land actively
communicates with and to Apaches (individually and collectively), especially through the
voice of ancestors who gave names to places (particular and specific geographical spaces)
that literally describe their appearance at that time. While environmental changes are
evident at some places that no longer appear as they once did (for instance, the absence of
water where, at the time of naming, there was a spring), most places retain a similar
geographical character. The place-names thus evoke the original stage for the telling of
historical events that happened there while enabling recognition of changes wrought by
circumstance.
Within specific social situations, especially those in which possibilities for public
criticism and embarrassment are rife, very particular cultural considerations for speaking
are invoked by Western Apaches. Under these delicate interpersonal conditions, a placename (or several) may be uttered “to substitute for the narrative it anchors, ‘standing up
alone’ (‘o’áá) as Apaches say, to symbolize the narrative as well as the knowledge it
contains” (p. 89). Place-names are understood by Apaches as direct quotations of their
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ancestors, and are coded with associated stories of historical events that occurred at the
named place which embody lessons about what it means to be Apache. Basso explains:
In addition, place-names implicitly identify positions for viewing these
locations: optimal vantage points, so to speak, from which the sites can be
observed, clearly and unmistakably, just as their names depict them. To
picture a site from its name, then, requires that one imagine it as if
standing or sitting at a particular spot, and it is to these privileged
positions, Apaches say, that the images evoked by the place-names cause
them to travel in their minds.
Wherever the optimal vantage point for a named site may be located –
east of the site or west, above it or below, near it or at some distance away
– the vantage point is described as being ‘in front of’ (bádnyú) the site;
and it is there, centuries ago, that ancestors of the Western Apache are
believed to have stood when they gave the site its name. Accordingly… in
positioning people’s minds to look ‘forward’ (bidááh) into space, a placename also positions their minds to look ‘backward’ (t’aazhi’) into time.
(italics in original, p. 89)
This juxtaposition of past/present, of ‘looking’ from the ideal angle at a physical place,
also positions Apache listeners to imagine their own situation ‘at the correct angle’ in
terms of the values and beliefs of long-standing cultural identity. This simultaneous
looking-forward and looking-back generated by such “travel in your mind” (p. 91) is a
calibration to timespace that enables the evocation of past practice as guide for future
action. It is precisely this kind of language use positioning that is at stake in the
chronotope. The juncture of chronotopal positionality in interpersonal communication as
well as in intercultural and institutional discourses generates conditions where
understanding or misunderstanding can both be turned to a social good.
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7.2.1.4.2

A Worst Case Instance

A “cholera chronotope” attached to place and timespace is analyzed in
comprehensive detail by Charles Briggs and Clara Mantini-Briggs (2003, p. 277).
Cholera and its attendant narratives cycled twice through the indigenous Warao
community during the 1990s in Venezuela, leading to more than five hundred easily
preventable deaths, particularly in Mariusa; a community nestled a fair distance into the
Orinoco Delta. Premised in a blame-the-victim logic, the transactional talk of government
officials, healthcare workers, journalists and clergy at every level of national and
international organization shows an individual and collective calibration to an
institutionalized, racializing discourse positioning the indigenous population as unclean,
i.e. as unsanitary citizens (Briggs & Mantini-Briggs, 2003)242 and therefore deserving (or
at least at fault) for inviting the epidemic.
The seventh cholera pandemic, historicized in a discursive timestream by the
World Health Organization (WHO) and the Pan American Health Organization, is
deemed to have originated in Peru by way of Europe and Asia before arriving at the
eastern coast of Venezuela (Briggs & Briggs-Mantini, 2003). As a modern-day outbreak
of a well-known and easily treatable disease, this pandemic “is situated within a master
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Briggs & Mantini-Briggs argue “that the key reason that authorities opted…for stop
gap measures, information control, and rhetorics of blame was rooted in the way that
spatializing, temporalizing, and racializing practices came together in institutional
contexts. The result was to make a race (‘the indígenas’), a space (the delta), and a
bacteria (Vibrio cholera) seem synonymous” (2003, p. 312). They continue,
“Cholera continued to carry out the function in the late twentieth century that it
served during much of the nineteenth—defining sanitary citizenship and identifying
unsanitary subjects” (p. 319).
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narrative that purports to track the ‘spread’ of cholera through vast stretches of time and
space” (p. 277). It is the disease, not human beings, that is centered by this chronotope.
Chronotopes in WHO publications cast geographic regions and nationstates as natural units of disease transmission, surveillance, and
containment. Texts, tables, and maps compare regions and countries in
ways that create hierarchies of success and failure in combating cholera”
(p. 283).
Many of the avoidable deaths occurred among the people of Mariusa, characterized as the
endpoint of all river journeys leading into the Orinoco Delta, the heart of the Warao’s
ancestral lands, still remote albeit colonized.
Mariusa, if understood analytically as a calibrating place-name, thus “serves as a
limiting case of remoteness, primitivism, and cultural conservatism” (Briggs & BriggsMantini, 2003, p. 217). Warao resistance could not penetrate the pervasive chronotopal
calibrating of official medicalizing, racializing, and blaming discourses: “Through the
delta, ‘the Mariusans’ were branded as the human manifestation of cholera’s imagined
ability to spring up at any point and spread across space” (p. 218). Tragically, these
“imposed spatial and temporal projections…were far from neutral or politically
inconsequential” (p. 284). Arrows on summary maps from the WHO during the pandemic
“trace the ‘movement’ of cholera across vast stretches of time and space….These timespace connections were perhaps nowhere as naturalized and powerful as in reference to
places of origin” (p. 277-278).
The Tortugans [Warao living in another town], on the other hand, never
become identified with cholera, never become agents of transmission. The
narrative casts them as innocent bystanders who had the misfortune to be
on the path taken by the Mariusans.
Note that cholera, people, and culture follow the same path in this account,
one that leads from Mariusa to Tortuga. The two places differ in terms of
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time, in that Mariusa continues to be the locus of a previous way of life, at
the same time that the premodern world coexists with its modern
counterpart.243 They also differ in terms of space, such that one becomes
the quintessence of the premodern world of forest gatherers while the other
is cast as a more modern realm of agricultural production and sale. Mariusa
and Tortuga are chronotopes—fusions of space and time—and the origin
narratives that the Tortugans told about themselves and cholera are linear
movements along this time-space continuum.244 The Tortugans claimed
that they lived in, if you will, a different time-space zone, thereby creating
a powerful sense of social distance from the Mariusans.245 (p. 189)
In what might be understood as horizontal violence, the Tortugans utilize a discursive
escape from the institutionalized cholera chronotope, which contributes to the structural
binding of the Mariusans within it. While cholera appears within the populations of both
towns, the depersonalization imposed from without overwhelms a more comprehensive
Warao chronotope; one group is sacrificed on behalf of the other. Time and space are
identified in the institutional discourses and cultural communication practices recognized,
studied, described, and critiqued in each of these settings. Graham, Basso, and Briggs &
Mantini-Briggs are alert to Bakhtinian notions and deploy them where they make sense.
Imagined as a continuum, Bakhtin poses two polarities of adventure time and folkloric
time as examples of how language fills time, institutionalizing an imagined structuring of
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Briggs & Briggs-Mantini (2003), footnote 5: “Dipesh Chakrabarty [2000] has argued
that this notion of the simultaneous existence of worlds that belong to distinct
temporal realms, modern and premodern, plays a key role in constituting modern
schemes of social inequality” (p. 350).
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Briggs & Briggs-Mantini (2003), footnote 6: “See Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination”
(p. 350).
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Briggs & Briggs-Mantini (2003), footnote 7: “Johannes Fabian [1983] refers to this
mode of creating distance as the ‘denial of coevalness’ and suggests that it is the
classic process whereby anthropologists have claimed distance from and superiority
over the objects of their research, thereby contributing to colonial relations of power
and domination” (p. 350).
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timespace that leads to actual social co-constructions of reality. Language use is the
means of calibration.

7.2.1.5

Loss: Subtlety, Nuance, Control
In the European Parliament, the discourse shows how the dead conduit metaphor

calibrates the information-centric transmission model of communication, resulting in an
elaborate transmission machine: an extension of the IBM system from the Nuremberg
Trials. The rigid structure of controlled multilingualism in the European Parliament
promotes the use of lingua francas, especially English, in order to avoid the exaggerated
risks of interpretation. “I don’t know,” muses this Member, “ if there are more problems
with English. It seems not as much is lost as when I use German” (OM03). The notion
that there is something there “in” the German, waiting to be lost, is conduit model (dead)
thinking. It reflects the homolingual attitude that communication should occur without
effort, and also a corollary: if effort is required, there must be something wrong.
As Reddy says, “In terms of the conduit metaphor, what requires explanation is
failure to communicate. Success appears to be automatic” (1993, p. 175). The phatic
qualities of presence desired by Members using ELF, or any lingua franca, are not absent
from simultaneously-interpreted transaction unless they are forced out by the structure of
the system. The different qualities of presence required for skillful and strategic
participation in simultaneously-interpreted communication provide the basis for new
calibrations to an alternative chronotope.
A fine-grained reading of the discourse shows Members are conflicted about
disregarding the significance of interpreting. The nub of the contradiction becomes
apparent in the discourse about words. One Member defined the choice of his own
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language or ELF: “If it is something where the terminology is not so important, it is not
an argument, and speed is not important, then I speak in Meridian” (OM66). These
criteria do not seem to leave much opportunity to use anything other than English! But, as
has already been indicated above and will be elaborated further, ELF is not a panacea,
and may even be hiding consequential, adverse outcomes. A Member’s Assistant spoke
frankly: “It’s always a problem when you have an English Rapporteur or Draftsman on a
topic” (F37). “Listen carefully on the English,” warns another Member, “very carefully”
(OM31). From the other side, in using ELF, “you can talk about complex issues with a
high percent of understanding and then native speakers are at a disadvantage. Subtlety
gets lost but no one notices except the native speakers” (NM28).
Putting something over on native English speakers during the spontaneous
interaction of debate may appear, on the surface, to be a good thing, especially since
English speakers are less prone to conform to the multilingual/language learning baseline.
“It’s easy for me, my mother tongue is English, and all the interpretations that come to
me are direct, not through relay. [Other language speakers] complain about time and the
numbers of combinations: Portuguese to Romanian, there can’t be too many specialized
in that” (OM44). However, as a non-native English-speaking Member observed, “There
is a feeling that if you speak English here, you can get away with anything” (NM68).
What can one get away with, I wondered. How and why? I observed an English-speaking
Member explain the advantage to colleagues in a Political Group meeting: “One of the
classic things about English is you can interpret it as you wish.” Recall the example
regarding an international agreement for Israel to withdraw from the Occupied
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Territories: in English, the specifics were indeterminate, but if the agreement had been
written in French, there could have been no ambiguity.
A Member from the UK explained how leaving the English vague leads to very
specific advantages when it comes time for implementation, because there is latitude to
interpret the application of the law according to what is expedient at the present time,
which may have changed since the past time period during which the legislation was
negotiated and voted into law. An MEP recounts this experience:
The Second Reading was very difficult in Working Groups and
Trialogues. On the First Reading the Parliament was nearly unanimous
but the Commission rejected it. We could have put interpreters on
everybody but everybody spoke English or partly French. We reached a
political compromise—all in English. I was happy the Shadow’s Assistant
is a native English speaker, who warned about some words. You have to
rely on the native English speakers on your own team. (OM09)
Which leaves one to wonder, what if you don’t have a native English-speaking Member
on your team?

7.2.1.5.1

Examples: Diction, Referent and Indexicality

“We have problems with the English language,” explained a Member’s Assistant,
because we are not native speakers, and when both are not native speakers
it’s very difficult to have a good communication about a Commission
document, about amendments, and if you read some amendments it’s
sometimes only one word to change. And that’s very difficult to have all
the nuance in your own translation from Dutch to English and then from
English to Spanish, Portuguese. (F37)
The word “translation” in this quote is accurate. There are two intercultural
communication issues in the European Parliament: one involves the dynamics of social
transaction using simultaneous interpretation, the exemplar of pluralingualism. The other
involves the dynamics of translation: of securing a legal translation that has a chance of
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complementary judicial interpretation across all twenty-seven countries of the European
Union.
As it stands, (witness the asylum legislation wording about the provision of
interpretation) much legislation in the European Union is written on the basis of how
much previously-existing legal language can be imported from previously-worked out
translations. The power of precedent is magnified by resisting efforts for better wordings
whose ripple effect necessarily entails new translations and may invoke the spread of
alternate cultural (and intercultural) norms. A truly pluralingual EU would have original
laws drawn up in each of its languages, distributing the burden of finding equivalence
equally, rather than privileging one linguistic frame.
A few of the challenging translation examples shared or observed during
fieldwork include the French label for government-supported housing because “behind it
is a logic for social organizing” (OM35), the notion of “cross-border” in Dutch, which
generated “a big discussion, a very emotional discussion, because the word was not good
translated into documents and not good translated by the interpretation” (F37), and the
use of “illegal” or “irregular” in reference to asylum seekers who fail to meet standard
official criteria or are otherwise of indeterminate status.
Another translation concern is the invention of new terms, such as “subsidiarity,”
which is originally a Latin word, related to the Church in Greece and “completely
artificial from the German point-of-view” (OM08); “employability,” which is “not in the
French or German dictionary, it’s a British philosophy [about whether a person] can train
for a job” (OM59); and “flexsecurity,” about which a Member scoffed: “What does that
mean? Give people some but not too much social security after working” (OM59).
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Another Member mentioned how the need for “parallel words” in all the official
languages (NM70) comes up, just by working on a material problem such as asbestos
abatement. There are “such specialized words…in fisheries, chemistry, finance” (OM35),
and, too often, “the interpreters are not experts in the field; they use another word that is
the normal word” (F17/M41) rather than the most precise technical jargon. In the analogy
of mathematical information theory, the interpreters lack the “repertory members”
(Reddy, 1993) in their pre-existing set of alternatives that could, nonrandonly, be fitted to
the signal of a given technical term. (Note: the lack of pre-existing alternatives in a
repertoire of already-matched concepts applies equally with interpreting ELF.) In another
instance, a Member explains:
I didn’t have any Meridian text in front of me, so I had to rely on the
English…it was really on words…I was not aware that the Germans
would turn up and come up with—they only read half of it, but the
problem is afterwards…we had to fight from a technical point…what I
learned is on language…I had tabled that amendment in English…and I
should have tabled it in Meridian, because in Meridian I would have
said….. ‘This was an extra argument’ … not as an ‘excluding
argument’…I read over that when I…drafted the English text, because my
English is okay, but I’m not a native English speaker…this was a
language problem…because the spirit of my amendment was certainly not
to put it as an excluding condition…if I would have tabled that in
Meridian, the services would have translated that into correct English or in
the right spirit of English. (OM09)
The challenge, it seems, is to be able to use the interpreters in order to resolve conflicts
regarding the words. But this is precisely what the structure of the regime of controlled
multilingualism prevents, backed up the conduit/transmission model of interpreting and
further reinforced by the ideology of speed.
If you know the subject—this is the point really in the Parliament—okay,
I can’t understand Romanian or Bulgarian or Greek, but I do speak French
and German fluently. I can understand Italian, I can understand Spanish—
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you can get the gist. What you lose in interpretation is… the words.
(OM63)
One Member asserted quite plainly that he would have been a better MEP if he had more
interpreting. “Yes. I think yes because the work of our work is also about the nuance
about legal things. We have to understand they are a sensitive question and one word
could change the sense of the item. I think it’s very—it’s important. It’s important”
(NM73).
The issue, then, seems to be less along the lines of blaming ‘the machine’ for
merely doing what it is ‘programmed’ to do, and more along the lines of how can
Members cope with making the necessary communicative repairs?

7.2.1.5.2

Asylum

The Asylum dossier described in Chapter 4 includes a regulation on the provision
of interpretation and translation for refugees seeking asylum in Europe. There are or “will
be a lot of environmental refugees…and…many victims of traffickers” (A1)246 as well
people fleeing war or political persecution. Many are economic refugees “just looking for
a better life” (A1). Also, “there’s a lot of illegal immigration…coming from Africa, and
[Malta is] ending up being the buffer zone and the filter of Europe” (A2). “Or for
instance the Canary Islands have had massive influx some point maybe 20,000, 25,000,
30,000 people within a few months” (A3). Negotiations among five European Parliament
Rapporteurs, their Assistants, and Secretariat officials representing different Political
246

As with the previous reporting of instances during fieldwork when I am quoting
individuals heard in meetings but not interviewed; in this section I’ve used a
different coding scheme for non-interviewed as well as interviewed subjects in an
attempt to safeguard the confidentiality of research participants.
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Groups were mainly focused on improving reception conditions and how best to enhance
the influence of the Parliament in the Trialogues with the Council of Presidents (“the
Council”) and the European Commission (“the Commission”). For the latter purpose, the
issue of “solidarity” was key.
The lack of solidarity between Member States is actually causing a lot of
problems because the Netherlands [for instance] can have a system up and
running. They [an interior country] can, you know, have beautiful words
on being tough on illegal migration and refugees to be welcomed. But if
you’re faced with hundreds and hundreds of people coming in every day,
it’s kind of difficult, you know, and you remain responsible just because
you are, in fact, the external border because of your geographical position.
(A1)
Solidarity was the main sticking point in the Trialogues, which focused on whether the
“shared responsibility towards the external borders” (A1) would be binding (required) or
voluntary (optional).
Another sticking point was on how to guarantee standards for the literal, physical
reception conditions, as the Commission was “opposed to every and any use of the word
quality” (A4).
This all sounds very basic, but [my first priority] is to make sure that the
conditions people, be it illegal or not, but the conditions people are
received in—this is not correct English, but whatever—that they are up to
standards, you know, not A-plus, but, you know, just a bed and some food
and a shower, you know. I mean this is what we talk about. (A1)
Given the essentially primitive state of reception conditions (at the time),
The asylum system is one which quite often gets by on sort of ad hoc
interpretation because also there’s an issue about the numbers side of
things there; you know, how many people do you have that speak this
particular Afghan dialect who are not from the same tribe as the tribe
you’re trying to get away from. (A4)
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From the Parliament’s perspective, the opportunity of the Asylum dossier was twofold: to
establish a new European Asylum Support Office as a focal point for solidarity and to use
the recast of the preceding Directives to improve “the execution law, which is part at the
end of the law” (A7). As summarized earlier, it was already conceded that improving the
wording regarding the provision of interpreting would fail. “Within the Asylum
dossier…the whole focus, [a particular MEP] doesn’t want it to be on this issue of
language” (A5).
Nonetheless, amendments were made (review Table 10) regarding the provision
of interpretation and the debate is representative (even to the level of metonymy) of the
discourse about SI in the EP. Of particular interest is the fact that “we have been
discussing [for] hours with Council on how to define language” (A1) and yet few seem
able to recall the preferred wording, e.g., “I’m not 100% sure on the exact rule” (A5), and
“…a definition where it is stated understands or presumed—what was it again?” (A1)
One Trialogue participant recalled from memory: “May reasonably be presumed to
understand” (A6); and another, “may reasonably presume to understand, that’s from a
judicial point of view, you or legally you can at least be in line with court cases and so
on” (A1).247
There is a switch between the subject and object in the grammar of the last two
phrases indicating a subtle but significant difference. In the phrase, “may reasonably be
presumed to understand,” the emphasis is on (in this case) the asylum seeker: “the
247

It is unclear what court cases this Member was referring to being in line with. In
2010 (one year after these conversational interviews), the Parliament and Council
issued Directive 2010/64 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal
proceedings. There are eleven references to understanding; the relevant paragraphs
are quoted in Appendix D.
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Other,” if you will. In the latter phrase, “may reasonably presume to understand,” the
focus of the decision-making and responsibility has been shifted away from the Other,
from the asylum seeker, to the person doing the presuming. In this framing, the legal
protection is not on or for the asylum seeker, but rather for the official(s) administering
the procedures. For the moment, just keep that nuance in mind. On the question of
understanding: “There’s a sticking point,” as another participant explained, “a major one.
We call it a key point, which means if a Political Group says something’s a key point,
what that means is that that’s the point at which they wouldn’t compromise” (A6).
It was recognized that the wording in the original draft from the Commission was
“rather weak—’supposed to understand’” (A1), so it was proposed to “see what we did in
a Return Procedure because I remember we had on-going discussions for I don’t know
how long.” This Trialogue participant continues:
Then I went back to the Return Procedure and I saw the definition used,
“understands or” et cetera. And then I phoned with the legal services of
the Commission and they confirmed that if I would propose that specific
definition, that that would improve the Commission text as much as
oversight of the Commission not to follow the definition as already
adopted in another instrument. (A1)
What is being sought is both the significance of precedent and also the oversight
responsibility of the European Commission to ensure continuities in wording because
different definitions used throughout the instruments…is actually causing
the major problem within the EU because every time we have an
instrument linked to other instruments, we feel—this is not always the
case—but we feel to have the same wording throughout the instruments
thereby creating different treatment, thereby creating too much room to
maneuver for Member States, creating too much room for all kinds of
court cases. (A1)
Here is the relevant section from the (2008) Return Directive (emphasis added):
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Member States shall provide, upon request, a written or oral translation
[sic] of the main elements of decisions related to return, as referred to in
paragraph 1, including information on the available legal remedies in a
language the third-country national understands or may reasonably be
presumed to understand. (European Parliament & Council of the EU)
Was the Commission intending to improve the wording by using “supposed” instead of
“presumed,” or was it just a “bad translation” from French, as one of the Trialogue
participants insisted?248 The initial draft of this legislation for a European Asylum
Support Office was generated by the Commission, in keeping with Vuorikoski’s material,
in which “a large part of the research material of [her] study is based on documents
initiated or drafted by the Commission” (2004, p. 77). The distinction between presumed
and supposed is subtle and, as a matter of differentiation, probably insignificant. Both
involve making an admittedly subjective judgment. “Those who are more malicious
about the issue are worried that asylum seekers get good translation [sic] and therefore
make a stronger case and can stay.” (A6). This person continued:
There’s a spectrum of opinion there. I’m not suggesting everyone is in
[this] case, but more disreputable people would be going for that option.
But the main option with the thing is probably cost and resources to be
fair to people who are voting for that. (A6)
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“The European Commission consists of [now, 28] Members, known as
Commissioners, who are appointed by agreement between the member governments.
Throughout their term of office they must remain independent of the governments
and the Council…. The role of the Commission is to uphold the common interests of
the EU. It acts as the guardian of the Treaties, it serves as the executive arm of the
Communities, it initiates Community policy, and it defends Community interests in
the Council. The Commission is accountable to Parliament alone. (Noël 1993: 7 –
15…)…The Commission is always represented in the plenary session of the
Parliament, being addressed by the speakers, and taking the floor when a document
drafted by the Commission has been debated” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 76).

401

As noted, the Return Procedure “is clearly something else” (A1), that is, something other
than the intake processing of persons seeking asylum that are being emphasized in all of
the directives included within the Asylum dossier.
Of particular interest is the Procedures Directive, which is “the Directive that simply
sets up a frame for the procedures to—for applying for asylum…the Procedures one is
actually the frame for the whole—at the axis point somehow for the asylum seekers” (A3).
The reason why the Socialists were so intent on this particular amendment
on language is because apparently there’s a ruling in The European Court
of Justice which makes a reference to language and understanding; so that
is why they believe that there is no legal basis for [the current wording].
(A5)249
“Basically, Geneva Convention and asylum law, and most legal opinion, suggests that an
asylum seeker needs to have information in a language he or she understands” (A6).

7.2.1.5.2.1 International Law
The first appearance of interpreting in major international legislation appears to
be in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which is a United Nations
multilateral treaty dating from 1966 and in force since 1976. Article 14, Section 3 on the
equality of persons before the law, states:
In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be
entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: (a) To be
informed promptly and in detail in a language which he [sic] understands
of the nature and cause of the charge against him; [and] (f) To have the
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I was unable to track down any particular court ruling. Directive 2010/64 (European
Parliament & EU Council) provides a legal basis for the right to interpretation for
victims and defendants of suspected criminal behavior in the European Union. The
question then becomes why asylum seekers are afforded a lesser legal right to
understanding.

402

free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the
language used in court. (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights)
The next appearance is specific to Europe, in the 1992 European Charter on Regional and
Minority Languages. Article 9 on judicial authorities says, in reference to both civil and
criminal proceedings: “at the request of one of the parties, shall conduct the proceedings
in the regional or minority languages…if necessary by use of interpreters and
translations.” In 1996, the Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights (also called the
Barcelona Declaration) was adopted by the World Conference on Linguistic Rights but
has not yet been approved by UNESCO. Article 20, Section 2 states: “Everyone has the
right, in all cases, to be tried in a language which s/he understands and can speak and to
obtain the services of an interpreter free of charge” (UNESCO).250
Returning to European context, the 1995 Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities entered into effect in 1998; it includes three statements
about communication access and language rights in Article 10:
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1

The Parties undertake to recognise that every person belonging to a national
minority has the right to use freely and without interference his or her
minority language, in private and in public, orally and in writing.

2

In areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities traditionally or
in substantial numbers, if those persons so request and where such a request
corresponds to a real need, the Parties shall endeavour to ensure, as far as
possible, the conditions which would make it possible to use the minority
language in relations between those persons and the administrative authorities.

3

The Parties undertake to guarantee the right of every person belonging to a
national minority to be informed promptly, in a language which he or she

The Girona Manifesto (2011) reiterates support for the Barcelona Declaration by
listing ten practical principles. None of these, however, emphasize the significance
of simultaneous interpreting in live human social transaction.
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understands, of the reasons for his or her arrest, and of the nature and cause of
any accusation against him or her, and to defend himself or herself in this
language, if necessary with the free assistance of an interpreter. (Council of
Europe)
In every instance, what we see is no modification of “understanding.” Rather, as an EP
Asylum Trialogue participant said, only “understands, full stop” (A1).

7.2.1.5.2.2 What’s In a Word?
In the case of the European Parliament’s debate about the Asylum dossier, there is
apparent concern for layers of meaning associated with understanding. It seems a number
of nonrandon alternatives could be matched (according to mathematical information
theory), interpretively, with the wording for the Asylum Procedures Directive, including
“presumed” or “supposed” (and even further refined by “reasonably). The solution opted
for during this debate (which continued until the Procedures Directive was adopted in
2013) was to copy phrasing previously established in the 2008 Return Directive:
“understands or may reasonably be presumed to understand” (emphasis added; see p.
399). Here is the (2013) Procedures Directive’s wording:
(25) In the interests of a correct recognition of those persons in need of
protection as refugees within the meaning of Article 1 of the Geneva
Convention or as persons eligible for subsidiary protection, every
applicant should have an effective access to procedures, the opportunity to
cooperate and properly communicate with the competent authorities so as
to present the relevant facts of his or her case and sufficient procedural
guarantees to pursue his or her case throughout all stages of the procedure.
Moreover, the procedure in which an application for international
protection is examined should normally provide an applicant at least with:
the right to stay pending a decision by the determining authority; access to
the services of an interpreter for submitting his or her case if interviewed
by the authorities; the opportunity to communicate with a representative
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
with organisations providing advice or counselling to applicants for
international protection; the right to appropriate notification of a decision
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and of the reasons for that decision in fact and in law; the opportunity to
consult a legal adviser or other counsellor; the right to be informed of his
or her legal position at decisive moments in the course of the procedure, in
a language which he or she understands or is reasonably supposed to
understand; and, in the case of a negative decision, the right to an
effective remedy before a court or a tribunal. (Emphasis added, European
Parliament & Council of the EU)
What happened? Is this some political sleight of hand, a blatant breach of oversight, or
did the only adjustment with the possibility of gaining enough support get lost in the
noise of other issues?251 Instead of repeating the language of the Return Directive
precedent as MEPs indicated they would do, the original “rather weak” wording of the
initial Commission’s draft has been kept, resulting in different wording in the two pieces
of legislation: presumed has been replaced by supposed. One of the Trialogue
participants mused at the time, regarding how some of the amendments were voted in the
LIBE Committee, “either an alliance was planned in advance or just…how would I
say…convergence of intentions, the Liberal Group (ALDE) and the Popular Group (EPPED) voted together. And when these two group join, they have a majority” (A8). That
means these two Groups rejected an amendment without securing passage of an updated
amendment to achieve the desired alignment in both legal instruments. The conservative
majority succeeding in maintaining a lesser standard, but failed to obtain the legal
consistency that was overtly sought.
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Perhaps the researcher, by drawing attention to a matter that Members believed was
unresolvable, contributed to the ‘noise’? This may have led Members to react
(probably unconsciously, if so) by deliberately dismissing giving attention to the
matter. In keeping with Cumming’s (xxxx) theory of a “problematic moment,” the
noise may have been a group level event indicating the presence of a dynamic with
constitutive potential to change entrenched power relationships and allow a new
story about the EP to emerge, with alternative (perhaps even pluralingual) bases of
co-identification.
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The Asylum recasts and proposal for a Support Office were being debated just
months prior to elections. This was a “hot issue…legal migration, it’s asylum, it’s
procedure rights” (A3):
parties tend to kind of—they get affected by these issues because they’re
populous issues. For example, on TV today there’s the big issue about the
asylum seekers, mainly Afghani asylum seekers in Kali, and now [the
public is getting their] fill of stories about they’re going to come to [old
Member country] and so on. (A6)
Was it just the timing of these “sensitive issues…[with] an extra political dimension”
(A6)? In a certain literal, legal sense (and quite ironically from the researcher’s
perspective), the major conservatively-moderate parties did defeat the alliance of smaller,
left-leaning parties (Socialists, Greens, and GUE) and their argument that EU law on
linguistic rights should be in sync with the body of international law on linguistic rights.
But this victory comes at the expense of obscuring the unified command of the desired
homolingual network of law.
This Trialogue participant explained the need for the “understanding or” caveat
(instead of “understanding, full stop”):
It certainly doesn’t go all the way, but we feel that this is—this could be
something that wins approval in Council. So we think the Commission’s
proposal is inadequate. What we want to achieve is one step further, but
the last step of the way is maybe one step to far…this is probably realistic
to achieve; whereas a number of Member States already indicated they are
not willing to go for the full-fledged option…. I think what they consider
is that this is—this would disproportionately make the whole process so
much more difficult that if there’s in any single dialect that the applicant
understands while you could reasonably argue that most applicants would
understand one of the main languages be it English, French, German or so
forth, Spanish, Italian, whatever.
That if there is an inkling that the applicant actually does have some level
of understanding of that language, it would be ludicrous to actually have
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to provide an interpreter in every single language combination that would
be foreseen. (A9)
Did you catch it? I think it is an instance of social metonymy: when the microsocial
interaction is bound up one-and-the-same with the macrosocial interaction. Doesn’t this
sound like the EP’s policy of providing interpreters for Members? If there is an inkling of
some level of understanding, it would be ludicrous to have to provide an interpreter for
every Member’s real need.

7.2.1.5.2.3 Spinning in the Discourse
This may be an inconsequential tangent, but I am bewildered by the contradictions
in comments of some of the Members of this Trialogue procedure, just as I found myself
often being pulled (as if literally drawn against my will) into similar conversations
revolving around the same themes no matter how diligently I tried to share insights as I
had them. Sometimes I would ‘re-discover’ an insight that I would recall having had
before but completely forgotten. Especially the participants associated with the two large
parties, the EPP (Popular) and ALDE (Liberals), I had to wonder: were they consistently
and deliberately misrepresenting their position, not just to the other participants but also to
me? How can switching the word presumed to supposed be considered “sort of
progressive” (A9) when it flies in the face of the strategy of exact duplication?
What comes to me repeatedly as I review my fieldnotes and interview transcripts
is that the participants themselves could not keep the wording clear, despite (some of
them) having spent “two or three years of negotiations” (A8) on the Return Directive. For
instance, one Trialogue participant thought the proposed amendment was to insert the
word reasonably, which is present in both versions. Or maybe it was to take it out? Of
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course no one had any of the exact texts in front of us while we spoke. “I should have
taken the text with me” (A1). But there it is: “Normally we use a definition which is
saying the person should understand or may reasonably presume to understand. That’s
the definition we currently use” (A1). So again, I’m puzzled: how did supposedly remain
in the draft and pass into the final version?
One reason is the pervasive logic of multilingualism with its hidden homolingual
tendency (to assume everyone understands) as well as the interaction taboo (which
interferes with attempts to confirm shared understanding). Figure 3 diagrams an analysis
of institutional discourse about multilingualism triggered by the shocking defeat of the
European Constitution. That defeat focused European Commissioner Barroso’s attention
on the problem of communicating Europe. Calling for a Period of Reflection, Barroso
stimulated a series of discursive contributions whose centripetal action is represented in
Figure 3. The centering force of the dead conduit/transmission machine keeps policy
mired: “ritual supporting homolingualism and the interaction taboo are pervasive in
information and communication policy, which presumes language in merely a utilitarian
tool for conveying information” (Kent, 2012c, p. 96-97). Specifically, “the problem of
communicating Europe is exacerbated by the routine (ritualized) dismissal of the social
interaction and identity implications” of language use (p. 98). One passage from the
article elaborating the discursive relationships in Figure 3 bears quoting in full.
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Figure 4.

Centripetal Discourse of Multilingualism in EU Language Policy. Space
constraints for the original article did not allow this figure to be printed in
The European Public Sphere: From Critical Thinking to Responsible Action
(Morganti & Bekemans, Eds., 2012).
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The Final Report of the High Level Working Group on Multilingualism
names the relationship among language, identity, and political power as
“somewhat of a taboo subject” (2007: 21). Specifically, this interaction
taboo regards articulating clearly “the tricky question of the situation of
speakers of minority and extra-Europe languages” (Gazzola 2006:
398)…Calls to provide “suitable translation and interpretation services”
(EC 2008: 5) to the specific groups who most need them are recent and
not yet supported in durable ways. The White Paper on Communication
claims “renewed attention is being paid to implement citizens’ right to
communicate with the institutions in their own language” (2006: 8). This
vertical communication still relies upon the transmission model of
communicating information, and fails to provide for horizontal coidentification through ritualized processes of social [trans]action. (p. 101102)
The machine model leaves interpretees to figure it for yourself. While there are reasons
this is desirable, it is also not necessarily always realistic. It leads to the assumption that
someone else will catch errors and make the necessary repair(s). This is a rationale both
MEPs and interpreters give for not interrupting to clarify or remedy mistakes or
misunderstandings recognized in the moment; the layers of redundancy in the legislative
process are intended to filter out mistakes.252
Of course “the state of play” (A7) with the asylum dossier involved other salient
issues (from the Members’ point-of-view) than the provision of interpretation to people
252

Vuorikoski’s (2004) research hypotheses were essentially predicated on the
assumption of shared knowledge: “From a theoretical point of view, with reference
to the cognitive aspects of SI, it is assumed here that the interpreters’ performances
are based on more or less the same set of background knowledge of the topic under
discussion. This assumption is based on the fact that interpreters work for the EP on
a regular basis, whereby they have acquired knowledge of the institutions and the
substance of the issues under debate. They also study EU documents and
terminology lists. Thus, the knowledge of the topic that interpreters share with the
speakers, while not at the same level as that of the MEPs, can be expected to be at a
considerably higher level than what is frequently the case when interpreters work for
international conferences in the so- called ’free market’ (i.e. outside the institutional
context). Consequently, it is hypothesized that interpreters will not face problems
comprehending the content of the speeches or the terms and concepts” (p. 156-157).
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whose lives might totally and absolutely depend upon the outcome . The argument for
communication access was “lost” before it had begun, “specifically in the face of
Council” (A5) but
the fact that the wording—’in a language that’ sense—didn’t even get
adopted into Parliament; so in negotiations with the Council they’ve got
no hope whatsoever, and they couldn’t even possibly try and negotiate
with that because they don’t even have support for it in Parliament. (A5)
Besides playing to xenophobia, or trying to constrain cash flows, another reason why
Members might themselves have gotten swirled up in an confusing and essentially
unsubstantial debate about a word is because the system of SI in the EP is itself
predicated upon presumed or and supposed understanding. “We all know,” says an
Official, “that the important thing is to get the message; it’s not to—whether the language
is perfect or not” (F11). Except for when it matters that the language is perfect (or not).
“There are issues,” offered a Member, “about the level at which you’re doing it and the
purpose for which you’re doing” (OM78)

7.2.1.5.3

Double Standards

Members accept the loss of subtlety and nuance in their own productions of
English as a lingua franca, but criticize the interpreters for failure to detect subtlety and
nuance. “Is it possible,” I asked one Member, “for interpreters to do well with subtlety
and nuance if they don’t know the context as well as the Members?” “Very interesting,”
is all he said in reply (OM33). The contradiction concerning diction shows up in two
ways: the double standard for evaluating professional interpreters and the use of
Assistants or officials with the Secretariats as informal interpreters.

411

Part of the problem about—and certainly in the English language—about
recruiting highly-skilled interpreters is that people may be highly skilled
in another language but they are not necessarily highly-skilled in English
to be able to interpret that nuance into English: their own sort of
grammatical and vocabulary skills in English are not good enough to do
that. (OM78)
It is admitted that fluency in ELF is not a sufficient stand-in for fluency in English. The
use of Assistants and Secretariat officials is also a mixed bag:
We spoil it because we have a lot of staff who are competent in more than
one language and therefore people will sometimes rely on their personal
assistant or—you know, I mean I’ve seen it—the Secretariat—you keep
an eye on them; it’s really not their job to be interpreting for a whole set
of reasons….if they’re interpreting for [an MEP] they’re not doing their
job as Secretariat. But you know, so people got sortof used to that and
working with people that they know and—and again—so they don’t
necessarily want to bring in the more formal interpreting side of it.
(OM78)
“Sometimes,” an Assistant explains, illustrating the point, there are “problems of
technical topics during …the Trialogue meetings, but then you have the assistance of the
Secretariat so they can explain and help. It’s a problem of interpretation then” (F37).
A particular example was raised by an official with a Secretariat explaining a
situation where “we did interpretation,” going on to say, “but in that case…if you do like
that, there was no language problem” (F38). That situation involved going “step by step,
because [the Member] had a very radical position…if there was a way to negotiate
something better, of course he would try.” This official continues:
But he was not the only one having interpretation limits….I was speaking
of him because I know him, but for example the Socialists had a French
Shadow Rapporteur on that file which spoke no English at all. At all. So
there was somebody speaking only French and somebody speaking only
Italian, more or less. I mean, well he speaks also some English. The
French lady didn’t speak a single word of English…so of course all
meetings, all bilateral meetings [with her] were done among four people.
That means [the MEP] and me, and the French lady and her
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Assistant…we managed, let’s say, to put through at least a part of our
position. So there was a real debate, real negotiation; and it was not
blocked by the linguistic…difficulties, I would say, in that case at least.
(F38)
In that case, what occurred was social interpreting: interpreting by multilingual persons
who were as concerned with the relationship and quality of connection among Members
as with the information content, per se.
Some of the Assistants reflected on their experience as informal interpreters:
The thing is that I’m fluent in English and I can understand and express
everything, but if there are negotiations or something, I’m always afraid
I’ll translate [sic?] something in a different meaning, because you always
intend something when you use special words and special expressions,
and I don’t know these words and expressions in English. (F38)
Limits to informal interpreting by non-professionals are also reached when the
transmission model infects the social construction of role. Another Assistant concurs,
“I’m always afraid I’ll interpret with the wrong meaning” (F33). And yet another
Assistant admits, “It is much more relaxing, not to have to interpret. Sometimes your
concentration lapses and you miss something. It’s embarrassing to have to ask” (F29).
That asking (especially by the interpreter) is the essence of social interpreting: rather than
pretending to an automatic transparency of meaning, in social interpreting every
participant (interpretees and interpreters) share responsible for constructing meanings that
are understood in common. Meanwhile, “people [Members] are comfortable with me [an
Assistant] as an interpreter” (F33) and it is widely understood that Assistants’ interpreting
“[is] really important for the informal” (F33).
Two comments are worth making: one is that the kind of “interpreting” that
Assistants are performing is akin to community-style interpreting such as professional
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sign language interpreting that upholds Deaf cultural practices around holding time and
ensuring mutual understanding (as performed by Deaf interpreters and evolved and
schooled/ally interpreters). The goal in community interpreting, as defined from the
minority language user’s perspective, is to ensure understanding (e.g., Adam, Carty &
Stone, 2011; Forestal, 2011, Kent, 2013; Stone 2009). This requires a different utilization
of role space (Lee & Llewellyn-Jones, 2013) than blending into the machine or fading
behind the glass as expected of conference interpreters. The Code of Conduct for
community interpreting is no less professional than the ethical guidelines for conference
interpreting (see Appendix B), but community interpreters intentionally and purposeful
attend to the relational as well as the informational needs of the interpretees.
The language labor being performed by Members’ Assistants is akin to the hidden
work of bilingual and multilingual employees in multinational corporations. To
understand this it is useful to look at some of the business management literature
regarding language use in multinational corporations.

7.3

Language Brokers and Language Policy in Multinational Corporations
“Acknowledging the presence of different languages allows those individuals who

speak different languages to move between different communication zones” but
international business managers (and researchers of international organizations and
international management) are not sure, really, how to deal with language brokers (van
den Born & Peltokorpi, 2010, p. 107). Language brokers are multilingual employees who
gain informal power by operating as language nodes (Marschan-Piekkari, Welch &
Welch, 1999) within an institution. This informal power is individually beneficial (DuBabcock & Babcock, 1996; San Antonio, 1987) but has been documented to have
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adverse organizational effects. Harzing & Feely (2008), for instance, found that such
brokers or “bridge individuals” (Harzing, Koster & Magner, 2010, p. 282)253 become
situated to act “as information gatekeepers, filtering, delaying, and distorting the
communication flow to their own advantage” (Harzing & Feely, 2008, p. 54). Described
as “muddle along functionalism,” there are “numerous drawbacks” (Feely & Harzing,
2003, p. 46), including adverse consequences to multilingual employees, who may
become “overwhelmed by the requests to translate company material and their language
skills are not always appreciated by…colleagues” (Vaara et al., 2005, p. 341).
Using lingua francas has also proven to have a significant downside, including
“disintegrating effects […] particularly at organizational levels below top management”
(Vaara et al, 2005, p. 330). Harzing and Feely go so far as to say that “reliance on a
single language is fatally flawed” (2003, p. 43). For instance, constraining a company to
only one standard language may ignore resources at its disposal due to the unique
knowledge and experiences of employees (Dhir & Goke-Pariola, 2002). Other
researchers, however, argue that language must be decoupled from culture and a lingua
franca utilized as an overt mechanism of corporate control (Luo & Shenkar, 2006).
Regarding English as a Lingua Franca (ELF), the international management
literature leans homolingually in support of Quirk’s (1990) concern with keeping a
standard model for language. Quirk’s view is seen as “the deficit perspective” by Kachru
(1990) because it assumes, homolingually, that native speaker English is ‘right’ or
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“…bridge individuals, refers to individuals with specific language skills that act as
bridges between employees without the necessary language skills…bridge
individuals can be structural solutions implemented by the company or can grow out
of informal solutions” (Harzing et al, 2010, p. 282).
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‘correct’ by default (Jenkins 2006). Meanwhile, Quirk (1990) attacks the “liberation
perspective” that he attributes to Kachru, who understands world Englishes in
pluralinguistic terms as “enabling what had been periphery English users to ‘write back’
and rewrite the discourses of their Englishes” (Bolton, 2005).
Kachru’s liberation perspective also challenges the thesis of Robert Phillipson’s
(1992) concept of linguistic imperialism in which English is accused of continuing to
colonize the global population. ELF is also, however, reported as having “dysfunctional
effects” (e.g., Piekkari & Tietze, 2008). Researchers are calling for increased attention to
ELF, asking, “Why is it that ELF research does not really have any visibility in business
communication?” (Louhiala-Salminen & Rogerson-Revell, 2010, p. 91) especially as
multinational corporations continue to engage “the prevailing reality of English, with the
largest number of speakers, in interactions which more often than not no native speakers
participate” (Seidlhofer, 2009, p. 237). Jenkins argues that the prevalence of ELF is seen
as evidence of empowerment rather than “passivity and exploitation” (2006, p. 165).
Coming under the umbrella term of World Englishes, effects of “transformative agency”
for learners of English as a second language (Jenkins, 2006, p. 168; Lantoff, 2000) are
evident, including “the representation of their sociolinguistic reality far better than either
British or American norms [for speaking/writing English] are able” (Jenkins 2006, p.
168).
Scholarship about languages in international business has been growing for the
past two decades. Boutet (2001) describes how language increasingly constitutes both the
process and product of work, and Steyaert, Ostendorp & Gabrois argue that researchers
are engaging in an intellectual “process of linguascaping” (2010); they question whether
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all of the ideas about language use being put forth by academics comport with empirical
data. The neologism of a linguascape was coined by Steyaeart et al. as an extension of
Appadurai’s (1990) transnational anthropology.
Conceptually, “a linguascape refers to the discursive space in which an
organization or any other actor frames and imagines how it can deal with its (de facto)
multilingual composition” (Steyaeart et al., 2010, p. 277; see also Blommaert et al, 2005).
The description and analysis of the discourse about SI in the EP is a representation of the
linguascape of the European Parliament. Although not every single theme matches up,
the parallels between the discourse about SI in the EP and the issues presented in the
international management literature are strikingly congruent.
The most glaring similarity is that language difference is framed as a problem,
e.g., “the faultlines of language” (Barner-Rasmussen & Aarnio, 2011). Metonymically,
language itself is conceived as problematic. Language is “a dividing factor” (van den
Born & Peltokorpi, 2010, p. 112 citing Anderson & Rasmussen, 2004), a “barrier” (e.g.,
Barner-Rasmussen & Aarnio, 2011, p. 289 citing Hedlund, 1986; Harzing & Feely, 2008,
p. 47) and a “problem” (e.g., Barner-Rasmussen & Aarnio, 2011, p. 293); Harzing &
Feely, 2008, p. 52) that generates “coupled vicious cycles,” “communication failures”
and an “adversarial climate” (Harzing & Feely, 2008, p. 54). There are “negative effects
of language diversity” (van den Born & Peltokorpi, 2010, p. 210 citing Frederickson et al,
2006). Luo & Shenkar blame “language barriers between the home and host country [as]
part of the liability of foreignness” (2006, p. 321-322). Barner-Rasmussen & Aarnio
provide a summary: “Previous research broadly agrees that MNCs are multilingual
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organizations in which language boundaries constitute important barriers to
communication and knowledge sharing” (2011, p. 289).
Monolinguals (in particular) are presumed to “suffer from language handicaps”
(Barner-Rasmussen & Aarnio, 2011, p. 294), have a “linguistic handicap” (Ehrenreich,
2010, p. 412 citing Frederickson et al, 2007, p. 418) and experience “linguistic
inadequacy” (Kunal, 2011, p. 122). Kingston reports “the frustration and exclusion
experienced by English speakers when their French colleagues spoke among themselves
in French” (1996, cited by Harzing & Feely, 2008, p. 50), while Brannen & Peterson
(2009) describe a case in which only monolingual native English speakers experience
communicative alienation. Concurrently there is a trend reported by Charles (2007) in
which “native speakers of English are…occasionally causing considerable
communicative trouble” (cited in Ehrenreich, 2010, p. 426). “English,” reports van den
Born & Peltokorpi, “is identified to be far from being ‘neutral’ or ‘culture-less’” (2010, p.
106). All of these framings represent the communication ‘problem’ in (what we will
properly call) pluralingual organizations as an issue of languages, rather than a problem
of social/intercultural transaction among people who use different languages. The
ideology of speed is implicated by Harzing, Koster, & Magner: “language is an important
barrier, slowing down and increasing the cost of decision-making” (2010, p. 279).
Piekkari & Tietze even use the engineering metaphor of multilingualism as “noise”
(2008, p. 267).
Among the most dastardly accusations against multilingualism (really
pluralingualism: the use of more than one language in the same timespace) are that
“language skills are an essential element in the construction of international
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confrontation, can lead to a construction of superiority and inferiority, and also reproduce
post-colonial identities” (Vaara, et al., 2005, p. 596). For instance, “employees who
operate in a foreign language are placed in disadvantageous positions compared to those
who are able to express themselves in their mother tongue” (Piekkari et al, 2005, p. 341).
Simultaneously, “the common corporate language may also be a challenge for those who
are allowed to use their mother tongue, because they realize the danger of one-way
communication” (Piekkari et al, 2005, p.341 citing Laine-Sveiby, 1991). This body of
literature is aptly summed up as “a systematic analysis of the problems associated with
language differences” (Harzing & Feely, 2008, p. 52).
The homolingual assumption of such a blatant language-as-problem ideology
ought to be glaringly obvious. Conduit metaphor (dead) transmission thinking is present
as well. For instance, organizational goals are often explicitly framed in terms of
“information flows with a minimum loss of information” (van den Born & Peltokorpi,
2010, p. 110), and interpreters are supposed to mask evidence of misunderstandings so
that tensions can “pass unnoticed” (Albl-Mikasa, 2010, p. 141). An anti-interpreting
discourse runs through the literature almost as if in order to pre-emptively discredit it.
Feely & Harzing list five specific reasons why using an interpreter “clearly injects a
potential source of misunderstanding into the proceedings” (2003, p. 44). The reasons
that justify blaming the interpreter are familiar: interpreters must understand the context,
have specialized knowledge of complex subjects, be familiar with interpretees as
individual members of their particular cultures (not stereotypes), and be able to represent
each interpretee’s rhetorical voice.
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In an unusual move, the fifth reason Feely & Harzing (2003) provide for why
using simultaneous interpretation might ‘inject misunderstanding into’ the
communication is the interpretees reluctance to share relevant background with the
interpreters. This is a mix of engineering and conduit metaphors and points to the
fundamentally social nature of ‘the problem.’ Generally, simultaneous interpretation is
hidden with the realm of “invisible translation” (Piekkari & Tietze, 2008, p. 268 citing
Barner-Rasmussen & Aarnio, 2011), but the interesting move of putting at least some
responsibility on the interpretees (and not just the interpreters) is that it points the way to
“the heart of social interactions” (Piekkari & Welch, 2010, p. 468) by opening inquiry
into “the interfaces or translation [sic] points between the languages used” (BarnerRasmussen & Aarnio, 2011, p. 294). Such a re-focusing allows a “look at the ‘positive’
or ‘facilitative’ aspects of identity and subjectivity construction related to language and
communication policies” (Vaara et al., 2005, p. 621).
“Sensitively managed,” Harzing & Feely concede, “there is no reason why code
switching should impair the relationship [among employees who speak different
languages]” (2008, p. 55). Charles and Peikkari emphasize “that corporate training
schemes should focus on the broad spectrum of international communication rather than
on increasing a systematic knowledge of any one language” (2002, p. 9). But, selective
recruitment of individuals with pre-existing multilingual skills is “inherently costly” and
“does not eliminate the language barrier [sic], but merely shifts it down a level” (Feely &
Harzing, 2003, p. 47). Possibilities of simultaneous interpretation are implicitly avoided.
The desire for homolingual communication permeates the linguascapes of
multinational corporations just as it does the European Parliament. Some researchers

420

advocate a common corporate language in hopes of “reducing the need for translation
[and/or interpretation] and potential for miscommunication” (van den Born & Peltokorpi,
2010), even though “communication difficulties stemming from a lingua franca are
caused by limited language skills” (van den Born & Peltokorpi, 2010). Likewise,
“communication problems are caused because of the difficulty of understanding different
types of English used by non-native speakers or poor translations of written material
(Charles & Marschan-Piekkari, 2002). Reddy’s (1993) toolmaker’s paradigm has not yet
appeared in the international management literature to complicate the three translation
[sic] models summarized by Janssens, Lambert, & Steyaert (2004): mechanistic, cultural,
and political.
Although a mechanistic perspective on languages and communication is critiqued
as “unrealistic…unproductive—perhaps even dangerous” (Barner-Rasmussen &Aarnio,
2011, p. 288), Shannon’s (1948) mathematical information theory can help us see how
most of the research on languages in international management has deployed a limiting
formula with a pre-determined code of matched sets of alternatives. Option: apply a
social identity lens and (as a result) find inequality. Alternative: apply a homolingualist
lens and find (as a result) trouble with diversity. “Unequal distribution of language skills
across linguistic boundaries tends to increase language-based inter-group boundaries,”
state van den Born & Peltokorpi (2010, p. 106 citing Lauring, 2008 and MarschanPiekkari et al, 1996b), as if no remediation exists.
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Meanwhile, if “communication…is only possible via interpreters” (Ehrenreich,
2010, p. 421), discount that option, too.254 Homolingualism can manifest in all these ways
and includes “the assumption that ‘one language fits all’ communication needs” (Piekkari
& Tietze, 2010, p. 267). Homolingualism promotes taking understanding for granted,
which plays out in “language [and language use being] taken for granted—not
questioned, examined, used as a variable, or explained” (Louhaiala-Salminen &
Rogerson-Revell, 2010, p. 91).

7.4

Simultaneity
The focus is simultaneity rather than working out the details of similarity.
Paul Amar
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In a paper on organizational strategy, Luo and Shenkar (2006) argue that
“coordination costs [for multinational corporate enterprise (MNEs)] are reduced
directly as a result of lower translation requirements and indirectly via minimization
of the misinterpretations associated with linguistic barriers” (p. 324). They admit,
however, “while we have discussed linguistic differences, we did not attempt to
measure such differences” (p. 336), nor did they “elaborate on institutional variables
that may influence the dynamics of language choice and their effectiveness” (p.
336). They further suggest: “While MNEs with global strategies are likely to use a
uniform language, the pressure to do so might be lower when the languages used in
diverse locations are less dissimilar (e.g., French and Italian). In contrast, languages
from different families (e.g., English and Chinese) involve fundamentally different
discourse forms, which might undermine understanding even when an interpreter is
used, and thus create much greater challenge for an MNE that needs to transcend
national boundaries” (emphasis added, p. 336). There are (at least) three, interrelated assumptions: one is the unquestioned tactic that differences which exceed
interpretation can—and should—be avoided and ignored; second is the untested
belief that shifting the burden and costs onto individuals for language learning is
both directly and indirectly more cost effective for the MNE; and third is assuming
that the short-term homogeneity of forced shared language use offers greater
controls to the organization than long term adaptation to incorporating interpretation
in order to preserve differences, which, if valued through highlighting and
engagement, can foster innovation and creativity.
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To take languages and language use as a pluralingual variable in the social
organization of institutional and cultural life is a way to address the simultaneity effects
of simultaneous interpretation and social transaction in terms of shared identity.
“Differences,” writes Evangelina Holvino, “and the identities constructed based on them
are interdependent and always interacting” (2006, p. 2). Her work255 addresses a
manifestation of what I have called an interaction taboo, specifically that there “is little
evidence that the importance of these intersections is acknowledged” (2010, p. 249). The
intersectionality of difference and identity is made visible by the presence and use of
simultaneous interpreters in the European Parliament. The discourse about SI in the EP,
however, evades proactive engagement with the simultaneity of pluralingualism through
its normative preference for homolingualism. As a terministic screen (Burke, 1996), this
echoes Holvino’s observation of the field of organization studies and managerial practice,
that “the silence on these intersections is outstanding” despite a discourse of “managing
diversity” (2010, p. 249).256
I will only note the similarities I can imagine between the administrative
strategies of controlled multilingualism in the European democratic policy context and
managing diversity in the international management context by surmising that both are
motivated by, and therefore (aim to) regenerate, homolingualism. The essential insight of
255

Holvino’s express purpose is “to reconceptualize the intersections of race, gender
and class as simultaneous processes of identity, institutional and social
practice…bringing to a close the modern impulse to search for a meta-narrative that
attempts to integrate race, gender and class (Sacks, 1989)” (2010, p. 249). That
‘modern impulse for integration’ is akin to homolingual desire.
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Another relevant silence regards “the unreflexive use of English” and subsequent
neglect of “language multiplicity” in the field of management and organization
studies (Steyaert & Janssens, 2013).
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Holvino’s model of simultaneity is that “simplification is no longer an alternative” (2010,
p. 262). The social field (Levitt & Schiller, 2004) of Members of the European
Parliament is a “transtemporal and translocative space” (Tweed, 1999 cited in Levitt &
Schiller, 2004). The European Parliament cannot be representative of Europe without
pluralingualism. Members are, of necessity, exposed to more than their own language.
Increased discursive consciousness is called for by the urgency of the history we are all
living now.
Holvino’s recommended intervention is to begin telling “the hidden stories at the
intersections,” which are inherently “more complex stories” (2010, p. 263) than those that
are usual and familiar. The most relevant hidden stories in the discourse about SI in the
EP are those of the MEPs who do not know English or another lingua franca. Nondominant-language speaking Members of the European Parliament are the keepers and
safeguard of difference in Europe. While it may be considered a weakness of this
research that few of their stories are included here, this analysis uses the accessible and
available discourse to “[focus] on institutional practices, how they create power and
material advantages and disadvantages for different groups and how these practices are
reinforced by and relate to specific symbolic and discursive organizational processes” (p.
264).
Further, the emphasis on thinking in terms of time and history (Neustadt & May,
1986) is responsive to Holvino’s call to “[articulate as] social practices, the relations
between organizational processes and their broader social, material and historical
contexts;” this is achieved in particular by “explicating how that context and history show
up in every day practices” (2010, p. 265). The description and critical analysis of the
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discourse of SI in the EP presents the possibility of a temporal zone and physical space
that could be characterized by, and deliberately championed as, an institutional
community of pluralingual practice (cf Wenger, 1998) based in “fundamental
simultaneity” (Holvino, 2010, p. 250)
Such a fundamental simultaneity, achieved by pluralingual calibration, may
provide a pivot for shifting the social field257 beyond the European Parliament to the
European public sphere. The shift would entail changing from a “concept of
society…that is…automatically equated with or confined by the boundaries of a single
nation state” (Levitt & Schiller, p. 1004, 2004) to a new imaginary of a shared European
identity based in simultaneous social transaction that retains intercultural difference
because of language difference maintained in shared timespace rather than splintered
through serial monolingualisms and homolingualisms. The pluralingual practices and
performances of simultaneous interpretation could become an exemplar of what Levitt
and Schiller call “simultaneous incorporation,” a both/and approach to transnationality
rather than “the nation-state container view of society258 [which] does not capture,
adequately or automatically, the complex interconnectedness of contemporary reality”
(2004. p. 1006).
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“Bourdieu used the concept of social field to call attention to the ways in which
social relationships are structured by power. The boundaries of a field are fluid and
the field itself is created by the participants who are joined in struggle for social
position” (Levitt & Schiller, 2004, p. 1008).
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Ulrich Beck (2000) says “‘the container view of society’ … [composes] most of the
sociology of the first age of modernity” (in Levitt & Schiller, 2004, p. 1007-1008).
Notice the similarity of analogy between the container view of society and the
conduit model of communication.
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The challenge of Europeanization is “a fundamental problem of social theory—
how to rethink society if we do not take national boundaries for granted” (Levitt &
Schiller, p. 1005, 2004). One hurdle to overcome is methodological nationalism in policy
making, that is, “the tendency to accept the nation-state and its boundaries as a given in
social analysis” (p.1007). The insight of Europe’s multilingual/language learning policy
is that homolingualism is archaic. The substantive issue of simultaneous incorporation
requires comprehension of the placement of the European Parliament in the historical
timestream of the people’s struggle for social justice.
Paul Amar, in a guest lecture at Hampshire College,259 describes “the return of the
future” in the timeline of history after it was “proclaimed dead in the 1990s” and “revived
as medieval history by George W. Bush’s War on Terror.” After the supposed death of
history, the future again became a topic of public discourse arising from the simultaneous
eruption of occupations in Tahrir Square, the Wisconsin State Assembly, and multiple
Occupy movements (citing particularly the Occupation at the University of California).
According to Amar, “The Future” re-enters history with the Arab Spring, with the
uprising of “The People” as a social actor, and the role of The Social as an actor in
history.

259

Paul Amar gave the 14th annual Eqbal Ahmad Lecture at Hampshire College
(Amherst MA, United States) on March 8, 2012. Retrieved 25 March 2014,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dNbLc7pLUMc
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A coordinated engagement of public intellectuals260 to the previous global
uprising against the US invasion of Iraq (15 February 2003) “triggered a widespread
debate on the meaning of Europe in which intellectuals from practically every European
country—including several from Eastern Europe—weighed in” (Kumar, 2008, p. 88).
Paul Amar characterizes that anti-war protest as merely as a footnote because it failed:
Iraq was still invaded. In “The Question of European Identity: Europe in the American
Mirror,” Krishan Kumar critiques Habermas’ and Derrida’s “attempt to construct a
European identity as against America” (p. 91), arguing for Europeans to “face fully and
acknowledge the legacy we want to refuse” (p. 96).261
Kumar quotes American Iris Marion Young: “Surely invoking a European
identity inhibits tolerance within and solidarity with those far away…I fear Habermas
may reinscribe the logic of the nation-state for Europe, rather than transcend it” (Young,
2005, p. 153; p. 156 in Kumar, 2008, p. 98). Kumar is critiquing an essential
homolingualism: “They [Habermas and Derrida] look inward when they should be
looking outwards” (p. 98). Kumar’s critique of a selective contrast [Europe vs. the US]
premised in a temporary homolingualism [agreement there should not be an invasion]
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Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida wrote an article that was published on May
31, 2003 in a leading French and German newspaper. Prior correspondence with
other “well-known intellectuals, such as Umberto Eco, Adolf Muschg, Gianni
Vattimo and Fernando Savater…[arranged that] on the same day…simultaneously
appeared articles by these other authors, responding to it, in a number of leading
newspapers in France, Italy, Spain and Switzerland” (Kumar, 2008, p. 88).
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Habermas and Derrida write of constructing a core European identity based on
distinguishing between “the legacy we appropriate, and the one we want to refuse’
(2005: 10)” (in Kumar, 2008, p. 96).
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suggests there is sufficient discursive consciousness among Europe’s intellectuals to
propagate a pluralingual center as the ground for a common European identity.

7.4.1

Challenges of Pluralingual Transaction
Premised in homolingualism and codified by controlled multilingualism, the

interaction taboo between Parliament Interpreters and the Members of the EP is rigid
enough to result in an interpersonal reduction, dehumanizing the interpreter as an
automatic decoder, an instrument assisting the tool of language in the mechanical
reproduction of inequality. The structure of controlled multilingualism in the EP that
divides the formal from the informal determines the linguistic interactions of Members.
An official with a Secretariat for one of the Political Groups describes how
the use of languages through negotiations depends on the Member…[Mr
MEP, for instance] has never been very… easy with foreign languages.
He understands and speaks English. He understands and speaks Spanish.
But when you come to a technical level, when you need legal language of
the language, then he has problems. So if he has to make a public speech
in English, either he prepares it or he feels he’s not able to express himself
fully; thus either he has interpretation or he prefers not to take part or
taking part but not to intervene. So of course this affects negotiation quite
a lot….this is one of the most important [issues]…in your research from
my point of view. Because it happened already a couple of times that we
had Coordinators, for example, without translation. Usually they try to
have translation. Sorry, interpretation. But it happened a couple of times
and he was like not motivated to take part, because he knew he couldn’t
really—he could just say, ‘ I support a decision,’ or ‘I’m against a
decision.’ But he would have a hard time to explain why.
So interpretation comes up to be extremely important to—if you want to
be able not to only say ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ but also to explain your position. So I
would rather say it is the essence of the political action. Because if you
can’t express your reasons why you are making a political fight, well all
the Parliamentary debate gets useless. Then it gets just to be a machine
where nobody will change his mind and you have no chances to convince
somebody else of your position. (F38)

428

Multilingualism has been turned, at least in the regime of controlled multilingualism
governing the system of simultaneous interpretation in the European Parliament during
the 6th Parliamentary Term (2004-2009), into the reproduction of homolingualisms that
inhibit voice.

7.4.1.1

How Would You Prefer to Lose Control?
When we’re arguing about language, it’s usually about something else.
Robert Lane Greene262

In the rooms and hemicycles of the European Parliament, Members literally turn the
channel dial to listen to their language of preference. A Member borrowed that
convenient metaphor to describe the codeswitching of multilingual colleagues: “You
change language [he gestures turning a knob], switch languages during an intervention to
be well understood by everybody, not to be mistranslated [sic]. It is a way of showing it’s
very international.” (OM20) The homolingual assumption is at work; that unquestioned
assumption of ‘being understood by everybody.’ Vuorikoski opened her research with
this sentiment expressed by a Finnish Commissioner: “‘If the topic is of a very general
nature, I can speak Finnish. When dealing with issues that are technical and complicated,
I prefer using a language such as English, which can be understood directly by everyone.’
(November 1, 2003)” (2004, p. 15). This untroubled assumption of ‘understanding’ is
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Overheard at the booksigning for You Are What You Speak (2011). Lane Greene was
the keynote speaker for the 2012 Business Language Research and Teaching (BLRT)
Conference of the United States’ Centers for International Business Education and
Research (CIBER). I used this quote in a Prezi on “Misunderstanding and
Innovation: English as a Lingua Franca” which was a 2011 Award presentation at
the conference and available online.
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opposed to the purported risks and dangers of misinterpretation by Parliament’s
simultaneous interpreters. The homolingual choice of a lingua franca is justified by the
rejection of difference, regardless of scale. By this logic, different understandings are
equally as bad as misrepresentations; a missed understanding as egregious as an
omission. It is a tight ideology.
Homolingual convergence as a language ideology is supported by the ideology of
speed. Many of the informal meetings (where interpreters are not required by the rules,
such as that of Coordinators),263 were explicitly created in order “to speed up the work”
(F11). No matter the sacrifice of Members whose language profile requires interpretation.
At the informal level, where the wording of law is crafted with attention to its
translational power across cultures and countries, language difference in the intercultural
social interaction is either erased or managed in ad hoc fashion. As a result, rather than
considering the broader and more far-reaching social implications of articulation within
the EU as well as between the EU and international law, (as, for instance, in the case of
providing interpreting for asylum seekers), an impatience with diversity misses the clue
that a conflict over word can provide.
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In this case, “eight times over ten they provide interpretation…[in] LIBE meeting
and plenary meetings he always have me [an Assistant or member of the Secretariat].
Committee meetings and plenary meetings, you always have interpretation;
otherwise there’s no meeting. It’s a rule. While Coordinators, it’s not really any
worry that you need—that you have to have interpretation at Coordinator’s
level…[because] they can not just say—decide—anything. They decide as far as
everybody agrees” (F11). This official said, at another point in the conversation:
“Well, French is my first foreign language. So if I can negotiate in French, I’m much
happier. Negotiating in English for me is a little bit limitating, too. so I can guess for
somebody who just has a basic level, it must feel really [laughter] difficult” (F11).
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In the asylum case, the point is not that “reasonably presumed” is better or worse
than “reasonably supposed.” Instead, the clue in the confusion is the attempt to qualify
what counts as understanding. That effort is problematic for all kinds of reasons, most
germane being that comprehension, especially at the level of mutual understanding, is not
a controllable substance. Control is constituted in the rituals not in the words. If the
rituals accord respect to everyone, democracy and social justice become achievable.
The comparison between an asylum seeker to the European Union and an MEP
fluent in only one European language may seem too far-fetched, but the dynamics of
trying to achieve voice in a linguistically-imbalanced situation are similar. The
consequences of failure to achieve voice in these disparate settings, however, cannot be
compared. The point of this illustration is that it encapsulates the controversy about
simultaneous interpretation. Members “break into English, because they don’t trust the
interpreters to pick up the subtleties” (F04). Subtleties? According to the discourse, much
of the political communication using a lingua franca is reduced to the level of a blunt
object.
Let’s return to the analogy of mathematical information theory. If there is a
misunderstanding at the simplified level of discourse, chances are high that either the
code is damaged or there are not pre-existing matched sets of alternatives from which
interpreters can make a nonrandon selection. In homolingual interpersonal
communication, such instances are usually handled in a face-saving way. In the system of
SI in the EP, if there is an identified problem with the interpretation, Members “don’t
know if I can intervene” (OM06). Regarding non-simplified language, one Member
shared his frustration about a particular instance: “I have a very specific point-of-view, to
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get out of the standard view. Sometimes the concept, [the interpreters] don’t understand
it…if you use English…it will be understood” (OM33).
Without belaboring the inherent homolingualism, what some Members talked
about was their desire to be innovative. They wanted to break through and away from
established ways of thinking by proposing creative alternatives. They felt stymied by the
interpreters rendering ‘the same ol’ party line.’264 This is where the ideology of speed
impinges directly upon interpreter performance. The emphasis on speed and quick
decision-making for instant closure, no less now than when SI was inaugurated with the
IBM system at Nuremberg, pushes interpreters to snap decisions based on the preexisting ‘set of alternatives’ within the repertoire associated with that particular language
combination, as specific as possible to the speaking individual, their political party’s
standard ideology, or whatever else is clued in from the diction choices in the source text.
These closure skills, as they are called within the profession, are the easiest measurement
of interpreting aptitude.
When an interpreter is clued to another set of nonrandon alternatives for
interpretation, the misunderstanding that arises is not the work of a wrong-headed fool
(Reddy, 1993, p. 175) but the inevitable result of a system under too much time pressure
(cf Vuorikoski, 2004). Reducing the quality of discourse in order to avoid errors is not the
only remedy. While ELF is a viable strategy evidenced by its rapid growth and
persistence; it does not resolve communication difference and it exacerbates
homolingualism. Minimizing misunderstanding can be also be accomplished by adhering
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The Members who shared egregious stories from their own experience usually went
‘off the record,’ therefore I can only provide general characterizations.
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to the EP’s indigenous argumentation genre (Vuorikoski, 2004), increasing clarity and
using repetition, as well as by increasing skills at recognizing and repairing challenging
communication dynamics when they occur, rather than allowing them to fester and
ramify. Adopting the pluralingual strategy means re-evaluating the conditions of social
transaction and accepting that what is most conducive to equitable simultaneouslyinterpreted communication are not the assumptions of homolingual communication.
For instance, the “laugh waves” (OM35) that accompany jokes when there is “a
relay in English: whoever understood the original is the first wave, then the English is the
second wave, and the third wave from the relay” (NM56). The result is “you can be three
sentences along before the Greeks get the jokes” (OM44). One particular anecdote
involved a situation involving a relay in which it was attributed that “the Germans got it
last and laughed aloud. The debate had moved on to discuss the number of casualties in
an armed conflict…[the laughter] was not appreciated” (OM08). Although clearly
unfortunate, the timing of the laughter is relative: it happened when it happens, it is what
is. The conundrum brings to mind Keith Basso’s situation of being ‘too much in a hurry.’
Perhaps Basso as an individual could adapt more readily to the established temporal
calibrations of western Apache culture than the Members can, as an organized group,
adapt their collective, intercultural behavioral and attitudinal norms to generate a
different orientation to pluralingual time.
If, for instance, “the Members know what each other’s languages are” (F30), why
does the conversation ‘move on’ when a relay is required? Why is it framed as “a
problem [that] the relay …is much slower, a full sentence behind” (OM28)? This
questioning is what Schön describes as
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the hermeneutic problem, the problem of the interpretation of texts in a
very broad sense, the problem of literary criticism. The concern here is to
understand the kinds of inferences by which such interpretations are
made, the sorts of evidence pertinent to them, and the criteria by which
they should be judged and tested. (1993, p. 138)
Why is the relay happening? What does it involve? In every instance, relay involves
communication among the languages sometimes characterized as exotic, such as “Finnish
to Dutch” and “Greek to Hungarian.” Even without relay sometimes there is a ripple
effect. “I can tell a joke in English…[then] you go on and suddenly there are Lithuanians
laughing up in the corner. You’d get a shock—’What are they laughing about?’”
(OM44). Other times, as I observed during an AFET meeting, a joke was told (in
English) but the laughter was confined to a particular section of Members, the periphery
never laughed at all.
Another Member clarifies the issue with humor (emphasis added):
If somebody tells a joke, which is always dangerous in politics because it
can be misunderstood, people laugh. Now the people who understand the
first language, laugh spontaneously. It’s then translated, so five or ten
seconds, other people start laughing. Sometimes with, say, a minority
language, by which I mean one which is spoken by few people, the
interpreter is actually interpreting from another interpreter. So you’re then
getting a third wave of laughter, which is quite funny, but it’s not really
natural. (OM63)
The assertion of nature, that the syncopated rhythm of interpreted interaction is not
natural, is evidence of cultural hegemony (Gramsci, 1971; Hall, 1986). The benchmark of
homolingual interaction is extended through illusion of what is/isn’t natural. Rather than
being evaluated within its own conditions of production, simultaneously-interpreted
social transaction is evaluated according to criteria for an altogether different kind of
communication, that which is both monolingual and homolingual.
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The linguascape of communication in the European Parliament is not
homolingual: involves the use of other languages in the same space and at the same time.
Multilingualism as a language ideology has prevented the generation of norms that are
adaptive to the observed outcomes of pluralingual social transaction. The time tolerance
of Members stretches beyond the spontaneous ripple, but reaches its (apparent) limit of
shared social interaction in the instances of Meridian-to-Meridian interpretation and
voting. Just as Members are reluctant or even resistant to using headphones to listen to
their ‘exotic’ colleagues, they are also (apparently) willing to periodically sacrifice them:
“If I see that I can communicate with English…if two or three don’t speak English I don’t
mind” (NM21). The ultimate breakdown of the information transmission machine occurs
during voting, when the ideology of speed exceeds the human capacity to communicate.
Even though, as an Official clarified, the system “was never intended to move to
one language” (F32, the homolingual impulse combines with the ideology of speed: as a
longterm EP official stated, the interpreting regime is “a trajectory we’ve followed. To
alter it will be difficult” (F04). In addition to the homolingual impulse, there is what is
understood about the nature of politics itself, which means, “sometimes compromises have
to made in private” (OM09).265 The desire for such “talks under four eyes: no interpreters
needed” (OM03) plays right into homolingualist insider/outsider language lines. It also
points to a deeper resentment: “From the moment there is a third person there, the
atmosphere is changed” (OM09). Isn’t that the point of a pluralingual democracy? A
Member recounts the situation of a colleague negotiating with the Council:
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Some Members insist that everything important happens in meetings.
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He don’t speak English. But the others and we are not understanding
Italian. So he has his interpreter with him…and he tells his interpreter
what he wants to say…then there is a translation [sic]…then Council is
answering. His interpreter translate [sic] the message, but then—that is a
very bad position in negotiations, a very bad position. When you have no
direct contact, when you cannot discuss directly vis-a-vis, then you are in
a bad position. (OM67).
This prejudice against interpreted interaction is validated by reference to the homolingual
situation. It is as if “your contact by eyes” and the ability to “see how is the relationship”
(ON67) are eradicated by the language mediation of an interpreter: as if interpretees’ own
perceptions no longer exist.

7.4.1.1.1

Relying on the Wrong Criteria: The Homolingual Illusion
It is difficult to participate with this person between us.
Old Member (OM) of the European Parliament

“Even with the best people [interpreting], there are still problems even though you
expect it should be smooth” (emphasis added, OM03). Where does this expectation come
from? The highest form of ‘smoothness’ is what Csikszentmihaly (1990) described as the
psychological experience of “flow.”266 I am suggesting that when we are communicating
homolingually, that is, with people who ‘speak the same language’ (be it a language such
as the mother tongue or a disciplinary or ideological language, interpreted or not), we
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As an optimal psychological state, Csíkszentmihályi (1990) describes flow as
completely absorbing, to the extent of immersion: “Time flies. Every action,
movement, and thought follows inevitably from the previous one, like playing jazz”
(Csíkszentmihályi, quoted by Geirland, 1996). Based on the definition of flow as “a
state of "intense emotional involvement" and timelessness that comes from
immersive and challenging activities” (Grierland, 1996), an action learning
hypothesis is that the experience of communicative flow is a reference point for
cultivating chronotopic awareness.
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experience a certain kind of flow that, put simply, feels good. Flow may be only the
phatic communication function of sharing some basis of identification, but it also applies
to being immersed in a task and unaware of the conditions enabling the task: fish in
water; people in air.
I suspect that it is the desire to achieve or maintain that flow that motivates the
resistance to interpretation, and the disappointment of losing flow contributes to the
discourse theme of complaint about interpreter’s purported mistakes and
misunderstandings. “Don’t think about it, “urges this Official. “Try not to use them…
interact directly, you can act more quickly and gauge understanding” (F04). The
assumption that one cannot “gauge understanding” during simultaneous interpretation is
false. In actuality, just as one example, “the evidence arises in debate when someone
disagrees and I would not expect them to disagree—why?” (OM29). The ideology of
speed motivates the desire for flow; if you cannot find any rationale for slowing down
then you will continue to reject the alternate rhythms of pluralingual interpreting.
There are apparently many sanctions to compel Members to conform to the
homolingual imperative: “In Parliament, if someone asks a question and you do not
answer in their language, then they do not ask again” (NM26); and “it becomes difficult
when language becomes an issue of nationalism or patriotism instead of a cultural value”
(OM57). The multilingual homologic is celebrated: “In the cafe, you can listen and hear
so many languages. It is very interesting. The communication is the tool, in such a case
no one is concentrated on the language: it’s the goals. And the necessity to be polite”
(OM20). There may be a mild tyranny of politeness that also draws Members to provide
that inkling of understanding; and there is disagreement on the extent to which (when and
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whether) complete comprehension or fully fluent expression matters: “Listening is not
the issue…[rather] to express every detail” (OM12). Or is it more true that “it is very
seldom that one needs to make a precise point in one’s own language” (NM24)?

7.4.1.2

Authorizing Interpretation
The problem is we have no contact with the interpreters.
There is no interpersonal.
I know some of them but it is sporadic and
no one is talking about this problem.
New Member (NM) of the European Parliament
The negative and adverse consequences of the system of controlled

multilingualism were perceived by the Parliament’s interpreters during the first chaotic
year (2004-2005) of the big bang enlargement. Interpreters’ concerns composed “a
discourse of danger and loss” (Kent, 2009) and foreshadowed everything the Members
articulate in their discourse during the last year (2008-2009) after the big bang
enlargement. The research periods coincide like bookends for the 6th Parliamentary term.
The designed of controlled multilingualism structures an inability to intervene in the
ideology of speed, driving Members to the homolingual option rather than cultivating the
full pluralinguistic capacities of communication involving simultaneous interpretation.
An insightful Member commented, “The rhythm is fundamental” (OM33), but the
pace of some aspects of Parliament’s language regime is faster than humanly possible.
Several Members offered their political wisdom, to select a few issues for an entire term
and follow them carefully all the way through. European Parliament Interpreters offer
advice, too:
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This is an environment where the illusion of being understood correctly easily
gets created. For example, if you are in a meeting and have to say something,
you’ll probably be referring to a text that has been talked about in three, four, or
five previous meetings, so everybody knows what you’re talking about. That’s a
great advantage because even if you don’t express yourself exactly, the listener
knows what you’re talking about and can fill in the gaps, so you get the illusion of
being understood if you speak English. This is very dangerous because then you
think that with your medium English, you get understood and you don’t need all
these interpreters…I even had my doubts, but the proof is they don’t understand
each other. You see it especially when there’s a new topic. People who think their
English is good have to speak in their mother tongue because they can’t cope with
speaking in English – the new terms, new reality they don’t know. (EP Interpreter
#12) (Kent, 2009, p. 67)
Familiar flows of connection and communication overlap and intersect with Members’
topical interests and motivations, leading to affinity groupings based in a kind of
attraction to what requires the least effort. (Which is not to imply Members are not
working hard. Every Member I spoke with impressed me, including Members that did not
self-select for inclusion in this research. I did not witness the stereotype of the Parliament
as a dumping ground for politicians unwanted in the national scene.)
Regarding the provision of interpretation, from the first year of the big bang
enlargement to the last, many Members agreed: “More and more often I use it” (NM53).
Members consistently commented on the increasing quality and caliber of interpreters. Many
Members want to use the system of SI in the EP passively, meaning they want to listen to the
original language (if they know enough of it) whenever possible but speak in their own
language and trust the interpreters’ renditions. “For my MEP,” explained one Assistant,
“[speaking] English would be unusual. He wants to know exactly what he’s saying; he trusts
the interpreters so much more than he trusts his own English” (F15/NM18). Members who
had experienced working with interpreters while traveling on Delegations were, in general,
much less critical of the interpretation process. “I had an experience in China: it works”
(OM42).
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Relations are changed when interpreters go with Members somewhere
else. It’s an open secret: there are affairs. They work more closely
together, physically, standing next to each other…’ Did he understand?’
You can query. (F28)
Fear of gossip and negative press should not deter the larger goal. The ability to interact
with the interpreter, rather than treating them as an uncommunicable part of a machine,
changes everything.
Members also warn each other about the consequences of language choices: “Our
[Meridian] colleagues always speak [their] Meridian…and they told us [our] Meridian is
important. ‘Speak Meridian, otherwise we will lose our rights to speak [it]’” (OM67).
This Member continues:
All the people from [our Meridia] speak English…and I have seen what
happens. In the Delegation of eight persons to the Slovakia, we have four
people from Meridia. There were one or two from England, one from
France, one from Germany, one from Austria. They had translation [sic].
We not. We were four, but not right to have translation [sic]…And you
see that in the Parliament, we have no problems. But outside the
Parliament on Delegations, then all the time we have to speak English.
(OM67).
Another Member urges, “Look to [the] booth…you’ve got to understand who you’re
working with. The accuracy is what’s important, not the speed” (OM44).
Historically, Delegations have played an important function in allowing Members
and Interpreters to interact. Since 2010, the new service of Ad Personam interpretation
should fulfil a similar function.

7.4.1.3

Ad Personam Interpretation
Why don’t they publicize this?
Old Member (OM) of the European Parliament
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The Member comments in this section are hopefully no longer representative of
the situation in Parliament. In 2008-2009 Ad Personam was brand new, now it has been
in use for all of the 7th Parliamentary term (2009-2014); the quality of access should be
much greater than during the pilot.267 “At the moment,” a Member’s Assistant explained
(during the 6th term), “there is not a good regulation to have an interpretation during a
Shadow meeting, during a roundtable conference, during a discussion with some
Members about amendments” (F37/M81). In 2008-2009, the Ad Personam program was
just being piloted, initially with only five languages.268 See Appendix E for the rules and
request form. Members that I talked with were “astonished to learn about personalized
interpretation” (OM09) and found it “hard to give an answer [about whether it is
worthwhile] because I have never used it” (NM02). Some MEPs, musing on why it had
not been more widely taken advantage of during the pilot, suggested, “Maybe they don’t
know Ad Personam is available” (OM58). Intriguingly, after one of the rare
professionally-interpreted interviews that I was able to have with an MEP who did not
speak English, the volunteer interpreter commented that, in such a direct interpersonal
setting,269 “[the Member] does not know how to use an interpreter” (F39).
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Appendix E is a copy of the bilingual request form (in French and English) for Ad
Personam interpreting: it defines the eligible Member roles and request logistics
(subject, location, languages requested, participants). Such information is
characteristically requested for any community interpreting job. The only substantial
difference between the Ad Personam request and a community interpreting request is
the inclusion of a feedback form.
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I was told by an Official (F23) that the most popular combination in the first year
was Italian-English.

269

In this instance there were four people: the researcher, the interpreter, the MEP and
the MEP’s primary Assistant.
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In other words, the Member wanted to apply the same impersonal (dead) conduit
model by ignoring the visible dynamics of interaction and focusing only on the language.
Another Member’s first reaction to the idea of using Ad Personam interpreting was that
“it would be awkward with [only] five or six people” (OM42). Experiences of using their
Assistant,270 an Official with one of the Secretariats, or a colleague as an informal
interpreter, seemed to fly out of mind. However, in contrast with the impersonalization of
the usual conference interpreting situation, with the interpreters removed “behind the
glass,”271 in dialogue interpreting (that is, community interpreting) all the resources of
interpersonal communication are present.272 The dynamics of presence and visibility
interrupt the European Parliament’s systemic illusion of homolingual communication.
This immediacy is what characterizes community interpreting. The most cutting edge
theory and practice has consistently come from the specialized sub-field of sign language
interpretation (e.g. Mindess, 1999; Napier, 1979).
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“It’s quite funny that normally the people don’t address me [an Assistant during ad
hoc interpreting], because they know that I’m an interpreter and they’ll look at him
and they answer him, and they look at him even if I speak…they address him” (F38).
Also: “I don’t have the feeling that [my interpreting] disturbs conversation
normally…[my MEP] can understand lots of the spoken words, he has just a
problem to express English, but I think he understands quite well. And that makes it
much more easier because you don’t have to translate [sic] every word” (F38).
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“You never see them, only behind glass, in the booth. Their worlds and ours don’t
contact each other very much—we only negotiate with the Service of provision”
(F04). (Evidence of the interaction taboo.)
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“Dialogue interpreting includes what is variously referred to in English as
Community, Public Service, Liaison, Ad Hoc or Bilateral Interpreting—the defining
characteristic being interpreter-mediated communication in spontaneous face-to-face
interaction” (Mason, 1999, p. 147).
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The humanized presence of an interpreter in sign language interpreting, whose
performance includes monitoring the achievement of mutual understanding (Forestal,
2011; Stone, 2009) introduces the possibility of “real interpreting” (Turner, 2007) in
which all participants “acknowledg[e] the interdependence of process, perceiver and
product . . .[bringing a] sense of reflexivity, this necessarily knowing relationship, this
interdependent relationship of knowing between the interpreter, the interpretees, the act of
interpreting and that which is interpreted” (p. 189). Setting prejudice against signed
languages aside,273 an exemplary model for social interpreting as a relational-cultural
counterpart to balance out the information-and-control (dead) conduit model of SI in the
EP already exists in sign language community interpreting.
By now, one hopes, many Members have had positive experiences with Ad
Personam interpretation. The only Member I spoke with in 2009 who had personal
experience with the program was delighted. “Just now,” the MEP explained,
I am [effective] for the project and I have all the conditions for my job and
I have interpretation ad personam and he is very good because without it,
it will be only formally and I—just now I am able to do this job in good
effectiveness. (NM70)
Other Members readily grasped its potential:
I think that the idea of a personal interpreters is very, very good because if
you have the—not non-formal, but formal discussion, for example, with
deputies from Belgium Parliament,274 et cetera, it is possible to discuss on
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I admit to being disheartened at the frequency of EP Interpreters, Members and other
Officials saying something to the effect of, “I’m not used to thinking of that as
interpreting” (F31), in regard to communication with Deaf persons involving a
signed language.
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Aside: The Flemish Parliament in Belgium has an elected Deaf Member, Helga
Stevens, who is now serving her second consecutive term, 2004-2014. She is running
for the European Parliament; elections are 25 May 2014.
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the normal level of, you know, which we know English, for example, or
French. But when in the case when it’s discussion about, for example,
agreement, a resolution, here I think must be professional interpreter.
(NM63)
No doubt there are other stories, too, less successful accounts due to various factors. If
there are more negative or critical stories than affirmative ones about the Ad Personam
interpreting provision, I would question to what extent the conduit model metaphor
predominates, and seek to identify the means by which interpreters are being authorized
to ensure mutual understanding.
The discourse reported here establishes that “it can be tricky when there’s no
interpretation” (F07). The homolingual imperative may lead Members to feel that “it is
embarrassing to ask just for me” (OM62), and of course, to request interpretation is
“political” because “you’ve got to ask somebody for it” (OM63). The myth in the
discourse about SI in the EP is that the choice of a lingua franca, be it ELF or another
language shared by the interacting Members, is somehow less political. It is not. Rather,
the homolingual option has consequences both in the immediate (perceived) achievement
or failure to achieve voice, and in the long-term calibration toward a timespace that
accords with Europe’s pluralingual dream.

7.5

The Toolmaker’s Paradigm
They were very aware that communicating was hard work. And their
successes were extremely rewarding to them, because they retained a
distinct sense of awe and wonder that they could make the system work at
all. It was a daily miracle, which had improved their respective standards
of living immensely.
Michael Reddy (1993, p. 185)
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The transmission metaphor may have been what Schön calls a “generative
metaphor” (1993) when the IBM system was invented at Nuremberg, but it turns out
closely related to the (dead) conduit metaphor, with unintended consequences that invite
critique and revision. Angelelli (2001) clearly states the main symptom of the problem:
interpreters, as “powerful individuals [have] often have been portrayed as invisible and
deprived of agency that is essential to their performance of very complex linguistic and
information processing tasks” (p. 1). Thinking in terms of time, we can anticipate that,
without intervention, the discourse about SI in the EP will continue to calibrate to
homolingualism and the ideology of speed.
In Reddy’s (1993) thought experiment, he describes the conduit metaphor as the
work of an “evil magician” who is “very upset” by the effectiveness of the conscious
communication practiced by intentional toolmakers (p. 185). “He hypnotized them in a
special way, so that, after they received a set of instructions and struggled to build
something on the basis of them, they would immediately forget about this” (p. 185). The
idea is that the toolmakers would forget the struggle and the effort based on a “false
memory that the object had been sent to them directly, via a marvelous mechanism in the
hub” (p. 185).
Is the system of SI in the EP a false or fouled mechanism because it does not
erase difference? An MEP said, “Language seems like a handicap for communication but
I think it is a force” (OM62). Despite the strong themes of complaint and blame, the
elements of a toolmakers paradigm are present, already. Schön elaborates:
The essential difficulties in social policy have more to do with problem
setting than with problem solving, more to do with the ways in which we
frame the purposes to be achieved than with the optimal means for
achieving them. It becomes critically important, then, to learn how social
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policy problems are actually set and to discover what it means to set them
well or badly. (1993, p. 138)
Reddy is unequivocal in his critique of the conduit metaphor: “This model of
communication objectifies meaning in a misleading and dehumanizing fashion. It
influences us to talk and think about thoughts as if they had the same kind of external,
intersubjective reality as lamps and tables” (1993, p. 186). Do Members of the European
Parliament, their co-legislators in the Council and Commission, and the civil servants of
the European Institutions, need to revisit and evaluate whether their “instruction manual
for use of the language system…is the wrong manual” (Reddy, p. 188)?
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Figure 5.

Two Interpreting Chronotopes
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7.5.1

The Mechanical Reproduction of Inequality
It’s a lost post occupied here, even with the best translation [sic].
New Member of the European Parliament
Interpreters refer to the European Parliament’s new languages, and some of the

small old languages, as exotic languages (F36). The instances of the pseudonym, Meridia,
throughout this dissertation include references by Members of these countries to their
own languages, including the new (post big bang enlargement) exotic languages from
eastern Europe (Bulgarian, Czech, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Romanian,
Slovak and Slovenian) as well as from the smaller exotic languages from old EU member
nations (Danish, Hungarian, Finnish and Swedish).275 In a few instances, the fake label of
Meridia is also used to mask the specificity of other Members in an effort to protect the
anonymity of the volunteer participants in this research.
The following quote describes a Member’s take on the use of English as a lingua
franca (italics added):
The reason that you heard a lot of English [in the EPP’s closed political
group debate on totalitarianism] is not because English people are
speaking on it but because the new countries, they tend to use English a
lot. Surprisingly, more than their native language…It’s about acceptance.
The kind of feeling that they have that their language is a minority
language and it may just apply to one country, so you’ll find…I suspect
with the new countries there’s an element of making an effort to be kind of
integrated. Because if you think that Swedes and Finns, they speak
English very often, but I reckon they speak English more in Committees
and Parliamentary Plenaries because they can speak English, basically,
275

At the risk of stereotyping, I’ve generalized many of the smaller or newer languages
to the EU’s language regime as exotic. In actual practice, “exotic” depends on the
vantage point of each person according to his or her own language profile and
relative exposure.
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and some of them can speak very good English. And therefore it’s easier
for them to be understood by a wider group and not just through
translation [sic]. So you do get, I’d say Swedes, Finns, maybe also
Hungarians very much speaking English, even if their English is not very
good, because they feel that’s a way of speaking to a wider audience.
(OM68)
This Member’s discursive consciousness accords with the discourse analysis. The use of
ELF is a concession involving a) an acceptance of minority status of one’s own language
and b) a desire for homolingualism (‘to be integrated’ and ‘to be understood’). The idea
that ELF-users are “understood by a wider group” may or may not be statistically true,
but it certainly defines a core membership group on homolingual terms, therefore
establishing the very language-based insider/outsider boundaries and hierarchies of
inequality that interpreting is designed to level out. Finally, the notion that “it’s easier”
for the original speaker to use ELF is a very selective representation of the complexities
of language choice. It ignores both the pressure of selective listening by colleagues and
the communicative costs for non-fluent ELF users who surrender the rhetorical repertoire
associated with the use of their mother tongue.
Rather than promoting the persistence of cultural and linguistic diversity, i.e., of
pluralingualism, Members lament their perceived incapacity and envision a more
homolingual future: “Doing my work in English is a handicap, but the young generation
is better” (OM27). In the interests of speed, rules are bent and even broken: “A document
prepared only in French may not be voted on because it is not in English, but an Englishonly document will be voted on” (F2). One Member called the language use dynamics “a
meta-monolingualism” (NM28).
If the social norms for using interpreters are different from context to context, this
knowledge did not become apparent during the research period. Based on the discourse,
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in the smaller, informal meetings where fewer languages are in use, Members may be
more proactive with codeswitching (as in Scenarios B, C, and F from Table 7), but very
few participants in this study were able to name or describe alternative uses or
understandings of interpretation along the lines of pluralingualism with its emphasis on
the social aspects of interpreting (less than 10%). Even fewer recognized a non-conduit
framing as viable. Instead, most MEPs seem to believe in “TINA: There Is No
Alternative” regarding what is perceived as “a deep structural problem that can’t be
overcome” (NM28).
Despite the admitted fact that “it is certainly a disadvantage, not to understand”
(OM62), the system invites continued, unchanged use. After all, “we have all the
boxes…” (OM36), gesturing to the booths lining the meeting rooms. In the end, the
discourse themes of risk, loss, danger, complaint and blame cohere centripetally:
“There’s only one second for this” (OM67). “We just did not have enough time” (NM73).

7.5.2

Pivot? Time for an Economy of Cultures, Not Control
“The economy is psychological—one factor is optimism” (NM25). Once the

biases of homolingualism are identified, the natural move of intelligence is to become
alert to their presence and effects in daily life: to detect their action in practical
consciousness and begin to grow discursive consciousness. Once one has discursive
consciousness, the linguascape changes. The possibilities for control reframe the
behaviors and courses of action that are available and important within the narrow
exigencies of the moment. The action research impetus of this fieldwork continues:
which path will Parliament pursue?
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To my knowledge, I was only introduced twice to groups that I had been invited
to observe in a way that included a description. I was intrigued by these host Members’
explanations of what I was doing. One Member said, “I told them that you are interested
in the possibilities of a good translation” (OM67). The other said that I was interested in
“how we can cope with our language system” (OM33). The latter MEP understood me
better, while the former MEP illustrates the most basic condition of communication:
meaning is in the mind of the listener. What I found and have gathered here is an
interpretation of a discourse that exposes a system of simultaneous intercultural
transaction trapped in the inertia of an ideology of speed and desire for homolingual
communication.
Instead of creating and promoting the necessity and desirability of simultaneous
interpretation as a crucial intercultural design element in a pluralingual European Union;
a discourse of complaint and blame minimizes and disincentivizes entrants to the career
field. Meanwhile, “the demand is ten times the need” (OM57). If the market was
extended to interpreting in the community, such as is needed to provide quality
interpretation to asylum seekers (or even the communication needs of current residents
and citizens of Europe speaking foreign and minority languages), the explosion of jobs
and extended circulation of capital in the economy would be phenomenal. A field of
linguistic equality premised in the shared capability to communicate across difference
(drawing upon Sen, 1992) could generate the basis of common European identity, not in
the conduit metaphor terms of control, but on the basis of an expanding sphere of ritually
shared experiences through participation in the special intercultural communication
practice of simultaneous interpretation.
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Think it’s not possible? That’s what was said about simultaneous interpreting at
Nuremberg! And about the European Parliament, too: “No one ever thought [interpreting
after the big bang enlargement] would be possible” (OM57). Given the enduring
examples of successful SI, why is it that “few consider the cost of non-interpreting”
(F25)?

7.5.3

The Heteroglossic and Pluralingual Reproduction of Diversity
We can’t have the multilingualism [sic] without interpretation. It’s
necessary and I consider multilingualism as—I can’t say the most
important, but one of the very important basis of European Union. If we
want the people, the inhabitants of the Europe Union, our wealth in
European Union, we have to respect it, yes.
New Member of the European Parliament
Often, when I mentioned the possibility of community-style interpreting to

Members, I would get a response like this: “Am I sitting in the coffee bar having a chat
with you, or are you in the office with a task we have to do?” (OM78) Community-style
interpreting can handle serious negotiating done over coffee, small talk that occurs in the
office, and Ad Personam interpretation in meetings the Parliament structure has deemed
‘informal.’ Despite the formality of the institutional structure, “It’s absolutely true that
the political debate is a conversation. It should show the interpreting, and it does”
(OM61). The fact that “sometimes it falls apart hugely” (OM03) is an indicator of
difference: these glitches in the system are natural to the conditions of human
communication. Rather than judging them on the basis of homolingual flow, the
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dynamics of ‘mistakes’ and ‘misunderstanding’ offer potentially valuable clues toward
creative resolutions that reach beyond the house into the public sphere.276
Learning to work with the laugh waves, for instance, and creating means for
Members to share inspirational or instructive cultural contributions from their home
countries through strategies that work with time, rather than against it, become possible
with the development of discursive consciousness. Then, pluralingualism becomes a
matter of political will and intercultural commitment. Differences of language use
dynamics provide insight into what people value. In the debate regarding a statement by
the Parliament on totalitarianism in Europe, EPP Members discussed matters calmly in a
few of the major languages while in the Socialists’ group there was an extremely high
percentage of mother tongue use and much more animation.277 At another time, mother
tongue use broke out in the EPP group while discussing an issue of sex education. A fight
on the working time directive also elicited more pluralingual behavior in some of the
Political Groups than many other topics.
In all these instances, the interpreters rendered interpretations and those who were
listening made progress sorting things out. “On the topics with ethical problems or
complicated social aspects, it is difficult to express your ideas…it is always better to
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Some recommendations are suggested in Appendix A, which includes the text of a
report submitted to the Bureau of the Parliament summarizing key points of this
research relevant to Members.
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Fifty-two turns of talk in two hours, eleven languages total: only three of the 52 turns
fully in English, with four more including English in a codeswitch. This extremely
interactive debate involved Members speaking French, English, Swedish, German,
Bulgarian, Estonian, Spanish (from a Czech MEP), Lithuanian (via retour to
English), Slovakian, Czech and Greek. There was one observable technical glitch
with a microphone that didn’t come on; it was resolved within seconds.

453

speak your own language” (NM27). A fear expressed by some concerning proactively
promoting the use of interpreting, is if it would interfere with language learning: “but,
will it stop multilingual?” (OM59). No. These are not competing but complementary
paradigms. ELF and other lingua francas have their place and time; the criticism offered
here regards the presumed superior value of homolingual over interpreted transaction.
What’s even funnier and even cleverer, a Lithuanian, for example, will
use a pun. He’ll pause, giving you the impression he’s looking for his
words, but he’s not, he’s making you listen to what he’s saying, and then
he’ll use an English word in a way which an Englishman wouldn’t, but
it’s expressing what he’s thinking. I just think it’s terribly clever. But how
on earth could an interpreter cope with that? Very difficult. (OM63)
Humor is clearly welcome!
They are some words not good interpreted. So I say that I’m surprised
there’s not war in Europe because sometimes the positive sense is
interpreted as a negative or the—how you say—the numbers…the
statistics, 40 is 400 and 5 is 50 and so on. So there some very, very funny.
(NM73)
Such grammatical and semantic glitches are inconsequential, and cleverness is
appreciated (keeping Vuorikoski’s (2004) caveats in mind, sometimes linguistic puns and
language games will require explanation). Substantively, “understanding what detention
means” (F13) is vital: whose cultural notion of time passing will be codified, whose
conception of the relative value of time spent in restrictive conditions of existence, is
quite significant. The nub of the communication challenge for Europe is how to
structurally design difference into a system seeking uniformity?
If you can distinguish when Members need to “speak their own language for
political points so that it’s quoted in their national newspapers” (OM63), why not also
learn to recognize the cultural value of generating a pluralingual institutional culture in
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which the consistent use of mother tongues and simultaneous interpretation is a) just as
normal as multilingual codeswitching, and b) equally valued out of recognition of the
long-term calibration to a chronotope that honors mutual intercultural understanding.

7.5.4

The Real Value of Interpreting
A senior politician at the European Parliament explained, “Normally people do

not understand the difference between interpretation and translation. Translation remains
there; interpretation is to allow people to communicate” (OM57). The distinction that
matters is in the dimension of time. By creating rituals of interaction premised in
controlling and managing the interpreter, information exchange becomes the exclusive
constituent of relationships. Cultural distinctiveness drops out. The only thing shared is
the shallow gesture of exchange. Mutual understanding and humane interconnection are
rarely achieved. This temporal function of simultaneous interpretation is rarely
highlighted in discursive consciousness. What the discourses about SI in the EP and SI in
the American Deaf Community show is a conflict at the level of practical consciousness.
Taken together, these two discourses show how language(s) and language use in social
transactions contribute to social constructions of cultural realities by calibrating to
particular chronotopes.
Two different orientations to time are evident in the discourses about the
conference interpreting style prevalent in the European Parliament and the community
interpreting style preferred by the culturally Deaf. To put it in very rough terms, the
discourse about community interpreting emphasizes culture; while the discourse about
conference interpreting emphasizes control. Simultaneous interpretation that leans toward
the cultural dimension of communication involves communing in the present, being
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aware of engaging in rituals of social transaction that compose the relationships and
identities that sustain society. When simultaneous interpretation is understood as a kind
of oral translation, such as in the system of SI in the EP, this emphasizes the information
transmission dimension of communication, over-privileging the immediate control of
space and neglecting the ritual dimension that controls and contains societies over time
(Carey, 1992): i.e., in the dureé, Bergson’s durance. The assumptions of oral translating
(if only understood from the paradigm of linguistic functionalism and the conduit model)
are, instead, to seek to fix a (singular) meaning for the future: to exercise power in ways
that attempt to reduce relationships to one homolingual dimension, re-inscribing
inequality and ultimately destabilizing society.
On the basis of this analysis, interpreting has three essential values. The first
value of interpreting is that it make time visible. This is evident in the discourse themes
of complaint and the reasons given for choosing a lingua franca. The second value of
interpreting stems from the first: by making time visible, interpreting makes culture
visible: specifically cultural difference, which appears in social transactions as
‘misunderstandings’ and ‘mistakes.’ Because interpreting makes culture and cultural
differences visible, it also makes power visible. This is evident in the hierarchical
relationships demonstrated by the observations and explanations Members provide for
listening behaviors, such as when to use or not use the headphones, when to use or not
use interpreting services that are provided, and when to carry on when interpreting
services are needed but not provided.
These values of interpreting have an exponential relationship with each other that
results in discursive calibrations to timespace, generating the chronotopes that then shape
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many of the material conditions of our lives. Understanding this creative generativity
could enable individual and collective agency through the collective exercise of
discursive consciousness. Participating in the special intercultural communication
practice of simultaneously-interpreted transactions can bring the differential calibrations
of homolingualism and pluralingualism into awareness. Rather than surrendering to the
chronotope inherited from modernity, alert participants, interpretees and interpreters
alike, can choose to bring the wisdom of lived experience and education into daily living
and labor.
Freely giving one’s words to an interpreter is a democratic act and a vote of
confidence in the capacity of communication to establish connection without needing to
erase difference. Listening to the words and expressions of another person expressed
through the lens of interpreter embraces the inevitability that meaning is always flexible
and contingent, that mutual understanding is an activity that requires energy and
continual investments of attention and reflection. Holding time to allow for and
normalize the syncopations of pluralingual flow through retour and relay equalizes the
linguistic playing field. A discourse of pluralingualism could replace the discourse of
homolingualism, especially in an institution like the European Parliament, which has as
part of its mission to be a centering focal point for the constitution of a European identity
premised in the preservation of linguistic diversity.
Simultaneous interpretation draws attention to chronotopes and highlights the existential
tension between homolingualism and pluralingualism. Do we want to live in a world
where people speak different languages but all say the same thing? Or a world in which
people speak different languages and say different things? The essential contribution of
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simultaneous interpretation is to collaboratively generate a livable future. Yes, learn
languages! Participate as an interpretee in simultaneously-interpreted social transactions,
even become an interpreter! Engage the paradox: Europe has an amazing opportunity to
hurry up and create the rituals that allow us all to slow down and solve some serious
problems.
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APPENDIX A
LETTER TO KLAUS WELLE AND TARGETED REPORT
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To:

Members of the European Parliament

From:

Stephanie Jo Kent, Fulbright Fellow, PhD Candidate in Communication

Re:

Request to the Bureau to authorize translation and distribution of the
following Research Report (un-commissioned) to Members about
Language Use Strategies and the System of Simultaneous Interpretation

Date:

7 February 2010

Findings and recommendations based on conversations with 55 Members about their
use of the system of simultaneous interpretation in 2008-2009.

Table [7]: MEPs language choices and strategies when addressing other MEPs.
See this table in the text; was Table 1 in the original report.

Discussion of Table [7]:
The choices and strategies outlined in Table [7] show that Members (in 2008-2009) are
sophisticated in terms of adapting quickly to the presence/absence of simultaneous
interpretation (SI). The main discursive themes from direct conversations with Members
about interpreting in the EP include:
●

proclamations concerning the utility (or even necessity) of knowing English,

●

politicization of the language choices of Members who choose to use their
official language and rely on the group’s collaborative use of the process of
interpretation,

●

low-key criticism of (so-called) interpreter errors (compensated by de rigour
proclamations of EP Interpreters being the best in the world), and

●

assumptions that SI can be measured according to the standards and effects of
frozen translations of legislation.

In general, however, Members focus so sharply on the task (generating EU legislation
through debate, deliberation, and compromise) that less attention is given to the processes
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of constructing meaning through SI, exposing a non-strategic, passive construction by
Members of institutional norms and attitudes regarding language use. The implications of
a laissez-faire approach to the use of simultaneous interpretation combined with the
attitudes evident in themes above are significant. Under-utilization and deliberate nonutilization become ‘goals’ in this model for SI systems. This outcome may explain the
main finding from Members’ talk about SI: which is their dual sense of risk and loss
regarding communication in the EP.

Snapshots of a language culture after Enlargement (2005-2009):
Table [7] illustrates the result of strategies developed by Members as they learned how to
cope with the challenges of the enlarged language regime that was instituted at the
beginning of the Sixth Term. In the spring of 2005, EP Interpreters described, among
other things, a sense of danger and loss as MEPs displayed inadequate language skills
(Kent, 2009). The two groups (Interpreters, Members) do not refer to exactly the same
risks, dangers, and losses. However, the presence of strongly-felt sentiments indicates the
extent and depth to which culture is being created and shared among people who have
different roles and responsibilities within the institution. See Table [8].

Theoretical Implications:
Multiple fluencies and the ability to switch quickly among languages is an individual
talent or acquired skill that is independent of culture. Switching languages is akin to
changing channels but keeping the same “direct” frequency. The repetition and
aggregation of privileging the choice of a lingua franca rather than SI is what generates
culture – and shared identity.
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Table [8]: Comparison of Dangers, Risks, and Losses between MEPs and EP
Interpreters (EPIs)
See Table 8 in the main text; was Table 2 in the original report.

Organizational and Representational Implications:
It appears that power dynamics within the institution have been shifted, at least in part,
onto the language structure of the SI system. MEPs desire to control meaning, combined
with a general distrust of simultaneous interpretation, leads to language use choices that
are monolingual in character rather than essentially [plura]lingual.278 One of the best
uses of SI, for instance, is to explore the full range of each language and culture’s vantage
point on a particular matter. If such perspectives are explored during negotiations they
can be worked through in advance of the legal translations, thus avoiding the discovery of
contradictions after the legislative process is supposed to be complete.

Recommendations (Practical):
1

Conceive of the interpreters as allies; they want to make you understood.

2

Use the new Ad Personam interpretation service as much as possible. “The
places where you most need interpretation,” explained a Member, “is where
you are least likely to receive it.”

3

Write speeches in advance – but use the revision process to clarify one or two
key points rather than pack in as much nuance as possible. Consider:
a. What is your communicative goal, and
b. Who is your audience?
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At the time of writing the original report, I had not yet internalized the theoretical
necessity of replacing multilingualism with pluralingualism.
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4

If you must pack in as much as you can, add clarifying contextual details for
the interpreter. This is more work but the result will be closer to your aim.

5

Seek patterns in so-called “errors” of interpretation in order to broaden
perception of the range of causal factors (see General Recommendation “D”
below).

6

Take advantage of pauses and delays during interpretation to think deeply
about what is being said and the possible directions the conversation could go.

7

Consider the effects of using jokes and famous cultural quotations: relational
or informative? If the main purpose is to convey cultural strengths and unique
qualities, this calls for a particular kind of translation. If you want an
emotional effect (laughter, inspiration, shame, etc.), that may require a
different ‘spin’ in [interpretation].279 An efficient system could be built to
streamline the dissemination of adequate translations (see General
Recommendation “E” below).

Recommendations (General):
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1

Imagine the interpreter as an extension of your own intellect, but remember
they are not telepathic – the more you give them to work with (background,
context, goals, etc), the more closely they will come to matching the effect
you want to create in your audience.

2

Remain aware of the distinction between “interpretation” and “translation.”
Even though “translation” technically includes both written and spoken forms,
when you describe the interpreters or the process of simultaneous
interpretation as “translation” you invoke the standards of legal linguistics –
the consequence is forgetting that simultaneous interpretation involves live
speech which has the quality of always being able to be corrected, refined, and
revised through interaction.

3

Being able to switch language channels is a substitution of a different type of
monolingualism, not the preservation of linguistic difference. Only when the
SI is in use and you are engaged (at some level) with the tensions of
difference (especially of time/timing, and cross-cultural understanding) are

Similarly (to the preceding footnote), it seemed useful (at the time of generating this
report) to use the more familiar term, translation. The concept of interpretation is
more accurate and precise.
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you participating in multilingualism [technically, pluralingualism] as a new
form of common European identity.
a. What kind of intercultural communication do you want to model?
b. Which basis for sharing identity do you want to affirm?
4

Cultivate a capacity for exploring “errors” of interpretation. The explanation
may provide more important information than the error itself: (4a) and (4b)
(below) are communication problems at the interpersonal level; (4c) at the
organizational level; and 4(d) at the institutional level.
a. Is it an error of fact or confusion that will be remedied through repetition
and thus is no cause for concern?
b. Is it an error of fact or confusion that could lead to a problem later, and
thus needs to be addressed and corrected now?
c. Is the error an indicator of lack of cooperation between the speaking
Member(s) and the working interpreters in the relevant booths?
d. Is it possible the speaker is making an unexpected rhetorical move, beyond
or outside of the usual discourse?

4

A “Joke and Quote” hotline/database could be constructed over time, built up
through a dedicated internal communication system. For instance:
a. MEPs or their Assistants send the joke/quote to the Head of Booth for the
language in which they’ll speak (e.g., Hungarian).
b. Head of Booth delegates the task (as appropriate) of crafting translations
with explanation.
c. Distribution to all “B” interpreters of the source language (via email with a
copy to the database keeper). These Groups can be set up in advance.
d. The Datakeeper position may become a focal point quickly or over time,
pending repetition of jokes/quotes and/or frequency of use, which may
necessitate streamlining the communication flow in a different sequence.

5

Over time the capacity of everyone – Interpreters and Members alike – will
build, and together you will develop a stronger multilingual/multicultural
container for creating the common European identity out of the mix of cultural
and linguistic differences.
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Concluding remarks:
The system of simultaneous interpretation in the European Parliament is administered
with a level of sophistication that facilitates the political work you are here to do. An
effect of the system’s generally smooth operation is to experience pauses, delays,
mistakes, and misunderstandings as disappointing breakdowns or rude ruptures. Rather
than a cause of problems, these could be viewed as opportunities for developing
collaborative skill in using SI among different languages to improve communication and
decision-making to yield a stronger, more creative Parliament for the citizens of Europe.

Kent, Stephanie Jo. 2009. “A Discourse of Danger and Loss: Interpreters on Interpreting
for the European Parliament.” In Quality in Interpreting: A Shared Responsibility. Sandra
Hale and Uldis Ozolins (Eds.). Amsterdam: John Benjamin’s Publishing Company.
This copyrighted report is a selection of research findings of particular interest to
Members. Please request the Bureau of the European Parliament to authorize
translation into all EU official languages and distribution to current MEPs and EP
Interpreters.
25 January 2010, © Stephanie Jo Kent
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NAD-RID CODE OF CONDUCT
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APPENDIX C
PROVISION AND EXCEPTIONS FOR THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO
PROVIDE SIMULTANEOUS INTERPRETATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Provision of Simultaneous Interpretation in the European Parliament
Rule 138 Languages280
1

All documents of Parliament shall be drawn up in the official languages.

2

All Members shall have the right to speak in Parliament in the official language of
their choice. Speeches delivered in one of the official languages shall be
simultaneously interpreted into the other official languages and into any other
language the Bureau may consider necessary.

3

Interpretation shall be provided in committee and delegation meetings from and into
the official languages used and requested by the members and substitutes of that
committee or delegation.

4

At committee and delegation meetings away from the usual places of work
interpretation shall be provided from and into the languages of those members who
have confirmed that they will attend the meeting. These arrangements may
exceptionally be made more flexible where the members of the committee or
delegation so agree. In the event of disagreement, the Bureau shall decide.

Where it has been established after the result of a vote has been announced that there are
discrepancies between different language versions, the President shall decide whether the
result announced is valid pursuant to Rule 164(5). If he declares the result valid, he shall
decide which version is to be regarded as having been adopted.
However, the original version cannot be taken as the official text as a general rule, since a
situation may arise in which all the other languages differ from the original
text.

280

All quotations are from the Rules of Procedure (16th Edition, European Parliament,
2004).
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Exceptions to providing simultaneous interpretation
Rule 81 Implementing measures
1

When the Commission forwards a draft of implementing measures to Parliament, the
President shall refer the draft of measures to the committee responsible for the act
from which the implementing measures derive. When the procedure with associated
committees has been applied with regard to the basic act, the committee responsible
shall invite each of the associated committees to communicate its views orally or by
letter.

2

The chair of the committee responsible shall set a deadline for Members to propose
that the committee object to the draft of measures. Where the committee considers it
to be appropriate, it may decide to appoint a rapporteur from among its members or
permanent substitutes. If the committee objects to the draft of measures, it shall table
a motion for a resolution opposing the adoption of the draft of measures which may
also indicate the changes that ought to be made to the draft of measures.

If, within the applicable deadline calculated from the date of receipt of the draft of
measures, Parliament adopts such a resolution the President shall request the Commission
to withdraw or amend the draft of measures or submit a proposal under the appropriate
legislative procedure. 472
3

Where there is no part-session before the deadline expires, the right of response shall
be deemed to have been delegated to the committee responsible. This response shall
take the form of a letter from the committee chair to the Member of the Commission
responsible, and shall be brought to the attention of all Members of Parliament.

4

If the implementing measures envisaged by the Commission fall under the regulatory
procedure with scrutiny, paragraph 3 shall not apply and paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be
supplemented as follows:
a
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the time for scrutiny281 shall start to run when the draft of measures has been
submitted to Parliament in all official languages. Where shorter time-limits

Rule 79 Procedures relating to scrutiny of voluntary agreements
1. Where the Commission informs Parliament of its intention to explore the use of
voluntary agreements as an alternative to legislation, the committee responsible may
draw up a report on the substantive issue in question pursuant to Rule 45.
2. When the Commission announces that it intends to enter into a voluntary
agreement, the committee responsible may table a motion for a resolution
recommending the approval or rejection of the proposal, and under what conditions.

472

apply (Article 5a(5)(b) of Council Decision 1999/468/EC laying down the
procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the
Commission) and in cases of urgency (Article 5a(6) of Decision
1999/468/EC), the time for scrutiny shall, unless the chair of the committee
responsible objects, start to run from the date of receipt by Parliament of the
final draft implementing measures in the language versions submitted to the
members of the committee established in accordance with Decision
1999/468/EC. Rule 138 shall not apply in this case;
b

Parliament, acting by a majority of its component members, may oppose the
adoption of the draft of measures, justifying its opposition by indicating that
the draft of measures exceeds the implementing powers provided for in the
basic instrument, is not compatible with the aim or the content of the basic
instrument or does not respect the principles of subsidiarity or
proportionality;

c

if the draft of measures is based on paragraph 5 or 6 of Article 5a of Decision
1999/468/EC, which provides for curtailed time-limits for opposition by
Parliament, a motion for a resolution opposing the adoption of the draft of
measures may be tabled by the chair of the committee responsible if the
committee has not been able to meet in the time available.

Rule 90 Recommendations within the framework of the common foreign and security
policy
1

The committee responsible for the common foreign and security policy may draw up
recommendations to the Council in its areas of responsibility after obtaining
authorisation from the Conference of Presidents or on a proposal within the meaning
of Rule 114.

2

In urgent cases the authorisation referred to in paragraph 1 may be granted by the
President, who may likewise authorise an emergency meeting of the committee
concerned.

3

During the process for adopting these recommendations, which must be put to the
vote in the form of a written text, Rule 138 shall not apply and oral amendments shall
be admissible.

The non-application of Rule 138 is possible only in committee and only in urgent cases.
Neither at committee meetings not declared to be urgent nor in plenary sitting may there
be any departure from the provisions of Rule 138.
The provision stating that oral amendments shall be admissible means that members may
not object to oral amendments being put to the vote in committee.
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4

Recommendations drawn up in this way shall be included on the agenda for the next
part session. In urgent cases decided upon by the President, recommendations may be
included on the agenda of a current part-session. Recommendations shall be deemed
adopted unless, before the beginning of the part-session, at least 37 Members submit
a written objection, in which case the committee’s recommendations shall be included
on the agenda of the same part-session for debate and voting. A political group or at
least 37 Members may table amendments.

Rule 139 Transitional arrangement
1

Exceptionally, in applying Rule 138, account shall be taken, with regard to the
official languages of the Member States which acceded to the European Union on 1
May 2004, as of that date and until 31 December 2006, of the availability in real
terms and sufficient numbers of the requisite interpreters and translators.

2

The Secretary-General shall each quarter submit a detailed report to the Bureau on the
progress made towards full application of Rule 138, and shall send a copy thereof to
all Members.

3

On a reasoned recommendation from the Bureau, Parliament may decide at any time
to repeal this Rule early or, at the end of the period indicated in paragraph 1, to
extend it.282

Rule 176 Committees of inquiry
7

A committee of inquiry may contact the institutions or persons referred to in Article 3
of the Decision referred to in paragraph 2 with a view to holding a hearing or
obtaining documents.

Travel and accommodation expenses of members and officials of Community institutions
and bodies shall be borne by the latter. Travel and accommodation expenses of other
persons who appear before a committee of inquiry shall be reimbursed by the European
Parliament in accordance with the rules governing hearings of experts. Persons called to
give evidence before a committee of inquiry may claim the rights they would enjoy if
acting as a witness before a tribunal in their country of origin. They must be informed of
these rights before they make a statement to the committee.

282

“On 11 March 2009 the European Parliament adopted a resolution to prolong the
provisional derogations with regard to the use of especially Irish and Maltese until
the end of the parliamentary term from 2009 to 2014.” Grahnlaw Euroblog:
Retrieved 7 April 2014, http://grahnlaw.blogspot.com/2009/03/europeanparliament-amendments-rules-of.html
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With regard to the languages used, a committee of inquiry shall apply the provisions of
Rule 138. However, the bureau of the committee:
- may restrict interpretation to the official languages of those who are to
take part in the deliberations, if it deems this necessary for reasons of
confidentiality,
- shall decide about translation of the documents received in such a way as
to ensure that the committee can carry out its deliberations efficiently and
rapidly and that the necessary secrecy and confidentiality are respected.
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APPENDIX D
LEGAL REFERENCES TO “UNDERSTANDING” INTERPRETATION DURING
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

DIRECTIVE 2010/64/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal
proceedings
Relevant paragraphs from the preamble:
(14) The right to interpretation and translation for those who do not speak or understand
the language of the proceedings is enshrined in Article 6 of the ECHR, as interpreted in
the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. This Directive facilitates the
application of that right in practice. To that end, the aim of this Directive is to ensure the
right of suspected or accused persons to interpretation and translation in criminal
proceedings with a view to ensuring their right to a fair trial.
(15) The rights provided for in this Directive should also apply, as necessary
accompanying measures, to the execution of a European arrest warrant ( 2 ) within the
limits provided for by this Directive. Executing Members States should provide, and bear
the costs of, interpretation and translation for the benefit of the requested persons who do
not speak or understand the language of the proceedings.
(2)

Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p.
1).
(17) This Directive should ensure that there is free and adequate linguistic assistance,
allowing suspected or accused persons who do not speak or understand the language of
the criminal proceedings fully to exercise their right of defence and safeguarding the
fairness of the proceedings.
(21) Member States should ensure that there is a procedure or mechanism in place to
ascertain whether suspected or accused persons speak and understand the language of the
criminal proceedings and whether they need the assistance of an interpreter. Such
procedure or mechanism implies that competent authorities verify in any appropriate
manner, including by consulting the suspected or accused persons concerned, whether
they speak and understand the language of the criminal proceedings and whether they
need the assistance of an interpreter.
(22) Interpretation and translation under this Directive should be provided in the native
language of the suspected or accused persons or in any other language that they speak or
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understand in order to allow them fully to exercise their right of defence, and in order to
safeguard the fairness of the proceedings.
Relevant paragraphs from Article 2: Right to interpretation
1. Member States shall ensure that suspected or accused persons who do not speak or
understand the language of the criminal proceedings concerned are provided, without
delay, with interpretation during criminal proceedings before investigative and judicial
authorities, including during police questioning, all court hearings and any necessary
interim hearings.
4. Member States shall ensure that a procedure or mechanism is in place to ascertain
whether suspected or accused persons speak and understand the language of the criminal
proceedings and whether they need the assistance of an interpreter.
7. In proceedings for the execution of a European arrest warrant, the executing Member
State shall ensure that its competent authorities provide persons subject to such
proceedings who do not speak or understand the language of the proceedings with
interpretation in accordance with this Article.
Relevant paragraphs from Article 3: Right to translation of essential documents
1. Member States shall ensure that suspected or accused persons who do not understand
the language of the criminal proceedings concerned are, within a reasonable period of
time, provided with a written translation of all documents which are essential to ensure
that they are able to exercise their right of defence and to safeguard the fairness of the
proceedings.
6. In proceedings for the execution of a European arrest warrant, the executing Member
State shall ensure that its competent authorities provide any person subject to such
proceedings who does not understand the language in which the European arrest warrant
is drawn up, or into which it has been translated by the issuing Member State, with a
written translation of that document.
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APPENDIX E
AD PERSONAM INTERPRETING
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APPENDIX F
REDDY ON THE CONDUIT MODEL

Reddy (1993) explains that his “initial work…suggests it is easier, when speaking
and thinking in terms of the conduit metaphor, to blame the speaker for failures” (p. 168).
Within the context of the discourse about SI in the EP, blame (at least complaint) is
typically assigned to the interpreter, not the original Member (e.g. this research; and
Vuorikoski, 2004). Interpreters’ rendered speech (their interpretations) are accused of
‘causing’ misunderstanding (a similar phenomenon occurs in international business),
which is further attributed to interpreters’ failure to extract ‘the meaning.’ “After all,”
Reddy continues, “receiving and unwrapping a package is so passive and so simple—
what can go wrong? A package can be difficult or impossible to open. But, if it is
undamaged, and successfully opened, who can fail to find the right things in it?” (p. 168).
To illustrate the power of the conduit metaphor, Reddy conducts a thought
experiment comparing and contrasting the conduit metaphor with an alternative framing
he calls the toolmaker’s paradigm. He shows that
the overwhelming tendency of [a communication] system, as viewed by
the conduit metaphor, will always be: success without effort….in terms of
the toolmaker’s paradigm…we come to…the opposite conclusion. Human
communication will almost always go astray unless real energy is
expended. (p. 174)
Semantic Pathology
Reddy argues that the conduit metaphor is “not just a list of expressions” but the
evidence of semantic pathology (1993, p. 178). Semantic pathology is
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a concept from pretransformational semantics. In his Principles of
Semantics, Stephen Ullman (1957, p. 122) makes use of the term semantic
pathology. A semantic pathology arises “whenever two or more
incompatible senses capable of figuring meaningfully in the same context
develop around the same name.” (in Reddy, p. 178)
For instance, the two possible meanings of the English phrase, “I’m sorry,” are an
apology or a display of sympathy. Reddy characterizes the need to distinguish between
these two alternatives as a “delicate and difficult problem:”
“I’m sorry” can mean either, “I empathize with your suffering,” or “I
admit fault and apologize.” Sometimes people expect apologies from us
when we only wish to sympathize, in which case saying, ‘I’m sorry,” is
either the perfect hedge or the opening line of a fight. Other times, people
think we are apologizing when they see no need for us to apologize and
respond with, “That’s alright, it wasn’t your fault.” (p. 178)
The issue of semantic pathology concerns whether it is important to distinguish the
metaphor of a conduit from the actualities of human communication using language.
Reddy argues that “the interaction of the conduit metaphor with the conceptual
foundations of information theory” resulted in “the whole notion of information as ‘the
power to make selections’” being “muddled beyond repair” (p. 182).

Shannon and Weaver’s Mathematical Theory of Communication
Reddy uses mathematical information theory (Shannon and Weaver, 1949) to:
1

illustrate how words do not contain meanings but are only signals for a coconstruction of meaning among people laboring to establish an ‘a priori
shared context,’ and

2

show how the conduit metaphor contaminated efforts to extend “the essential
insight of information theory” to other domains (notably biology and the
social sciences), and is

3

evident in the labeling of their model as well as in Shannon and (especially)
Weaver’s ordinary language use.
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“The conceptual basis of the new mathematics,” claims Reddy, “though not the
mathematics itself, has been completely obscured by the semantic pathologies of the
conduit metaphor” (1993, p. 181). Mathematical information theory is
based totally on the notion that the message…is never sent anywhere…the
“received signals” were not necessarily the “transmitted signal” because
of the possible intervention of distortion and noise. But they blithely
wrote the word “message” on the right, or receiving side of their famous
paradigm (Shannon & Weaver, 1949, p. 7). At the very least they should
have written “reconstructed message” there. In their theory, something is
rebuilt on that right side which, hopefully, resembles the original message
on the left side. The ambiguity of the word “message” should have led
them to regard this word as a disaster and never to consider it for use. (p.
183)
The reconstruction that occurs on the right/receiving side of the information model is
accomplished through a process of selection among previously-established alternatives,
which are part of an ‘a priori shared context.’
The “signals” of the mathematical theory are…patterns that can travel,
that can be exchanged..the alternatives—the “messages” are not contained
in the signals. If the signals were to arrive at the receiving end, and the set
of alternatives was damaged or missing, the proper selections could not be
made. The signals have no ability to bring the alternatives with them; they
carry no little replica of the message. (p. 182)
Reddy summarizes Shannon and Weaver’s mathematical information theory thus:
Information is defined as the ability to make nonrandom selections from
some set of alternatives. Communication, which is the transfer of this
ability from one place to another, is envisioned as occurring in the
following manner. The set of alternatives and a code relating these
alternatives to physical signals are established, and a copy of each is
placed at both the sending and receiving ends of the system. This act
creates what is known as an “a priori shared context,” a prerequisite for
achieving any communication whatsoever. At the transmitting end, a
sequence of the alternatives, called the message, is chosen for
communication to the other end. But this sequence of alternatives is not
sent. Rather, the chosen alternatives are related systematically by the code
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to some form of energy patterns which can travel quickly and retain their
shape while they do travel—that is, to the signals (p. 181).
By analogy with what has been learned from the discourse about SI in the EP, the
homolingual assumption presumes that an a priori context with matching sets of
alternatives has already been established, and the code (of, say, English as a lingua
franca/ELF) aligns perfectly with the copies of these alternatives in all the relevant
sending and receiving locations, that is, within the cognition (be it at the level of practical
or discursive consciousness) of each Member, every interpreter, and all languages.
The point of mathematical information theory is that “information [is] the power
to reproduce an organization by means of nonrandom selections. Signals do something.
They cannot contain anything” (Reddy, 1993, p. 184). Weaver, apparently, “could not
hold the theory clearly in mind when he spoke of human communication, and used
conduit metaphor expressions almost constantly” (p. 183). Shannon, however, “used
exactly the right ordinary language terms. He wrote, ‘The receiver ordinarily performs
the inverse operation of that done by the transmitter, reconstructing the message from the
signal’ (p. 34)” (in Reddy, p. 184). Building from Reddy’s critique in order to apply the
analogy of mathematical information theory to the discourse about SI in the EP, we come
up with a definition of communication as the (repeated, therefore ritual) transfer of the
social ability to make nonrandom selections from a set of alternatives in order to
reproduce a social organization.
Reddy (1993) elaborates a major and minor framework of the conduit metaphor
and lists the implications of their core expressions. The major framework (p. 170) of the
conduit model implies:
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●

language functions like a conduit, transferring thoughts bodily from one person
to another—e.g. “If you salesmen can’t put this understanding across to the
clients more forcefully, our new product will fail” (p. 189);

●

in writing and speaking, people insert their thoughts or feelings in the words—
e.g., “If you can’t pack more thought into fewer words, you will never pass the
conciseness test” (p. 190);

●

words accomplish the transfer by containing the thoughts or feelings and
conveying them to others—“His words carry little in the way of recognizable
meaning” (p. 191); and

●

in listening or reading, people extract the thoughts or feelings once again from
the words—e.g., “Please pay attention to what’s there in the words!” (p. 193)

Reiterating, Reddy says:
The major framework [of the conduit metaphor] sees ideas as existing
either within human heads or, at least, within words uttered by humans.
The ‘minor’ framework overlooks words as containers and allows ideas
and feelings to flow, unfettered and completely disembodied, into a kind
of ambient space between human heads. In this case, the conduit of
language becomes, not sealed pipelines from person to person, but rather
individual pipes which allow mental content to escape into, or enter from,
this ambient space. (p. 170)
The minor framework (p. 170-171) involves three categories of expression:
1

thoughts and feelings are ejected by speaking or writing into an external ‘idea
space’—e.g., “IBM put forth the idea that they had been mistreated” (p. 194);

2

thoughts and feelings are reified in this external space, so that they exist
independent of any need for living human beings to think or feel them—e.g.,
“The concept made its way very quickly into the universities” (p. 196); and

3

these reified thoughts and feelings may, or may not, find their way back into
the heads of living humans—e.g., “Different ideas come to mind in a situation
like this” (p. 197).
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